DPP v R.M. - Sexual Assault Convictions Appeal

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  The Director of Public Prosecutions v R.M. (Approved) [2026] IECA 50 (19 March 2026)

URL: https://www.bailii.org/ie/cases/IECA/2026/2026IECA50.html
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[2026] IECA 50 | | |
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APPROVED

NO REDACTION NEEDED

THE COURT OF APPEAL

Record Number: 173/2022

Neutral Citation Number: [2026] IECA 50

Kennedy J.

Burns J.

Owens J.

Between/

THE PEOPLE (AT THE SUIT OF
THE DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS)

Respondent

AND-

R.M.

Appellant

JUDGMENT of the Court delivered by Mr. Justice Alexander Owens on the ?19 day of March 2026.

1. On 5 May 2022, following a trial. ?R.M. was convicted of having committed two offences. He was convicted of having sexually assaulted a young relation of his wife's, A.B., in a concrete shed behind a house on an unknown date between a date in 1997 and a date in 1999. He also was convicted of having orally raped AB on a family occasion which took place ?at a different location on a date in late March or early ?April 2003.

2. AB gave evidence that the family gathered at the house ** every year after an anniversary mass, and following the annual blessing of the graves. She gave evidence that R.M. molested her when they were attending one of these gatherings. She also gave evidence that he orally raped her while she was attending the later family gathering.

3. The jury acquitted R.M. of two further charges. The first of those charges alleged that he sexually assaulted A.B. at a playground on an unknown date between ?January 1997 and? January 2002. The second alleged that he sexually assaulted her at a family gathering at a different location on a New Year's Eve between 1996 and 2001.

4. R.M. appealed against his convictions. He claims that the trial judge erred in law in refusing to give a corroboration warning. He also claims that evidence by AB that she made a disclosure to her mother on 19 January 2016 ought to have been excluded. He also claims that evidence of another witness, XY that she saw AB go off on her own with him on occasions when they were at the house ought not to have been admitted.

5. There is no merit in any of the three grounds on which RM is appealing against his convictions.

6. The Learned Trial Judge was asked to give a corroboration warning to the jury in relation to A.B.'s evidence because of two factors. Firstly, the offences charged were alleged to have been committed over a wide and ill-defined time-frame. Secondly, the charges pertained to events in public places or family occasions. It might therefore be expected that if RM had engaged in the sexual improprieties described by AB in evidence, these would have been witnesses by third parties.

7. It is often the case that a witness giving evidence of having been sexually abused while a child is unable to provide any degree of certainty as to the date when a specific instance of abuse took place. The witness will only be able to testify that the event occurred in a specific year or within a particular timeframe or at a specific event. That inability does not, of itself, make the testimony of such a witness unreliable.

8. The fact that evidence of a witness relates to sexual assaults charged as having have been perpetrated within such time-frames is not sufficient reason to justify a trial judge in acceding to an application to give a corroboration warning in relation to that evidence. Were trial judges obliged to give corroboration warnings in such circumstances, the result would be that such a warning would be necessary in virtually every trial involving an allegation of historic sex abuse.

9. The courts have frequently encountered instances where persons have been convicted of perpetrating sexual assaults on children on the occasion of visits to relations, or of family or other social gatherings. It is in the nature of sexual abuse that it is opportunistic and committed out of sight of others. Were trial judges obliged to give a corroboration warning where a person gives evidence of being the victim of a sexual assault perpetrated on such an occasion, the result would be that a corroboration warning would be necessary in every trial where evidence shows that there was some risk that the alleged perpetrator might have been caught red-handed.

10. The rationale for a corroboration warning, prior to enactment of s.7 of the Criminal Law (Rape) (Amendment) Act 1990, was the supposed risk of unreliability of testimony from witnesses who give evidence of having been subjected to sexual improprieties. The warning was directed to the so-called danger of convicting on such testimony. The logic of removing any rule of law or practice which required that a corroboration warning be given in trials relating to these offences is that the courts should not, as their starting point in considering whether to exercise their residual discretion to give such a warning, proceed from an assumption that such a danger may exist.

11. There must be something in the evidence in the trial which would justify a trial judge in considering that there is a real concern about the reliability of the testimony of the witness. The exceptional course of giving a corroboration warning in this type of case cannot be permitted to become the rule.

