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March 19, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

State v. Smith

Idaho Court of Appeals

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: 51758

• Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

• Opinion

• Authorities (8)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (2K)

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Combined Opinion

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

Docket No. 51758

STATE OF IDAHO, )
) Filed: March 19, 2026
Plaintiff-Respondent, )
) Melanie Gagnepain, Clerk
v. )
) THIS IS AN UNPUBLISHED
ADAM JAMES SMITH, ) OPINION AND SHALL NOT
) BE CITED AS AUTHORITY
Defendant-Appellant. )
)

Appeal from the District Court of the Third Judicial District, State of Idaho, Canyon
County. Hon. George A. Southworth, Senior District Judge. Hon Susan E. Weibe,
District Judge. Hon. Brent L. Whiting, District Judge.

Judgment of conviction for domestic battery with traumatic injury and attempted
strangulation with a persistent violator enhancement, affirmed.

Erik R. Lehtinen, State Appellate Public Defender; Sally J. Cooley, Deputy
Appellate Public Defender, Boise, for appellant.

Hon. Raúl R. Labrador, Attorney General; Kacey L. Jones, Deputy Attorney
General, Boise, for respondent.

GRATTON, Judge
Adam James Smith appeals from his judgment of conviction and sentence for domestic
battery with traumatic injury and attempted strangulation with a persistent violator enhancement.
Smith claims the district court deprived him of his constitutional rights by denying his motion for
substitute counsel. In addition, Smith contends the district court abused its discretion by imposing
an excessive sentence. We affirm.
I.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Smith was charged with domestic battery with traumatic injury and attempted strangulation
with a persistent violator enhancement allegation. The morning of trial, Smith’s counsel requested
a continuance, seeking an evaluation to establish Smith’s competency to stand trial as a result of
difficulties in preparing Smith for his defense. At that same time, Smith complained to the district

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court that his attorney had not reviewed the discovery with him and requested substitute counsel.
The district court did not rule on the request for substitute counsel but granted a continuance and
ordered a competency evaluation.
One month later, at a status conference, Smith expressed concerns that his counsel was not
taking time to prepare with him for trial. The district court declined to address Smith’s concerns
with counsel due to his pending competency evaluation. At a subsequent hearing, Smith was found
competent to stand trial. Smith again requested substitute counsel. Smith argued he had never
spoken to his attorney in person, only on the phone. In response, the district court informed Smith
of his right to hire his own counsel and advised Smith that he does not get to choose which attorney
is appointed. Smith’s counsel told the district court she had already met with Smith and was going
to be doing so again, in person, since the trial was three weeks away. Additionally, Smith’s counsel
stated that she had spoken with Smith several times on the phone. As a result, the district court
found that Smith failed to show good cause to appoint Smith substitute counsel.
A jury found Smith guilty of domestic battery with traumatic injury and attempted
strangulation. Additionally, Smith was found to be a persistent violator. The district court
sentenced Smith to concurrent, unified sentences of twenty years with five years determinate.
Smith appeals.
II.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Whether substitute counsel should be provided is a decision that lies within the sound
discretion of the trial court and will be reviewed on appeal for an abuse of discretion. State v.
Severson, 147 Idaho 694, 702, 215 P.3d 414, 422 (2009). An appellate review of a sentence is
also based on an abuse of discretion standard. State v. Biggs, 168 Idaho 112, 114, 480 P.3d 150,
152 (Ct. App. 2020). When a trial court’s discretionary decision is reviewed on appeal, the
appellate court conducts a multi-tiered inquiry to determine whether the trial court: (1) correctly
perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) acted within the boundaries of such discretion; (3)
acted consistently with any legal standards applicable to the specific choices before it; and (4)
reached its decision by an exercise of reason. State v. Herrera, 164 Idaho 261, 270, 429 P.3d 149,
158 (2018).

