James P. v. Frank Bisignano - Disability Benefits Granted

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Feb. 26, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

James P. v. Frank Bisignano, Acting Commissioner of Social Security

District Court, D. Minnesota

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: 0:25-cv-01078

• Precedential Status: Unknown Status

• Opinion

• Authorities (17)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (86.7K)

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Trial Court Document

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA

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James P.,1 Case No. 25-cv-1078 (SGE)
Plaintiff,
v. ORDER
Frank Bisignano,2
Acting Commissioner of Social Security,
Defendant.

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Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405 (g) Plaintiff James P. (“Mr. P”) seeks judicial review of
the final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security Administration (“Defendant”)
denying his application for disability insurance benefits (“DIB”) under Title II of the Social
Security Act. This matter is before the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge for
disposition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636 and District of Minnesota Local Rule 72.1. Both
Mr. P and Defendant have fully briefed their positions, and this matter is now ripe for
review. (Dkt. 8; Dkt. 14; Dkt. 15.) For the reasons below, the Court GRANTS Mr. P’s
request for relief, and DENIES Defendant’s request for relief.

1 This District has adopted the policy of using only the first name and last initial of any
nongovernmental parties in Social Security opinions such as the present Report and
Recommendation. Thus, when the Court refers to Plaintiff by his name, only his first name
and last initial are provided.
2 Frank Bisignano became the Acting Commissioner of Social Security on May 7, 2025,
and is substituted as the Defendant in this suit pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
25(d).
BACKGROUND
On February 15, 2022, Mr. P applied for disability insurance benefits under Title II
of the Social Security Act. (R. 60, 202-08.)3 Mr. P alleged disability beginning on January

1, 2022. (R. 202.) His claim was denied initially and on reconsideration. (R. 50-71.) Mr. P
then requested a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”). (R. 121-22.)
The ALJ held a hearing on January 9, 2024. (R. 14.) A Vocational Expert (“VE”),
Diamond Warren, was present and testified. (R. 43.) Ms. Warren characterized Mr. P’s past
relevant work as a maintenance electrician under the Dictionary of Occupations Titles4

(“DOT”), 829.261-018, SVP:7,5 which is typically performed at the medium demand level.

3 The Court refers to the Administrative Record in this Order as “R.” followed by the page
number located in the lower-right hand corner.

4 Though not necessary for the Court's decision here, the Court acknowledges that the
national workforce's jobs have significantly changed since the last time the DOT was
updated in 1991. See Medved v. Kijakazi, 855 F. App'x 311 (8th Cir. 2021) (citing Purdy
v. Berryhill, 887 F.3d 7, 14 n.10 (1st Cir. 2018)). ALJs, vocational experts, and judges
routinely acknowledge variations in jobs that have occurred since the DOT's last
update. See, e.g., Svendsen v. Kijakazi, No. 1:21-cv-1029 (CBK), 2022 WL 2753163, at
*15 (D.S.D. July 14, 2022) (calling the DOT “a document that egregiously has not been
updated since 1991 and is comfortably divorced from reality in 2022”); Poole v. Kijakazi, 28 F.4th 792, 795 (7th Cir. 2022) (“[T]he fact that the DOT was last revised before the
Internet revolution means that it is a resource that must be used with care. Recognizing that
the DOT is increasingly out of step with the modern economy, the [SSA] has been planning
for years to replace it ....”) (citing Chavez v. Berryhill, 895 F.3d 962, 965 (7th Cir. 2018)).

