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March 18, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

State v. Harris

Idaho Court of Appeals

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: 52436

• Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

• Opinion

• Authorities (12)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (18.7K)

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Combined Opinion

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

Docket No. 52436

STATE OF IDAHO, )
) Filed: March 18, 2026
Plaintiff-Respondent, )
) Melanie Gagnepain, Clerk
v. )
) THIS IS AN UNPUBLISHED
DONALD LEONARD HARRIS, ) OPINION AND SHALL NOT
) BE CITED AS AUTHORITY
Defendant-Appellant. )
)

Appeal from the District Court of the First Judicial District, State of Idaho,
Kootenai County. Hon. Barbara Duggan, District Judge.

Order denying I.C.R. 35(a) motion to correct illegal sentence, affirmed.

Donald L. Harris, Arizona, pro se appellant.

Hon. Raúl R. Labrador, Attorney General; Mark W. Olson, Deputy Attorney
General, Boise, for respondent.

GRATTON, Judge
Donald Leonard Harris appeals from the district court’s order denying his Idaho Criminal
Rule 35(a) motion to correct an illegal sentence. We affirm.
I.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Two women reported to law enforcement that Harris sexually abused them when they were
minors, and that Harris may have documented some of the abuse through videos and photographs.
A search of Harris’s house resulted in discovery of a large quantity of sexually exploitative
material. In 2019, a grand jury indicted Harris for two counts of lewd conduct with a minor under
sixteen and five counts of possession of sexually exploitative material. The lewd conduct was
alleged to have occurred between 1999 and 2003. Pursuant to a plea agreement, Harris entered an

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Alford1 plea to one count of injury to a child, Idaho Code § 18-1501 (1), naming both victims with
the same factual bases as the lewd conduct charges. Harris also pled guilty to three counts of
possession of sexually exploitative material, I.C. § 18-1507(a). In November 2019, the district
court imposed three concurrent, ten-year indeterminate sentences for possession of sexually
exploitive material, to run consecutive to a unified ten-year sentence with eight years determinate
for felony injury to a child, resulting in a cumulative twenty-year sentence with eight years
determinate. Harris’s judgment of conviction was affirmed on direct appeal. State v. Harris,
Docket No. 47635 (Ct. App. Dec. 3, 2020) (unpublished). The district court’s judgment summarily
dismissing Harris’s pro se petition for post-conviction relief was also affirmed. Harris v. State,
Docket No. 50147 (Ct. App. June 3, 2024) (unpublished).
In 2023, Harris filed an I.C.R. 35(a) motion to correct an illegal sentence. Harris argued
that the conduct underlying the reduced charge of felony injury to a child fell outside of the statute
of limitations for that offense. Harris relied on I.C. § 19-402 which sets forth a general five-year
statute of limitations for felony offenses, with the exception of those specific offenses enumerated
in I.C. § 19-401. The State did not respond. The district court denied the motion with a file stamp
stating, “DENIED. Writ for ICR 35 is years untimely,” which was affixed upon Harris’s request
that his motion be set for a hearing. Harris appeals.
II.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Whether a sentence is illegal is a question of law over which the appellate courts exercise
free review. State v. Farwell, 144 Idaho 732, 735, 170 P.3d 397, 400 (2007). Whether a court
lacks jurisdiction is a question of law over which appellate courts exercise free review. State v.
Barros, 131 Idaho 379, 381, 957 P.2d 1095, 1097 (1998).
III.
ANALYSIS
Harris claims the district court erred in denying his motion on the basis it was untimely.
The State agrees. Idaho Criminal Rule 35(a) allows a trial court to correct a sentence that is illegal
at any time. State v. Clements, 148 Idaho 82, 84, 218 P.3d 1143, 1145 (2009). However, the State
argues that this Court may affirm the district court’s order on any correct legal theory supported

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See North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970).
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by the undisputed facts in the record. See State v. Garcia-Rodriguez, 162 Idaho 271, 275, 396
P.3d 700, 704 (2017) (noting the “right result-wrong theory” rule allowing an appellate court to
affirm a district court decision for a different reason than the one cited by the district court).
In Clements, the Idaho Supreme Court held that the term “illegal sentence” under I.C.R.
35(a) is narrowly interpreted as a sentence that is illegal from the face of the record, i.e., does not
involve significant questions of fact or require an evidentiary hearing. Idaho Criminal Rule 35(a)
is a “narrow rule,” and because an illegal sentence may be corrected at any time, the authority
conferred by I.C.R. 35(a) should be limited to uphold the finality of judgments. Clements, 148
Idaho at 86, 218 P.3d at 1147; Farwell, 144 Idaho at 735, 170 P.3d at 400. Idaho Criminal Rule
35(a) is not a vehicle designed to re-examine the facts underlying the case to determine whether a
sentence is illegal; rather, the rule only applies to a narrow category of cases in which the sentence
imposes a penalty that is simply not authorized by law or where new evidence tends to show that
the original sentence is excessive. Clements, 148 Idaho at 86, 218 P.3d at 1147.
Harris couched his illegal sentence argument on a jurisdictional challenge, that the statute
of limitations had run on the felony injury to a child charge and, thus, the district court lacked
jurisdiction, and any sentence based on that charge is illegal. The indictment or information filed
by the prosecution is the jurisdictional instrument upon which a defendant stands trial. State v.
Jones, 140 Idaho 755, 757, 101 P.3d 699, 701 (2004). The Supreme Court has held an objection
that an indictment did not confer jurisdiction may be raised for the first time in a motion to correct
an illegal sentence. State v. Lute, 150 Idaho 837, 840, 252 P.3d 1255, 1258 (2011). However, a
defendant cannot revisit an underlying conviction via an I.C.R. 35(a) motion. State v. Roberts,
175 Idaho 12, 19, 175 P.3d 470, 477 (2024) (challenging whether a prior DUI conviction should
have been a juvenile misdemeanor rather than an adult misdemeanor that could later be used as for
enhancement purposes). Idaho courts obtain personal jurisdiction over a criminal defendant when
the defendant initially appears in court. State v. Rogers, 140 Idaho 223, 227, 91 P.3d 1127, 1131
(2004). Subject matter jurisdiction in a criminal case is conferred by the filing of an information,
indictment, or complaint alleging an offense was committed within the state of Idaho. Id.
The State first argues that Harris’s claim is not within the scope of I.C.R. 35(a) or clear
from the face of the record. However, assuming Harris’s jurisdictional claim can be raised in the
present I.C.R. 35(a) motion, the facts appear clear from the record. The record shows the dates of
the allegations and crime charged in the original indictment and the second amended superseding

