Washington v. Bisignano - Court Affirms Partially Favorable SSA Disability Ruling

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March 30, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

Jonathan Washington v. Frank Bisignano, Commissioner of Social Security

District Court, M.D. Alabama

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: 3:25-cv-00082

• Precedential Status: Unknown Status

• Opinion

• Authorities (26)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (75.5K)

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Trial Court Document

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA
EASTERN DIVISION
JONATHAN WASHINGTON, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) Case No. 3:25-cv-82-CWB
)
FRANK BISIGNANO,1 )
Commissioner of Social Security, )
)
Defendant. )
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
I. Introduction and Administrative Proceedings
Jonathan Washington (“Plaintiff”) filed an application for Supplemental Security Income
under Title XVI of the Social Security Act on December 10, 2020—initially alleging disability
onset as of March 21, 2015, which was later amended to December 10, 2020—due to blood cancer,
high blood pressure, blood clots, stroke, torn ACL, and lupus. (Tr. 18, 1122-23).2 Plaintiff’s
claims were denied at the initial level on April 1, 2022 and after reconsideration on May 25, 2023.
(Tr. 18, 1122, 1129, 1135-36, 1143, 1151). Plaintiff then requested de novo review by an
administrative law judge (“ALJ”). (Tr. 18, 1154, 1171). The ALJ subsequently heard the case on
November 14, 2023, at which time live testimony was given by Plaintiff and by a vocational expert.
(Tr. 18, 1079-1098). The ALJ took the matter under advisement and issued a written decision on
February 13, 2024 that found Plaintiff not disabled prior to July 23, 2023 but disabled beginning
on that date and continuing through the date of the decision. (Tr. 18-27).

1 Frank Bisignano became Commissioner for the Social Security Administration on or about
May 7, 2025 and is automatically substituted as a party pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 25(d).
2 References to pages in the transcript are denoted by the abbreviation “Tr.”
The ALJ’s written decision contained the following enumerated findings:
1. The claimant has not engaged in substantial gainful activity since the date of
application, December 10, 2020 (20 CFR 416.971 et seq.).

1. Since the date of application, December 10, 2020, the claimant has had the
   following severe impairments: obesity, diabetes mellitus Type 2,
   thrombocythemia/thrombocytosis, hypertension, status post cerebrovascular
   accident (CVA), history of deep vein thrombosis, left ventricular systolic
   dysfunction, and grade 1 diastolic dysfunction (20 CFR 416.920(c)).

2. Since December 10, 2020, the claimant has not had an impairment or
   combination of impairments that meets or medically equals the severity of
   one of the listed impairments in 20 CFR Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1
   (20 CFR 416.920(d), 416.925 and 416.926).

3. After careful consideration of the entire record, the undersigned finds that since
   December 10, 2020, the claimant has the residual functional capacity to perform
   sedentary work as defined in 20 CFR 416.967(a) except he can never push/pull
   with the left lower extremity, and can never climb ladders, ropes, and scaffolds,
   or work at unprotected heights or with hazardous machinery. He can
   occasionally climb ramps and stairs, as well as frequently balance, stoop,
   crouch, and crawl, and is limited to occasional kneeling. He must avoid
   concentrated exposure [to] extreme cold, extreme heat, and vibration.

4. The claimant has no past relevant work (20 CFR 416.965).

5. Prior to the established disability onset date, the claimant was a younger
   individual age 45-49. Applying the age categories non-mechanically, and
   considering the additional adversities in this case, on July 23, 2023, the
   claimant’s age category changed to an individual closely approaching advanced
   age (20 CFR 416.963).

6. The claimant has at least a high school education (20 CFR 416.964).

7. Transferability of job skills is not an issue in this case because the claimant
   does not have past relevant work (20 CFR 416.968).

8. Prior to July 23, 2023, the date the claimant’s age category changed,
   considering the claimant’s age, education, work experience, and residual
   functional capacity, there were jobs that existed in significant numbers in the
   national economy that the claimant could have performed (20 CFR 416.969 and
   416.969a).

9. Beginning on July 23, 2023, the date the claimant’s age category changed,
   considering the claimant’s age, education, work experience, and residual
   functional capacity, there are no jobs that exist in significant numbers in the
   national economy that the claimant could perform (20 CFR 416.960(c) and
   416.966).

   1. The claimant was not disabled prior to July 23, 2023, but became disabled on that date and has continued to be disabled through the date of this decision. His disability is expected to last twelve months past the onset date (20 CFR 416.920(g)).

(Tr. 20, 21, 25, 26).
On December 13, 2024, the Appeals Council issued a partially favorable decision
finding that Plaintiff had been under a disability since February 13, 2024 but not prior to that date
(Tr. 1-14), thereby rendering the decision the final decision of the Commissioner. See Chester v.
Bowen, 792 F.2d 129, 131 (11th Cir. 1986).
The Appeals Council’s written decision contained the following enumerated findings:
1. The claimant has not engaged in substantial gainful activity since
December 10, 2020 (20 CFR 416.971 et seq.).

