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March 18, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

State v. Clark

Court of Appeals of Oregon

• Citations: 347 Or. App. 721
• Docket Number: A183077
• Judges: Tookey

• Disposition: Remanded for resentencing; otherwise affirmed.

• Opinion

• Authorities (9)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (54.3K)

• PDF

Disposition

Remanded for resentencing; otherwise affirmed.

Combined Opinion

No. 195 March 18, 2026 721

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE
STATE OF OREGON

STATE OF OREGON,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
LACIE COLLEEN CLARK,
Defendant-Appellant.
Marion County Circuit Court
21CR55628; A183077

Sean E. Armstrong, Judge.
Argued and submitted December 19, 2025.
Kali Montague, Deputy Public Defender, argued the
cause for appellant. Also on the briefs was Ernest G. Lannet,
Chief Defender, Criminal Appellate Section, Oregon Public
Defense Commission.
Jonathan N. Schildt, Assistant Attorney General, argued
the cause for respondent. Also on the brief were Dan Rayfield,
Attorney General, and Benjamin Gutman, Solicitor General.
Before Tookey, Presiding Judge, Kamins, Judge, and
Jacquot, Judge.
TOOKEY, P. J.
Remanded for resentencing; otherwise affirmed.
722 State v. Clark
Cite as 347 Or App 721 (2026) 723

TOOKEY, P. J.
Defendant appeals a judgment of conviction for first-
degree arson, ORS 164.325, challenging the trial court’s
imposition of a 90-month mandatory prison sentence under
ORS 137.700(2)(b)(A), as disproportionate under Article I,
section 16, of the Oregon Constitution and the Eighth
Amendment to the United States Constitution.1 We conclude
that the trial court erred in imposing the sentence, because
the court mistakenly concluded that it could not consider
whether defendant’s mental health attributes justified a
reduced sentence. We therefore remand for resentencing.
Defendant was convicted after a jury trial of first-
degree arson based on evidence that she started a fire in her
bedroom, which was in the garage of the house that defen-
dant shared with her father. Defendant’s father, brother,
and a friend were in the house at the time. The fire was
quickly extinguished and there were no injuries. The record
at trial included evidence that defendant suffers from many
severe mental health conditions. As a result of mental ill-
ness, defendant has blackouts and, at trial, she stated that
she did not remember having started the fire. However, she
did not seek to be determined guilty except for insanity
(GEI), and the jury found her guilty of the offense.
As noted, defendant’s conviction is subject to a man-
datory prison sentence of 90 months under ORS 137.700(2)
(b)(a). At sentencing, relying on State v. Rodriguez/Buck, 347
Or 46, 58, 217 P3d 659 (2009), defendant argued that, in
light of her severe mental health conditions, the 90-month
mandatory sentence was unconstitutional as applied to her.
Defendant urged a sentence of probation rather than prison.
The sentencing court had before it and considered
four psychiatric reports describing defendant’s mental ill-
nesses and mental health conditions. The court stated that
“if it could consider defendant’s mental illnesses in a propor-
tionality challenge, it would have imposed a probation sen-
tence and ordered mental health services and drug treat-
ment.” But the court concluded that our opinion in State v.

1
Article I, section 16, provides in part that “all penalties shall be propor-
tioned to the offense.”
724 State v. Clark

Gonzalez, 326 Or App 587, 534 P3d 289 (2023), aff’d, 373 Or
248, 564 P3d 109 (2024) (Gonzalez I), did not permit con-
sideration of defendant’s mental illnesses at sentencing, but
only allowed consideration of intellectual disability, which
defendant did not have. The court therefore imposed the
90-month mandatory sentence.2
On appeal, defendant contends that the sentencing
court erred in concluding that it was prohibited from consid-
ering defendant’s mental illnesses in determining whether
the 90-month sentence was disproportionate as applied to
defendant. In reviewing the court’s decision concerning the
constitutionality of the sentence, we are bound by the court’s
findings of historical facts, but we “assess anew whether
the facts suffice to meet constitutional standards.” State v.
Rowe, 133 Or App 41, 43, 889 P2d 1329 (1995) (citing State
v. Stevens, 311 Or 119, 135, 806 P2d 92 (1991)). We review for
legal error whether a defendant’s sentence is disproportion-
ate to the offense. State v. Ryan, 361 Or 602, 614-15, 396 P3d
867 (2017).
As noted, the sentencing court cited our opinion in
Gonzalez I as standing for the rule that only an intellectual
disability may be considered in evaluating the proportional-
ity of a sentence. At the time of defendant’s sentence, review
of our opinion in Gonzalez I was pending in the Supreme
Court. After defendant’s sentencing, the Supreme Court
affirmed our opinion. State v. Gonzalez, 373 Or 248, 564 P3d
109 (2025) (Gonzalez II).
On appeal here, the parties argue about the extent
to which the Supreme Court’s opinion in Gonzalez II adhered
to or clarified our opinion in Gonzalez I, on which the trial
court had relied. Defendant contends that the Supreme
Court’s opinion reflects a gloss that was not apparent from
our opinion, explaining that, in certain circumstances, a
person’s mental health conditions other than intellectual
disability may be considered in a proportionality analysis.
2
The court explained:
“[I]f I was permitted to take into account your specific mental health condi-
tions and efforts since * * * this case got underway, uh, I would. It should be
a case where you should be on probation and get the benefit of mental health
services and drug treatment. But that’s not how the law works, so I am con-
strained to impose 90 months[.]”
Cite as 347 Or App 721 (2026) 725