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indictment to which Harris pled. The facts underlying the statute of limitations claim appear in
the record. The question becomes whether the amended charge deprived the district court of
jurisdiction on the basis that Harris agreed to plead guilty to an amended charge for which the
statute of limitations had expired.
The State argues that the limitation period in I.C. § 19-402 precludes “prosecutions which
are initially charged more than five years after the underlying conduct is alleged to have occurred,”
and does not preclude defendants, such as Harris, from entering a knowing, voluntary, and
intelligent guilty plea to a reduced charge where that charge would have been barred by I.C. § 19-
402 if had been originally brought by the State. While a valid plea of guilty, voluntarily and
understandingly given, waives all non-jurisdictional defenses, State v. Fowler, 105 Idaho 642,
643, 671 P.3d 1105, 1106 (Ct. App. 1983) (emphasis added), the State contends that Harris could
waive any jurisdictional issue by pleading guilty to an agreed-upon reduced charge.2
In State v. Hoagland, 160 Idaho 920, 921, 382 P.3d 369, 370 (Ct App. 2016), a grand jury
indicted Hoagland on one count of lewd conduct with a minor under sixteen. Pursuant to a plea
agreement, the district court amended the indictment to sexual abuse of a child by interlineation
and without obtaining the signature of the grand jury foreperson. Id. The amendment occurred in
open court with the stipulation of Hoagland and the district court accepted Hoagland’s guilty plea.
Id. at 922, 382 P.3d at 371. Eight years later, Hoagland filed an I.C.R. 35(a) motion to correct an
illegal sentence arguing the amended indictment did not confer jurisdiction on the district court
because it was not resubmitted to the grand jury. The district court denied the motion. Id.
On appeal, Hoagland relied on State v. Flegel, 151 Idaho 525, 261 P.3d 519 (2011) in
which the Supreme Court held that the sentence was illegal because sexual abuse is not an included
offense of lewd conduct, and the prosecutor had no authority to amend an indictment. The Court
in Hoagland distinguished Flegel on the basis that Flegel did not consent to the amended charges
or plead guilty. Hoagland, 160 Idaho at 922, 382 P.3d at 371. The Hoagland Court then looked
to State v. Schmierer, 159 Idaho 768, 367 P.3d 163 (2016) where an indictment was amended
without signature of the grand jury foreperson. Id. at 770, 367 P.3d at 165. In Schmierer, as in
Hoagland and this case, the amendment was pursuant to consent in a plea agreement. Id. The

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The State points out that the originally charged offense of lewd conduct has no statute of
limitations, I.C. § 19-401, and thus, no statute of limitations defense would have been effective
against the original indictment, which was, therefore, valid and gave the district court jurisdiction.
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Schmierer Court reasoned that there was no evidence the amended indictment prejudiced the
defendant. Id. at 771, 367 P.3d at 166.
The Hoagland Court held that “When a charging document’s jurisdictional sufficiency is
challenged after trial, it will be upheld unless it is so defective that it does not, by any fair or
reasonable construction, charge the offense for which the defendant is convicted.” Hoagland, 160
Idaho at 922-23, 382 P.3d at 371-72. The Court concluded that the alleged defects were not
jurisdictional and were waived by the guilty plea. Id. at 923, 382 P.3d at 372. The same is true
here. Harris took advantage of a plea agreement that allowed him to plead guilty to an amended
charge. The expiration of the statute of limitation with respect to that amended charge did not
deprive the district court of jurisdiction, which was validly conferred when the grand jury returned
the original indictment.
Harris’s knowing, intelligent, and voluntary plea to an agreed upon charge did not render
his sentence illegal due to a lack of jurisdiction in the district court.
IV.
CONCLUSION
The district court erred in denying Harris’s I.C.R. 35(a) motion as untimely. However,
jurisdiction is reviewed de novo, and Harris’s claim that his sentence is illegal because the district
court lacked jurisdiction over an amended charge to which he pled guilty is without merit.
Therefore, the district court’s order denying Harris’s I.C.R. 35(a) motion is affirmed.
Chief Judge TRIBE and Judge LORELLO CONCUR.

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