US District Court NDIN Docket Feed

Diana Tran v. A&E Welding LLC - Claims Dismissed Without Prejudice

Chief Judge Holly A. Brady of the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Indiana adopted a Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation and dismissed pro se plaintiff Diana Tran's claims against A&E Welding LLC and Louis Lengacher without prejudice. The dismissal was ordered under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16(f)(1) after the plaintiff failed to cure deficiencies in her complaint despite two court orders with warning that failure would result in dismissal. The 14-day objection period under Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b) passed without any objections filed by the parties.

Ricardo Bustos v. Lake Station Police Department — Excessive Force Claim, Leave to Amend

The United States District Court for the Northern District of Indiana evaluated Ricardo Bustos's in forma pauperis complaint alleging that Officers Jezerski and Koselke, Corporal Dokmanovic, Detective Boney, and the Lake Station Police Department used excessive force during a home arrest in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1983. Applying the pleading standards under Ashcroft v. Iqbal and its progeny, the Court found the complaint insufficient because it failed to plausibly connect each named defendant to the alleged misconduct — the pleading attributed conduct only to unidentified "Officers" without specificity. The Court granted Bustos until April 30, 2026 to file an amended complaint and cautioned that failure to do so would result in dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A without further notice.

Reginald Ruffin v. Dyer Nursing & Rehabilitation Center - Title VII Hostile Work Environment Dismissed

The United States District Court for the Northern District of Indiana granted in part and denied in part Defendants' Partial Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff Reginald Ruffin's Amended Complaint in this Title VII action against Dyer Nursing & Rehabilitation Center, LLC and Dyer HC, LLC. The Court dismissed the hostile work environment claim in Count III as duplicative of the sexual harassment claim in Count II, finding both claims arose from the same operative facts and sought the same relief. The sexual harassment claim in Count II, sex discrimination claim in Count IV, and retaliation claim in Count I remain pending.