Defendant asserts that her mental illness constitutes such
a circumstance.
The state responds that the Supreme Court adhered
to and did not modify our opinion in Gonzalez I that the cir-
cumstances under which a person’s mental health condition
may be considered by a court in a proportionality analysis
are rare, and limited to situations where there is a statutory
or other basis for concluding that there is a societal standard
that eschews treating persons with the defendant’s mental
health attributes the same as adults who do not have those
attributes. In the state’s view, that standard is not met here.
The proportionality issue before us is quite narrow:
In light of the Supreme Court’s opinion in Gonzalez II, did
the sentencing court err in concluding that it could not con-
sider defendant’s mental illness in determining whether the
sentence of 90 months’ incarceration was disproportionate?
And if the court did err, is the error reversible? The parties’
arguments necessitate a close examination of both Gonzalez
opinions to determine whether the trial court erred and,
if so, exactly under what circumstance a person’s mental
health conditions may be considered by a court in a propor-
tionality analysis at sentencing.
In Gonzalez, the defendant, attempting suicide, set
fire to her apartment building, injuring several people and
causing extensive damage. Gonzalez I, 326 Or App at 598.
The defendant was convicted of first-degree arson and third-
degree assault. The trial court acquitted the defendant of
five counts of attempted first-degree murder and one count
of second-degree assault, finding that the defendant did not
intend to harm or kill the other residents of the apartment
when she set the fire. Id.
At sentencing, the defendant argued that the man-
datory 90-month minimum sentence for first-degree arson
required by ORS 137.700(2)(b)(A) would be unconstitu-
tionally disproportionate as applied to her, in violation of
Article I, section 16, of the Oregon Constitution and the
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States
Constitution. The sentencing court agreed. Citing State v.
Sanderlin, 276 Or App 574, 575-77, 368 P3d 74 (2016), the
726 State v. Clark

court reasoned that it could consider mitigating facts in
assessing the defendant’s moral culpability. The court con-
cluded that, under the totality of the circumstances, includ-
ing the defendant’s “psychological paradigm,” her adverse
life circumstances, and her remorse, applying the 90-month
mandatory minimum sentence would be unconstitutionally
disproportionate under Article I, section 16. Gonzalez I, 326
Or App at 597. Thus, the court sentenced the defendant to
60 months’ probation. Id. at 598.
On the state’s appeal, we reversed. Citing Article I,
section 15, of the Oregon Constitution (“Laws for the pun-
ishment of crime shall be founded on these principles: pro-
tection of society, personal responsibility, accountability for
one’s actions and reformation”), we stated that “a reasonable
sentencing court could conclude that on the circumstances
present here, the 90-month sentence might not be the best
way to punish defendant while promoting her reformation.”
Id. But we explained that, although the many circumstances
cited by the sentencing court could weigh in favor of leniency
if the court’s sentencing determination was discretionary,
the legislature did not take that approach, instead imposing
a mandatory sentence of 90 months for conduct constituting
first-degree arson, “no matter what an individual’s circum-
stances may be.” Id. at 600.
We then considered whether courts are permitted
to consider those circumstances in applying the proportion-
ality analysis required by Article I, section 16, as construed
in Rodriguez/Buck, which holds that the application of a
legislatively specified penalty violates Article I, section 16,
only if the penalty “is so disproportionate, when compared
to the offense, so as to ‘shock the moral sense’ of reasonable
people.” Gonzalez I, 326 Or App at 590 (quoting Rodriguez/
Buck, 347 Or at 58). That standard, we said, is one that will
rarely be satisfied. Id. at 590. That is because, “in general,
determining the appropriate penalty or range of penalties
for a crime is the province of the legislature (or the people,
when acting in their legislative capacity),” and “ ‘[i]t is not
the role of this court to second-guess the legislature’s deter-
mination of the penalty or range of penalties for a crime.’ ”
Id. (quoting Rodriguez/Buck, 347 Or at 58). We cited the
Cite as 347 Or App 721 (2026) 727

