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March 18, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

State v. Christopher William Kerber

Idaho Court of Appeals

• Citations: None known

• Docket Number: 52000

• Opinion

• Authorities (14)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (643)

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Combined Opinion

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

Docket No. 52000

STATE OF IDAHO, )
) Filed: March 18, 2026
Plaintiff-Respondent, )
) Melanie Gagnepain, Clerk
v. )
)
CHRISTOPHER WILLIAM KERBER, )
)
Defendant-Appellant. )
)

Appeal from the District Court of the Seventh Judicial District, State of Idaho,
Bingham County. Hon. Stephen S. Dunn, Senior District Judge.

Judgment of the district court, affirmed; order denying I.C.R. 35(b) motion,
affirmed.

Erik R. Lehtinen, State Appellate Public Defender; Stacey M. Donohue, Deputy
Appellate Public Defender, Boise, for appellant.

Hon. Raúl R. Labrador, Attorney General; Mark W. Olson, Deputy Attorney
General, Boise, for respondent.

GRATTON, Judge
Christopher William Kerber appeals from the district court’s judgment of conviction and
sentence for possession of a controlled substance. Kerber claims the district court abused its
discretion by imposing an excessive sentence and denying his Idaho Criminal Rule 35(b) motion.
In particular, Kerber argues the district court exceeded its statutory authority in imposing 100 hours
of community service. We affirm.
I.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Kerber was stopped for driving with an obstructed view of the roadway. Officers searched
Kerber’s vehicle and recovered methamphetamine and drug paraphernalia. The State charged
Kerber with possession of methamphetamine with intent to deliver, possession of drug
paraphernalia, and a persistent violator sentencing enhancement. Pursuant to a plea agreement,

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Kerber pled guilty to possession of a controlled substance (methamphetamine), Idaho Code § 37 -
2732(c)(1), and the State agreed to dismiss the paraphernalia charge and the sentencing
enhancement. The district court imposed a unified sentence of seven years with two years
determinate. The district court stated that it was ordering completion of 100 hours of community
service. Defense counsel asked for confirmation that the district court was imposing the
community service requirement noting “that’s typically a probation term.” The district court
indicated it had read the statute many times but concluded that the community service requirement
“has to be imposed on every drug conviction, whether [defendants] get probation or not.” The
judgment of conviction contained the term of incarceration as imposed at the sentencing hearing,
as well as the costs, restitution, fines, and public defender reimbursement as set forth in the court’s
oral sentencing pronouncement; however, the judgment did not contain any reference to
community service hours.
Kerber filed an I.C.R. 35(b) motion for reduction of sentence. After a hearing, the district
court denied the motion. Kerber appeals.
II.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The interpretation of a statute is a question of law over which this Court exercises free
review. State v. Anderson, 145 Idaho 99, 103, 175 P.3d 788, 792 (2008).
An appellate review of a sentence is based on an abuse of discretion standard. State v.
Biggs, 168 Idaho 112, 114, 480 P.3d 150, 152 (Ct. App. 2020). When a trial court’s discretionary
decision is reviewed on appeal, the appellate court conducts a multi-tiered inquiry to determine
whether the trial court: (1) correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) acted within the
boundaries of such discretion; (3) acted consistently with any legal standards applicable to the
specific choices before it; and (4) reached its decision by an exercise of reason. State v. Herrera,
164 Idaho 261, 270, 429 P.3d 149, 158 (2018).
III.
ANALYSIS
Kerber claims the district court abused its discretion by ordering him to complete 100 hours
of community service because the district court exceeded its statutory authority. Kerber also
contends the district court abused its discretion by imposing an excessive sentence and denying
his I.C.R. 35(b) motion. The State agrees that the district court lacked statutory authority to impose

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the community service requirement but argues that remand is not necessary because the judgment
of conviction entered by the district court did not include the unlawful community service term.
Further, the State argues the district court was within its discretion to impose Kerber’s sentence
and deny his I.C.R. 35(b) motion.
A. Community Service Requirement
Kerber argues that since the district court chose not to place him on probation or retain
jurisdiction, the district court had no lawful authority to impose any conditions on his sentence
other than the period of incarceration and any fines associated with the conviction. The State
agrees.
When a district court suspends a felony sentence and withholds judgment or imposes
probation, it possesses the authority to impose “such terms and conditions as it deems necessary
and appropriate.” I.C. § 19-2601(2), (3); see also I.C.R. 33(b), (d). However, when the district
court sentences an offender to the custody of the Idaho Department of Correction (IDOC) by
imposing a period of confinement, the IDOC possesses the statutory and constitutional authority
to impose requirements while the offender is incarcerated, and the Commission of Pardons and
Parole possesses the statutory and constitutional authority to establish the terms of any parole
supervision. See I.C. §§ 19-2513(1) (sentencing court’s authority); 20-219 (supervisory authority
of the board of correction); 20-1004(4) (Idaho Commission of Pardons and Parole authority to
impose parole conditions); see also State v. Jakoski, 139 Idaho 352, 354-56, 79 P.3d 711, 713-15
(2003) (district court loses jurisdiction over judgments of conviction after they become final,
absent a rule or statute extending its jurisdiction).
It appears that the district court was referring to I.C. § 37-2738(5) for its statement at the
sentencing hearing that it interpreted the statute to require community service “on every drug
conviction” regardless of whether the sentence is suspended. The referenced statute provides that
any offender who is convicted of a drug offense set forth in I.C. § 37-2732 (a), (b), (c), or (e) shall,
“when granted a probationary period of any sort whatsoever, be required by the court to complete
a period of not less than one hundred (100) hours of community service work.” Where the
language of a statute is plain and unambiguous, this Court must give effect to the statute as written,
without engaging in statutory construction. State v. Burnight, 132 Idaho 654, 659, 978 P.2d 214,
219 (1999); State v. Escobar, 134 Idaho 387, 389, 3 P.3d 65, 67 (Ct. App. 2000). Under the
statute’s plain language, the community service requirement is activated only when a convicted