5 The U.S. Department of Labor publishes the DOT to provide “standardized occupational
information to support job placement activities.” DOT, Introduction, 1991 WL 645964 (4th
ed., rev., 1991). The nine-digit number is the occupational code number. DOT, Parts of the
Occupational Definition, 1991 WL 645965 (4th ed., rev., 1991). The Specific Vocational
Preparation (“SVP”) component represents the “time required by a typical worker to learn
the techniques, acquire the information, and develop the facility needed for average
performance in a specific job-worker situation.” DOT, app. C, 1991 WL 688702 (4th ed.,
rev., 1991).
(R. 45.) Ms. Warren also classified Mr. P’s past work as a bus driver under DOT 913.463-
010, SVP: 4, which is generally performed at medium level. (R. 45.)
The ALJ asked a series of hypothetical questions to Ms. Warren. First, the ALJ

asked Ms. Warren to assume a person of Mr. P’s age, education, and past work, who was
limited to “lifting up to 20 pounds occasionally; up to 10 pounds frequently; stand/walk for
about 6 hours; can sit for up to 6 hours in an 8-hour work day with normal breaks. . . .
[F]requent reaching and overhead reaching, handling, fingering, and feeling.”6 (R. 45-46.)
Ms. Warren testified that an individual with the hypothetical limitations could not perform

Mr. P’s past work in accordance with the DOT definitions because the hypothetical gave
“light” instead of “medium” level work. (R 46.) For the second hypothetical question, the
ALJ added a “medium exertional level” to the original question, and Ms. Warren testified
that a hypothetical individual would not be able to perform work as a maintenance
electrician but would be able to perform work as a school bus driver. (R. 46-47.) Lastly,

the ALJ asked Ms. Warren whether her answers were consistent with the DOT and Ms.
Warren testified that they were. (R. 48.)
After the online, video hearing, on January 9, 2024, the ALJ found Ms. B was not
disabled. (R.75-92.) In reaching his decision, the ALJ proceeded through the five-step
sequential evaluation process outlined in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520.7 At step one, the ALJ

6 The hypothetical individual also had climbing, postural, exposure, and other limitations
that are not material to the issues on judicial review.

7 Step one of this process involves determining whether a claimant is engaged in substantial
gainful activity. If not, the ALJ must next decide (in step two) whether the claimant’s
impairments are severe, and of a duration of least 12 continuous months. At step three, the
found Mr. P had not engaged in substantial gainful activity during the period between his
alleged onset date through his date of last insured. (R. 77-78.) At step two, the ALJ found
Plaintiff had the following severe impairments: osteoarthritis of the right knee and obesity.

(R. 78.) At step three, the ALJ determined that none of Mr. P’s impairments, or any
combination of impairments, met or medically equaled the severity of a listed impairment.
(R 79-80.) After step three but before proceeding to step four, the ALJ found Mr. P had the
residual functional capacity (RFC) to perform:
medium work as defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(c) subject to the following
limitations: lifting no more than fifty pounds occasionally and lifting and
carrying up to twenty-five pounds frequently; pushing and/or pulling for
control operations limited by the medium exertional level; frequent climbing
of ramps or stairs, balancing, stooping, kneeling, and crouching; occasionally
climbing ladders, ropes, or scaffolds; occasional crawling; frequent reaching,
handling, fingering, and feeling bilaterally; avoid concentrated exposure to
extreme cold, wetness, humidity, and vibrations; avoid concentrated
exposure to pulmonary irritants, such as fumes, odors, dust, gases, poorly
ventilated areas, and cleaning chemicals, such as bleach; and avoid
concentrated exposure to operational control of hazardous, moving
machinery and unprotected heights.
(R. 80.) At step four, the ALJ found—based on the testimony of the VE who considered
Mr. P’s RFC—that Mr. P could perform past relevant work as a school bus driver. (R. 85.)
The ALJ also noted that the DOT indicates a school bus driver requires constant instead of