three Rodriguez/Buck “guideposts” that bear on a court’s
determination of proportionality:
“(1) a comparison of the severity of the penalty and the
gravity of the crime; (2) a comparison of the penalties
imposed for other, related crimes; and (3) the criminal his-
tory of the defendant.”
Gonzalez I, 326 Or App at 591 (quoting Rodriguez/Buck, 347
Or at 58). Those factors, we ultimately explained, did not
support a conclusion that the sentence in that case was dis-
proportionate. Id. at 604.
But the heart of our analysis in Gonzalez I was a
discussion of the first Rodriguez/Buck factor—a comparison
of the severity of the penalty and the gravity of the crime—
in light of State v. Ryan, 361 Or 602, 614-15, 396 P3d 867
(2017), in which the court held that a person’s disability that
causes a person to have the intellectual ability of a child
can be considered in determining proportionality. The court
held in Ryan that a person’s intellectual disability is rele-
vant to proportionality, because it can affect an “offender’s
level of understanding of the nature and consequences of his
or her conduct and ability to conform his or her behavior to
the law.” 361 Or at 621.
In describing Ryan in Gonzalez I, we stated:
“As we understand Ryan, it carves out a narrow excep-
tion to allow for a court to consider whether an offender’s
intellectual disability, brain injury, or the like, effectively
means that the offender’s ‘age-specific intellectual capacity
fell below the minimum level of criminal responsibility for
a child.’ Ryan, 361 Or at 625-26. In those circumstances,
a mandatory sentence is ‘arguably unconstitutional’ to the
extent it results in an offender being treated more harshly
than a child. Id. at 626.”
Gonzalez I, 326 Or App at 600.
We noted the apparent rationale of Ryan
“that the proportionality of a sentence for an adult offender
with the intellectual capacity of a child should be assessed
by comparing the presumptive sentence for an adult with
the consequences, if any, that would be imposed on a child
for the same conduct, in view of the legislative judgment
728 State v. Clark

that children generally should be treated more leniently
than adults. [Ryan, 361 Or] at 623-24.”
Gonzalez I, 326 Or App at 601. We noted that our opinions
both before and after Ryan had limited consideration of a per-
son’s personal characteristics for purposes of proportionality
to those affecting intellectual capacity. Id.; see also State v.
Jeffery, 329 Or App 380, 381, 541 P3d 909 (2023), rev den,
372 Or 290 (2024) (“[A]s we recently explained in [Gonzalez
I, 326 Or App at 601 ], ‘our cases before both and after Ryan
have restricted the consideration of a defendant’s personal
characteristics to those affecting intellectual capacity.’ ”). In
rejecting consideration of the defendant’s mental health con-
dition in Gonzalez I, we reasoned:
“[I]n contrast with Ryan, defendant has not identified any
statutory or other basis for concluding that there is a ‘soci-
etal standard that eschews’ treating persons with defen-
dant’s mental health attributes the same way that other
adults are treated where, as here, they are found to have
acted with the requisite culpable mental state, notwith-
standing the presence of mental health issues.”
326 Or App at 601 (quoting Ryan, 361 Or at 624). We con-
cluded that,
“[b]ecause such conditions—and their relationship to crim-
inal culpability—are taken into account in the determina-
tion of guilt in the first instance, it is difficult to see how
such conditions might then also be relevant, in the con-
text of proportionality analysis under Ryan, to show that
a defendant should be viewed as less culpable than other
defendants found to have acted with the same culpable
mental state, absent the same sort of legislatively recognized
societal standard on which the Ryan court relied.”
Gonzalez I, 326 Or App at 602 (emphasis added).
On review, the Supreme Court affirmed our opin-
ion, reasoning that, although a person’s mental health issues
may generally bear on culpability, the defendant had failed
to identify an objective basis for a societal standard recogniz-
ing reduced culpability for individuals with that defendant’s
specific mental health attributes, given the trial court’s find-
ing that the defendant had the requisite mental state and
ability to appreciate the criminality of her conduct. Gonzalez
Cite as 347 Or App 721 (2026) 729

