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March 25, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

Meek, J. v. Tomlins, D.

Superior Court of Pennsylvania

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: 1039 WDA 2025
• Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

• Judges: Murray

• Opinion

• Authorities (14)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (44.5K)

• PDF

Lead Opinion

                        by Murray

J-A06021-26

ON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

JOHN MEEK : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
DON TOMLINS, T/D/B/A DECKED :
OUT BY DON :
: No. 1039 WDA 2025
Appellant :

Appeal from the Judgment Entered November 7, 2025
In the Court of Common Pleas of Greene County Civil Division at No(s):
951 A.D. 2019

BEFORE: OLSON, J., MURRAY, J., and BECK, J.

MEMORANDUM BY MURRAY, J.: FILED: March 25, 2026

Don Tomlins, t/d/b/a Decked Out By Don (Appellant), appeals from the

judgment entered against him and in favor of John Meek (Meek), following a

non-jury trial on Meek’s breach of contract claim. We affirm.

On September 30, 2021, Meek filed a complaint asserting a claim for

breach of contract against Appellant, relating to work Appellant performed on

Meek’s residence (the residence or house) pursuant to a November 1, 2017,

agreement (the Agreement).1 Appellant agreed to install siding, soffit, fascia,

and gutters on the residence for $18,675.00. In early 2018, Appellant

---

1 Meek’s complaint also asserted claims for negligence and breach of implied

warranty. The trial court excluded those claims in connection with motions in
limine filed by Appellant, and they are not at issue on appeal. See Order
8/14/24; Order, 6/17/24.
J-A06021-26

completed the job and Meek paid him. Shortly thereafter, Meek alleged, the

components Appellant installed began warping, buckling, loosening, and

detaching, as a result of Appellant’s “subpar, negligent work[.]” Complaint,

9/30/21, ¶ 11. Meek obtained from another contractor “an estimate of

$19,602.87 to fix, repair, and re-install the work previously done by

[Appellant].” Id.

Appellant filed an answer and new matter. After prevailing at a

compulsory arbitration hearing, Meek appealed the arbitrators’ award to the

trial court. On July 1, 2025, the matter proceeded to a non-jury trial. We

summarize the evidence adduced at trial as follows.

Meek testified that, on August 22, 2017, a tornado caused significant

damage to his residence. N.T., 7/1/25, at 10. On November 1, 2017, Meek

and Appellant entered into the Agreement, whereby Appellant agreed to install

siding, soffit, fascia, and gutters for $18,675.00.2 Id. at 10-12. The

Agreement provided, in pertinent part, as follows: “All work to be completed

in a substantial workmanlike manner according to specifications submitted,

per standard practices.” Exhibit 1 (Agreement, 11/1/17) at 2 (unpaginated).

Meek testified that Appellant completed the work in January or February 2018,

and Meek paid Appellant $18,675.00. N.T., 7/1/25, at 13, 15, 19.

---

2 By a separate agreement, Meek engaged Appellant to replace his damaged

deck for $55,000.00. N.T., 7/1/25, at 10-11, 14. Appellant completed the
deck project before the siding project, and Meek duly paid Appellant. Id. at
14, 18. Meek’s claims do not involve the deck project. Id. at 13.

-2-
J-A06021-26

Meek testified that by early spring 2018, he observed significant

problems with the components Appellant installed. Id. at 17-19. Meek

introduced into evidence a set of 16 photos he took within several months

after Appellant completed the work. Id. at 17-18; see also Exhibit 3 (2018

photos). Meek described the photos collectively as showing the following:

Siding at all corners, all sides of the house that is buckling, the
trim has fallen off, the siding was cracked when it was installed.
J-channel [(i.e., siding trim)] was never straight, was never
secured. Siding had not been secured, it was held on with some
type of white caulking and there [are] numerous pieces … that are
buckling.

N.T., 7/1/25, at 17. Meek also described each individual photo. See id. at

19-23 (Meek describing, inter alia, “siding that’s buckling above the window,

and the upper trim had fallen off the house”; “siding [that] is buckled and you

can see where it’s loose”; “right above the driveway, that’s where the siding

was always cracked”; “J-channel … on the left side of the house … [that] was

never secured”; “pieces of siding that are falling off that have the white

silicone or some type of adhesive on them”; “you can see all the siding [on

one side of the house] has buckled and it is also loose, and all the J-channel

has fallen off the top”; “on the back side of the house, all the J-channel has

fallen off the top and siding has fallen off the house,” and “all the siding is

buckling at the windows”; on “the front side of the house … all the J-channel

is falling down and the siding is … loose”; “J-channel is loose” and “siding [is]

buckling and … detaching from the building”; siding is “loose at the ends, it’s

buckling, and … there [are] ripples in it”); see also Exhibit 3.