ALJ determines whether the claimant’s impairments are severe enough to equal a listed
impairment under appendix 1 to subpart P of part 404. If so, the claimant is considered
disabled without further inquiry. If not, the ALJ must determine the claimant’s RFC, and
determine (at step four) whether the claimant can still do their past work given their
limitations. Finally, if the ALJ concludes a claimant cannot perform their prior work, step
five requires the ALJ to determine whether they can do other work considering their RFC,
age, education, and work experience. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520 (a)(4)(i)-(v).
frequent reaching and handling but that nevertheless, the ALJ accepted the VE’s answer
that her testimony was consistent with the DOT. (R. 86.)
Though the ALJ could have stopped at step four, he continued to step five and made

an alternative finding, relying on the VE testimony, that there were jobs that existed in
significant numbers in the national economy that Mr. P could perform. (R. 86-87.)
Specifically, the ALJ found that Mr. P could perform the job requirements of hospital
cleaner, of which there are 55,000 jobs nationally; order picker, of which there are 10,000
jobs nationally; and counter supply worker, of which there are 35,000 jobs nationally. (R.

87.) Accordingly, the ALJ found Mr. P was not disabled. (R. 87-88.)
Mr. P sought review of the ALJ’s decision from the Appeals Council (“AC”) on
March 12, 2024. (R 199-200.) In seeking review by the AC, Mr. P submitted a vocational
report by Karen Starr (“Starr Report”),8 as well as her curriculum vitae, to rebut Ms.
Warren’s testimony. (R. 4, 199-201; Dkt. 9-1.) The Starr Report contradicted Ms. Warren’s

testimony as to each of the jobs Ms. Warren identified that Mr. P could perform. (Dkt. 9-
1.) The Starr Report explains that all three jobs identified by Ms. Warren cannot be
performed within the definition of medium work because all three “involve little or no tasks
performed in a seated position” and medium work “includes approximately [two] hours of
seated tasks per work day.” (Dkt. 9-1 at 1 (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1567 (c); SSR 83-10).)

The AC denied Plaintiff’s request for review on January 24, 2025. (R. 1.) The AC
Notice stated:

8 As discussed more below, the Starr Report was not included in the administrative record.
This is about your request for review of the Administrative Law Judge's
decision dated February 12, 2024. You submitted reasons that you disagree
with the decision. We considered the reasons and exhibited them on the
enclosed Order of the Appeals Council. We found that the reasons do not
provide a basis for changing the Administrative Law Judge's decision.

(R. 1.) The AC exhibited Mr. P’s three-page request for review dated March 12, 2024. (R.
4.) The Notice also stated that the AC will review the case if:
“[W]e receive additional evidence that you show is new, material, and relates
to the period on or before the date of the hearing decision. You must also
show there is a reasonable probability that the additional evidence would
change the outcome of the decision. You must show good cause for why you
missed informing us about or submitting it earlier.
(R. 2.) The AC’s denial of review made the ALJ’s decision the final decision of the
Commissioner. (R. 1-6.) On March 24, 2025, Mr. P filed a Complaint seeking judicial
review of the final decision under 42 U.S.C. § 405 (g). (Dkt. 1.)
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Following a final decision from the Commissioner, the claimant may elect to seek
judicial review of the determination. 42 U.S.C. § 405 (g); 20 C.F.R. § 404.981. Under this
review, the District Court is limited to a determination of “whether the ALJ’s decision
‘complies with the relevant legal standards and is supported by substantial evidence in the
record as a whole.’” Lucas v. Saul, 960 F.3d 1066, 1068 (8th Cir. 2020) (quoting Halverson
v. Astrue, 600 F.3d 922, 929 (8th Cir. 2010)); 42 U.S.C. § 405 (g). “Substantial evidence
‘is less than a preponderance, but enough that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate
to support a conclusion.’” Kraus v. Saul, 988 F.3d 1019, 1024 (8th Cir. 2021) (quoting
Phillips v. Astrue, 671 F.3d 699, 702 (8th Cir. 2012)). The ALJ must build a logical bridge
between the RFC and the evidence. Social Security Ruling9 (“SSR”) 96-8p.
“If, after reviewing the record, the court finds it is possible to draw two inconsistent

positions from the evidence and one of those positions represents the [ALJ’s] findings, the
court must affirm the [ALJ’s] decision.” Perks v. Astrue, 687 F.3d 1086, 1091 (8th Cir.
2012) (quoting Pearsall v. Massanari, 274 F.3d 1211, 1217 (8th Cir. 2001)). Essentially,
the ALJ’s decision should not be disturbed just because the Court might have reached a
different conclusion. Kraus, 988 F.3d at 1024. Thus, the Court will not reverse the ALJ’s