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III.
ANALYSIS
On appeal, Smith claims the district court abused its discretion by denying his motion for
substitute counsel. Smith argues he demonstrated good cause for the appointment of substitute
counsel because of a breakdown in communication. Further, Smith asserts that the district court
abused its discretion by imposing an excessive sentence.
A. Good Cause for Substitute Counsel
In State v. Lippert, 152 Idaho 884, 887, 276 P.3d 756, 759 (Ct. App. 2012) (internal
citations omitted) we stated:
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I,
Section 13 of the Idaho Constitution guarantee the right to counsel. The right to
counsel does not necessarily mean a right to the attorney of one’s choice. Mere
lack of confidence in otherwise competent counsel is not necessarily grounds for
substitute counsel in the absence of extraordinary circumstances. However, for
good cause a trial court may, in its discretion, appoint a substitute attorney for an
indigent defendant. The trial court must afford the defendant a full and fair
opportunity to present the facts and reasons in support of a motion for substitution
of counsel after having been made aware of the problems involved.
Good cause is shown if there is “an actual conflict of interest; a complete, irrevocable breakdown
of communication; or an irreconcilable conflict which leads to an apparently unjust verdict.” Id.
Regarding the breakdown of communication, this Court identified four factors to consider:
(1) whether the defendant’s motion for new counsel was timely; (2) whether the
trial court adequately inquired into defendant’s reasons for making the motion;
(3) whether the defendant-attorney conflict was so great that it led to a total lack of
communication precluding an adequate defense; and (4) whether the defendant
substantially and unreasonably contributed to the communication breakdown.
Id. (internal citations omitted). Only if good cause is shown must the defendant be appointed new
counsel. Id.
On appeal, Smith frames the request for substitute counsel as based on a total breakdown
in communication. In the district court, Smith did not assert that counsel had a conflict of interest,
that there was a complete and irrevocable breakdown of communication, or that there was an
irreconcilable conflict which would lead to an unjust verdict. He only expressed concern about
counsel meeting with him to prepare for trial. The record indicates Smith disagreed with counsel’s
defense strategy and methods of communication. For example, Smith contended his rights to
effective assistance of counsel were implicated because counsel did not want to call a witness

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Smith proposed. As to refusal to call a witness, the district court advised Smith that claims of
ineffective assistance of counsel would have to be raised in a later petition for post-conviction
relief if he was convicted. In any event, whether to call a witness is a decision of counsel and does
not support a claim of breakdown in communication.
Smith’s principal argument in district court was in regard to his counsel’s communication
and preparedness, particularly that counsel had not met with Smith in person to prepare for trial.
Smith acknowledged he had spoken with counsel over the phone multiple times but expressed
concern about her preparation for trial “just days away.” After hearing from Smith, the district
court noted that trial was three weeks away, not days away. The district court asked counsel about
her ability to meet with Smith in advance of trial. Counsel responded, “Your Honor, I will. I
already have also, and he and I have spoken on the phone regularly.” Even with counsel’s
representations about regular communication with Smith, the district court further inquired if
counsel would “be able to meet with him here at some point in the near future.” Counsel answered
she would be prepared for trial. The district court found Smith failed to demonstrate good cause
for substitution of counsel. The district court found that Smith would “be able to meet with
[counsel] more now that [he was] getting closer to trial,” which was still three weeks away. The
record does not support Smith’s claim on appeal of a total breakdown in communication. Smith’s
disagreement with counsel’s defense strategy and methods or timeliness of communication is not
good cause.
Smith argues the district court did not properly consider or apply the Lippert factors. Given
that there was no claim or evidence of a total breakdown in communication, it was not incumbent
on the district court to expressly conduct a Lippert analysis. Nonetheless, the Lippert factors do
not support a finding of good cause or a constitutional violation of the right to counsel. As to the
first Lippert factor, while Smith’s request for substitute counsel was timely, it was first made the
morning of trial.
The second Lippert factor looks at the adequacy of the trial court’s inquiry. Smith sets
forth law regarding the district court’s duty to inquire and intimates the district court failed to
adequately inquire but does not articulate how the inquiry was inadequate. In fact, Smith states
“Over the course of three hearings, the district court heard Mr. Smith’s complaints about his lack
of communication with counsel.” The only specific claim Smith makes as to this second Lippert
factor is “trial counsel stated she was unable to communicate with Mr. Smith and represented that

