Com. v. Wilson, M. - Non-Precedential Superior Court Opinion
Summary
The Pennsylvania Superior Court issued a non-precedential decision in the case of Commonwealth v. Michael Anthony Wilson. The court vacated in part and remanded the case for further proceedings concerning Wilson's Post-Conviction Relief Act petition, which raised claims of ineffective assistance of counsel.
What changed
The Pennsylvania Superior Court has issued a non-precedential decision in the criminal case of Commonwealth v. Michael Anthony Wilson (Docket No. 618 WDA 2025). The court vacated in part the lower court's order denying Wilson's Post-Conviction Relief Act (PCRA) petition and remanded the case for further proceedings. Wilson's petition raised a layered claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.
This decision means that the legal proceedings concerning Wilson's PCRA petition will continue, potentially involving further hearings or reviews of counsel's performance. Legal professionals representing defendants in similar post-conviction matters should note the court's reasoning regarding the claims presented and the procedural outcome. The specific details of the remand will depend on the further proceedings ordered by the lower court.
What to do next
- Review the court's decision for implications on PCRA petition handling.
- Monitor further proceedings in the Wilson case on remand.
Source document (simplified)
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by Panella](https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/10811164/com-v-wilson-m/#o1)
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March 19, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note
Com. v. Wilson, M.
Superior Court of Pennsylvania
- Citations: None known
- Docket Number: 618 WDA 2025
- Precedential Status: Non-Precedential
Judges: Panella
Lead Opinion
by [Jack A. Panella](https://www.courtlistener.com/person/8243/jack-a-panella/)
J-S01030-26
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
MICHAEL ANTHONY WILSON :
:
Appellant : No. 618 WDA 2025
Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered April 24, 2025
In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County Criminal Division at
No(s): CP-02-CR-0006754-2020
BEFORE: BOWES, J., PANELLA, P.J.E., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*
MEMORANDUM BY PANELLA, P.J.E.: FILED: March 19, 2026
Michael Anthony Wilson appeals from the order entered in the Court of
Common Pleas of Allegheny County denying his first Post-Conviction Relief Act
(“PCRA”)1 petition without a hearing. On appeal, Wilson raises a layered claim
of ineffective assistance of counsel. After careful consideration, we vacate in
part and remand for further proceedings.
We glean the following facts from the certified record. Wilson and V.F.
(“Victim”) were involved in an intimate relationship, beginning when Victim
was thirteen years old, that resulted in multiple shared children. On October
8, 2020, Wilson was charged by criminal information with involuntary deviate
- Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
1 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546.
J-S01030-26
sexual intercourse, unlawful contact with a minor, statutory sexual assault,
aggravated indecent assault, corruption of minors, indecent assault, and rape
of a child.2
The trial court appointed Milton Railford, Esq. (“trial counsel”) to
represent Wilson at a bifurcated waiver trial that commenced on February 27,
2023, and concluded on June 20, 2023. At trial, the defense did not pursue a
mistake of age defense but rather maintained that Victim was of the age of
consent at the time of their sexual relationship. Accordingly, the defense’s
theory rested upon the contention that Victim was born in 1988 rather than
in 1992 as the Commonwealth sought to establish through documentary and
testimonial evidence. At the conclusion of trial, Wilson was acquitted of the
counts of rape of a child and indecent assault and convicted of all remaining
offenses. On June 29, 2023, the court sentenced Wilson to an aggregate term
of 72 to 144 months of incarceration followed by five years of probation. On
July 3, 2023, trial counsel filed a motion to withdraw, which the court granted
that same date.
The court subsequently appointed Rachael Santoriella, Esq. to represent
Wilson in his appeal. On July 7, 2023, Attorney Santoriella filed a post-
sentence motion on Wilson’s behalf seeking reconsideration of his sentence.
Upon Wilson’s written request, Attorney Santoriella filed a motion for leave to
2 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 3123(a)(7), 6318(a)(1), 3122.1, 3125(a)(8), 6301(a)(1),
3126(a)(1), and 3121(c), respectively.