“denial of benefits so long as the ALJ’s decision falls within the ‘available zone of choice.’”
Bradley v. Astrue, 528 F.3d 1113, 1115 (8th Cir. 2008) (quotation omitted). The decision
of the ALJ “is not outside the ‘zone of choice’ simply because [the Court] might have
reached a different conclusion had [it] been the initial finder of fact.” Id. (quoting Nicola
v. Astrue, 480 F.3d 885, 886 (8th Cir.2007)).

ANALYSIS
Mr. P presents one issue to the Court—that the AC failed to consider rebuttal
evidence he submitted with his request for review. (Dkt. 8 at 1; Dkt. 15 at 1.) Mr. P makes
two arguments regarding this one issue: (1) that the ALJ erred at step four in finding Mr. P
could perform past relevant work, and (2) that the AC failed to consider a rebuttal vocation

9 “Social Security Rulings are agency rulings published under the authority of the
Commissioner of Social Security and are binding on all components of the
Administration.” Sullivan v. Zebley, 493 U.S. 521, 530 n.9 (1990) (cleaned up).
opinion which calls into question the ALJ’s alternative finding at step five. (Dkt. 8 at 4;
Dkt. 15 at 1.)

I. ALJ Erred by Failing to Resolve Conflict Between VE Testimony and
the DOT
The ALJ limited Mr. P to “frequent reaching, handling, fingering, and feeling
bilaterally.” (R. 80.) However, as the ALJ pointed out in the decision, “the DOT indicates
that the job of school bus driver requires constant reaching and handling, rather than
frequent.” (R. 86.) Mr. P argues that the ALJ failed to follow SSR 00-4p, 2000 WL
1898704, at *1 (S.S.A. Dec. 4, 2000). (Dkt. 8 at 4-5.)10

SSR 00-4p explains how an ALJ may use VE testimony. Pursuant to SSR 00-4p,
the ALJ must “rely primarily on the DOT ... for information about the requirements of
work in the national economy” but may also use evidence from a VE “to resolve complex
vocational issues.” Id. at *2. “When there is an apparent unresolved conflict between [VE]
evidence and the DOT, the adjudicator must elicit a reasonable explanation for the conflict

before relying on” the VE's testimony. Id. Part of the ALJ's duty is to “inquire, on the
record, as to whether or not there is such consistency.” Id. If there is a conflict between the
VE testimony and the DOT, the ALJ must resolve it by determining whether the VE’s
explanation “is reasonable and provides a basis for relying on the VE’s… testimony rather

10 As Mr. P correctly notes, the SSA rescinded and replaced SSR 00-4p with SSR 24-3p on
January 6, 2025. (Dkt. 8 at 4 n.5); see SSR 24-3p, 2024 WL 5256890, at *1 (S.S.A. Dec.
6, 2024). Because the ALJ's decision was issued before January 6, 2025, the Court applies
SSR 00-4p. See SSR 24-3p, 2024 WL 5256890, at *2 n.1 (“We expect that Federal courts
will review our final decisions using the rules that were in effect at the time we issued the
decisions.”).
than on the DOT information.” Id. “A reasonable explanation includes, for example: (1)
when evidence from the VE includes information that is not included in the DOT, such as
information from the VE's experience; or (2) when the VE is able to provide more specific

information about a job than the DOT, such as how a particular job is performed in a
specific setting.” Lori A. H. v. Bisignano, No. 24-CV-2262 (JMB/JFD), 2025 WL 2374304,
at * 5 (D. Minn. July 23, 2025) (citing SSR 00-4p, 2000 WL 1898704, at *2-3), R&R
adopted sub nom. A-H v. Bisignano, 2025 WL 2374305 (D. Minn. Aug. 15, 2025). The
ALJ “will explain” in the decision “how he or she resolved the conflict” between the VE