1. The claimant has the following severe impairments: obesity, diabetes mellitus
   Type 2, thrombocythemia/thrombocytosis, hypertension, status post
   cerebrovascular accident (CVA), history of deep vein thrombosis, left
   ventricular systolic dysfunction, and grade 1 diastolic dysfunction, but does not
   have an impairment or combination of impairments which is listed in, or which
   is medically equal to an impairment listed in 20 CFR Part 404, Subpart P,
   Appendix 1 (20 CFR 416.920(c), 416.920(d), 416.925 and 416.926).

2. The claimant’s combination of impairments results in the following limitations
   on his ability to perform work-related activities: limited to less than the full
   range of sedentary work, except he can never push/pull with the left lower
   extremity, and can never climb ladders, ropes, and scaffolds, or work at
   unprotected heights or with hazardous machinery. He can occasionally climb
   ramps and stairs, as well as frequently balance, stoop, crouch, and crawl, and
   are limited to occasional kneeling. The claimant must avoid concentrated
   exposure [to] extreme cold, extreme heat, and vibration. In view of the above
   limitations, the claimant has the residual functional capacity to perform a
   reduced range of the sedentary exertional level.

3. The claimant’s alleged symptoms are not fully consistent with and supported
   by the evidence of record for the reasons contained in the body of this decision.

4. The claimant has no past relevant work (20 CFR 416.963).

5. Prior to February 13, 2024, the claimant was under age 50, which was
   considered to be a younger individual. As of February 13, 2024, the claimant
   is considered to be an individual closely approaching advanced age (20 CFR
   416.963).

6. The claimant has a high school education (20 CFR 416.964).

7. Based on the claimant’s age, education and work experience, if the claimant
   had the capacity to perform the full range of the sedentary exertional level,
   20 CFR 416.969 and Rule 201.21 in Table No. 2 of 20 CFR Part 404,
   Subpart P, Appendix 2, would direct a conclusion of not disabled before
   February 12, 2024. Although the claimant’s exertional and nonexertional
   limitations do not allow him to perform the full range of the sedentary exertional
   level, using the above-cited Rule as a framework for decisionmaking, there are
   a significant number of jobs in the national economy, which he could perform.
   These jobs include folder (D.O.T. # 685.687-014) with 50,000 jobs in the
   national economy and label cutter (D.O.T. # 585.685-062) with 38,000 jobs
   in the national economy (20 CFR 416.969 and 416.969a).

As of February 13, 2024, based on a change in age category, Rule 201.12 directs
a finding that the claimant is disabled (20 CFR 416.920(g)).

1. The claimant has been disabled as defined in the Social Security Act since February 13, 2024, but not before that date.

(Tr.10-11).

On appeal, Plaintiff asks the court to reverse the final decision and to remand for an award
of benefits or, alternatively, for a new hearing and further consideration. (Doc. 13 at p. 15).
As contemplated by 28 U.S.C. § 636 (c) and Rule 73 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
the parties have consented to the exercise of jurisdiction by a Magistrate Judge (Docs. 4 & 5),
and the court finds the case ripe for review pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405 (g) in that Plaintiff’s
supporting brief (Doc. 13) is construed as a motion for summary judgment and the Commissioner’s
opposition brief (Doc. 19) is construed as a competing motion for summary judgment.
Upon consideration of the parties’ submissions, the relevant law, and the record as a whole,
the court concludes that Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment is due to be granted, that
the Commissioner’s motion for summary judgment is due to be denied, and that the final decision
is due to be reversed and remanded.
II. Standard of Review and Regulatory Framework
The court’s review of the Commissioner’s decision is a limited one. Assuming the proper
legal standards were applied by the ALJ, the court is required to treat the ALJ’s findings of fact as

conclusive so long as they are supported by substantial evidence. 42 U.S.C. § 405 (g); Graham v.
Apfel, 129 F.3d 1420, 1422 (11th Cir. 1997). “Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla,” but
less than a preponderance, “and is such relevant evidence as a reasonable person would accept
as adequate to support a conclusion.” Crawford v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 363 F.3d 1155, 1158 (11th Cir. 2004) (“Even if the evidence preponderates against the Commissioner’s findings,
[a reviewing court] must affirm if the decision reached is supported by substantial evidence.”)
(citations omitted). The court thus may reverse the ALJ’s decision only if it is convinced that the
decision was not supported by substantial evidence or that the proper legal standards were not
applied. See Carnes v. Sullivan, 936 F.2d 1215, 1218 (11th Cir. 1991). Reversal is not warranted

simply because the court itself would have reached a different result. See Edwards v. Sullivan, 937 F.2d 580, 584 n.3 (11th Cir. 1991). Despite the deferential nature of its review, however,
the court must look beyond those parts of the record that support the decision, must view the record
in its entirety, and must take account of evidence that detracts from the evidence relied on in the
decision. See Hillsman v. Bowen, 804 F.2d 1179, 1180 (11th Cir. 1986); see also Walker v. Bowen, 826 F.2d 996, 999 (11th Cir. 1987).
To qualify for disability benefits and establish entitlement for a period of disability, a
person must be unable to:
engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable
physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which
has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than
12 months. 42 U.S.C. § 423 (d)(1)(A).3 To make such a determination, the ALJ employs a five-step sequential
evaluation process:
(1) Is the person presently unemployed?

(2) Is the person’s impairment severe?

