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March 18, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

Dept. of Human Services v. A. A. C.

Court of Appeals of Oregon

• Citations: 347 Or. App. 827
• Docket Number: A188296
• Precedential Status: Non-Precedential
• Judges: Egan

• Disposition: Reversed and remanded.

• Opinion

• Authorities (9)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (0)

• PDF

Disposition

Reversed and remanded.

Combined Opinion

No. 206 March 18, 2026 827

This is a nonprecedential memorandum opinion
pursuant to ORAP 10.30 and may not be cited
except as provided in ORAP 10.30(1).

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE
STATE OF OREGON

In the Matter of K. C.,
a Child.
DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES,
Petitioner-Respondent,
v.
A. A. C.,
aka A. A. C., aka V. C., aka A. M.,
Appellant.
Multnomah County Circuit Court
25JU00433; A188296

Jacqueline L. Alarcón, Judge.
Submitted January 22, 2026.
Shannon Storey, Chief Defender, Juvenile Appellate
Section, and Sarah Peterson, Deputy Public Defender,
Oregon Public Defense Commission, filed the brief for
appellant.
Dan Rayfield, Attorney General, Benjamin Gutman,
Interim Deputy Attorney General, and Jon Zunkel-
deCoursey, Assistant Attorney General, filed the brief for
respondent.
Before Tookey, Presiding Judge, Egan, Judge, and
Jacquot, Judge.
EGAN, J.
Reversed and remanded.
828 Dept. of Human Services v. A. A. C.

EGAN, J.
In this juvenile dependency case, mother (they/
them) appeals from the judgment asserting dependency
jurisdiction over their child, K, who was 18 months old at
the time of the jurisdiction trial. In their first assignment
of error, they claim that the trial court erred in asserting
jurisdiction over K without determining that jurisdiction
was warranted on grounds related to both of K’s parents.1 In
their second through fifth assignments of error, they chal-
lenge the three jurisdictional bases on which the juvenile
court asserted dependency jurisdiction as to mother and the
court’s ultimate ruling asserting jurisdiction. We conclude
that the juvenile court erred in entering a judgment assert-
ing jurisdiction on grounds related to only one of K’s two
parents. As explained more fully below, we therefore reverse
and remand for the juvenile court to correct that defect.
Standard of Review. We review mother’s claim
that the court erred in entering a jurisdictional judgment
on grounds concerning only one of K’s two parents for legal
error. See Dept. of Human Services v. W. A. C., 263 Or App
382, 394, 328 P3d 769 (2014) (so reviewing). We review her
claims that the evidence was legally insufficient to support
dependency jurisdiction by “view[ing] the evidence, as sup-
plemented and buttressed by permissible derivative infer-
ences, in the light most favorable to the juvenile court’s
disposition and assess[ing] whether, when so viewed, the
record was legally sufficient to permit the outcome.” Dept. of
Human Services v. T. L. H. S., 292 Or App 708, 709, 425 P3d
775 (2018).
Discussion. The juvenile court is authorized to
assert dependency jurisdiction over a child when the child’s
condition and circumstances expose the child to a current
threat of serious loss or injury that will likely be realized.
ORS 419B.100(1)(c); Dept. of Human Services v. A. L., 268 Or
App 391, 397-98, 342 P3d 174 (2015). The petitioner, usually
and in this case the Oregon Department of Human Services

1
Mother did not preserve this claim of error. But we have held that preser-
vation is not required when the error appears for the first time in the judgment.
See State ex rel Dept. of Human Services v. M. A., 227 Or App 172, 182, 205 P3d 36
(2009).
Nonprecedential Memo Op: 347 Or App 827 (2026) 829