-3-
J-A06021-26

Meek agreed that the problems were “pervasive” and not “restricted to

any one particular corner of the house[.]” N.T., 7/1/25, at 24. Meek testified

that the problems exist on all sides of the house, including “all the tops of the

windows” and “anything that has got any type of sun on it[,] from morning

sun to the evening sun, it has all been buckled and [it] warps.” Id.

Meek testified that, at the time of trial, the condition of Appellant’s

workmanship continued to deteriorate, and the house looks “worse now” than

it did in the 2018 photos. Id. at 24, 26. Meek testified that “[c]urrently … all

the soffit is falling off the front” of the house. Id. at 26. Meek introduced into

evidence two photos he took in 2024. See id. at 24-26; see also Exhibit 4

(2024 photos).3 Meek described one of the photos as showing “all the pieces

that have been gathered from all the siding that’s fallen off the house,”

including “J-channel that had been … siliconed up with some type of white …

adhesive or silicone[.]” N.T., 7/1/25, at 25. Meek described the second photo

as showing where additional siding had fallen off the house. Id.

Meek testified that, in the summer of 2018, he sent text messages to

Appellant, attaching the 2018 photos and advising that the siding was

---

3 As discussed below in connection with Appellant’s third issue, the trial court

admitted these photos over Appellant’s objection. See N.T., 7/1/25, at 15-
16, 24, 26. In addition to objecting to their admission at trial, Appellant filed
a pre-trial motion in limine seeking to exclude the 2024 photos. See Motion
in Limine to Exclude Testimony and/or Exhibits Regarding Any Alleged
Damage to Plaintiff’s Home in 2024, 6/7/24. The trial court denied the motion.
See Order, 6/17/24.

-4-
J-A06021-26

“buckling,” “falling off and starting to loosen up.” Exhibit 7 (text messages);

see also N.T., 7/1/25, at 27. Appellant responded that he would send an

employee to Meek’s house and that it “[s]houldn’t take him long to twe[a]k

stuff.” Exhibit 7. However, Appellant stated it would be “a while” before they

could get to it because his business was “major backed up.” Id. Meek testified

that Appellant thereafter became unresponsive, and never sent anyone to the

house. N.T., 7/1/25, at 27-28.

Meek testified that Appellant failed to complete the work according to

Meek’s expectations and as warranted in the Agreement. Id. at 13, 33. Meek

agreed that he did not expect the siding to last only “a few months before it

would start to fall off and come apart[.]” Id. at 39. Rather, Meek testified he

expected that the work “would last my lifetime.” Id. Meek agreed that he

communicated his dissatisfaction to Appellant, but Appellant “never came

back to fix it[.]” Id.

Meek testified that in August 2021, he solicited an estimate from Wayne

Lumber and Supply (Wayne Lumber) for the replacement and repair of the

siding previously installed by Appellant. Id. at 28-31. Wayne Lumber

provided an estimate of $19,602.87. See Exhibit 5 (August 2021 estimate).

In February 2024, Wayne Lumber reaffirmed its $19,602.87 estimate. See

Exhibit 6 (February 2024 estimate); N.T., 7/5/25, at 30-31. Meek testified

that he intends to engage Wayne Lumber to perform the work, but does not

have the money to do so. Id. at 31.

-5-
J-A06021-26

Robert Mooney (Mooney), co-owner of Wayne Lumber, testified that he

visited Meek’s residence before preparing the August 2021 estimate. Id. at

41, 49. Mooney testified that the estimate covered replacement siding for the

entire house, as well as some gutter repair. Id. at 44, 49; see also Exhibit

5 (estimate including $515.41 for labor and materials related to gutter repair,

with the remaining $19,087.46 related to siding). Mooney did not recall

observing significant damage to the soffit or fascia, and his estimate did not

include those items. N.T., 7/1/25, at 44-45, 49.

After reviewing the 2018 photos, Mooney testified that Wayne Lumber

would not leave a job in the condition depicted in the photos. Id. at 46.

Mooney agreed that if he installed siding and, a few months later, it was in

the condition depicted in the photos, he would not consider that acceptable,

but would perform additional repairs. Id. Mooney agreed that “the work

depicted in the photos” is not “consistent with the quality of work performed

by Wayne Lumber[.]” Id.

On cross-examination, Mooney agreed that his estimate called for

replacing all the siding on Meek’s house, rather than replacing only the

damaged portions. Id. at 49-50. Mooney testified that “the siding was in

such disrepair” that he would not attempt to “mix and match it.” Id. at 50.