(3) Does the person’s impairment meet or equal one of the specific impairments set
forth in 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1 [the Listing of Impairments]?

(4) Is the person unable to perform his or her former occupation?

(5) Is the person unable to perform any other work within the economy?

An affirmative answer to any of the above questions leads either to the next
question, or, on steps three and five, to a finding of disability. A negative answer
to any question, other than step three, leads to a determination of “not disabled.”

McDaniel v. Bowen, 800 F.2d 1026, 1030 (11th Cir. 1986).4 See also See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520.

3 A “physical or mental impairment” is one resulting from anatomical, physiological, or
psychological abnormalities that are demonstrable by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory
diagnostic techniques. 42 U.S.C. § 423 (d)(3).

4 “[T]he law and regulations governing a claim for disability benefits are identical to
those governing a claim for supplemental security income benefits.” Patterson v. Bowen, 799 F.2d 1455, 1456 (11th Cir. 1986). Therefore, cases arising under Title II are appropriately
cited as authority in Title XVI cases, and vice versa. See, e.g., Smith v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 486 F. App’x 874, 875 n.* (11th Cir. 2012) (“The definition of disability and the test used
to determine whether a person has a disability is the same for claims seeking disability
insurance benefits or supplemental security income.”); Claudia S. v. Saul, No. 1:18-CV-01896, 2019 WL 3059745, *1 (N.D. Ga. July 12, 2019) (“[T]o the extent that the Court cites to DIB cases,
statutes, or regulations, they are equally applicable to Plaintiff's SSI claims, and vice versa.”).
The burden of proof rests on the claimant through step four. See Phillips v. Barnhart, 357 F.3d 1232, 1237 (11th Cir. 2004); Ellison v. Barnhart, 355 F.3d 1272, 1276 (11th Cir. 2003).
A claimant establishes a prima facie case of a qualifying disability once he or she has carried
the burden of proof from step one through step four. Id. At step five, the burden shifts to the
Commissioner, who must then show that there are a significant number of jobs in the national

economy that the claimant can perform. Id. In order to assess the fourth and fifth steps, the ALJ must determine the claimant’s
Residual Functional Capacity (“RFC”). Phillips, 357 F.3d at 1238-39. The RFC is what the
claimant is still able to do despite the claimant’s impairments and is based on all relevant medical
and other evidence. Id. It may contain both exertional and nonexertional limitations. Id. at 1242-
43. At the fifth step, the ALJ considers the claimant’s RFC, age, education, and work experience
to determine if there are jobs available in the national economy that the claimant can perform. Id.
at 1239. To do so, the ALJ can either use the Medical Vocational Guidelines (“grids”), see
20 C.F.R. pt. 404 subpt. P, app. 2, or call a vocational expert (“VE”). Id. at 1239-40. The grids

allow the ALJ to consider factors such as age, confinement to sedentary or light work, inability to
speak English, educational deficiencies, and lack of job experience. Each factor can independently
limit the number of jobs realistically available to an individual, and combinations of these factors
yield a statutorily-required finding of “Disabled” or “Not Disabled.” Id. at 1240.
III. Issues on Appeal
Plaintiff raises three core issues on appeal: (1) whether the Appeals Council failed to
properly consider evidence submitted after the ALJ’s decision; (2) whether the ALJ failed to
properly evaluate the listings at step three; and (3) whether the ALJ failed to properly consider
Plaintiff’s subjective complaints and the medical opinion of Brandon Johnson, M.D.
IV. Discussion
Plaintiff argues that the Appeals Council did not properly consider the additional evidence,
consisting of over 1,000 pages of medical records, that Plaintiff submitted. (Doc. 13 at p. 8;
Doc. 20 at p. 2, citing Tr. 65-1078). Specifically, Plaintiff asserts that those records support a
finding that he meets or equals Listing 4.02 and that the ALJ did not have access to the records at

the time of the decision. (Doc. 20 at p. 3; Doc. 13 at pp. 10-12). The Commissioner contends that
both the ALJ and the Appeals Council considered the evidence and reasonably concluded that
Plaintiff did not meet or equal a listing. (Doc. 19 at p. 7).
The court “must consider evidence not submitted to the administrative law judge but
considered by the Appeals Council when that court reviews the Commissioner’s final decision
denying Social Security benefits.” Ingram v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 496 F.3d 1253, 1258 (11th Cir. 2007). Evidence is properly presented if the evidence is “new [and] material” and
if it “relates to the period on or before the date of the hearing decision.” See 20 C.F.R. §
416.1470 (a)(5); Russell v. Astrue, 742 F. Supp. 1355, 1382 (N.D. Ga. 2010) (citing Smith v. Soc.

