Court of Appeal, Lanigan v Twohig, 19th Mar

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  Lanigan v Twohig & ors and Gorden Transport Ltd v The Revenue Commissioners & ors (Approved) [2026] IECA 43 (19 March 2026)

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[2026] IECA 43 | | |
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THE COURT OF APPEAL

CIVIL

Neutral Citation Number: [2026] IECA 43

Appeal Number: 2025 269

2025 271

Faherty J.

Pilkington J.

Allen J.

---

BETWEEN

ALICE LANIGAN

PLAINTIFF

- AND ?

---

JAMES TWOHIG, GORDEN TRANSPORT LIMITED

AND

TOM KANE MOTORS LIMITED

DEFENDANTS

---

AND

BETWEEN

---

GORDEN TRANSPORT LIMITED

PLAINTIFF

AND

THE REVENUE COMMISSIONERS, ALICE LANIGAN

AND

FERGUS GALLAGHER

DEFENDANTS

---

EX TEMPORE JUDGMENT of Mr. Justice Allen delivered on the 19 th day of March, 2026

1. On 19 February 2024 Tom Kane Motors Limited ("TKM") was in arrears with its taxes to the tune of ?768,002.88.

2. On or shortly before 19 February 2024 the Collector General discovered that there were three trucks - two Volvos and one Man, all with 232 D registration numbers - which were registered in the name of TKM on the premises of Irish Machinery Auctions in Kildare, where they were for sale.

3. The Collector General issued a certificate pursuant to s. 960L(1) TCA 1997 and sent it to the Revenue Sheriff for Kildare and Carlow **** ("the Revenue Sheriff") **** with a direction to seize the trucks.? The Revenue Sheriff appointed Mr. Fergus Gallagher, who happens to be the Sheriff and a Revenue Sheriff for the County of Dublin, as her agent and on 20 February 2024 the trucks were seized.

4. On 21 February 2024 Gorden Transport Limited, the appellant, by its then solicitors J.T. Flynn & Co., wrote to the Revenue Sheriff, Mr. Gallagher and the Revenue Commissioners claiming that it was the owner of the trucks which it had - it claimed - bought from TKM in September 2023 for a total of ?271,044.03.

5. The Revenue Sheriff formally gave notice to the Collector General of the appellant's claim, which the Collector General contested, and by special summons issued on 13 March 2024 the Revenue Sheriff commenced interpleader proceedings in which she named the Collector General, the appellant and TKM as defendants.

6. The interpleader proceedings were grounded on an affidavit of the Revenue Sheriff who deposed to having seized the trucks; that TKM was the registered owner of the trucks; that they were the subject of adverse claims by the Collector General and the appellant; that she had no interest in the vehicles the subject matter of the dispute, other than for costs and charges; and - formally - that she was not in collusion with any of the defendants.

7. In the meantime, on 8 March 2024 the appellant, by its then solicitors, had commenced plenary proceedings seeking the return of the trucks and damages and had issued a motion seeking interlocutory relief.?? When that motion came before the High Court on 22 April 2024 Sanfey J. noted the Revenue Sheriff's undertaking not to dispose of the trucks pending the determination of the proceedings.?? The order on its face tends to suggest that the ownership issue was to have been determined in the plenary proceedings but, as I will come to, no step was taken thereafter in the plenary proceedings.

8. I pause here to say that the appellant's motion in the plenary proceedings was grounded on an affidavit of a Mr. Bernard McMahon, a director of the appellant.? Mr. McMahon deposed that the appellant had bought the trucks from TKM on foot of two invoices: the first, dated 5 September 2023 which was for ?151,044, in respect of the two Volvos, and the second, dated 12 September for ?120,000.03, in respect of the Man truck.? The money was said to have been paid as to ?100,000 on 15 September and ?51,044 on 19 September in respect of the Volvos; and ?40,000 on 9 October and ?80,000 on 10 October in respect of the Man truck.?

9. An appearance was entered in the interpleader proceedings by J.T. Flynn & Co. on behalf of both the appellant and TKM.? TKM took no part in the proceedings.? The appellant stood over the claim which had been made in correspondence but did not file a replying affidavit.