II, 373 Or at 268-69. The court reviewed Rodriguez/Buck,
noting that it permits a court to consider “case-specific fac-
tors, such as characteristics of the defendant” in assessing
the gravity of the offense for purposes of a constitutional pro-
portionality analysis. Gonzalez II, 373 Or at 257.
The court then discussed Ryan. The court explained
that, in Ryan, it had recognized the legislature’s pronounce-
ment on the age of criminal responsibility, ORS 161.290,3
as relevant to the proportionality analysis, “ ‘because it is
objective evidence of a societal standard that eschews treat-
ing persons with the attributes of a pre-teen child as if they
were normally abled adult offenders.’ ” Gonzalez II, 373 Or at
259 (quoting Ryan, 361 Or at 624). Thus, the court in Ryan
concluded that the trial court had erred when, in compar-
ing the gravity of the defendant’s offense and the severity of
the mandatory minimum sentence as required by the first
Rodriguez/Buck factor, it had failed to sufficiently consider
evidence that the defendant’s “ ‘age-specific intellectual
capacity fell below the minimum level of criminal responsi-
bility for a child.’ ” Gonzalez II, 373 Or at 259 (quoting Ryan,
361 Or at 625-26).
The court in Gonzalez II then proceeded to address
the first Rodriguez/Buck factor—a comparison of the grav-
ity of the defendant’s offense and the severity of the man-
datory minimum sentence—and whether the circumstances
permitted consideration of the defendant’s mental health
attributes. The court first identified the elements of the
offense of first-degree arson, ORS 164.325,4 noting that the
trial court had found that the state had established each
element: the defendant had intentionally set a fire in the
landing of her apartment building, had intentionally
3
ORS 161.290(1) provides:
“A person who is tried as an adult in a court of criminal jurisdiction is not
criminally responsible for any conduct which occurred when the person was
under 12 years of age.”
4
As relevant here, a person commits first-degree arson if the person, by
means of fire or explosion: (1) intentionally damages “protected property” of
another or (2) intentionally damages “any property, whether the property of the
person or the property of another person, and such act recklessly places another
person in danger of physical injury or protected property of another in danger
of damage[.]” ORS 164.325. “Protected property” is a structure, place, or thing
customarily occupied by people. ORS 164.305(1).
730 State v. Clark

damaged property, and had recklessly placed others in
danger of physical injury. Gonzalez II, 373 Or at 271. The
court identified the sentencing requirements for first-degree
arson “as an external source of law that assists the court
in determining whether imposition of that penalty would
shock the moral sense of reasonable people.” Based on the
potential sentence for that offense,5 the court stated that
the legislature considered arson to be a very serious crime,
particularly when it threatens serious physical injury. Id. at
262. The court also observed that first-degree arson is not
less serious than other crimes carrying a 90-month man-
datory minimum sentence under ORS 137.700. Id. at 263.
The court thus concluded that, “apart from consideration of
any personal characteristic of defendant that may have con-
stitutional significance,” a 90-month mandatory minimum
sentence for the defendant’s conduct would not “ ‘shock the
moral sense’ of reasonable people.” Id. (quoting Rodriguez/
Buck, 347 Or at 58).
The Supreme Court then considered the defendant’s
assertion that her mental illness, like an intellectual disabil-
ity, is a “characteristic of the defendant” that courts must
consider under the first Rodriguez/Buck factor of a propor-
tionality analysis under Article I, section 16. The court first
agreed with the defendant’s contention that Ryan did not
hold that no characteristic other than intellectual disability
may ever be relevant. Gonzalez II, 373 Or at 264. “In fact,”
the court stated, Ryan “neither embraced nor rejected the
proposition that other personal characteristics may be rele-
vant.” Id. The court then concluded, however, that, contrary
to the defendant’s contention, the Court of Appeals opinion