Sec. Admin., 272 F. App’x 789, 800-02 (11th Cir. 2008)); Washington v. Soc. Sec. Admin., Com’r, 806 F.3d 1317, 1320 (11th Cir. 2015) (“[T]he Appeals Council ‘must consider new, material,
and chronologically relevant evidence’ that the claimant submits.”). The Appeals Council must
review a case if properly presented new evidence shows that “there is a reasonable probability that
the additional evidence would change the outcome of the decision.” 20 C.F.R. § 416.1470 (a)(5).5
However, if the Appeals Council denies a request for review, it is “not required to provide a
detailed discussion of the new evidence or an explanation as to why the claimant’s new evidence

5 In addition, the claimant must show “good cause” for not submitting the evidence to the ALJ. 20 C.F.R. § 416.1470 (b).
would not change the ALJ’s decision.” Douglas v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 764 F. App’x 862,
863 (11th Cir. 2019) (citing Mitchell v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 771, F.3d 780, 784-85
(11th Cir. 2014)). “[W]hen a claimant properly presents new evidence to the Appeals Council,
a reviewing court must consider whether that new evidence renders the denial of benefits
erroneous.” Ingram, 496 F.3d at 1262. A court considers that evidence with the whole record

to determine whether substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s decision. Id. at 1266-67.
The administrative record makes clear that the Appeals Council accepted the additional
evidence submitted by Plaintiff but found that the additional evidence did not show a reasonable
probability that it would change the outcome of the ALJ’s decision. (Tr. 8). Specifically,
the Appeals Council stated that it agreed with the ALJ’s step three finding that Plaintiff did not
have an impairment or combination of impairments that met or medically equaled an impairment
listed in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1 (20 C.F.R. §§ 416.920 (d), 416.925, and
416.926). (Tr. 9, 19, 21). At step three of the sequential evaluation process, the ALJ’s discussion
of findings consisted of the following statement: “As discussed herein, the medical evidence does

not contain the objective signs, symptoms or findings, or degree of functional limitations,
necessary for the claimant’s physical impairments, considered singly or in combination, to meet
or equal the severity of any section contained in Appendix 1.” (Tr. 21).
In discussing the medical record, the ALJ noted the following:
The medical evidence of record confirms a history of treatment with Mercy Medical
Clinic (B7F-B8F, B10F, B14F). Records show consistent treatment for essential
thrombocythemia and the claimant compliant with hypertensive prescription
medications (B8F/7). Follow up in March 2022 showed some swelling in the left
leg but dizziness and shortness of breath at baseline. He reported occasional brain
fog and slurred speech. However, the hypertensive disorder was well-controlled
and the essential thrombocythemia showed no change in symptoms or abnormal
bleeding (B10F/8). Follow up on September 28, 2022, indicates ejection fraction
was improved (B14F/9). During post hospitalization follow up on October 24,
2022, the claimant expressed that he was feeling really good since discharge and
felt like his heart would improve. He denied chest pain and abnormal heartbeats.
Notes indicate the claimant inquired about when he could drive again (B14F/5).

The medical evidence of record confirms treatment with The Heart Center for chest
pressure, dyspnea on exertion, and fatigue (B11F/B17F). An echocardiogram
performed April 1, 2022, revealed mild mitral regurgitation, mild aortic stenosis,
and ejection fraction of 45% (B11F/21). On October 14, 2022, the claimant
underwent several cardiovascular procedures, to include catheterization and
stenting. He was also found to have profound left ventricular dysfunction
(B11F/28-29). Thereafter, a transthoracic echocardiography report revealed
ejection fraction estimated at 25-30% with severe hypokinesis and Grade 1 diastolic
dysfunction (B11F/45). However, subsequent follow up shows good symptom
management and control with medication and treatment compliance. Although
the claimant continued to be on a life vest, progress notes from January 11, 2023,
shows the claimant “doing actually pretty well.” Notes indicate no shocks from the
defibrillator, mild dyspnea with exertion, and only slight peripheral edema but not
much (B17F/32). Additionally, during follow up on March 14, 2023, the claimant
denied chest pain, palpitations, nausea, vomiting, or diaphoresis and not
experiencing progressing dyspnea on exertion or lower extremity edema. Notes
further indicate that he had completed a course with cardiac rehabilitation and was
exercising regularly (B17F/36). An echocardiogram conducted March 15, 2023,
revealed a mildly dilated left atrium and mild mitral regurgitation (B17F/40).

On December 21, 2022, Dr. Brandon Johnson completed a statement detailing the
claimant’s treatment history. He described the claimant in general as very tired.
Dr. Johnson determined that because of the claimant’s history of strokes, as well as
severe heart failure, coronary artery disease, and myeloproliferative, he is simply
not able to work. Dr. Johnson indicated that the claimant is at risk for cardiac
decompensation at any point and any exertion could promote another potentially
fatal arrhythmia (B16F).

Turning to the claimant’s obesity, most current progress notes document that
the claimant has a body mass index (BMI) of 30.4 (B17F/34) and is classified as
Level I obesity (SSR 19-2p). As indicated in SSR 19-02p, obesity may have an
adverse impact upon co-existing impairments. The claimant’s obesity has been
considered as required in this decision. In the present case the claimant’s obesity
is not such as to prevent lifting, carrying, ambulation, reaching, orthopedic and
postural maneuvers, or to prevent him from working or being able to complete a
fairly full range of activities of daily living. Therefore, the claimant’s obesity
cannot, either by itself, or in conjunction with the claimant’s other impairments, be
considered to be disabling. Nevertheless, allowance has been made for this
condition in determining the claimant’s functional capacity insofar as proscribing
some exertionally demanding activities such as climbing ladders, ropes, or
scaffolding or prohibition against exposure to workplace hazards to which
the claimant may be more susceptible.
(Tr. 23-24).
As to the opinion evidence, the ALJ stated:
The State agency medical consultants who reviewed the evidence at the initial and
reconsideration stages of adjudication determined the claimant could perform
work-related duties (B4A-B5A). These opinions are afforded partial weight. The
undersigned finds that the record supports a more limiting residual functional
capacity of sedentary work physical impairment and symptoms. However, these
symptoms are not disabling as alleged by the claimant. It should be further noted
that no physician has placed greater restrictions on the claimant than those adopted
herein.