10. On 30 April 2024 the Deputy Master of the High Court gave directions in the interpleader proceedings for the exchange by the appellant and the Collector General of points of claim and points of defence, and of letters seeking voluntary discovery and replies, and put the matter into the judge's list for 17 June 2024.? There was no formal order made that the interpleader proceedings be adjourned to plenary hearing but neither was there any direction as to the filing of further affidavits.

11. In the written submissions filed on the appeal, it was contended by counsel for the Revenue Sheriff and the Collector General - who were in the case at the time - that the order of the Deputy Master was made with the agreement of the appellant's then lawyers.? At the hearing of the appeal, counsel for the appellant - who was not in the case at the time and whose instructing solicitor was not in the case at the time - submitted that there was no agreement.? I take counsel for the Revenue Sheriff and the Collector General at their word and, frankly, I do not understand how their word came to be challenged.? That apart, it would have made no sense to progress both the plenary action and the interpleader proceedings in tandem.? There was one issue to be determined and it could have been determined in one or other of the proceedings.? To have progressed both would have been a waste of effort and money.? Moreover, the proposition that there was no agreement - or that the appellant was determined to pursue the plenary proceedings - is inconsistent with the fact that no statement of claim was ever delivered.

12. The points of claim and points of defence were duly exchanged.? There was some delay in making discovery but the interpleader proceedings eventually came into the chancery list to fix dates on 6 December 2024.? By then Mr. Flynn had become ill and his practice had closed.? The case was then listed for hearing on 18 March 2025 on the basis that that would allow the appellant sufficient time to instruct a new solicitor.

13. In the ordinary way, the interpleader proceedings appeared in a callover list on 13 March 2025, which was the Thursday before the trial date.? By then the appellant had identified a firm of solicitors J.V. Geary & Co. who would act for it, and Mr. Geary had instructed counsel.? At the callover, the appellant was represented by Mr. Geary and counsel.? Mr. Geary had not yet come on record but he gave an undertaking that he would do so and counsel was heard on that basis and the proceedings were adjourned to allow the new legal team to come on board.? The matter came back into the list to fix dates on 2 May 2025 when a new hearing date was fixed in the presence of Mr. Geary and counsel for 7 October 2025.? The proceedings were listed for 2 days.? It appears to have gone unnoticed that Mr. Geary had not yet formally come on record for the appellant.

14. In the ordinary way, the matter appeared again in a Thursday callover list at the end of July and was called on for hearing by the Revenue Sheriff and the Collector General.? There was no appearance on behalf of the appellant but no one thought anything of it.

15. In the ordinary way, the proceedings were listed on 7 October 2025 before the chancery list judge.? Senior counsel then appeared - as a matter of courtesy, she said - to say that her solicitor had not entered an appearance and would not be acting for the appellant. The case was assigned by the list judge to Quinn J.? Mr. Geary appeared before Quinn J. to say that while he had previously appeared for the appellant, he had no instructions and had not entered an appearance and was in court - as a matter of courtesy, he said - to say that he would not be acting.?? At that stage Quinn J. knew nothing about the case and Mr. Geary was allowed to withdraw.

16. I pause here to say that it was wholly unsatisfactory that Mr. Geary had not filed and served notice of change of solicitor and had left it until the morning on which the trial was to commence to say that he had no instructions.?? When asked to explain why Mr. Geary had not complied with his undertaking, it was said that he had been injured and was out of work for some time.? It was unfortunate that Mr. Geary had an accident.? I entirely accept that his indisposition may have prevented him from complying with his undertaking for the duration of his indisposition but it did not discharge it.? He should have served notice of change of solicitor as soon as he was fit to do so.? It was suggested in the High Court that the reason why - as it is customarily put - Mr. Geary had no instructions was that the appellant's bank account had been sequestered by Revenue.? This happened 23 July 2025 which was about a week before the callover and 8 sitting days before the trial was due to commence.? In my view it was at best opportunistic for Mr. Geary to have taken advantage of his own omission or oversight to withdraw at the very last minute from a case to which he had been committed for at least four months.