Mooney testified that replacing only damaged siding would “[n]ot necessarily”

cost less, because he would “still [have to] pull all the siding off” and “make

sure I had correct fastening and a repair[.]” Id.

-6-
J-A06021-26

On redirect, Mooney further explained why he considered it necessary

to replace all the siding:

One [factor] is age of the siding, right, so a new piece isn’t going
to match, … but when I look at some of these pictures here, there
had to be a reason why the siding is coming off. Was it fastened
correctly, you know, was it a manufacturing, you know, problem.
So you can replace one piece on certain jobs, and certain jobs I
wouldn’t recommend just one piece.

Id. at 51. Mooney did not recommend piecemeal replacement on Meek’s

house because of “the way [the siding is] coming off. I would have to look at

the substructure underneath to make sure it was fastened correctly and make

sure that it didn’t happen again.” Id.

On recross-examination, Appellant’s counsel asked Mooney if he could

tell why the siding was in the condition it was in when he observed it, whether

“it was fastened incorrectly or … it was a manufacturing defect[?]” Id. at 52.

Mooney answered as follows:

So, the places that it came off … on the upper sides and stuff like
that, I feel that it was not fastened correctly, the trim and stuff
like that. There was one place on the house that when I
originally—why it warped, if it was me and I would have done it,
I probably would have t[aken] a piece off and went to the
manufacturer and said, is there something wrong with this. But
the rest of the places where it just came off, … I thought that was
craftsmanship, in my opinion.

Id.

Appellant testified that “one of my guys and his helper did” the work on

Meek’s house, and Appellant “stopped by as often as [he] could” to supervise

-7-
J-A06021-26

the project. Id. at 61, 67. Appellant testified that he observed no problems

with the siding at the time of the project’s completion. Id. at 58.

Regarding the condition of the siding depicted in the 2018 photos,

Appellant testified that “there is no way of knowing how that happened.” Id.

at 66. Appellant testified that, “generally speaking[,] when siding falls off a

house or gets loose, it’s wind or storm damage.” Id. at 62-63. Appellant

suggested that “once a piece of siding falls off and you leave it like that, more

damage can occur because wind starts to loosen things up.” Id. at 66; see

also id. at 77 (when asked about the problems shown in the 2018 photos,

Appellant testified “[t]hat is because a couple pieces of siding were left off and

then once the wind gets behind there, it exponentially gets worse.”).

Asked about warped siding, Appellant testified “[t]hat could have been

caused by a lot of things.” Id. at 76. Acknowledging one of the 2018 photos

showed siding that was “a little warped,” Appellant suggested “that could be

the wall bowing out a little bit.” Id. at 63; see also id. (Appellant testifying

that “when houses are built, they are not [a] perfect plane, you know, unless

it’s steel.”). Asked about cracked siding, Appellant suggested “[t]hat could be

one of [Meek’s] kids hitting it with the baseball, anything could have caused

that….” Id. at 77.

Appellant testified that the problems with Meek’s siding were “very, very

minor[.]” Id. at 74; see also id. at 81 (Appellant testifying, “If you knew

how minor it was, you would be laughing about it right now.”). Regarding

-8-
J-A06021-26

pieces of siding that fell off, Appellant testified “it would have taken two

seconds … to snap those pieces back in.” Id. at 76. Appellant agreed that

warped pieces of siding would have to be replaced. Id. Appellant testified

that “it would probably take four hours to fix the siding on [Meek’s] house.”

Id. at 60; see also id. (Appellant testifying he would charge about $700 to

repair the siding).

Appellant agreed that Meek advised him via text message about

problems with the siding, and Appellant responded that he would send

someone to look at it. Id. at 70-73. Appellant testified that he never sent

anyone because he “told [Meek] how to snap” the siding back in place, and

he “assumed [Meek] took care of it[.]” Id. at 74. Appellant agreed that Meek

never told him the problem was fixed or that he no longer needed to send

anyone. Id. at 80. Appellant also testified that he did not send anyone

“[b]ecause [Meek] never called me back.” Id. at 77. However, Appellant

agreed he did not respond to Meek’s last text message for over nine months.

Id. at 75; see also Exhibit 7 (Meek texting on August 2, 2018, “All I am

asking for is a response”; Appellant replying on May 31, 2019, “Give me a call

when [you] can”).4 Appellant also testified that he would have gone back to

Meek’s house if Meek had not filed the instant lawsuit. N.T., 7/1/25, at 67

---

4 Meek initially filed the instant claim before a magisterial district judge on
May 30, 2019. See Notice of Appeal From Magisterial District Judge
Judgment, 11/14/19, Attachment (notice of magisterial district judge’s
October 16, 2019, judgment in Meek’s favor).

