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March 18, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

Pickard v. Bland

Court of Appeals of Oregon

• Citations: 347 Or. App. 864
• Docket Number: A186666
• Precedential Status: Non-Precedential
• Judges: Aoyagi

• Disposition: Affirmed.

• Opinion

• Authorities (6)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (0)

• PDF

Disposition

Affirmed.

Combined Opinion

864 March 18, 2026 No. 214

This is a nonprecedential memorandum opinion
pursuant to ORAP 10.30 and may not be cited
except as provided in ORAP 10.30(1).

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE
STATE OF OREGON

Amy Ruth PICKARD,
Petitioner-Respondent,
v.
Christopher Scott BLAND,
Respondent-Appellant.
Multnomah County Circuit Court
14DR04468; A186666

Patrick W. Henry, Judge.
Submitted January 20, 2026.
Christopher Bland filed the brief pro se.
No appearance by respondent.
Before Aoyagi, Presiding Judge, Kamins, Judge, and
Pagán, Judge.
AOYAGI, P. J.
Affirmed.
Nonprecedential Memo Op: 347 Or App 864 (2026) 865

AOYAGI, P. J.
Father appeals a supplemental judgment denying
his motion to modify custody and parenting time. He con-
tends that the trial court erred in four respects: (1) by not
granting him legal custody of the child; (2) by not applying
the best-interest factors in ORS 107.137; (3) by denying the
child frequent and continuing contact with father in con-
travention of ORS 107.101; and (4) by making improper and
negative findings against father that are unsupported by
the record. Mother did not file a brief in response. For the
reasons explained below, we affirm.
As a preliminary matter, we address the stan-
dard of review. Father has requested de novo review. De
novo review is discretionary and generally disfavored, such
that we provide it only in exceptional circumstances. ORS
19.415(3)(b); ORAP 5.40(8)(c). Having reviewed the record,
we are unpersuaded that de novo review is warranted and
therefore apply the normal standards for appellate review.
Mother and father have one joint child, S, born in
2013. In 2015, the trial court entered a judgment regard-
ing custody, parenting time, and child support, based on an
agreement of the parties. Mother was awarded legal cus-
tody of S, and her home was designated as S’s residence.
Father was given weekly parenting time and ordered to
pay $242 of monthly child support. In April 2021, the trial
court entered a supplemental judgment reducing father’s
monthly child support obligation to $100. In March 2023,
the trial court entered a supplemental judgment changing
father’s parenting time—using a series of “phases” that cul-
minated after three months with father having parenting
time “every Monday after school (or at 9:00 a.m. if there is no
school) until 7:00 p.m.” and “every other weekend from 9:00
on Saturday to 6:00 p.m. on Sunday.”
In December 2023, father filed another motion to
modify, asking that he be given sole legal custody of S and
that mother be granted parenting time. In connection with
that motion, mother stipulated to having used illicit drugs in
September 2023, and she provided father with records show-
ing that she was in drug treatment and that her urinalysis
866 Pickard v. Bland

results were all negative since starting treatment. The mer-
its hearing was held in September 2024. Father argued for
a change of custody based on mother being drug addicted
and consequently unfit. Father was skeptical of mother’s
urinalysis results and asserted that she must be manipu-
lating them. Father also cited S’s school tardiness as relat-
ing to mother using drugs. The trial court was unpersuaded
by father’s evidence, including being unpersuaded that
mother was unable to appropriately care for S, and it ulti-
mately declined to modify custody or parenting time. The
court ordered custody, parenting time, and child support
to remain the same, i.e., the same as ordered in the March
2023 supplemental judgment.
Legal Custody. We begin with the first and sec-
ond assignments of error, which challenge the trial court’s
denial of modification of custody. The Supreme Court has
established a two-step inquiry for courts to follow in decid-
ing whether to modify custody. Boldt and Boldt, 344 Or 1, 9,
176 P3d 388, cert den, 555 US 814 (2008). The parent seek-
ing a change of custody must prove (1) that, since entry of
the original custody judgment or the last judgment mod-
ifying custody, “circumstances relevant to the capacity of
either the moving party or the legal custodian to take care
of the child properly have changed,” and (2) “considering
the asserted change of circumstances in the context of all
relevant evidence, it would be in the child’s best interests
to change custody from the legal custodian to the moving
party.” Id. “[A] new development may be considered a legally
sufficient change in circumstances only if it is shown that
the change has injuriously affected the child or affected the
custodial parent’s ability or inclination to care for the child
in the best possible manner.” Botofan-Miller and Miller, 365
Or 504, 520-21, 446 P3d 1280 (2019), cert den, ___ US ___,
141 S Ct 134, 207 L Ed 2d 1079 (2020) (internal quotation
marks omitted). If a change in circumstances is proved, the
court proceeds to the best-interests analysis, looking to the
factors listed in ORS 107.137. Id.
On appeal, father focuses on the best-interest
issue, arguing that it was contrary to S’s best interests to
remain in mother’s legal custody and that the court failed to
Nonprecedential Memo Op: 347 Or App 864 (2026) 867