(Tr. 24).
Plaintiff contends that the ALJ’s decision only contained one sentence of boiler plate
language regarding the conclusion that Plaintiff does not have an impairment or combination of
impairments that meet or medically equals the severity of a listed impairment and that there was
no further analysis at step three—as the rest of the ALJ’s decision merely contained a summary of
the medical history without any analysis as to how the listings were not met. (Doc. 13 at p. 10;
Doc. 20 at p. 6). Plaintiff asserts that the Appeals Council merely adopted this finding without
further explanation or analysis. (Id.).
If at step two of the sequential evaluation process an ALJ finds that a claimant has an
impairment or combination of impairments that is “severe,” then at step three the ALJ must
determine whether that impairment or combination of impairments meets or medically equals
the severity of a listed impairment in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1 and meets
the duration requirement. Flemming v. Comm’r of the Soc. Sec. Admin., 635 F. App’x 673,
676 (11th Cir. 2015); 20 C.F.R. § 416.920 (a)(4)(ii)-(iii). A claimant bears the burden of proving
that his or her impairments meet or equal a listing. Barron v. Sullivan, 924 F.2d 227, 229 (11th Cir. 1991). “The burden to meet a listed impairment is heavy, but one the plaintiff must bear
in order to receive an automatic finding of disability under 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520 (d), 416.920(d).”
Nettles v. Astrue, No. 3:09-CV-862, 2010 WL 3394666, *7 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 26, 2010). “The
evidentiary standards for presumptive disability under the listings are stricter than for cases that
proceed to other steps in the sequential evaluation process because the listings represent an
automatic screening based on medical findings rather than an individual judgment based on all
relevant factors in a claimant’s claim.” Nolen v. Colvin, No. 6:14-CV-01306, 2015 WL 4617236,

*3 (N.D. Ala. July 31, 2015); Stanton v. Astrue, 617 F. Supp. 2d 1205, 1215 (M.D. Fla. 2008).
An ALJ is not required to make detailed findings or explicitly discuss why a plaintiff did
not actually meet a listing as long as substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s conclusion that
the plaintiff’s impairment did not meet a listing. See Bailey v. Soc. Sec. Admin., Comm’r, 782 F. App’x 838, 841-42 (11th Cir. 2019) (citing Hutchison v. Bowen, 787 F.2d 1461, 1463 (11th Cir. 1986) (“While Appendix 1 must be considered in making a disability determination, it
is not required that the Secretary mechanically recite the evidence leading to her determination.
There may be an implied finding that a claimant does not meet a listing.”)). “To ‘meet’ a Listing,
a claimant must have a diagnosis included in the Listings and must provide medical reports

documenting that the conditions meet the specific criteria of the Listings and the duration
requirement. To ‘equal’ a Listing, the medical findings must be ‘at least equal in severity and
duration to the listed findings.’” Wilson v. Barnhart, 284 F.3d 1219, 1224 (11th Cir. 2002)
(internal citation omitted); see 20 C.F.R. §§ 416.925 (a)-(d), 416.926(a).6 The duration requirement

6 According to 20 § 416.926(b), medical equivalence can be found in three ways:

(1)(i) If you have an impairment that is described in the Listing of Impairments in
appendix 1 of subpart P of part 404 of this chapter, but—

(A) You do not exhibit one or more of the findings specified in the particular listing,
or
(B) You exhibit all of the findings, but one or more of the findings is not as severe
as specified in the particular listing,
means that the impairment “must have lasted or must be expected to last for a continuous period
of at least 12 months.” 20 C.F.R. § 416.909. “For a claimant to show that his impairment matches
a listing, it must meet all of the specified medical criteria. An impairment that manifest
only some of those criteria, no matter how severely, does not qualify.” Sullivan v. Zebley, 493 U.S. 521, 530 (1990) (emphasis in original). “For a claimant to qualify for benefits by showing

that his unlisted impairment, or combination of impairments, is ‘equivalent’ to a listed impairment,
he must present medical findings equal in severity to all the criteria for the one most similar listed
impairment.” Id. at 531 (emphasis in original). “A claimant cannot qualify for benefits under the
‘equivalence’ step by showing that the overall functional impact of his unlisted impairment or
combination of impairments is as severe as that of a listed impairment.” Id. A claimant who is
not currently engaging in substantial gainful activity and who has a severe impairment that meets
or equals a listing is entitled to disability benefits, and the sequential evaluation of a claim ends.

(ii) We will find that your impairment is medically equivalent to that listing if you
have other findings related to your impairment that are at least of equal medical
significance to the required criteria.