-2-
J-S01030-26
withdraw Wilson’s post-sentence motion on November 6, 2023, which the
court granted the following day.
On February 15, 2024, Attorney Santoriella (hereinafter, “initial PCRA
counsel”) filed a PCRA petition3 on Wilson’s behalf alleging ineffective
assistance of trial counsel for failing to investigate the authenticity of Victim’s
foreign birth certificate and for failing to investigate or call a potential defense
witness.4 Specifically, Wilson’s petition alleged the following concerning trial
counsel’s failure to investigate or call a potential witness:
[P]rior to trial, [Wilson] had relayed to trial counsel that there
were proceedings involving [Victim] that were relevant to his
defense and that could be used to discredit [Victim and her
mother’s] testimony, and that there is a witness that was willing
to testify and that the substance of that testimony dealt with the
accuser and her mother making false accusations of another that
were similar in nature to these proceedings (see certification
attached). There was no communication or investigation into that
potential witness, no subpoena requested nor issued, [and] no
request for documents pursuant to the freedom of information act
or by subpoena.
3 We note that this petition was titled “Amended Petition Pursuant to the
[PCRA].” PCRA Petition, 2/15/24. However, in our review of the docket and
certified record, this appears to be the first and only PCRA petition filed on
Wilson’s behalf. Accordingly, we refer to this filing as Wilson’s initial PCRA
petition.
4 Wilson does not dispute the PCRA court’s ruling on his ineffectiveness claim
concerning the authenticity of Victim’s birth certificate. Accordingly, we need
not address the PCRA court’s disposition of this ineffectiveness claim, and our
decision in no way alters its ruling with respect to this claim.
-3-
J-S01030-26
PCRA Petition, 2/15/24, at 5 (unpaginated). An unsworn witness certification
was attached to Wilson’s petition, which indicated that trial counsel would
substantially testify to the following at a hearing on Wilson’s petition:
That he is an active member of the Pennsylvania Bar and has his
offices in Allegheny County in Pittsburgh and has so for many
years. That he did not file any pretrial motions to limit the
introduction of evidence, nor did he take efforts to investigate the
authenticity of the Liberian birth record, nor did he call Attorney
Reginald Bridges as a witness as requested by [Wilson].
Id. at 9 (unpaginated). Notably, Wilson’s petition did not include a certification
for the purported trial witness, Attorney Bridges.5 The Commonwealth filed a
5 Where a petitioner requests an evidentiary hearing in a post-conviction
proceeding, the following certification mandates apply:
(i) Where a petitioner requests an evidentiary hearing, the petition
shall include a certification signed by each intended witness
stating the witness’s name, address, date of birth and substance
of testimony and shall include any documents material to that
witness’s testimony.
(ii) If a petitioner is unable to obtain the signature of a witness
under subparagraph (i), the petitioner shall include a certification,
signed by the petitioner or counsel, stating the witness’s name,
address, date of birth and substance of testimony. In lieu of
including the witness’s name and address in the certification under
this subparagraph, counsel may provide the witness’s name and
address directly to the Commonwealth. The certification under this
subparagraph shall include any documents material to the
witness’s testimony and specify the basis of the petitioner’s
information regarding the witness and the petitioner’s efforts to
obtain the witness’s signature. ...
(Footnote Continued Next Page)
-4-
J-S01030-26
court-ordered answer to Wilson’s PCRA petition on April 29, 2024.6 On April
3, 2025, the PCRA court issued a notice of its intent to dismiss Wilson’s petition
without a hearing, pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 907, upon determining that Wilson
was not entitled to PCRA relief and no purpose would be served by further
proceedings. PCRA counsel did not file a response to the notice on Wilson’s
behalf, and on April 24, 2025, the court entered an order denying Wilson’s
PCRA petition.
