Q.T. v S. O'F. - Quashing of District Court Safety Order

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  Q. T. v S. O'F. (Approved) [2026] IEHC 168 (19 March 2026)

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THE HIGH COURT

2024 1570 JR

[2026] IEHC 168

BETWEEN:

Q. T.

APPLICANT

AND

S. O'F.

RESPONDENT

JUDGMENT of Ms. Justice Mary Rose Gearty delivered on 19 th March, 2026

1. Introduction

1.1 The Applicant seeks to quash a District Court safety order. Rather than lodging an appeal, he applied to the Judge to state a case and then applied to this Court to quash the order, arguing that the Judge had misapplied the Domestic Violence Act of 2018 by granting a safety order to a neighbour and that the original hearing had been unfair. Leave was granted to seek an order of certiorari, quashing the safety order, on these grounds. This judgment addresses the substantive issues and the application of the Judge to have his name and title removed from the proceedings.

1.2 The Judge is entitled to be released and his name removed from the title of the action as there is no evidence of mala fides or bad faith on his part. ?In respect of the substantive case, there is no basis on which to grant the orders sought.

2. Procedural History and Scope of this Substantive Hearing

2.1 Two District Court hearings are relevant to this case, but only one was the subject of the application for leave. The Applicant avers that his neighbour made a complaint and obtained a safety order against him in the District Court on 24 th September 2024, despite his opposition to that order.? None of the parties addressed the issue of anonymisation.? Section 23 of the Domestic Violence Act of 2018 provides that civil applications under the Act are made otherwise than in public and the parties' names have been anonymised accordingly.

2.2 The Applicant was granted leave to review the granting of a safety order on the following grounds: that the Judge did not give him a fair hearing, that he was prejudiced against him in making his decision, and that the Judge had a pre-determined outcome, particularly when clarity was sought regarding the status of the complainant in section 6(1)(a) of the Domestic Violence Act, 2018.

2.3 The Applicant's core argument in his initial leave application was that the Judge ought not to have applied the terms of the 2018 Act to a neighbour. In fact, the neighbour had been the Applicant's intimate partner, but this fact only became clear on the hearing date in this Court, in February of 2026. In his statement of grounds, the Applicant also claimed there was insufficient evidence on which to grant the order and that the hearing was pre-determined.?

2.4 The leave application was dated 17 th December 2024, leave was granted on 17 th February 2025, and the Judicial Respondent was put on notice. ?On 6 th May 2025, the complainant, was joined as a Respondent on the basis that she is the obvious legitimus contradictor (the legitimate opponent) in the case. The application was in time and both Respondents were on notice of the substantive application. The complainant's solicitors on record for the District Court proceedings entered an appearance, but did not take part in the judicial review proceedings. The Judicial Respondent filed a motion seeking an order that he ought not to be named as a Respondent.? Both the motion and the substantive application were heard on 19 th February 2026.

2.5 In the affidavit supporting his application, having briefly noted that he did not receive a fair hearing on 24 th September, the Applicant's affidavit refers mainly to a later hearing, which occurred on 28 th November, 2024. The Judicial Respondent argued that the November hearing was irrelevant to the case as no leave was granted in respect that hearing.? However, despite the fact that leave was not sought, or granted, to challenge the November decision, it is necessary to refer to the evidence of that hearing. Not only does this evidence help to assess the allegations of mala fides, but the transcript sheds light on the previous September hearing and clarifies the Applicant's approach to this case.

2.6?After the September hearing, the Applicant contacted district court staff and was asked to appear before the same District Judge on 28 th November 2024. While he characterises this as being an invitation to state a case, the email from court staff was in direct response to the Applicant's emails asking when he could appear before the District Court to make his application to state a case. In that respect, it was not at the Court's invitation that he appeared, but after his repeated requests to be heard.? He points out, correctly, that the application was in time when considering the provisions of the Summary Jurisdiction Act 1857 but that the District Court's response was late.? I note this timeline, but also note that he repeatedly refers to errors of law in this regard and in each case, as set out below, it is the Applicant who is in error and not the District Judge.