17. The High Court was then addressed by a Mr. Fran McGuinness who said that he was a senior employee of the appellant but not a director.? According to Mr. McGuinness, the appellant was not in a position to retain lawyers as its bank account had been sequestered by Revenue.?? He did not unequivocally say that the appellant could not pay its lawyers, or that the lawyers had refused to act unless they were paid.? He asked for an adjournment for a four to six weeks to allow the appellant to engage lawyers.? The Revenue Sheriff and the Collector General made the point that Mr. McGuiness had no right of audience and objected to any adjournment.? Notwithstanding a proposal by the Revenue Sheriff when the proceedings were in their infancy that the trucks should be sold and the row had about the proceeds of sale, the trucks were in storage, declining in value and racking up storage charges.

18. As Quinn J. pointed out, Mr. McGuiness was not entitled to be heard on behalf of the company; the action had previously been listed for hearing; and the trucks were at the same time losing and costing money.? The judge declined to adjourn the case.

19. The withdrawal of the appellant's legal team at the last minute came as a surprise.? The position of the Revenue Sheriff was unaffected.? She had three trucks the subject of competing claims on which the competing parties had exchanged pleadings and discovery and wanted to know which of them was the owner.? The position of the Collector General however, had changed.? His case had been prepared on the basis that he would challenge and answer the appellant's claim of ownership portended in the points of claim.? Instead, counsel for the Collector General found himself in the position of explaining to the High Court what the pleaded case was and - to some extent - what his answer would have been to that claim if it had been advanced and a witness or witnesses called to support it.

20. The case was opened by counsel for the Revenue Sheriff.? Counsel for the Collector General called a witness who had really been prepared as a rebuttal witness to meet the case which it had been expected would be made but which in the event had not been made.? Having heard the evidence and the arguments of counsel, Quinn J. made an order declaring that the appellant was not the legal or beneficial owner of the trucks; that as on 20 February 2024 - the date of the seizure - the legal owner of the vehicles was TKM; and an order pursuant to O. 57, r. 10 RSC that the appellant having failed to maintain its claim in the interpleader proceedings was forever barred against the Revenue Sheriff and all persons claiming under her.

21. I mentioned earlier that the order of 22 April 2024 in the plenary proceedings noted the undertaking of the Revenue Sheriff not to dispose of the trucks pending the determination of the proceedings.? It went on to adjourn "the matter" until 17 June 2024.?? I suppose that it could have been, but I think that it is unlikely to have been, an accident that the interpleader summons was later sent forward by the Deputy Master for the same day.? It certainly cannot have been an accident that the motion in the plenary proceedings travelled with the interpleader proceedings and was in the list for 7 October 2025.? This, it seems to me, is only consistent with there having been an agreement that they would travel together on the basis that the ownership issue would be determined in the interpleader proceedings, and that the determination of the ownership issue would effectively dispose of the motion.

22. The finding of Quinn J. that the appellant was not the legal or beneficial owner of the trucks effectively disposed of the plenary proceedings which - as the order recorded - fell away.? The motion was struck out with no order as to costs.

23. By notice of appeal filed on 05.11.2025? (2025 269) the appellant appealed against the orders made in the interpleader proceedings on nine grounds and by notice of appeal filed on 06.11.2025 (2025 271) the appellant appealed against the refusal of interlocutory injunction three grounds.

24. One of the grounds in appeal 269 was that the judge failed to grant an adjournment.? Another was that the appellant, being incapable of discharging the fees of the solicitor and counsel, had been prejudiced.?

25. All of the original grounds were later abandoned and replaced by five grounds, so that the appellant does not persist in its contention that the hearing ought to have been adjourned but I am bound to say that the complaint that the trial ought to have been adjourned was wholly without merit.? On the one hand, the reason why the then claimant was not represented was said to have been that it did not have the money to pay its lawyers.? On the other hand, the object of the suggested adjournment was to allow the appellant to instruct lawyers within four or six weeks. ?The two were completely inconsistent.? The then claimant had already had an adjournment to allow it to obtain legal representation.? It was grossly unsatisfactory that Mr. Geary should have given an undertaking to enter an appearance and then not done so.? The untenability of Geary's position is underlined by the fact that within weeks of turning heel in the High Court, he filed the notices of appeal.