(2) If you have an impairment(s) that is not described in the Listing of Impairments
in appendix 1 of subpart P of part 404 of this chapter, we will compare your findings
with those for closely analogous listed impairments. If the findings related to your
impairment(s) are at least of equal medical significance to those of a listed
impairment, we will find that your impairment(s) is medically equivalent to the
analogous listing.

(3) If you have a combination of impairments, no one of which meets a listing
described in the Listing of Impairments in appendix 1 of subpart P of part 404 of
this chapter (see § 416.925(c)(3)), we will compare your findings with those for
closely analogous listed impairments. If the findings related to your impairments
are at least of equal medical significance to those of a listed impairment, we will
find that your combination of impairments is medically equivalent to that listing. 20 C.F.R. § 416.926 (b).
Edwards v. Heckler, 736 F.2d 625, 628 (11th Cir. 1984). “The ALJ’s finding as to whether a
claimant meets a listed impairment may be implied from the record. Furthermore, while the ALJ
must consider the Listings in making its disability determination, ‘it is not required that the [ALJ]
mechanically recite the evidence leading to [its] determination.’” Kalishek v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 470 F. App’x 868, 870 (11th Cir. 2012) (quoting Hutchison, 787 F.2d at 1463).

Plaintiff asserts that he met or equaled Listing 4.02 for chronic heart failure as early as
October 2022. (Doc. 13 at p. 11). Plaintiff’s main argument pertains to meeting or equaling
Listing 4.02A(1) and B(3). (Doc. 13 at pp. 11-12; Doc. 20 at pp. 6-9). Listing 4.02 states, in
relevant part, as follows:
4.02 Chronic heart failure while on a regimen of prescribed treatment, with
symptoms and signs described in 4.00D2. The required level of severity for this
impairment is met when the requirements in both A and B are satisfied.

A. Medically documented presence of one of the following:

1. Systolic failure (see 4.00D1a(i)), with left ventricular end diastolic dimensions greater than 6.0 cm or ejection fraction of 30 percent or less during a period of stability (not during an episode of acute heart failure) ...

---

AND

B. Resulting in one of the following:

---

1. Inability to perform on an exercise tolerance test at a workload equivalent to 5 METs or less due to:

a. Dyspnea, fatigue, palpitations, or chest discomfort; or
b. Three or more consecutive premature ventricular
contractions (ventricular tachycardia), or increasing
frequency of ventricular ectopy with at least 6 premature
ventricular contractions per minute ... .
20 C.F.R. § Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1 § 4.02A(1), B(3).
In establishing prong A, Plaintiff asserts that the record shows that he has systolic failure
with an ejection fraction of 30 percent or less during a period of stability (not during an episode of
acute heart failure). (Doc. 13 at p. 11). The ALJ found, and the Appeals Council agreed, that
Plaintiff’s “left ventricular systolic dysfunction” was a severe impairment. (Tr. 9, 21). Plaintiff

was diagnosed with “[c]ombined systolic and diastolic heart failure.” (Tr. 252-53, 264, 304, 562,
623, 734). An echocardiogram on March 16, 2023 showed mild left atrial dilation, mild mitral
regurgitation, and a left ventricular ejection fraction of 25%. (Tr. 1076). On April 24, 2023,
Plaintiff had an Automatic Implantable Cardioverter-Defibrillator (“AICD”) implanted. (Tr. 552).
Plaintiff’s preoperative diagnoses by John W. Johnson, M.D. was “[c]hronic systolic heart failure,
severe left ventricular dysfunction putting this patient at increased risk of sudden cardiac death,
cardiac arrest.” (Tr. 552). A heart catheterization performed on October 14, 2022 revealed
Plaintiff’s “ejection fraction was markedly reduced at 20%.” (Tr. 1794). Records show that
Plaintiff’s EF did not get above 30% (listing level threshold) from October 2022 through 2024.

(Tr. 185, 253, 256, 263, 376, 624, 720, 830, 2030).
The Commissioner does not dispute or present anything against Plaintiff’s argument that
he meets or equals the 4.02 diagnostic criteria of prong A. Instead, the Commissioner argues that
the evidence Plaintiff provided regarding “peak METs” and “PVCs” (or premature ventricular
contractions) alone does not indicate that Plaintiff “meets Listing 4.02, B.3.” (Doc. 19 at p. 9).
The Commissioner asserts that “Plaintiff assumes without evidence that the necessary connection
exists between the ‘peak METS’ and ‘PVCs.’” (Id.). Plaintiff, however, cites to medical records
that the ALJ did not have, but that the Appeals Council did have, and argues that those records
show that he established the criteria for prong B. (Doc. 13 at pp. 11-12; Doc. 20 at pp. 7-8).
From November 8, 2022 to February 13, 2023, Plaintiff attended 36 cardiac rehabilitation
sessions where medical records regularly showed on his ECGs during exercise that he had
“SR-ST w/ST depression and inverted T wave with PVC’s.” (Tr. 376, 380, 383, 385, 388,
391, 393, 396, 399, 403, 422, 424, 426, 429, 431, 433, 437, 955, 957, 960, 964, 967, 970,
972, 976, 979, 986, 988, 991, 995, 997, 1000, 1003, 1006, 1008, 1010, 1012, 1015, 1018-19).