12. This Court agrees with the finding of the learned trial judge that there was nothing special or particular within t he evidence which could give rise to the danger of convicting on the uncorroborated evidence of AB. The learned trial judge did not err in law in coming to this conclusion. She correctly applied guidance set out by this Court in People (Director of Public Prosecutions) v. Wooldridge [2018] IECA 135.

13. The learned trial judge was in the best position to assess whether a corroboration warning was warranted by the manner in which AB gave her evidence. She was satisfied that there was nothing special or particular in the evidence which could give rise to the danger of convicting on the uncorroborated evidence of AB. This Court cannot go behind that assessment.

14. There is nothing in the transcript of the trial which could justify this Court in taking a different view to the learned trial judge on that issue.

15. AB gave evidence, without objection, that she made statements to the Garda? on dates in 2016 and 2017. She confirmed that she did not go to the Garda? until June 2016. Counsel for the Director asked her why she did not go to the Garda? until June 2016 and she began to explain that she had told her mother. At that stage counsel for the defence objected, suggesting that the purpose of the questioning was to introduce evidence of a complaint which was not a " recent complaint." A.B.'s ?statement in the book of evidence outlined that she told her mother about the incident in 2016. This led to her mother referring her to the rape crisis centre and that it was only after counselling that she felt able to go to the Garda?.

16. The learned trial judge referred to the fact that AB was between ten and 14 years of age at the time of the alleged offences and concluded that it would be unfair to her if the jury were not given an explanation of the reason why she did not go to the Garda? until June 2016. She invited counsel to agree to a formula of evidence which would adhere to her ruling.

17. As a result of that ruling and agreement, counsel for the Director of Public Prosecutions led out the following evidence: "Q. Now, I think in January of 2016... you told your mother something on that date..., which as a result of that, attendance was organised for you to go to counselling and you went to counselling once weekly in February 2016 for approximately five months; isn't that right? A. Yes, that's correct yes. Q. And I think following on from that counselling, as a consequence of that counselling you then went to the garda? and made the statement, as we've indicated, on... June 2016; is that correct? A. Yes."

18. It can be seen that, as a result of this agreement, the jury also got to hear about counselling.

19. It is a feature of sexual abuse of children that this may only come to light, and be brought to the attention of the authorities after many years, and after the maker of a complaint has received professional counselling assistance.

20. A.B.'s evidence was admissible in chief to explain the background to how she came to make a complaint to the Garda?; but not as proof that whatever she may have said to her mother, ?or ?to the counsellor or ?to the Garda? was true. The information that A.B. told her mother something and told her counsellor something and attended weekly counselling sessions had the same evidential status as the information given to the jury that AB went to the Garda? and made statements to them.

21. Her evidence, that she interacted with her mother, or with a counsellor or with the Garda?, could not go to prove that RM committed any offence and could not bolster the reliability of her evidence in the witness box. That material could only be used to explain how it came about that she brought her complaint to the Garda?, and that she made statements to them in the course of an investigation which led to the prosecution.

22. The fact that a witness has made a statement prior to testifying in court is generally inadmissible either on direct examination to confirm his or her testimony, or on re-examination to establish credit when impeached by proof of a previous contradictory statement. This rule also applies to assertions which imply that a particular piece of information was imparted, such as "I told my mother something," or "I went to the Garda?," or "I attended counselling"

23. The recent complaint rule of evidence concerns the related issue of whether the hearer or other recipient of an out of court assertion by a person may give evidence of the fact or content of that assertion. This rule permits receipt of evidence from a witness that a person has made a disclosure of being the victim of a sexual assault to that witness and of the terms of that disclosure.

24. While the two rules are connected, the submission of the defence at the trial and on this appeal did not correctly identify the applicable rule.

25. It often happens that evidence, which is admissible for one purpose, cannot be used by the fact-finder for a different purpose. The recent complaint exception to the rules against hearsay and self-corroboration is an example of such evidence.

26. This evidence is admissible as showing consistency of the fact and terms of the disclosure as recounted by receiver with the evidence of the complainant. This is a recognised exception to the rule against narrative.

27. The witness who received the disclosure was not present at the event complained of. It follows that the testimony by the witness of the incident recounted is hearsay, and therefore incapable of being independent evidence of that incident. The judge ?therefore explains to the jury that this testimony cannot be ?treated as independent proof the truth of the assertion.