(ODHS), bears the burden of proof. Id. That burden includes
demonstrating a nexus between the child’s allegedly risk-
causing conditions and circumstances and a threat of harm
to the child of the type, degree, and duration as to justify
the state’s intervention into the constitutionally protected
family sphere. Dept. of Human Services v. S. D. I., 259 Or
App 116, 121, 312 P3d 608 (2013). Proof of harm or risk at
some point in the past is insufficient; the threat must be
current at the time of trial. State v. S. T. S., 236 Or App
646, 654, 238 P3d 53 (2010). Nor can the risk be speculative;
there must be a reasonable probability that the risk will be
realized. Dept. of Human Services v. J. H., 292 Or App 733,
738, 425 P3d 791 (2018).
A juvenile court cannot assert jurisdiction based on
grounds concerning only one of a child’s two parents. See
W. A. C., 263 Or App at 394 (holding that “a juvenile court
cannot assert jurisdiction over a child based on the admis-
sions of one parent when the other parent has been served
and summoned, appears, and contests the allegations in the
petition”); see also Dept. of Human Services v. E. M., 264 Or
App 76, 84-85, 331 P3d 1054 (2014) (reversing jurisdiction
judgment notwithstanding the father’s unfitness because
the department failed to prove its allegations against the
mother so “the record reflect[ed] one fit parent”).
First, we address mother’s challenges regarding the
juvenile court taking dependency jurisdiction over K on all
three bases related to mother: (4B) mother having mental
health issues, (4C) mother lacking parenting skills, and (4F)
mother exposing K to dangerous people. Ultimately, mother
argues that the juvenile court erred in asserting depen-
dency jurisdiction over K because the evidence was legally
insufficient.
Having reviewed the evidentiary record, we con-
clude that there was legally sufficient evidence to support
jurisdictional bases (4B), (4C), and (4F). The court deter-
mined that mother’s mental health issues make it difficult
for them to read people’s emotions and distinguish safe from
unsafe people, causing a pattern of mother “associating with
unsafe people and exposing the child to unsafe people.” That
pattern included mother associating with Tossing—who was
830 Dept. of Human Services v. A. A. C.

a level 3 registered sex offender and had sexually abused a
child—and allowing Tossing to have unsupervised contact
with K, and mother exposing K to Drake, the man who sex
trafficked mother. In addition, the undisputed evidence that
mother blew marijuana smoke at the K’s face and did not
know that K had developmental delays and needed addi-
tional support also supports the court’s ruling. Ultimately,
we conclude that the juvenile court did not err in determin-
ing that the evidence was legally sufficient to support the
assertion of dependency jurisdiction on bases concerning
mother. T. L. H. S., 292 Or App at 709.
Next, we address mother’s first assignment of error,
in which they argue that the juvenile court erred in asserting
jurisdiction on bases concerning only mother, rendering the
judgment defective. See W. A. C., 263 Or App at 399 (“[T]he
juvenile court can consider the admission by one parent as a
fact in determining whether DHS proved the admitted alle-
gation, but it cannot conclusively establish that allegation.”).
ODHS concedes that the jurisdictional judgment does not
explicitly list the jurisdictional bases as to father but asserts
that the error is harmless because the juvenile court took
judicial notice of and entered an order memorializing father’s
admission to the jurisdictional bases concerning father.2 We
accept ODHS’s concession but conclude that the error is not
harmless, because, at a minimum, there is no valid judgment
asserting jurisdiction over K as a result of the error. Dept. of
Human Services v. D. J., 259 Or App 638, 646, 314, P3d 998
(2013). Thus, we agree with mother that the juvenile court
erred in entering a judgment in which it asserted jurisdic-
tion based on conditions and circumstances concerning only
mother. Contrary to ODHS’s harmlessness argument, the
judgment on its face is legally insufficient to establish depen-
dency jurisdiction over K. As a result, we must reverse and
remand for the juvenile court to address that defect.
Reversed and remanded.

2
In January 2025, father entered admissions to two jurisdictional bases
relative to him: (4D) “[F]ather lacks a custody order and is therefore unable to
protect the child from mother’s neglectful behavior, placing the child at a risk of
harm;” and (4E) “[F]ather is not a custodial resource and is therefore unable to
protect the child from mother’s neglectful behavior, placing the child at risk of
harm.”