Upon entering cardiac rehabilitation, Plaintiff’s “peak METS” were 2.98, and upon completion of
cardiac rehabilitation in February 2023 his “peak METS” were 3.49. (Tr. 346). Notes from
November 9, 2022 to December 7, 2022 and January 30, 2023 reflect that Plaintiff was instructed
to slow down his intensity on machines because of elevated heart rate. (Tr. 356, 376). Records
also show that after Plaintiff’s AICD was implanted, the event monitor documented “187568”
total PVCs from August 04, 2023 to December 6, 2023 and that “Three or More PVCs” occurred
92 times during this period. (Tr. 125). From December 6, 2023 to May 6, 2024, the event monitor
documented “430331” total PVCs and that “Three or More PVCs” occurred 1,300 times during
this period. (Tr. 125).7

Generally, evidence must show that a claimant’s impairment has lasted or can be expected
to last for a continuous period of at least 12 months. 20 C.F.R. § 416.925 (c)(4). However, some
listings may state a specific period of time for which a claimant must meet the listing. Id. Thus,

7 The court notes that in situations where a claimant has an implanted cardiac defibrillator
the Social Security Administration will not order an exercise test. 20 C.F.R. § Pt. 404, Subpt. P,
App. 1 § 4.00C(8)(a)(iii) (“We will not purchase an exercise test when a[] [Medical Consultant]
finds that you have one of the following significant risk factors: ... (iii) An implanted cardiac
defibrillator.”); Gunter v. Astrue, No. 3:09CV0292, 2010 WL 3293567, *10 (S.D. Ohio
June 28, 2010), report and recommendation adopted, No. 3:09CV0292, 2010 WL 3293356 (S.D. Ohio Aug. 19, 2010) (noting that “Listing 4.00(C)(8)(iii) specifically provides that a claimant
with ‘[a]n implanted cardiac defibrillator’ will not be required to perform an exercise test,” and
that ALJ’s finding that “pacemaker implant” was a severe impairment further demonstrated that
plaintiff was exempted under the Social Security Administration’s own guidelines from being
ordered to perform an exercise test).
a 12-month durational requirement does not apply to all listings. Some courts have determined
that Listing 4.02B(3) does not include a 12-month durational period or require more than
one exercise tolerance test. See Amos A. C. v. Comm’r, Soc. Sec. Admin., No. 6:18-CV-1185, 2019 WL 3024657, *3-4 (D. Or. July 10, 2019). While not making a determination here as to
whether the 12-month durational requirement applies to Listing 4.02B(3), the court notes that

evidence submitted to the Appeals Council that was not before the ALJ may possibly satisfy
the criteria under prong B. The Appeals Council did not specifically address the additional
evidence in relation to Listing 4.02 but merely adopted the ALJ’s earlier findings. To be sure,
courts may infer an implicit finding that a listing is not met or equaled when the decision shows
consideration of the pertinent criteria. See Hutchison, 787 F.2d at 1463. However, given that
the ALJ was not in possession of the additional evidence and the Appeals Council did not
address it, the court cannot discern if Listing 4.02 was properly considered. The record simply
is bereft of sufficient discussion for meaningful judicial review.
Because there is some indication that Plaintiff’s condition may possibly satisfy the

prong B criteria—as the record contains evidence that arguably illustrates the elements of the
Listing—it is unclear whether substantial evidence supported the ALJ’s findings. “While in some
cases, the ALJ’s analysis of the claimant’s RFC might lend support or enable the reviewing court
to determine whether a listing was met or equaled without assuming the role of the ALJ as
fact finder, this unfortunately, is not such a case.” Martin v. Saul, No. CV 19-0993, 2021 WL 1235244, *5 (S.D. Ala. Mar. 31, 2021). The responsibility for deciding whether an
impairment meets or equals a listed impairment rests with the Commissioner. 20 C.F.R. §
416.927 (d). Accordingly, it is appropriate for the case to be remanded for the ALJ to weigh this
evidence in determining whether Plaintiff’s impairment meets or equals Listing 4.02. See Chaney
v. Bisignano, No. 7:24-CV-00880, 2025 WL 3280711, *9 (E.D.N.C. Oct. 29, 2025), report and
recommendation adopted, No. 7:24-CV-880, 2025 WL 3272042 (E.D.N.C. Nov. 24, 2025) (noting
that a lack of an explanation as to why a condition fails to satisfy a listing may frustrate meaningful
judicial review when the record contains evidence of symptoms that might match some or all of
the criteria of a listed impairment and remanding case where the ALJ offered no indication or

explanation of how the evidence fell short of Listing 4.02 although there was some indication that
plaintiff’s condition might satisfy subparagraph B’s criteria as the record contained evidence that
arguably illustrated the elements of the listing); Gonzalez v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 1:20-CV-
00336, 2021 WL 2808561, *2 & 6 (E.D. Cal. July 6, 2021) (finding it was more appropriate for
the ALJ to weigh the evidence and resolve the question where the record was not clear as to
whether or not the medical evidence of stress testing meant that plaintiff was unable to perform on
an exercise tolerance test at a workload equivalent to 5 METs or less as required by the B criteria
of Listing 4.02); Fulgencio S. v. Berryhill, No. 8:18-cv-00318, 2018 WL 6248545, *7 (C.D. Cal.
Nov. 29, 2018) (declining to make specific factual findings regarding the paragraph B criteria