evidence and the DOT. SSR 00-4p, 2000 WL 1898704, at * 4.
Here, the ALJ noted in the decision that:
Pursuant to Social Security Ruling 00-4p, the undersigned inquired whether
the vocational expert’s testimony was consistent with the Dictionary of
Occupational Titles (“DOT”). The undersigned notes that the DOT indicates
that the job of school bus driver requires constant reaching and handling,
rather than frequent. The vocational expert testified that her testimony was
indeed consistent with the DOT, as well as with her education and experience
in vocational rehabilitation.11 The vocational expert also testified that the job
of school bus driver works within the above-discussed residual functional
capacity. The undersigned accepts that testimony.
(R. 86.) However, the ALJ did not comply with SSR 00-4p. When a VE’s testimony is not
consistent with the DOT, the ALJ has a duty to “inquire on the record” about that
inconsistency and is then required to resolve the conflict before relying on the VE’s
testimony in making the disability determination. SSR 00-4p, 2000 WL 1898704, at
*4. Here, the ALJ did not inquire about the conflict between Ms. Warren’s testimony that

11 Ms. Warren did not testify at any point that her answers were based on her education and
experience. (R. 12-49.)
the job of bus driver involved “frequent” reaching and handling and the DOT’s “constant”
reaching and handling definition. (R. 12-49.) The ALJ merely asked Ms. Warren, at the
very end of the hearing, whether her testimony was consistent with the DOT. (R. 48.) If

this question were enough to resolve an inconsistency, it would render SSR 00-4p’s
requirements to inquire about inconsistencies and obtain a reasonable explanation
meaningless.12

In sum, though the ALJ noted in the decision that there was a conflict, the ALJ failed
to inquire about that conflict on the record and elicit a reasonable explanation as required
by SSR 00-4p. Because Ms. Warren’s testimony was not consistent with the DOT, and the
ALJ failed to inquire about and resolve the conflict, he cannot rely on Ms. Warren’s
testimony in the disability determination. Lori A. H., 2025 WL 2374304, at * 6 (“When a

VE’s testimony is not consistent with the DOT, the ALJ must resolve the conflict before
he can rely on the testimony in the disability determination.”) (citing SSR 00-4p, 2000 WL
1898704, at * 4). And without Ms. Warren’s testimony, “the DOT definition is the default.” Id. (citing SSR 00-4p, 2000 WL 1898704, at *2.) The DOT definition for bus driver
requires “constant” reaching and handling which exceeds the “frequent” reaching and

handling the ALJ limited Mr. P to. See DICOT 913.463-010, 1991 WL 687823.
Consequently, the Court recommends that the Commissioner’s final decision be reversed,
and the matter remanded because the ALJ did not identify, inquire, obtain an explanation,

12 Mr. P states that the “ALJ made the required inquiry whether the VE’s testimony was
consistent with the DOT.” (Dkt. 8 at 5.) For the reasons explained above, the Court
disagrees.
or resolve the conflict between the Ms. Warren’s testimony and the DOT regarding
reaching and handling.
II. Appeals Council Erred When It Omitted the Starr Report

Mr. P argues that because the ALJ erred at step four, the ALJ’s alternative finding
at step five is critical. (Dkt. 8 at 5.) Mr. P argues that the AC erred in failing to consider
the additional evidence he submitted to the AC to rebut the ALJ’s step five analysis,
namely, the Starr Report.
If a claimant is dissatisfied with an ALJ’s decision, the claimant may request review

by the AC. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.967. The AC must review a case where it receives
additional evidence that is: “(1) new; (2) material; (3) relates to the period on or before the
date of the ALJ's hearing decision; and (4) presents a reasonable probability that the
outcome of the decision would change.” Thor S. v. Berryhill, No. 18-CV-538
(NEB/KMM), 2018 WL 7141873, at *5 (D. Minn. Dec. 13, 2018) (citing 20 C.F.R. §