Following Wilson’s subsequent request for court-appointed counsel, on
May 22, 2025, Ryan James, Esq. (“current PCRA counsel”) was appointed to
represent Wilson from that time forward. On May 23, 2025, current PCRA
counsel filed a notice of appeal from the order denying Wilson’s PCRA petition,
on Wilson’s behalf. Wilson timely filed a court-ordered concise statement of
errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b), in which he
alleged ineffective assistance of initial PCRA counsel. On August 13, 2025, the
PCRA court filed a statement in lieu of filing an opinion pursuant to Pa.R.A.P.
1925(a), in which it indicated that it could not address Wilson’s layered
(iii) Failure to substantially comply with the requirements of this
paragraph shall render the proposed witness’s testimony
inadmissible.
42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(d)(1).
6 The Commonwealth’s answer does not appear in the certified record.
-5-
J-S01030-26
ineffectiveness claim and instead relies upon its Rule 907 notice to the extent
it assists appellate review.
On appeal, Wilson presents the following question for our review:
Is Wilson entitled to a remand to make out a claim that prior PCRA
counsel was ineffective for failing to properly plead and present a
claim that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate
and call a witness to testify that the alleged victim and her mother
had made prior false accusations about another person?
Appellant’s Brief, at 3.
“We review the denial of a PCRA petition to determine whether the
record supports the PCRA court’s findings and whether its order is free of legal
error.” Commonwealth v. Min, 320 A.3d 727, 730 (Pa. Super. 2024)
(citation omitted). A PCRA petitioner may be eligible for relief if his conviction
or sentence was a product of the “[i]neffective assistance of counsel which, in
the circumstances of the particular case, so undermined the truth-determining
process that no reliable adjudication of guilt or innocence could have taken
place.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9543(a)(2)(ii).
To prevail on a claim that counsel was constitutionally ineffective,
the defendant must overcome the presumption that counsel was
effective by showing that: (1) the underlying substantive claim
has arguable merit; (2) counsel whose effectiveness is being
challenged did not have a reasonable basis for his or her actions
or failure to act; and (3) the petitioner suffered prejudice as a
result of counsel’s deficient performance. A failure to meet any of
these required prongs bars a petitioner from obtaining relief.
Commonwealth v. Orner, 251 A.3d 819, 824 (Pa. Super. 2021) (en banc)
(citations omitted).
-6-
J-S01030-26
“A convicted defendant has a right under the Rules of Criminal Procedure
to the assistance of counsel on a first PCRA petition.” Commonwealth v.
Miranda, 317 A.3d 1070, 1075 (Pa. Super. 2024) (citation omitted). “The
indigent petitioner’s right to counsel must be honored regardless of the merits
of his underlying claims[.]” Id. (citation omitted). Accordingly, this Court
recognizes that “[t]he purpose of a Rule 907 pre-dismissal notice is to allow a
petitioner an opportunity to seek leave to amend his petition and correct any
material defects, the ultimate goal being to permit merits review by the PCRA
court of potentially arguable claims.” Id. at 1076 (citation omitted). However,
[w]hen a petition for post-conviction collateral relief is defective
as originally filed, the judge shall order amendment of the
petition, indicate the nature of the defects, and specify the time
within which an amended petition shall be filed. If the order
directing amendment is not complied with, the petition may be
dismissed without a hearing.
Pa.R.Crim.P. 905(B); see Commonwealth v. McGill, 832 A.2d 1014, 1024
(Pa. 2003) (explaining that Rule 905 reflects the Supreme Court’s “desire ...
to provide PCRA petitioners with a legitimate opportunity to present their
claims to the PCRA court in a manner sufficient to avoid dismissal due to a
correctable defect in claim pleading or presentation.”) (citation omitted).
In this appeal, Wilson alleges that prior PCRA counsel rendered
ineffective assistance by failing to properly plead and develop his claim of trial
counsel’s ineffectiveness.