2.7 The Applicant exhibits his email exchange with court staff and a document entitled:

"Summary Jurisdiction Act, 1857 Section 2

Notice of Application to State a Case"

He exhibits also a "Summary of the opinion" as to why he is asking the Judge to state a case, stating his grounds that the Judge:

a. Did not afford me the presumption of innocence, nor did he afford me an opportunity to present my defence at the outset of the hearing.

b. Did not allow me to interrogate the Applicant of her testament with prior notice

c. Ignored my sworn affidavit filed on 23 rd September detailing the Applicant's Perjury in her previous sworn testaments and details of a separate Garda investigation of this matter (pulse number redacted ) I did mention to the court of the matter of perjury being reported to the Garda and judge did not take notice and inquire of its standing.

d. Appeared to have a pre-determined decision with the proceeding and an unclear knowledge of Section 6.1.a of the Domestic Violence Act 2018, when in relation to subsection (iii) of no relationship for 4 years and 8 months.

The summary concludes by seeking " the Court's direction in relation to defending [ his ] good name against malicious and fabricated allegations."

2.8 The applicant has obtained the transcript of the Digital Audio Recording [DAR] of the November hearing and has directed a number of oral arguments to alleged failures in that hearing.? He refers specifically to the four grounds of this case stated application in his affidavit grounding his application for leave, dated 17 th December, 2024. The Applicant also referred to the November decision in support of his argument that the Judge had ignored evidence, had been biased, had acted mala fides and should be named in the proceedings.

2.9 The scope of this leave application is important: the Order granting leave is confined to the September decision. The Applicant has challenged only one order, not both. He has asked, but only in his affidavit, for orders quashing both the decisions in September and in November. However, despite this averment that he seeks to quash both the granting of a safety order and the refusal to state a case to the High Court, he has leave only in respect of the first Order.? Further, the only practical and effective remedy this Court can grant is to remit the issue of the safety order to the District Court for reconsideration.? For reasons set out below, this Court would not consider quashing the refusal of the Judge to state a case, even if leave had been granted, as no error of law was identified.?

2.10 The Applicant was afforded ample time to make submissions on all issues at hearing. This judgment assesses the relevance of the November hearing but the substantive ruling is confined to the September order, as required by the terms of the Order granting leave to the Applicant.

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3. Judicial Respondents and *mala fides*

3.1?The first issue for determination is whether the Judge is properly named as a respondent.? O. 84 rule 22(2A) of the Rules of the Superior Courts, provides that a judge shall not be named in judicial review proceedings in the absence of a claim of mala fides such as would deprive her of immunity from suit.?

3.2 The Applicant relied on one case, O'Connor v. O'Donohoe and Cronly [2017] IEHC 830, to support his claim that the judge's excessive interventions rendered the hearing in November unfair and the same hearing was evidence of his bad faith or mala fides, to use the term in Rule 22(2A).? He submitted that this could be considered by the Court in considering whether that the same bad faith was evident in the September hearing.? In September, he claimed that the Judge made his decision without hearing his defence, considering an affidavit and not having permitted him to cross-examine the complainant.

3.3 The Applicant's own case, that of O'Connor, addresses this question squarely.? The kind of conduct which requires the naming of a judge as a respondent has been confirmed by Haughton J. in A.G. v. A Judge of the District Court [2023] IECA 311: deliberate bad faith on the part of the judge must be established.

3.4 In O'Connor, Faherty J. examined exactly this argument and found no evidence of mala fides.? Put simply, just because you disagree with a judge's decision, and even if he appears to disagree with you, this is not evidence that he is abusing the court process or that he intends to bring about a certain result in the case.?