404.970 (a)(5)), R&R adopted, 2019 WL 368459 (D. Minn. Jan. 30, 2019); Angela R. M.
v. Colvin, No. 23-CV-03033 (JMB/JFD), 2025 WL 554020 (D. Minn. Jan. 22, 2025), R&R
adopted sub nom. Angela R. M. v. King, 2025 WL 553616, at * 3 (D. Minn. Feb. 19, 2025)
(citing Thor S., 2018 WL 7141873, at * 5). “To be ‘new,’ evidence must be more than
merely cumulative of other evidence in the

record.” Lamp v. Astrue, 531 F.3d 629, 632 (8th Cir. 2008) (quoting Bergmann v. Apfel, 207 F.3d 1065, 1069 (8th Cir. 2000)). Additional evidence is material if it is “relevant to
claimant’s condition for the time for which benefits were denied,” and not merely detailing
“after-acquired conditions or post-decision deterioration of a pre-existing condition.”
Bergmann, 207 F.3d at 1069-70.
“When the [AC] has considered material new evidence and nonetheless declined

review,” the court’s “task is only to decide whether the ALJ's decision is supported by
substantial evidence in the record as a whole, including the new evidence deemed material
by the [AC] that was not before the ALJ.” Mackey v. Shalala, 47 F.3d 951, 953 (8th Cir.
1995). However, if it is unclear whether the AC considered additional evidence submitted
a court may remand the case. See Lamp v. Astrue, 531 F.3d 629, 632-

33 (8th Cir. 2008) (determining that it was unclear from the record whether the AC
reviewed new evidence and remanding); Gartman v. Apfel, 220 F.3d 918, 922 (8th Cir.
2000) (explaining that the court could not discern whether the AC considered the additional
evidence and remanding); Craig M. v. Berryhill, No. 18-CV-908 (NEB/DTS), 2019 WL
2648029, at * 3 (D. Minn. June 10, 2019) (“When the Appeals Council denies review

without substantively considering newly submitted evidence, the reviewing court may
remand the case. . . .”) (citing Nelson v. Sullivan, 966 F.2d 363, 366 (8th Cir. 1992)), R&R
adopted, 2019 WL 2644199 (D. Minn. June 26, 2019); B.L.B. v. Kijakazi, No. 4:21-CV-
04222 (VLD), 2022 WL 14812595, at * 27-28 (D.S.D. Oct. 26, 2022) (finding AC erred
when it failed to address additional evidence in its decision letter and remanding for

evaluation); Torrey v. Astrue, No. 4:10-CV-2271 (LMB), 2012 WL 886828, at * 17-18
(E.D. Mo. Mar. 15, 2012) (remanding because court could not determine whether AC
considered additional evidence where the AC’s notice did not refer to the new evidence);
but see Thor S., 2018 WL 7141873, at * 6 (noting that “it is somewhat unclear whether the
[AC] considered the new material, in denying review” and concluding there was no error
because the additional evidence “did not create a reasonable probability that the outcome
of the ALJ’s decision would have been different.”)

Here, Mr. P submitted the Starr Report dated March 4, 2024, to the AC. (R. 200;
Dkt. 9-1.) The Starr Report is clearly new and material—it was written after the hearing,
is not cumulative of other evidence in the record, is relevant to Mr. P’s abilities for the time
at which benefits were denied, and does not merely detail a change in post-decision
conditions. See Lamp, 531 F.3d at 632; Bergmann, 207 F.3d at 1069; 20 C.F.R. §

404.970 (a)(5). And the Starr Report presents a reasonable probability that the outcome of
the decision would change. The ALJ relied exclusively on Ms. Warren’s testimony
regarding the jobs Mr. P could perform (R. 87), and the Starr Report directly contradicts
Ms. Warren’s testimony, suggesting that none of the jobs Ms. Warren identified would
actually be plausible for Mr. P.13 See Duran v. O'Malley, 754 F. Supp. 3d 251, 263-64 (D.

