Reginald Ruffin v. Dyer Nursing & Rehabilitation Center - Title VII Hostile Work Environment Dismissed
Summary
The United States District Court for the Northern District of Indiana granted in part and denied in part Defendants' Partial Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff Reginald Ruffin's Amended Complaint in this Title VII action against Dyer Nursing & Rehabilitation Center, LLC and Dyer HC, LLC. The Court dismissed the hostile work environment claim in Count III as duplicative of the sexual harassment claim in Count II, finding both claims arose from the same operative facts and sought the same relief. The sexual harassment claim in Count II, sex discrimination claim in Count IV, and retaliation claim in Count I remain pending.
Employers defending Title VII actions should review how they plead related claims to avoid duplication findings that could narrow or eliminate claims at the pleading stage. Where multiple Title VII theories arise from the same conduct, practitioners should consider consolidating theories under a single coherent narrative rather than asserting parallel claims that a court may view as duplicative — the Ruffin ruling shows that hostile work environment and sexual harassment claims based on identical facts face dismissal, while sex discrimination and retaliation claims that add distinct elements may survive alongside sexual harassment claims.
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What changed
The Court applied the duplicative-claim standard under Seventh Circuit precedent, finding that the hostile work environment claim in Count III shared identical operative facts and injury with the sexual harassment claim in Count II. The Court exercised its authority under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) to dismiss the duplicative count without prejudice to refiling as part of a properly consolidated claim. Defendants' partial motion to dismiss was granted as to Count III and denied as to Counts II and IV, which the Court found raised distinct legal theories even if based on overlapping facts. Employers facing Title VII litigation should note that multiple claims arising from the same factual nucleus may be consolidated, but duplicative counts face dismissal — the surviving claims here demonstrate that sexual harassment, hostile work environment, sex discrimination, and retaliation are distinct legal theories requiring careful pleading to survive a 12(b)(6) challenge.
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Apr 24, 2026GovPing captured this document from the original source. If the source has since changed or been removed, this is the text as it existed at that time.
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April 2, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note
Reginald Ruffin v. Dyer Nursing & Rehabilitation Center, LLC and Dyer HC, LLC
District Court, N.D. Indiana
- Citations: None known
- Docket Number: 2:25-cv-00037
Precedential Status: Unknown Status
Trial Court Document
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
HAMMOND DIVISION
REGINALD RUFFIN,
Plaintiff,
v. CAUSE NO.: 2:25-CV-37-TLS-JEM
DYER NURSING & REHABILITATION
CENTER, LLC and DYER HC, LLC,
Defendants.
OPINION AND ORDER
This matter before the Court on the Defendants’ Partial Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s
Amended Complaint, which is fully briefed. ECF Nos. 38, 39, 46, 47, 54. The Defendants argue
that the Plaintiff’s Title VII hostile work environment claim in Count III and Title VII sex
discrimination claim in Count IV are duplicative of the Plaintiff’s Title VII sexual harassment
claim in Count II because the three counts are based on the same set of facts and ask for the same
relief. For the following reasons, the Court grants in part and denies in part the motion to
dismiss, dismissing the hostile work environment claim in Count III.
LEGAL STANDARD
“A motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) challenges the
viability of a complaint by arguing that it fails to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted.” Camasta v. Jos. A. Bank Clothiers, Inc., 761 F.3d 732, 736 (7th Cir. 2014) (citing Fed.
R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6); Gen. Elec. Cap. Corp. v. Lease Resol. Corp., 128 F.3d 1074, 1080 (7th Cir.
1997)). When reviewing a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a court construes the
complaint in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, accepts the factual allegations as
true, and draws all inferences in the non-moving party’s favor. Bell v. City of Chicago, 835 F.3d
736, 738 (7th Cir. 2016). “Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the
speculative level . . . on the assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are true (even if
doubtful in fact).” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). “A claim has facial
plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.
662, 678 (2009) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). “It is the defendant’s burden to establish the
complaint’s insufficiency.” Gunn v. Cont’l Cas. Co., 968 F.3d 802, 806 (7th Cir. 2020).
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The Amended Complaint alleges the following facts. The Plaintiff began working for the
Defendants Dyer Nursing and Dyer HC, LLC in October 2021 as a dietary aid, and he performed
his job well. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 6,7, ECF No. 29. On March 26, 2023, the Plaintiff went outside
with the Manager and Assistant Manager. Id. ¶ 8. The Plaintiff dropped his lighter, and when he
bent over to pick it up, the Manager aggressively pulled his head into her genital area. Id. ¶ 9.
The Plaintiff immediately went inside the building and asked for documentation to file a sexual
harassment complaint. Id. ¶ 10. The Assistant Manager told the Human Resources Administrator
what happened and was told to leave it alone and not make a complaint. Id. ¶ 11. On March 28,
2023, the Plaintiff made a formal complaint to Human Resources, and the Assistant Manager
submitted a statement corroborating his complaint. Id. ¶ 12. On March 29, 2023, the Manager
was sent home pending the investigation. Id. ¶ 13.
Over a period of about two weeks, the Plaintiff was questioned about what happened. Id.
¶ 14. On April 12, 2023, the Plaintiff was told that the Manager would be returning to manage
the kitchen. Id. ¶ 15. The Plaintiff informed management that he was uncomfortable working
with the Manager. Id. ¶ 16. The Human Resources Administrator told the Plaintiff that he would
have to work second shift, move to another department, or resign. Id. ¶ 17. The Plaintiff stated
that he did not want to move to another department and that he liked his job. Id. ¶ 18. The
Plaintiff was moved to second shift, and his hours were reduced by more than fifteen hours per
week. Id. ¶ 19.