3.5 Both Haughton J. in A.G. v. A Judge of the District Court and Faherty J. in O'Connor cite ** Humphreys J. (in Hall v. Stepstone Mortgage Funding Limited [2015] IEHC 737) who used the words "flagrant and deliberate".? This Court considered the issue in G.P. v. N.S. [2025] IEHC 238, contrasting bias with bad faith per Hogan, Morgan & Daly in Administrative Law in Ireland, concluding at paragraph 14.01 of the 5 th Edition: bias may have an objective existence without any element of consciousness... whereas the essence of bad faith is dishonesty.

3.6 Mr. O'Connor had relied on interruptions, a cross-examination of his witness by the Judge and various other procedural irregularities (which were more frequent and more significant than those arising in this case) to support claims of mala fides. Faherty J. concluded that the intention of the judge was, notwithstanding many interruptions, to grapple with the core issues. She found no evidence of mala fides.? There was such a pattern of intervention, however, that she found that an objective observer might have considered the hearing to be unfair and the case was remitted to the Circuit Court for a fresh hearing.

3.7 As in O'Connor, there is no evidence that this Judge had an interest in the outcome of the case, nor is there evidence that he knew either party.? It is clear that this Judge has no case to answer in terms of the allegation of mala fides, as was the case in O'Connor. The appropriate respondent can be identified readily: it is the applicant for the safety order.? The argument that the Judge in O'Connor should not have been named in the title of the action does not appear to have arisen at all, and it is not addressed in the judgment.

3.8 The practical effect of O.84 r.22(2A) has been considered by Simons J. in Murphy v. Roscommon County Council [2025] IEHC 447 where he discussed the specific terms of the rule, which provides that a judge shall not be " named " in judicial review proceedings in the absence of a claim of mala fides.? As noted, the Court of Appeal confirms that to claim mala fides is not sufficient to justify naming a judicial respondent, otherwise, the mere claim would defeat the purpose of the provision. Thus, some evidence of mala fides must be established and that issue has already been addressed. The title of the judge was used in the 2023 judgment of Haughton J., rather than his name, but again, the argument in respect of whether even his title should appear does not appear to have arisen.?

3.9 As regards the "naming" of a judge, Simons J. reviewed the relevant caselaw and concluded that the name and title of the judge should be removed from the title of the action and that a judge should not be joined as a respondent. The practice of joining a judge as respondent by referring to "a Judge" in the title, should cease.? He followed the earlier case of M. v. M. [2019] IECA 124, a decision of Irvine J. in the Court of Appeal and his judgment is consistent with that of Phelan J. in Tallon v. DPP [2022] IEHC 322, in this regard.? In the decision of the Court of Appeal in Brady v. Revenue Commissioners [2021] IECA 8, while Edwards J. was critical of the fact that the Circuit Court Judge was not joined, the decision of M. v M. does not appear to have been cited to that Court.?

3.10 In Murphy, Simons J. noted that removing judicial respondents was consistent with the constitutional imperative that justice should be administered in public as the original case usually takes place in public and there is no difficulty in discerning the identity of a judicial decision maker. Moreover, he noted, removing the judicial respondent is consistent with the principles of judicial independence and judicial immunity. The rule ensures that the respondent in a judicial review case is the original opposing party, referred to as the legitimus contradictor and this rationale is compelling.

3.11 On that basis, it is appropriate that this Judicial Respondent be removed and the original complainant in the District Court remain as the only Respondent, although she has not participated in the application. ?The Court must, nonetheless, consider the substance of the claim based solely on the Applicant's papers and submissions.? Even if one party concedes or does not take part in the hearing of a judicial review application, the Court may not simply find in favour of the applicant but has a duty to ensure that proceedings are conducted in a manner which accords with the efficient administration of justice and is, ultimately, in the interests of justice:? Ballyboden Tidy Towns Group v. An Bord Plean?la and others [2024] IESC 4.?