Mass. 2024) (finding similar vocational expert report submitted as additional evidence
showed reasonable probability of changed outcome). Thus, the AC was required to review

13 Defendant argues that the ALJ’s decision at step five is supported by substantial evidence
and that the Starr Report does not call into question the ALJ’s step five finding. (Dkt. 14
at 6-7.) Mr. P argues the Starr Report undermines the ALJ’s step five analysis because the
ALJ’s RFC limited him to medium work and the jobs identified by Ms. Warren cannot be
performed under the definition of medium work. (Dkt. 8 at 9-10; Dkt. 15 at 2-4.) As
discussed more below, the Court need not determine whether the ALJ’s step five analysis
was supported by substantial evidence, rather at this juncture the Court determines that the
Starr Report presents a reasonable probability of a different outcome at step five.
the Starr Report submitted as additional evidence. 20 C.F.R. § 404.970 (a)(5); Thor S., 2018
WL 7141873, at *5 (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.970 (a)(5)).
The Court cannot, however, determine if the AC reviewed the Starr Report.14 Mr.

P’s Request for Review to the AC references an “attached brief and vocational report.” (R.
200.) The AC Notice denying review stated:
This is about your request for review of the Administrative Law Judge's
decision dated February 12, 2024. You submitted reasons that you disagree
with the decision. We considered the reasons and exhibited them on the
enclosed Order of the Appeals Council. We found that the reasons do not
provide a basis for changing the Administrative Law Judge's decision.
(R. 1.) The AC exhibited Mr. P’s three-page request for review dated March 12, 2024. (R.
4.) The Starr Report is also three pages long. (Dkt. 9-1 at 1-3.) Though the AC Notice states
that it considered the reasons submitted in request for review, it is unclear whether the AC
considered the Starr Report. If it had, the Court suspects the AC would have exhibited the
Starr Report in its Notice, not just the request for review, and the report would have been
included as part of the Administrative Record. Regardless, the Court need not speculate as
to whether the AC actually considered the Starr Report because remand is warranted where
it is unclear the AC considered the evidence. See Lamp, 531 F.3d at 632-33; Gartman, 220
F.3d at 922; Craig M., 2019 WL 2648029, at * 3 (citing Nelson, 966 F.2d at 366); Torrey, 2012 WL 886828, at * 18. Because the AC was required to review the Starr Report and the

14 Both parties’ arguments rely on the substantial evidence standard of review. (Dkt. 8 at
6-7; Dkt. 14 at 4.) This would be the correct standard had the AC “considered material new
evidence.” Mackey, 47 F.3d at 953. Because the Court cannot determine if the AC
considered the additional evidence submitted here, the Court does not review the final
decision under the substantial evidence standard. See Lamp, 531 F.3d at 632-33.
Court cannot determine whether the AC did so, the action must be reversed and remanded
to the ALJ.

III. Conclusion
In sum, the ALJ erred by failing to comply with SSR 00-4p, and the AC erred by
not addressing additional evidence submitted. Accordingly, the Court remands the matter
to the ALJ for further proceedings. On remand the ALJ should reconsider its previous

decision in light of the Starr Report and reassess Mr. P’s ability to perform his past relevant
work at step four pursuant to SSR 00-4p.
ORDER
Therefore, based on the foregoing, and on all of the files, records, and proceedings
herein, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:
1. Plaintiff’s request for relief (Dkt. 8) is GRANTED.

1. Defendant’s request for relief (Dkt. 14) is DENIED.
2. This case is REMANDED to the Commissioner pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405 (g), for further administrative proceedings consistent with this ORDER. LET JUDGMENT BE ENTERED ACCORDINGLY.

Date: February 26, 2026 s/Shannon G. Elkins
SHANNON G. ELKINS
United States Magistrate Judge