The Plaintiff alleges that he was subjected to a hostile work environment when the
Defendants’ Manager sexually harassed him, id. ¶ 20, he was sexually harassed, id. ¶ 21, and he
was retaliated against by the Defendants for engaging in protected activity, id. ¶ 22.
The Amended Complaint brings four claims against the Defendants for alleged violations
of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000, et al.: (1) retaliation due to the Plaintiff’s submission of a
complaint of sexual harassment (Count I); (2) sexual harassment (Count II); (3) hostile work
environment (Count III); and (4) sex discrimination (Count IV).
ANALYSIS
The Court has the authority to dismiss as duplicative “[c]laims that involve the same
operative facts and same injury, and that require proof of essentially the same elements.” Greene
v. Ill. Sec’y of State, — F. Supp. 3d —, —, No. 23 C 2182, 2025 WL 3268678, at *3 (N.D. Ill.
Nov. 24, 2025) (quoting Barrow v. Blouin, 38 F. Supp. 3d 916, 920 (N.D. Ill. 2014)); see also
Roy v. Power Dry Chi. Inc., No. 21 C 2744, 2021 WL 3801817, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 26, 2021)
(dismissing a Title VII wrongful termination claim as “wholly duplicative” of a properly pled
Title VII race discrimination claim (citing Barrow, 38 F. Supp. 3d at 920)). In the pending
motion, the Defendants ask the Court to dismiss both the Title VII hostile work environment
claim in Count III and the Title VII sex discrimination claim in Count IV as duplicative of the
Title VII sexual harassment claim in Count II, arguing that the three claims are based on the
same singular event on March 26, 2023. The Court considers each count in turn.
Count III alleges that the Plaintiff was subjected to a hostile work environment in
violation of Title VII. The Plaintiff does not oppose dismissal of Count III as duplicative of the
claim in Count II for sexual harassment under Title VII. Accordingly, the Court grants the
motion as to Count III.
In Count IV, the Plaintiff alleges that the Defendants subjected him to “different terms
and conditions of employment due to his sex” in violation of Title VII, citing Paragraphs 1
through 22 of the Amended Complaint. Am. Compl, ¶ 30 (emphasis added). In comparison,
Count II alleges that the Defendants sexually harassed the Plaintiff in violation of Title VII, also
based on the allegations in Paragraphs 1 through 22 of the Amended Complaint. The Defendants
argue that the Plaintiff has alleged no new facts that would support an independent claim of sex
discrimination but is instead alleging “gender discrimination based on sexual harassment.” Def.
Br. 5, ECF No. 39 (quoting Brooks v. FedEx Supply Chain, Inc., No. 3:19-CV-14, 2019 WL
1746264, at *5 (S.D. Ill. Apr. 18, 2019) (dismissing a sex discrimination claim, explaining that
“Counts I and II are duplicative because sexual harassment is a form of gender discrimination”
(citing cases)); Brownlee v. Cath. Charities of the Archdiocese of Chi., No. 16-CV-665, 2017
WL 770997, at *3–4 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 28, 2017) (striking the plaintiffs’ sex discrimination claims
as redundant with their sexual harassment and constructive discharge claims)).
The Plaintiff responds that, while the Defendants are correct that sexual harassment is a
form of sex discrimination, see Anicich v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc., 852 F.3d 643, 650 (7th Cir.
2017), not all sex discrimination claims are sexual harassment claims. The Plaintiff contends that
his claim of sex discrimination in Count IV is based on the Defendants’ disparate treatment of
him following his complaint compared to the female Manager who harassed him.
Title VII prohibits discrimination by an employer “because of” an individual’s sex. 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a). “A complaint alleging sex discrimination under Title VII ‘need only aver
that the employer instituted a (specified) adverse employment action against the plaintiff on the
basis of [his] sex.’” Carlson v. CSX Transp., Inc., 758 F.3d 819, 827 (7th Cir. 2014) (quoting
Tamayo v. Blagojevich, 526 F.3d 1074, 1084 (7th Cir. 2008)).1 Here, the Plaintiff has alleged
that he is a male, he performed his job well, he suffered an adverse employment action when he
was forced to move to second shift and his hours were cut, and his female Manager, who
allegedly harassed him, was returned to her position as kitchen manager. Count IV alleges that
he was treated differently “due to his sex.” Drawing the inferences in his favor as the Court must
on a motion to dismiss, there are sufficient factual allegations to infer that the Plaintiff was
forced to move to second shift and had his hours cut because he is a male. Accordingly, the
Plaintiff has stated a distinct claim of sex discrimination, and the Court denies the motion to
dismiss as to Count IV.
CONCLUSION
For the above reasons, the Court hereby GRANTS in part and DENIES in part the
Defendants’ Partial Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint [ECF No. 38], dismissing
Count III of the Amended Complaint. This case remains pending on Counts I, II, and IV of the
Amended Complaint.
SO ORDERED on April 2, 2026.
s/ Theresa L. Springmann
JUDGE THERESA L. SPRINGMANN
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
1 Although both the Plaintiff and the Defendants cite cases setting out the four elements of a prima facie
case for discrimination used on summary judgment, a plaintiff’s complaint is not required to plead those
elements. See Kaminski v. Elite Staffing, Inc., 23 F.4th 774, 777 (7th Cir. 2022) (“Satisfying Rule 8 and
the accompanying standards articulated by the Supreme Court in Twombly and Iqbal does not require a
plaintiff to plead a prima facie case of employment discrimination.” (citations omitted)).
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