5
The court noted:
“Arson that threatens serious physical injury carries a presumptive sentence
of up to 130 months in prison, depending on the person’s criminal history—and
that sentence is subject to doubling by departure. OAR 213-004-0001, App 1
(sentencing guidelines grid); OAR 213-008-0003 (durational departures shall
not total more than double the maximum duration of a presumptive prison
term). If a court finds substantial and compelling reasons to depart from the
presumptive guidelines sentence range, even a person with no criminal his-
tory—such as defendant—could receive a sentence of 116-120 months in prison
for arson that threatened serious physical injury. OAR 213-004-0001, App 1
(sentencing guidelines grid). In other words, had defendant been sentenced
under the guidelines, she could have received an even longer sentence than the
90-month mandatory minimum sentence required by ORS 137.700.”
Cite as 347 Or App 721 (2026) 731

in Gonzalez I had not erroneously interpreted Ryan to fore-
close the possibility that “personal characteristics other
than intellectual disability might, theoretically, be relevant
to constitutional proportionality in a particular case.” 373
Or at 265. Additionally, citing our observation in Gonzalez
I that the defendant “had identified ‘no statutory or other
basis’ for the societal standard of which defendant urges
recognition,” Gonzalez I, 326 Or App at 602, the Supreme
Court rejected the defendant’s contention that our opinion
had held that only a statutory basis can establish a societal
standard for consideration of personal characteristics. Id. at
266. The court stated:
“Because of the legislature’s primary role in determining
the punishments for criminal conduct, it is appropriate
that, in determining whether a societal standard exists
that militates against imposing a punishment that would
otherwise be required, courts will give great weight to the
existence or absence of legislative enactments bearing on
such a standard. However, that does not make the exis-
tence or absence of legislation dispositive in the analysis.”
Id. The court explained, however:
“[T]here must be some objective basis for allowing this
court to discern a societal standard that requires treating
persons with certain attributes differently for purposes of
criminal culpability—even in the face of a legislative pol-
icy (such as a mandatory minimum sentence) that would
otherwise require them to be punished the same as others.”
Id. The court then addressed the defendant’s contention that
her mental illness was such an objective basis.
The court noted that mental illness is indeed rec-
ognized in Oregon as bearing on culpability, in the form of
legislative enactments providing a defense for persons with
a “qualifying mental disorder” who lack the capacity to
appreciate the criminality of their conduct or conform their
conduct to the requirements of the law, ORS 161.295, and in
allowing a defendant to introduce evidence that they suffer
from a “qualifying mental disorder” to show that they did
not have the requisite intent to commit the charged offense.
ORS 161.300.
732 State v. Clark

In rejecting the defendant’s argument that all
mental illness, “of whatever nature,” should be taken into
account in addressing moral culpability at sentencing, the
court stated:
“[T]he term ‘mental illness’ encompasses a vast array of
conditions, and defendant’s assertion fails to account for
either the range of disorders that may fall within the scope
of that term or the different ways that such disorders may
affect those who suffer from them.”
Gonzalez II, 373 Or at 268. The court noted the defendant’s
acknowledgment that
“not all mental illnesses will require a finding that a lengthy
mandatory prison sentence is unconstitutional, because
like people with intellectual disabilities, not all people with
mental illness will be so impaired as to fall within the range
of mentally ill offenders who are deemed less morally culpa-
ble than those with no excuse.”
Id. (Emphasis added.) Given that acknowledgment, the court
stated that the question before it was whether the court “can
identify a societal standard that requires a court to view a
person with a constellation of mental health attributes com-
parable to defendant’s as so much less culpable than peo-
ple without those attributes that the mandatory 90-month
sentence cannot constitutionally be imposed.” Id. (emphasis
added). The court then considered the defendant’s mental
health disorders, among them, depression, anxiety, adjust-
ment disorder, and opioid-use disorder. Id. In rejecting the
defendant’s contention that those mental health disorders
should be relied on to impose sentencing, the court held:
“Defendant has not cited any evidence of a societal stan-
dard recognizing that people who suffer from those disor-
ders—but who have the ability to form the requisite men-
tal state and appreciate the gravity of their conduct—have
reduced moral culpability for their criminal conduct to the
extent that imposing the mandatory minimum sentence
would violate Article I, section 16.”
Id.
With that background in mind, we address the
parties’ arguments here. As noted, the sentencing court
Cite as 347 Or App 721 (2026) 733