**

4. The Substantive issue:? Alternative Remedies

4.1 Those who seek leave to review judicial decisions must demonstrate arguable grounds for the remedy sought: G v. DPP [1994] 1 IR 374. It is well established that the remedy of judicial review is one that is available only when other remedies have been exhausted. As set out by Murray J. in Chubb European Group v. HIA [2020] IECA 91, if there is an alternative remedy, relief should be refused unless that remedy is not adequate, or it is in the interests of justice to allow leave instead. ?Where a lack of fair procedures at the first decision-making stage is so fundamental that the appeal is, in reality, the only fair hearing, then judicial review is appropriate.? Here, the Applicant had a full appeal available to him and, on that basis alone, it appears that he has not exhausted his remedies and should be refused relief. Nonetheless, if the initial hearing was so fundamentally unfair as to remove the effective right of appeal, judicial review may be appropriate, so the substance of his application must be examined.

5. The Domestic Violence Act 2018

5.1?On the 10 th of February, the first return date in the Judicial Review Ex Parte List in the High Court, the Applicant was asked if it was not more appropriate that he appeal the granting of the safety order.? In response, he argued that he was entitled to review the decision instead, as the Judge had a pre-determined view and had applied the Domestic Violence Act to a person who was his neighbour and not his intimate partner. Leave was granted on that basis.?

5.2 In fact, a reference in his affidavit provides a clue as to why the Act was properly invoked: his neighbour was also a former partner.? The only averment which referred to this is a recitation of grounds for stating a case which reads:?

" Appeared to have a predetermined decision with the proceeding and an unclear knowledge of section 6.1.a of the domestic violence Act 2018, when in relation to subsection iii of no relationship for 4 years and 8 months."

5.3 This is the only reference, in the papers filed, to the factual situation with which the District Judge was presented: the Applicant was in a prior, intimate relationship with the complainant, albeit one that ended over 4 years before the application for a safety order. At the hearing, on 26 th February 2026, the Applicant confirmed this important detail to this Court.?

5.4 The Applicant avers that he was not permitted to interrogate the complainant during her application for a safety order.? This is in line with section 16 of the Domestic Violence Act of 2018 which restricts cross‑examination of applicants in such proceedings.? The Act provides that: the court may direct that the applicant or the respondent, as the case may be, may not personally cross-examine the witness unless the court is of the opinion that the interests of justice require the applicant or respondent to conduct the cross-examination personally. Section 16 goes on to provide that the relevant party, or the judge, may appoint a legal representative to conduct the cross-examination.? There is no averment touching on this.?

5.5 The section was not opened to this Court, nor was there evidence as to what had occurred in this regard. Instead, the Applicant presented his case as though preventing a personal cross-examination was not permitted by law:? it is, in limited circumstances.? With no other evidence, this Court cannot criticise this decision, even taking the Applicant's description as an accurate one.?

5.6 The other specific aspects of unfairness relied upon in the affidavit and the oral arguments were (a) the failure to hear the Applicant and (b) to afford him the presumption of innocence. There is no specific evidence offered as to how the Judge failed in either regard and, more fundamentally, no reference at all to the evidence heard by the Judge.? There is no description of evidence from the complainant nor any indication of evidence he gave himself, if any.?

5.7 The Applicant is obliged to act with uberrima fides (or utmost good faith) in his application for leave.? In other words, he must place all relevant information before this Court, favourable or otherwise.? He did not set out the grounds of the complainant's application, other than as a broad assertion in oral argument.

5.8 The relevant portions of section 6. (1) (a) read as follows:? In this section?

" applicant" means a person (other than the Agency) who has applied ... for a safety order against another person (in this section referred to as "the respondent") and the person so applying or on whose behalf the Agency has so applied? ...