26. The written submissions filed on behalf of the parties and most of the authorities in the thick folder of authorities were directed to the appellant's attempt to make a case on the appeal which had not been made below: which was abandoned.

27. The revised grounds of appeal against the order made in the interpleader proceedings (2025 269) are that:-

1. The High Court erred in admitting or relying on inadmissible unsworn testimony.

2. The High Court erred in ignoring or disregarding evidence of contractual EFT payments, ?291,000 (rounded), from the appellant to TKM as transferring title and beneficial interest in the trucks.

3. Where the Finance Act 1992 defines ownership by reference to the person who keeps the vehicle or truck, the High Court erred in ruling registration under the same Finance Act 1992 alone determining ownership

4. The High Court erred in purporting, without any? or any sufficient grounds, to afford the Collector General's sheriff blanket immunity by O. 57, r. 10

5. Consequential orders should be reversed where the Collector General failed in its submission that TMK had a beneficial interest in the trucks.

28. I will deal with the first ground of appeal last.

29. The fifth ground ?of appeal is that what are described as the consequential orders should be reversed where the Collector General failed in its submission that TKM had a beneficial interest in the trucks.

30. This is based on a misunderstanding of the judgment.? The High Court judge found that TKM was the registered owner, and so, the legal owner of the trucks.? The transcript shows that while counsel for the Collector General initially asked for a declaration as to legal and beneficial ownership, he later said that his client would be content with a declaration as to legal ownership.

31. In truth, the central issue was not whether TKM was the owner - whether legal or beneficial - of the trucks but whether the appellant, although not the registered owner, was the beneficial owner.? On the day following the seizure, the appellant, by its then solicitors, asserted its claim to ownership and purportedly vouched it.? The Revenue Sheriff gave notice to the Collector General pursuant to O. 57, r. 15 of the appellant's claim, and the Collector General gave formal notice pursuant to O. 57, r. 15 disputing the claim.? The object of the special summons proceedings was to have the appellant's disputed claim determined.

32. It simply did not follow from the fact that the Collector General could not establish that TKM was the beneficial owner of the trucks, that the appellant was.? The judge's reticence to making a declaration as to TKM's beneficial owner was not in the slightest prompted by any doubt that the appellant was not the beneficial owner.

33. The third ground of appeal is that the Finance Act 1992 defines ownership by reference to the person who keeps the vehicle or truck, and that the High Court erred in ruling registration under the same Finance Act 1992 alone determining ownership.? This was not really developed in the written or oral submissions.

34. Section 130 of the Finance Act 1992 defines "owner" as meaning, in relation to a vehicle, the person by whom the vehicle is kept.? Section 130 is the definitions section for Chapter IV, which deals with the Registration and Taxation of Vehicles and for those purposes ownership is given a special meaning which does not necessarily correspond with the ordinary meaning of the word.

35. Separately, there was no evidence as to the identity of the person by whom the trucks were kept.? They were seized from the premises of Irish Machinery Auctions, which was not the premises of either TKM or the appellant.? There was no evidence that they had been sent there by the appellant.

36. The authorities relied on by the appellant in support of its argument as to the time at which the property in identified goods passes does not arise in the absence of evidence that there was any contract for the sale of the trucks.

37. The second ground is that the judge erred in ignoring or disregarding evidence of what are said to have been contractual EFT payments, ?291,000 (rounded), from the appellant to TKM as transferring title and beneficial interest in the trucks.