Where a petitioner alleges multiple layers of ineffectiveness, he is
required to plead and prove, by a preponderance of the evidence,
each of the three prongs of the [ineffective assistance] test
-7-
J-S01030-26
relevant to each layer of representation. In determining a layered
claim of ineffectiveness, the critical inquiry is whether the first
attorney that the defendant asserts was ineffective did, in fact,
render ineffective assistance of counsel. [C]ounsel cannot be
deemed ineffective for failing to raise a meritless claim.
Commonwealth v. Shields, 347 A.3d 734, 744 (Pa. Super. 2025) (quotation
marks, brackets, and citations omitted).
In Commonwealth v. Bradley, 261 A.3d 381 (Pa. 2021), our Supreme
Court held that “a PCRA petitioner may, after a PCRA court denies relief, and
after obtaining new counsel or acting pro se, raise claims of PCRA counsel’s
ineffectiveness at the first opportunity to do so, even if on appeal.”
Commonwealth v. Bradley, 261 A.3d at 401 (footnote omitted). The
Bradley Court also recognized that when a petitioner raises PCRA counsel’s
ineffectiveness for the first time on appeal, remand may be necessary:
In some instances, the record before the appellate court will be
sufficient to allow for disposition of any newly-raised
ineffectiveness claims. However, in other cases, the appellate
court may need to remand to the PCRA court for further
development of the record and for the PCRA court to consider such
claims as an initial matter. Consistent with our prior case law, to
advance a request for remand, a petition would be required to
provide more than mere boilerplate assertions of PCRA counsel’s
ineffectiveness; however, where there are material facts at issue
concerning claims challenging counsel’s stewardship and relief is
not plainly unavailable as a matter of law, the remand should be
afforded[.]
[ A]n appellate court will not be tasked with developing the record
or acting as a court of original jurisdiction. Rather, appellate courts
will have the ability to grant or deny relief on straightforward
claims, as well as the power to remand to the PCRA court for the
development of the record.
-8-
J-S01030-26
Id. at 402-03 (citations, internal quotation marks, brackets, and footnote
omitted). Where current PCRA counsel properly raised claims of initial PCRA
counsel’s ineffectiveness in a 1925(b) statement, our Supreme Court has
found that such a procedural posture presented “unique” circumstances in that
“there was neither a PCRA court record nor a ruling on [the petitioner’s]
ineffectiveness claims directed toward initial PCRA counsel.” Commonwealth
v. Parrish, 317 A.3d 551, 561 (Pa. 2024). “To remedy this problematic
situation[,]” the Supreme Court determined that remand to the PCRA court
was necessary based on its conclusion that “the PCRA court need[ed] to
further develop the record [ ] and consider, in the first instance, [the
petitioner’s] layered claims, all alleging the ineffective assistance of initial
PCRA counsel.” Id. (citation omitted).
Wilson adequately preserved his claim concerning PCRA counsel’s
ineffectiveness by raising it at the first opportunity to do so, in his 1925(b)
statement, following the appointment of current PCRA counsel. See Bradley,
261 A.3d at 401. In his underlying claim, Wilson avers that trial counsel was
ineffective for failing to investigate and call a potential witness to testify on
his behalf at trial. This Court recognizes that “[n]eglecting to call a witness
differs from failing to investigate a witness in a subtle but important way.”
Commonwealth v. Stewart, 84 A.3d 701, 712 (Pa. Super. 2013) (citations
omitted).
A claim that trial counsel did not conduct an investigation or
interview known witnesses presents an issue of arguable merit
-9-
J-S01030-26
where the record demonstrates that counsel did not perform an
investigation. It can be unreasonable per se to conduct no
investigation into known witnesses. A showing of prejudice,
however, is still required.
Id. (citations omitted).
Conversely, “[a] failure to call a witness is not per se ineffective
assistance of counsel for such decision usually involves matters of trial
strategy.” Commonwealth v. Sneed, 45 A.3d 1096, 1109 (Pa. 2012)
(citation omitted).
[W]hen a PCRA petitioner claims counsel was ineffective for failing
to call a witness, he or she must establish that: the witness
existed; (2) the witness was available to testify for the defense;
(3) counsel knew of, or should have known of, the existence of
the witness; (4) the witness was willing to testify for the defense;
and (5) the absence of the testimony of the witness was so
prejudicial as to have denied the defendant a fair trial.