explained that it could not consider defendant’s mental ill-
ness in view of case law requiring that only intellectual
disability at sentencing is relevant in determining whether
defendant was less morally culpable. In light of the Supreme
Court’s statement in Gonzalez II that Ryan and our opinion
in Gonzalez I did not hold that no condition other than intel-
lectual disability may be considered in evaluating a defen-
dant’s moral culpability at sentencing, defendant contends
that the trial court erred in its assumption that only intel-
lectual disability may be considered.
We agree with defendant that, in light of the
Supreme Court’s opinion in Gonzalez II, the trial court’s
understanding of Gonzalez I that only intellectual disability
could be considered, was not correct. The Supreme Court
was clear that other mental health attributes can be con-
sidered, if there is “evidence of a societal standard recog-
nizing that people who suffer from [the particular mental
disorders]—but who have the ability to form the requisite
mental state and appreciate the gravity of their conduct—
have reduced moral culpability for their criminal conduct.”
Gonzalez II, 373 Or at 268. As a strategic matter, defendant
here chose not to pursue a defense of GEI. ORS 131.300.
In finding defendant guilty, the jury necessarily found that
defendant had the ability to form the requisite mental state.
Thus, the question for us is whether, despite that finding,
the record includes objective evidence of a societal standard
that recognizes, for purposes of sentencing, that people who
suffer from the particular mental health attributes suffered
by defendant have reduced moral culpability for their crimi-
nal conduct. See State v. Lancaster, 345 Or App 155, 158, 581
P3d 989 (2025) (applying standard).
It is undisputed that defendant suffers from a
“qualifying mental disorder” under ORS 161.295 and ORS
161.300 that could support a finding of guilty except for
insanity. ORS 161.295 provides:
“(1) A person is guilty except for insanity if, at the time
of engaging in criminal conduct, the person lacks substan-
tial capacity either to appreciate the criminality of the con-
duct or to conform the conduct to the requirements of law,
and:
734 State v. Clark

“(a) But for a qualifying mental disorder, the person
would have had such substantial capacity;
“(b) A mental disorder other than a qualifying mental
disorder is not the primary cause of the lack of substantial
capacity; and
“(c) The lack of substantial capacity is not the result
of voluntary intoxication in combination with a qualifying
mental disorder, a mental disorder other than a qualifying
mental disorder or both.
“(2) As used in chapter 743, Oregon Laws 1971, the
term ‘qualifying mental disorder’ does not include an abnor-
mality manifested only by repeated criminal or otherwise
antisocial conduct, nor does the term include any abnor-
mality constituting solely a personality disorder.”
ORS 161.300 provides:
“Evidence that the actor suffered from a qualifying mental
disorder is admissible whenever it is relevant to the issue
of whether the actor did or did not have the intent which is
an element of the crime.”
Defendant argues that, like ORS 161.290 (which states that
a person under the age of 12 lacks criminal responsibility),
on which the court relied in Ryan, ORS 161.295 and ORS
161.300 provide the necessary “societal standard” recogniz-
ing that persons who suffer from a qualifying mental dis-
order may not have the same moral culpability as a person
who does not suffer from those conditions. Defendant con-
tends that, as in Ryan, the existence of that societal stan-
dard requires a court to consider whether, based on the spe-
cific circumstances, a defendant suffering from a qualifying
mental disorder has reduced moral culpability for their
criminal conduct to the extent that imposing the mandatory
minimum sentence would violate Article I, section 16.
We agree with defendant that ORS 131.295 and ORS
131.300 provide that objective societal standard. Through
those statutes, the legislature has shown its intent to per-
mit a defendant who suffers from a qualifying mental disor-
der to show that they are less criminally culpable. Whether
or not a person chooses to invoke those statutes for purposes
of establishing guilt except for insanity, we conclude that
Cite as 347 Or App 721 (2026) 735

ORS 131.295 and ORS 131.300 provide a societal standard
that recognizes that a person who suffers from a qualifying
mental disorder may be less morally culpable.
We note that the record includes evidence that
defendant has severe mental illness, more severe than
the mental illness suffered by the defendant in Gonzalez,
with multiple diagnoses. The record also includes evidence
that, as a result of her mental illness, defendant was “sub-
stantially unable to conform or control her conduct to the
requirements of law.” That evidence, along with undisputed
evidence that defendant suffers from a qualifying mental
disorder under ORS 131.295 and ORS 131.300, lawfully has
bearing on the court’s consideration of proportionality.
We therefore remand the case to the trial court for it
to determine in the first instance whether defendant’s men-
tal health attributes caused her to have reduced moral cul-
pability for her criminal conduct to the extent that imposing
the mandatory minimum sentence would violate Article I,
section 16.
Remanded for resentencing; otherwise affirmed.