(iii) is not the spouse or civil partner of the respondent and is not related to the respondent within a prohibited degree of relationship, but was in an intimate relationship with the respondent prior to the application for the safety order

5.9 The section applies to various relationships including spouses, and it also applies expressly to parties who are, or were once, in an intimate relationship prior to the date of the application.? As noted above, it emerged during the hearing, although it was not set out clearly in the Applicant's affidavit, that the woman in question had been in an intimate relationship with this Applicant and, even though that relationship was now over, the Judge was, therefore, entitled to consider the application under the Domestic Violence Act.

6. The Case Stated Procedure and the "Option" of Judicial Review

6.1 After the hearing and determination of a summary case, that is a case which has been heard by a judge sitting alone rather than by a jury, a party who is dissatisfied with the decision as being erroneous in law may ask the relevant judge to state a case for the opinion of the Superior Courts under section 2 of the Summary Jurisdiction Act of 1857. The facts and grounds for the application must be set out and questions prepared for the consideration of this Court.

6.2 As is clear from this description, any applicant who seeks to use this process must set out the error in law in the decision. Here, the Applicant has exhibited the papers which were before the Judge in the November hearing. This was when he sought to persuade the Judge to state a case.? Even though he has not sought to review that decision, I have considered the substance of that case in order to ensure that there has been no injustice to the Applicant.

6.3?In his application under s.2, the Applicant sets out his grounds but none of these amounts to an error of law.? The Applicant argued strongly that failures such as refusing to hear him, ignoring his affidavit, or rejecting his evidence were errors of law but this is not correct. Such grounds amount to claims that the judge was mistaken in the facts or erred in assessing the evidence but not that he mistook the law.? The law was set out in the 2018 Act and there is no support here for the claim that the Judge erred in how that Act was applied: The law permitted the making of the safety order.?

6.4 The Applicant characterises the November hearing as one that was unfair, but the DAR transcript reveals that the Applicant and the Judge were at cross-purposes, at most.? The Judge interrupts, albeit mainly to assist the Applicant by telling him that he has a right of appeal.? While the Applicant may have felt aggrieved and frustrated, his own application did not reveal a basis in law on which the Judge could have stated a case.? In a perfect world, the Judge might have had time to explain that the process the Applicant was using was not just unorthodox but inappropriate and then set out why that was so.? This is rarely possible in the District Court where the case load is very large. Applicants must prepare their cases according to law and may not benefit from an advantage not available to lawyers, such as using the wrong procedure and relying on their status as a litigants in person to plead that they should be permitted to do what no other litigant, when represented by a lawyer, is permitted to do: e.g. Clarke J. in Burke v. O' Halloran [2009] IEHC 343, at para. 5.5:? a party who chooses to represent themselves is no less bound by the laws of evidence and procedure and any other relevant laws, and by the rulings of the court in that regard, than any other party

6.5 The Applicant submitted that the fact that he was not listened to in November was "an extension of mala fides ".? He also submitted that a pre-determined outcome amounted to bad faith.? He argued that it happened in the September hearing and that the second hearing, in November, was an opportunity to remedy this.? He also noted that section 6(1) of the Domestic Violence Act was not explained to him, referring to the categorisation of his neighbour as a former intimate partner.? This may also refer to the fact that there is no time period referred to in the section so that the safety order may be granted years after a relationship has concluded. The Applicant argued that the response of the Judge to his submission about s.6(1)(a)(iii) indicated pre-judgment.

6.6 There was no description in the pleadings about the hearing on the 24 th of September save that the hearing was unfair and that the Judge showed pre-determination in respect of his interpretation of s.6(1).? This makes it clear that no error of law has been identified in this case because, as set out above, the Judge's interpretation of the section was correct.?

6.7 Only at the oral hearing did the Applicant put forward the case that the s.6(1)(a)(iii) category of victim, encompassing a prior relationship, should incorporate an element of temporal proximity to that relationship.? Put simply, he argues that the Judge was wrong to rely on evidence of an intimate relationship that ended over 4 years before the proceedings.? This was never pleaded and there was no evidence that it was ever raised before the Judge. ?