Commonwealth v. Abdul-Ali, 345 A.3d 759, 775 (Pa. Super. 2025)
(quotation marks and citation omitted). To demonstrate prejudice in this
context, the petitioner must show “how the uncalled witnesses’ testimony
would have been beneficial under the circumstances of the case.”
Commonwealth v. Selenski, 228 A.3d 8, 16 (Pa. Super. 2020) (citation
omitted).
Prior to reviewing Wilson’s claim of initial PCRA counsel’s
ineffectiveness, we must first determine whether Wilson’s underlying claim of
trial counsel’s ineffectiveness for failing to investigate and call Attorney
Bridges as a witness satisfies each prong of the ineffectiveness test. See
Shields, 347 A.3d at 744. However, we are unable to make such a
- 10 - J-S01030-26
determination based on the record before us. In its Rule 907 notice, the PCRA
court explained its grounds for denying Wilson relief on this ineffectiveness
claim as follows:
[Wilson’s] second claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is that
[trial counsel] was ineffective for failing to call an unnamed
witness to testify that the victim and her mother made “false
accusations” about another person.
The petition failed to cite, discuss, or analyze the … five (5) factor
test [related to a claim of failing to call a witness]. Additionally,
the petition did not attach a witness certification for this person
as would be necessary to establish the factors and move forward
with an evidentiary hearing.
Even pulling from the only “witness certification” offered, i.e.,
[that of trial counsel], [Wilson] fails to establish any merit for this
claim. Although [trial counsel’s] witness certification suggests that
the “unnamed” witness is Attorney Reggie Bridges, the underlying
proffer of testimony is vague and without any context. Nor is there
any discussion regarding how such testimony would be
admissible, as it facially appears to be prohibited by the rape
shield statute and/or is hearsay.
Rule 907 Notice, 4/3/25, at ¶¶ 31-35 (paragraph numbering and unnecessary
capitalization omitted). Thus, the court denied relief based upon deficiencies
in Wilson’s petition, specifically noting the failure to properly plead a claim of
trial counsel’s ineffectiveness as well as the failure to include an adequate
witness certification. We find that the PCRA court erred by denying Wilson
relief on his ineffectiveness claim where the PCRA court specifically
acknowledged, in its Rule 907 notice, both the substantive and procedural
defects in Wilson’s first PCRA petition, as filed by initial PCRA counsel. In
- 11 - J-S01030-26
accordance with our Rules of Criminal Procedure, the court should have
instead ordered Wilson to amend his PCRA petition within a specified time
period and thereby afforded him the opportunity to remedy the defects in his
petition. See Pa.R.Crim.P. 905(B). If the amendment is not filed or pursued,
then dismissal is, of course, appropriate.
We note that permitting Wilson to file an amended PCRA petition to
plead and prove his ineffectiveness claims is particularly necessary to promote
the interests of fairness and justice where initial PCRA counsel failed to
respond to the court’s Rule 907 notice or appear before the court in any
capacity following her filing of Wilson’s PCRA petition. Our review of the record
indicates that initial PCRA counsel neither petitioned to withdraw from
representation nor was granted leave to withdraw prior to the court’s
appointment of current PCRA counsel. Thus, it remains unclear whether initial
PCRA counsel effectively abandoned Wilson in these proceedings.
Based on the foregoing, we remand this matter to the PCRA court for
current PCRA counsel to file an amended PCRA petition on Wilson’s behalf that
sets forth a layered ineffectiveness claim and complies with the certification
requirements of Section 9545(d)(1). The PCRA court shall then conduct an
evidentiary hearing to further develop the record and consider, in the first
instance, Wilson’s layered ineffectiveness claim.
Order vacated in part. Case remanded for further proceedings consistent
with this decision. Jurisdiction relinquished.
- 12 - J-S01030-26
3/19/2026
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