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drug offender is granted probation. Because the district court imposed a term of incarceration, it
was without authority to impose probationary conditions such as community service requirements
and, therefore, abused its discretion by imposing the 100 hours of community service.
Although the parties agree that the district court erred by including a community service
requirement in its oral pronouncement, they disagree on the proper remedy. The State contends
that no remand is necessary to correct this error because the judgment of conviction entered by the
district court did not include the unlawful community service term. The State acknowledges that
when there is a difference between the oral pronouncement of the sentence and the written
judgment, the oral pronouncement of sentence controls. State v. Shackelford, 174 Idaho 31, 33,
551 P.3d 31, 33 (2024). The State argues, however, where the discrepancy is an illegal term in the
oral pronouncement, which is not included in the written judgment, remand is not necessary to
correct a legal written judgment because “in practical terms, it is the judgment of conviction, rather
than a transcript of a sentencing hearing, that serves as the operative document by which the IDOC,
courts, and other entities are informed of an individual’s sentence.” Alternatively, the State notes
that this Court could remand and instruct the district court to amend the judgment of conviction
with a notation affirmatively disavowing the community service requirement that was contained
in the oral sentencing pronouncement. In reply, Kerber contends that despite the legally correct
written judgment, the oral pronouncement controls and is the effective sentence; therefore, remand
is necessary to establish the correct sentence. Alternatively, Kerber states that he “would be
satisfied if this Court used its authority under Rule 35 to ‘deem’ his written judgment of conviction
to be a correction of his unlawful oral sentence.” Although the oral pronouncement contained an
illegal term, because that illegality is not memorialized in the operative judgment, the error was
corrected and remand is not necessary. We affirm the written judgment of conviction.
B. Sentence
Kerber argues the district court abused its discretion by imposing an excessive sentence.
He contends the district court failed to adequately consider the mitigating factors, including his
mental health conditions, substance abuse issues, and family support.
Sentencing is a matter for the trial court’s discretion. Both our standard of review and the
factors to be considered in evaluating the reasonableness of the sentence are well established and
need not be repeated here. See State v. Hernandez, 121 Idaho 114, 117-18, 822 P.2d 1011, 1014-
15 (Ct. App. 1991); State v. Lopez, 106 Idaho 447, 449-51, 680 P.2d 869, 871-73 (Ct. App. 1984);

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State v. Toohill, 103 Idaho 565, 568, 650 P.2d 707, 710 (Ct. App. 1982). When reviewing the
length of a sentence, we consider the defendant’s entire sentence. State v. Oliver, 144 Idaho 722,
726, 170 P.3d 387, 391 (2007). Our role is limited to determining whether reasonable minds could
reach the same conclusion as the district court. Biggs, 168 Idaho at 116, 480 P.3d at 154. Applying
these standards, and having reviewed the record in this case, we cannot say that the district court
abused its discretion.
C. Idaho Criminal Rule 35
Kerber argues the district court abused its discretion in denying his I.C.R. 35(b) motion in
light of the new information in the form of two affidavits and three exhibits showing that he had
been accepted into an addiction treatment program and into the Bannock County Mental Health
Court.
A motion for reduction of sentence under I.C.R. 35 is essentially a plea for leniency,
addressed to the sound discretion of the court. State v. Knighton, 143 Idaho 318, 319, 144 P.3d
23, 24 (2006); State v. Allbee, 115 Idaho 845, 846, 771 P.2d 66, 67 (Ct. App. 1989). In presenting
a Rule 35 motion, the defendant must show that the sentence is excessive in light of new or
additional information subsequently provided to the district court in support of the motion. State
v. Huffman, 144 Idaho 201, 203, 159 P.3d 838, 840 (2007). Upon review of the record, including
any new information submitted with Kerber’s Rule 35 motion, we conclude no abuse of discretion
has been shown.
IV.
CONCLUSION
Because the district court imposed a term of incarceration, it lacked the authority to impose
the probation condition requiring 100 hours of community service. However, the written judgment
of conviction is correct and does not include that term. Therefore, the judgment of conviction,
including the sentence set forth therein, is affirmed. The order denying Kerber’s I.C.R. 35(b)
motion for reduction of sentence is also affirmed.
Chief Judge TRIBE and Judge LORELLO CONCUR.

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