38. This is demonstrably not so.? There was no evidence on the interpleader proceedings of any sale. There was no evidence of the EFT payments.? The appellant had asserted in correspondence that such payments had been made and had provided documentation said to establish the fact that they had been made, but had not sworn an affidavit in the interpleader proceedings.? Giving the appellant the benefit of the doubt, the affidavit which had been sworn in the plenary proceedings by Bernard McMahon was tentative evidence to that effect but the interpleader proceedings had been sent for plenary hearing on oral evidence because the appellant's claim - and necessarily what Mr. McMahon had deposed to - was contested.? In endeavouring to be as fair as possible, counsel for the Collector General drew the judge's attention to what had previously been sworn and offered criticism of the credibility of the case which had been made on the pleadings.? However, the affidavit which had been sworn in the plenary proceedings was not evidence in the interpleader proceedings and in circumstances in which the appellant well knew that evidence along the lines of what Mr. McMahon had deposed to would be contested, the appellant cannot sensibly have expected that it would be treated as evidence - and cannot now sensibly be heard to complain that it was not.

39. The case pleaded by the appellant was that it had purchased the three vehicles from TKM in September 2023 and that the purchase was evidenced by two invoices and four EFT transfers.

40. The witness called on behalf of the Collector General, Ms. Redmond, gave evidence of the registration of the vehicles in the name of TKM and of the date of that registration.? She did so by reference to the documents which had been submitted to Revenue by TKM - in fact in the person of Mr. McGuinness - in support of the registration application.? The proposition that this evidence could only have been given by a witness from the Department of the Environment is utterly without merit

41. Ms. Redmond also addressed the documents which had been produced and discovered by the appellant in support of its claim.?? She was plainly entitled to have done that.? The judge considered that evidence.? As he - rather delicately - put it, the fact that the registration numbers of the Volvos did not exist at the date of the invoice "raised a problem for the validity of" the invoices.? It is important to understand however that what the judge was dealing with was the credibility of the claim which had been made but which, when it came to it, was unsupported by any evidence.? On one view, at least, counsel for the Collector General would have been within his rights - and perhaps wiser - to have confined himself to the simple point that there was no evidence in support of the claim, and to have asked that on that basis alone, the claim should be dismissed.

42. The judge also considered the evidence of Ms. Redmond as to the significant number of round sum payments from the appellant to TKM which was said to call into question any linkage between any particular payments and any particular vehicles.? On the appeal, the focus of counsel's written and oral submissions was that the bank records produced by Ms. Redmond and to which she referred were hearsay.? I think that in this counsel may have had a point but it went nowhere.? As I have previously said, the case on behalf of the Collector Generalwas prepared in anticipation that the appellant would adduce evidence, to undermine the credibility of that evidence.? Absent any evidence in support of the claim, the question of credibility did not arise.

43. The judge found that the evidence established that TKM was the registered owner of the vehicles at the time of the seizure.? He found that there was no evidence in support the appellant's claim and that the evidence of Ms. Redmond went entirely against that argument.? It was sufficient that the judge found - as was the fact - that there was no evidence in support of the appellant's claim.

44. The fourth ground of appeal is that the High Court erred in purporting - as it is put - without any or any sufficient grounds, to afford the Revenue Sheriff what is described as blanket immunity by O. 57, r. 10.

45. Order 57 RSC sets out the procedure for relief by way of interpleader.? It is a relief that is available either to what I would describe as any ordinary person who finds himself in possession of property or money - or in the words of O. 57, r. 1 under liability for any debt, money, goods or chattels - which is the subject of competing claims or apprehended competing claims, or to a sheriff or other officer charged with the execution of process by or under court authority.? There was no argument that it was not available to a Revenue Sheriff. In either case, the fundamental requirement is that the applicant for interpleader relief does not claim any interest in the subject matter of the dispute, other than for charges or costs.

46. In the initial grounds of appeal, since abandoned, there was some suggestion that because, by the time the interpleader application was made, the appellant had issued its plenary proceedings, the interpleader application ought to have been made by way of a motion on notice in those proceedings rather than by way of special summons.? That point was never made in the High Court and was utterly inconsistent with the fact that the appellant engaged with the special summons proceedings until the day on which - for the second time - they were listed for hearing.