6.8?Even if it was raised, this could not be an error of law.? The Act itself does not provide for any temporal proximity.? Its terms are clear: " was in an intimate relationship with the respondent prior to the application for the safety order."? No judge could read a temporal proximity requirement into this subsection without changing the law, which a court is not permitted to do.? Prior to the 2018 Act coming into force, there had been such a provision.? The legislature removed it, supporting my conclusion based on the plain words of the section.

6.9 Finally, it appears unlikely that the Applicant did not understand that an intimate partner was included in the list of those who could apply for a safety order. His defence appears to have rested, in some part, on the fact that this person was his neighbour and not his partner. Yet even this is hard to determine as the evidence in respect of the safety order was not before this Court.? It is not necessary that a DAR transcript be exhibited, but a general description of what was put before the District Judge must be set out.? The onus is on the Applicant to adduce evidence to support the grounds of his application.

7. ?Conclusions

7.1 The Applicant had a full statutory right of appeal to the Circuit Court against the District Judge's decision to grant a safety order. That appeal is heard de novo, with all evidence reconsidered and a fresh order made, if appropriate. Instead of availing of that remedy, the Applicant returned to the District Court seeking to have the Judge state a case for the opinion of the High Court. He acknowledged that this step was " unorthodox " but maintained that he was entitled to choose it. He was not. Litigants cannot decide, at their election, to bypass the clear statutory appellate structure. Courts must operate within statutory frameworks, developed through the case law. As repeatedly affirmed (see Chubb, cited above) judicial review is a remedy of last resort and does not lie where an adequate alternative remedy exists and has not been exhausted.

7.2 The Applicant argued that the September hearing had been predetermined and unfair, and that the subsequent November hearing demonstrated mala fides on the part of the Judge. The evidence does not support that contention. The November DAR reveals a judge attempting to understand the purpose of the Applicant's presence in court and directing him to the appropriate remedy of an appeal. Interruptions of that nature do not, and could not, amount to bias or bad faith. Nor was any error of law identified in the proposed case stated.? The Judge was entitled to refuse to state a case where no legal question arose.

7.3 As regards the September hearing itself, the Applicant offered no substantive account of the evidence before the District Court and did not disclose plainly, until the hearing, that he and the complainant had previously been in an intimate relationship. This fact alone permitted the complaint under s.6(1)(a)(iii) of the Domestic Violence Act 2018, and the District Judge was therefore entitled to consider her application. The weight to be attached to any particular piece of evidence was a matter solely for the Judge. The refusal to permit cross‑examination was consistent with s.16 of the 2018 Act. None of the matters raised discloses an error of law or procedural unfairness of such gravity as to undermine the Applicant's right to a full appeal in the Circuit Court

7.4 In those circumstances, the Court is satisfied that judicial review is not appropriate. The existence of a clear and adequate statutory appeal route, which the Applicant chose not to pursue, is determinative. There was no evidence of a fundamental unfairness in the original proceedings. There is therefore no basis on which an Order of certiorari can be granted.

8. Final Orders

8.1 The final order in respect of the motion is to remove the judge from the title of the proceedings.

8.2 The final order in respect of the proceedings is to refuse the remedy of certiorari on the basis that the Applicant ignored the alternative and more appropriate remedy of appealing the original decision granting a safety order.

8.3?My provisional view is that this is not an appropriate case in which to make an order of costs, given the conflicting authorities in respect of the judicial respondents and the fact that the second Respondent did not take part in the hearing. The Applicant incurred no legal costs in the case but also, he has been unsuccessful so s.169 of the Legal Services Regulatory Authority Act suggests that he would not usually be entitled to any such order.? If either party wishes to argue for a different order, submissions should be made in writing to the Court within 14 days by emailing no more than two thousand words to the Registrar at Nonjuryjudicialreview@courts.ie

8.4 If no submissions are received, no order will be made in relation to costs.

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