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he was unable to assist her in preparing for trial.” First, the statement mischaracterizes the record.
Counsel expressed similar concerns early on but later noted that they spoke on the phone on
multiple occasions, had met, and would meet again before trial. Second, it does not speak to the
adequacy of the district court’s inquiry. Third, to the extent it relates to the district court’s inquiry,
the statement admits that the district court was aware of the logistical problems underlying the
claim of lack of communication. Finally, counsel’s statements that she was unable to communicate
with Smith were based on a competency concern, not a concern related to a breakdown in
communication on some other bases.
In regard to the third Lippert factor, that the conflict was so great that it led to a total lack
of communication precluding an adequate defense, Smith states “both Mr. Smith and counsel
agreed that the conflict led to a total lack of communication precluding an adequate defense.”
Again, this statement is a mischaracterization of the nature and extent of any communication
problems. Neither Smith nor counsel agreed that there was a total lack of communication and, as
noted above, the district court assured that trial preparation communication had occurred and
would continue to occur prior to trial.
As to the final Lippert factor, whether Smith contributed to the problem, counsel told the
district court at the first hearing:
Well, Your Honor, Mr. Smith has been unable to help me, assist me in
preparing his defense. Although he tells the Court today none of his attorneys have
spoken to him about a defense, about discovery, and I can’t speak to the other
attorneys, I can speak for myself, but I have made attempts to speak with him about
his defense, about the discovery in this case. He is either unwilling or unable to
think linear, so I can’t--I have had difficulties having a conversation with him about
his defense because there’s no linear thinking. He gets angry with me. If I try to
have follow-up questions, I try to point out where I believe he’s--he’s jumping
around, it’s confusing me, and trying to bring him back on track, he gets angry, but
he does not respond to my questions regarding that. So, I made the statement
actually to him that I was in a position where I was preparing his defense all alone
because I did not have his assistance.
A defendant must not “manufacture good cause by abusive or uncooperative behavior.” Lippert,
152 Idaho at 887, 276 P.3d at 759. Moreover, as noted above, counsel’s comments were related
to competency concerns, not the type of communication breakdown that should be remedied by
the appointment of new counsel.
After Smith was found to be competent, Smith was able to regularly communicate with his
counsel and the district court was assured that counsel had and would continue to meet with Smith

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in preparation for trial. The record does not support a claim of a total breakdown in
communication. The district court conducted a meaningful inquiry to ensure defense counsel
would be prepared and communicate with Smith. Therefore, the district court’s finding that Smith
did not demonstrate good cause for the appointment of substitute counsel is supported by the
record.
B. Excessive Sentence
Smith claims the district court abused its discretion in imposing a concurrent, unified
sentence of twenty years with five years determinate. Sentencing is a matter for the trial court’s
discretion. Both our standard of review and the factors to be considered in evaluating the
reasonableness of the sentence are well established and need not be repeated here. See State v.
Hernandez, 121 Idaho 114, 117-18, 822 P.2d 1011, 1014-15 (Ct. App. 1991); State v. Lopez, 106
Idaho 447, 449-51, 680 P.2d 869, 871-73 (Ct. App. 1984); State v. Toohill, 103 Idaho 565, 568,
650 P.2d 707, 710 (Ct. App. 1982). When reviewing the length of a sentence, we consider the
defendant’s entire sentence. State v. Oliver, 144 Idaho 722, 726, 170 P.3d 387, 391 (2007). Our
role is limited to determining whether reasonable minds could reach the same conclusion as the
district court. Biggs, 168 Idaho at116, 480 P.3d at154. Applying these standards, and having
reviewed the record in this case, we cannot say that the district court abused its discretion.
IV.
CONCLUSION
Smith has failed to establish the district court erred in denying Smith’s request for
appointment of substitute counsel. In addition, the district court did not abuse its sentencing
discretion. Accordingly, Smith’s judgment of conviction and sentence are affirmed.
Judge HUSKEY and Judge LORELLO CONCUR.

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