28. In the present case, ?the testimony ?of A.B. ?that she interacted with her mother and the counsellor and then the Garda? was admissible, not to show that A.B'.s evidence about R.M.'s activities was true, or even that her testimony was consistent with her earlier disclosures or implied assertions to her mother, or the counsellor or the Garda?, but to explain how it came to be that she went to the Garda? a long time after the events which she recounted in her evidence. This was something which could properly be explained to the jury.

29. If the jurors were not given this information, they would be left with a witness who, for some unexplained reason, walked into a Garda station some fourteen years after the date of last incident charged in the indictment and alleged that R.M. molested her.

30. The members of the jury knew that all of the interchanges between A.B. and her mother, her counsellor and the Garda? related to what she was alleging against RM. They knew that this was an explanation for how A.B. came to go to the Garda? and that they then took statements from her and that this was what started the process which led to the trial. It would be difficult for AB to give any meaningful explanation, without some indication that she felt able to go to the Garda? following a disclosure to her mother and counselling. It was obvious to the members of the jury what that counselling related to.

31. During the course of her charge to the jury, the learned trial judge referred to A.B.'s evidence relating to her contact with her mother and a counsellor prior to her attendance with the Garda?.

32. The trial judge is responsible for ensuring that the members of the jury receive only the material which the law allows them to consider in arriving at a verdict. In carrying out this task a trial judge has the assistance of counsel.

33. If it was perceived that there was any real concern about the use to which the jury members might put this evidence, the appropriate course was for counsel to request the learned trial judge to explain to the jury why they received that information. Counsel could have asked the trial judge to remind the jurors that they should not use the fact that A.B. ?took the steps of interacting with her mother, a counsellor or the Garda? as providing any sort of proof or support for the reliability of her testimony relating to the charges against R.M., and that they were only entitled to use that information to understand the circumstances in which she made a complaint to the Garda? after a number of years.

34. No such request was made to the learned trial judge, either prior to the judge's charge to the jury, or in requisitions relating to the charge.

35. While it might have been preferable for the learned trial judge to explain to the jurors the use which they could make of this evidence, her omission to do so in this instance does not merit the setting aside of this conviction.

36. The learned trial judge rejected an application to exclude the proposed evidence of X.Y. X.Y. is a relation of A.B. X.Y.'s proposed evidence was that on occasions when she visited the house she observed RM and AB go off together and that she was not allowed to accompany them.

37. The learned trial judge agreed with a submission of counsel ?that the part of XY's statement, where she stated: " I always felt there was a secret," should not be led as evidence on grounds that it was more prejudicial than probative. Her speculation as to the reason why she was excluded had no evidential value and was likely to be prejudicial. The learned trial judge allowed the remainder of X.Y.'s evidence to be led. She considered ?that this evidence was relevant to denials by RM to Garda? that he was ever alone with A.B.

38. X.Y. gave evidence that, when she was a child, she visited the house. RM was there. A.B. was there at the same time. X.Y. ?then gave evidence that "there was occasions I remember myself and AB would be hanging around or playing together as kids, and there was occasions where herself and R.M. would have went off on their own, and I was told that I wasn't allowed to go with them. I'd be told that I was too young... And at that time I thought they were maybe just hiding, smoking or something behind [A.B.'s mother's] back and that was why maybe I wasn't allowed." On cross- examination she agreed that, while she was at that house, the children would be in the garden and that adults, who would be indoors, would sometimes come out to smoke.

39. R.M. had been interviewed by Garda?. His answers to questions asked by ?Garda? in the course of those interviews were before the jury. In the course of the first of those interviews, he asserted that he was never alone with A.B.

40. In the second interview, Garda? put to R.M. the content of a statement by X.Y., which was in much the same terms as her testimony in court ?of having seen him going off with A.B. and of her not being allowed to go with them. He responded that he was at the house smoking. He did not want his partner to know. He did not know why X.Y. would remember him heading off with A.B. Her parents did not care for her. She was outside the whole time. Others who he named used to come out as well. They wouldn't be smoking though.

41. This Court agrees with the view of the learned trial judge that this evidence of X.Y. was relevant. R.M. had twice denied to Garda? that he was alone with AB. He did not give a direct answer on the issue identified to him by the Garda?, which was whether he went off with A.B. alone, ?and that X.Y. had claimed that ?she was not allowed to join them.

42. It follows that this appeal against conviction will be dismissed.

Result:     Dismissed.

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URL: https://www.bailii.org/ie/cases/IECA/2026/2026IECA50.html