properly consider the best-interest factors in ORS 107.137.
The difficulty with that argument is that the trial court
did not find a qualifying change of circumstances to have
occurred, because it was unpersuaded by father’s evidence
in that regard, so it never reached the issue of best interests.
See Boldt, 344 Or at 9 (“When there is insufficient evidence
of a change in circumstances since the last custody deter-
mination, a court does not consider the second step of the
analysis.”).
To the extent that father means to challenge the
trial court’s determination that there was not a qualifying
change in circumstances, or its findings underlying that
determination, we reject that argument as well. The court
acknowledged that mother had suffered a relapse and used
drugs in 2023, but it expressly found that mother had been
sober since September 2023. Father may disagree with
that finding, but there is evidence in the record to support
it. Botofan-Miller, 365 Or at 505 (the facts pertinent to the
change-in-circumstances decision are to be viewed “in the
light most favorable to the trial court’s disposition,” and the
trial court’s findings are to be upheld “if there is any evi-
dence in the record to support them”). And, based on the
findings as a whole, the trial court did not err in determin-
ing that mother remained able to care for S, such that there
had not been a qualifying change in circumstances for cus-
tody-modification purposes. See Ellis v. Kyker, 309 Or App
26, 27, 480 P3d 1048 (2021) (“Whether an alleged change of
circumstances is of the ilk that lawfully allows for a change
of custody presents a question of law that we review for legal
error where, as here, we do not exercise our discretion to
review de novo.”). Accordingly, we reject the first and second
assignments of error.
Contact with Father. In his third assignment of error,
father contends that by denying modification, the trial court
denied S “frequent and continuing contact with” father, in
contravention of ORS 107.101. See ORS 107.101(1) (“It is the
policy of this state to * * * [a]ssure minor children of frequent
and continuing contact with parents who have shown the
ability to act in the best interests of the child[.]”). Father
describes his parenting time as “substantially restricted”
868 Pickard v. Bland

and essentially argues that he is statutorily entitled to more
parenting time.
We are unpersuaded. “The development of a parent-
ing plan that is in the best interests of the children is within
the trial court’s discretion.” Wintle v. Martin, 337 Or App
343, 345, 562 P3d 1148, adh’d to as modified on recons, 339
Or App 318, 569 P3d 719 (2025); see also ORS 107.102(5)(b)
(“In developing a parenting plan under this subsection, the
court may consider only the best interests of the child and the
safety of the parties.”); ORS 107.101(4) (describing it as the
policy of the state to “[g]rant parents and courts the widest
discretion in developing a parenting plan”). Even assuming
arguendo that father’s challenge to the amount of parenting
time does not constitute an impermissible collateral attack
on the March 2023 supplemental judgment (which set that
amount of parenting time), we are unpersuaded that the trial
court abused its discretion by not increasing father’s parent-
ing time.1 See Davison and Schafer, 308 Or App 513, 518, 479
P3d 1108 (2021) (the trial court determines parenting time by
evaluating what is in the best interests of the child, and our
review is first for legal error and then for abuse of discretion
in making the best-interests determination itself).
Findings. In his final assignment of error, father
argues that the trial court made “improper negative find-
ings against [f]ather that are unsupported by the record.”
Father specifically contests the court’s findings or conclu-
sions: (1) that father “continues to demonstrate inflexibil-
ity in his thinking regarding Mother’s parenting capacity”;
(2) that there was “objective evidence of Mother’s compli-
ance with her treatment and ongoing negative UAs”; (3) that
father “failed to adequately address” any issues that he had
in gaining access to S’s electronic medical records; (4) that
mother adequately cares for S; and (5) that it is best for S to
have more limited time with father to reduce his “ability to
undermine [S’s] relationship with Mother.”

1
To the extent that father views the supplemental judgment on appeal as
having reduced his parenting time, it is understandable that father may feel that
way—because he had increased parenting time for nearly a year under a tempo-
rary order—but, legally, there was no reduction in parenting time, because only
the last judgment is relevant to whether the court is changing parenting time. A
temporary order is just that—temporary.
Nonprecedential Memo Op: 347 Or App 864 (2026) 869

“We review the trial court’s findings of fact for any
evidence to support them, * * * and its legal conclusions for
errors of law.” Allco Enterprises v. Goldstein Family Living
Trust, 183 Or App 328, 330, 51 P3d 1275 (2002). Here, hav-
ing reviewed the record in full, we disagree with father’s
view of the record. The trial court’s findings are supported
by evidence. We also note that the March 2023 findings pro-
vide important context for the January 2025 findings. We
reject the fourth assignment of error.
Conclusion. Having considered and rejected each
assignment of error for the reasons explained, we affirm the
supplemental judgment denying modification of child cus-
tody, parenting time, and child support.
Affirmed.