because it is “a responsibility reserved to the Commissioner”); Wilder v. Saul, No. 6:20-CV-59, 2021 WL 203196, *6 & 8 (E.D. Ky. Jan. 20, 2021) (“The record contains no specific notation from
a medical provider indicating that Wilder could not perform an ETT as described in subpart B(3)
of Listing 4.02. But neither was an exercise test ordered. And the record indicates consistent
physical symptoms that could suggest inability to perform an ETT ‘at a workload equivalent to
5 METs or less.’ The ALJ made no findings relative to subpart B, so there is no underlying
decision for which the Court could find substantial evidence or a lack thereof. … When the
evidence needs to be weighed and evaluated in light of the requirements of the listing, that is ‘the
ALJ’s task and not the Court’s.’”) (citation omitted); Martin, 2021 WL 1235244 at *5 (remanding
because plaintiff’s “pulse oximetry results were not discussed anywhere in the ALJ’s decision,
the Court cannot determine whether they were considered or what stead may have been placed on
them. Because it is not the role of this Court to make such determinations, the Court hereby finds
that this case should be remanded to the Commissioner for a specific determination of
whether Martin’s impairments meet or medically equal Listing 3.02C(3).”); Burrell v. Astrue,

No. 5:11CV1627, 2012 WL 4461524, *7 (N.D. Ohio Sept. 25, 2012) (remanding the case “for
redetermination and analysis as to whether Plaintiff’s heart conditions meet or equal the Listings”
because “[w]ithout more as to whether Plaintiff’s heart condition met or equaled Listing 4.02(A)
and (B)(3)(a), the Court cannot ascertain whether substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s
determination.”).
Because this case is being remanded, the court need not decide Plaintiff’s additional
arguments. Washington, 806 F.3d at 1323 n.10 (explaining that “[b]ecause this case must be
remanded for consideration of the new evidence, [the court] need not address” the plaintiff's
additional arguments in support of his appeal); Jackson v. Bowen, 801 F.2d 1291, 1294 n.2

(11th Cir. 1986) (per curiam) (finding that, where remand was required, it was unnecessary to
review other issues raised) (citations omitted); McClurkin v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 625 F. App’x 960,
963 n.3 (11th Cir. 2015) (per curiam) (finding no need to analyze other issue when the case was
reversed due to other dispositive errors); Arce v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 2024 WL 36061, *2
(11th Cir. 2024) (“Because remand is necessary, we do not reach Arce’s remaining arguments and
offer no opinion as to whether the ALJ erred with respect to those issues.”); Pelham v. Astrue,
No. 5:11-CV-01354, 2012 WL 4479287, *9 (N.D. Ala. Sept. 21, 2012) (“Because the first issue
on appeal is meritorious, the court does not need to address any further issues.”); Devron M. v.
Comm’r, Soc. Sec. Admin., No. 2:20-CV-291, 2022 WL 16752083, *4 (N.D. Ga. Aug. 22, 2022);
Dease v. Kijakazi, No. 2:20-CV-394, 2022 WL 428173, *7 n.5 (M.D. Ala. Feb. 11, 2022)
(“Because remand is required, the Court pretermits review of the other issues Plaintiff raised.”);
Cantu v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 2:19-CV-832, 2021 WL 960686, *7 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 15, 2021)
(“Based on the conclusion above, which warrants remand, the Court need not address the
remaining issues Plaintiff raises.”). On remand, the Commissioner should reassess the entire

record, providing sufficient reasons and readily identifiable evidentiary support for the decision.
Nichols v. Kijakazi, No. 2:20-CV-1053, 2023 WL 3138938, *18 (M.D. Ala. Apr. 7, 2023), report
and recommendation adopted, No. 2:20-CV-1053, 2023 WL 3137973 (M.D. Ala. Apr. 27, 2023)
(citing Diorio v. Heckler, 721 F.2d 726, 729 (11th Cir. 1983) (holding that, on remand, the ALJ
must reassess the entire record)); Amerson v. Saul, No. 8:19-CV-682, 2020 WL 13594933, *5
(M.D. Fla. Sept. 23, 2020).8
V. Conclusion
After carefully and independently reviewing the record, and for the reasons stated above,
the court concludes as follows:

• that Plaintiff’s construed motion for summary judgment (Doc. 13) is due to be
GRANTED;

• that the Commissioner’s construed motion for summary judgment (Doc. 19)
is due to be DENIED; and

• that the Commissioner’s decision is due to be REVERSED and REMANDED
for additional proceedings consistent with this opinion, including rehearing if
necessary.

A separate judgment will issue.

8 The court emphasizes that, though reversing the Commissioner’s decision, no opinion is being
expressed regarding Plaintiff’s entitlement to disability. The court holds only that the ALJ’s
decision demonstrates error requiring reversal and acknowledges that the ALJ potentially could
reach the same conclusion after a proper reevaluation.
DONE this the 30th day of March 2026.
(har
CHAD W. BRYAN
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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