47. The whole point of the interpleader procedure is to allow a qualifying person to extricate himself from litigation in which he has no interest in the outcome.? In this case - as in every case in which the relief is correctly sought - the plaintiff expressly disclaimed any interest in the subject matter of the adverse claims.? The object of the directions given by the Deputy Master and later by the High Court which led to the listing on 7 October 2025 was the determination of the appellant's claim to be the owner of the trucks.? The determination of the High Court that the appellant was not the legal or beneficial owner of the trucks was a final order.? It is not immediately obvious to me why the Revenue Sheriff thought that she needed an order pursuant to O. 57, r. 10.?? It was described by counsel for in the High Court as belt and braces.? Which or whether, it would have been - and would be - an abuse of process for the appellant to commence or continue proceedings against the Revenue Sheriff founded on an issue that has been finally determined.

48. In the event, this ground of appeal was not addressed in either the appellant's oral or written submissions and, in the face of the submission of counsel for the Revenue Sheriff, was abandoned.

49. The first ground of appeal is that the High Court erred in admitting or relying on inadmissible unsworn testimony.

50. The transcript shows that the application was listed for hearing for two days.? The trial date had been fixed by agreement with Mr. Geary who had been heard by the Chancery list judge on his undertaking to enter an appearance and whose effective withdrawal from the proceedings came as a surprise to counsel for the Revenue Sheriff and the Collector General.? The Collector General had intended to call Mr. Gallagher - the Dublin Revenue Sheriff who had acted as the agent - and a Garda Oxley who had been present at the premises when the warrant was executed.

51. The transcript shows that the judge was puzzled as to why he was being referred to Mr. Gallagher's report or to what Garda Oxley would say he was told by Mr. Reid, the manager of the premises from which the trucks had been seized.? Both had reported that the manager had said that the trucks had been consigned by Mr. Fran McGuiness or McGuinness Haulage Limited.?

52. As the judge put it, Revenue was trying to be as fair as possible in putting everything before the court.? It seems to me that counsel may have been proceeding from an abundance of caution onto dangerous ground.?? With the benefit of hindsight, it might have been better to have either called the witnesses or not to have said anything about what they would have said if called.?

53. To my mind, it is doubtful that the evidence of Mr. Gallagher or Garda Oxley - if it had been evidence - would have been evidence of anything other than what they had been told by Mr. Reid, which, in turn, would have been no more than what he had been told by Mr. McGuinness.? The judge quite correctly made clear that he was not conducting an enquiry into the matter but merely dealing with the issue before him.? He found that the question of whether TKM was the beneficial owner of the vehicles was unclear - with the result that he was not prepared to declare that TKM was the beneficial owner - but what was clear was that whoever it was, it was not the appellant.

54. When withdrawing the grounds of appeal on the interpleader appeal and substituting the five new grounds, the appellant said that it was standing over the three grounds in the appeal against the refusal of the interlocutory injunction (2025 271).

55. The fact was - as had been agreed by the appellant's lawyers - that the question of an injunction would follow the determination of the interpleader proceedings.? If the appellant was the beneficial owner of the trucks, it would be entitled to an injunction or at least to an order for the return of the trucks.? If it was determined not to be the beneficial owner there could be no issue to be tried.

56. The first ground of appeal - that the judge erred in concluding that his determination of the interpleader application meant that the appellant's motion fell away is inconsistent with the position taken by the appellant on the High Court: and separately and objectively, obviously wrong.

57. The second ground - that the O. 57, r. 10 order ought only to have been made if the appellant failed to maintain or relinquished its claim - fails to recognise that the appellant, by failing to instruct lawyers - or at least by reason of the fact that the solicitors who it had instructed failed give notice of change of solicitor - had not maintained its claim.

58. The third ground - that the order under O. 57, r. 10 was inappropriately applied to the appellant's separate application for injunctive relief - seems to contemplate that but for the O. 57, r. 10 order the appellant would have asked the High Court for an interlocutory order in the plenary proceedings pending the determination of an issue of beneficial ownership of the trucks which had already been decided in the interpleader proceedings.? That plainly would have been an abuse of process and was rightly not pursued.

59. For these reasons, I would dismiss both appeals on all grounds.

Result:     Appeals dismissed.

[Faherty and Pilkington JJ. agreed.]

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