-9-
J-A06021-26

(Appellant testifying, “I told [Meek] I was going to go back there, and then

next thing you know, this [lawsuit] happens.”).

At the trial’s conclusion, the trial court found that Meek had met his

burden of proof, stating, “I’m convinced that the work was not done in a

workmanlike manner.” Id. at 86-87. The court also found that Wayne

Lumber’s estimate was appropriate, and announced a verdict in Meek’s favor

in the amount of $19,602.87. Id.

On July 10, 2025, Appellant timely filed a post-trial motion for judgment

notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV), arguing the evidence was insufficient to

support Meek’s claim. On the same date, Appellant timely filed a post-trial

motion for a new trial, asserting the verdict was against the weight of the

evidence. On July 16, 2025, the trial court entered orders denying both post-

trial motions.

Appellant timely appealed.5 Appellant and the trial court have complied

with Pa.R.A.P. 1925. Appellant presents three questions for our review:

---

5 Appellant purported to appeal from the orders denying his post-trial motions.

On November 3, 2025, this Court directed Appellant to praecipe the trial court
to enter judgment on its verdict, noting that the entry of judgment is a
prerequisite to the exercise of this Court’s jurisdiction. See Order, 11/3/25;
see also Johnston the Florist, Inc. v. TEDCO Const. Corp., 657 A.2d 511,
514 (Pa. Super. 1995) (en banc) (where an “appeal was filed prior to the entry
of judgment, it is clear that jurisdiction in appellate courts may be perfected
… upon the docketing of a final judgment.”). Appellant thereafter filed the
appropriate praecipe, and the trial court entered judgment on November 7,
2025. We have revised the caption to reflect that the appeal lies from the
entry of judgment.

• 10 - J-A06021-26

1. Whether the trial court erred when it ruled that [Meek] set forth
   sufficient evidence to support his claims?

2. Whether the trial court erred when it ruled that its verdict was
   supported by the weight of the evidence?

3. Whether the trial court erred when it admitted testimony and
   exhibits relating to damage to [Meek’s] home which allegedly
   occurred in 2024?

Appellant’s Brief at 7 (capitalization modified).

In his first issue, Appellant argues Meek presented insufficient evidence

to support his claim. Appellant’s Brief at 13-15. Appellant asserts Mooney

testified “that at least some of the damage to” Meek’s house “could have been

caused by a manufacturer’s defect.” Id. at 14 (citing N.T., 7/1/25, at 52-53).

Appellant maintains that Mooney “could not say with certainty that the

damage … was caused by” Appellant. Id. at 15. Appellant argues that, in his

own testimony, “he could not specifically identify the cause of the damage….”

Id. (citing N.T., 7/1/25, at 59-60, 62-63, 66, 77). Appellant asserts that,

“[w]ithout conclusive evidence that [Appellant] improperly installed the

siding,” Meek “did not show, by a preponderance of the evidence, that

[Appellant] failed to perform his obligations under the parties’ contract.” Id.

Meek counters that he was not required to prove the cause of the siding

failure with “certainty,” but only by a preponderance of the evidence. Meek’s

Brief at 15-16 (citing Ragnar Benson, Inc. v. Bethel Mart Assocs., 454

A.2d 599, 602 (Pa. Super. 1982)). Meek argues that “[c]ircumstantial

evidence, including the nature and timing of the failure,” supports an inference

• 11 - J-A06021-26

that Appellant’s poor workmanship was the “probable cause of the harm.” Id.

at 17-18. Meek argues that his testimony and photographic evidence

established that the siding “began to warp, separate, and detach shortly after

installation[.]” Id. at 15. Meek also points to Mooney’s testimony that the

siding was not fastened correctly. Id. (citing N.T., 7/1/25, at 52). Meek

argues “[t]his evidence, if believed (and it was [believed], as the trial court’s

decision makes clear)[,] easily supports the trial court’s conclusion that

[Appellant] breached his duty to perform in a workmanlike manner.” Id. at

16.

“[A] challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence in a civil case is

reviewed on appeal as a claim that the trial court erred in denying a motion

for [JNOV.]” Krishnan v. Cutler Grp., Inc., 171 A.3d 856, 880 n.14 (Pa.

Super. 2017) (citation omitted). “An appellate court will reverse a trial court’s

denial … of a request for [JNOV] only when the trial court abused its discretion

or erred as a matter of law.” Young v. Lippl, 251 A.3d 405, 413 (Pa. Super.

2021) (citing Rost v. Ford Motor Co., 151 A.3d 1032, 1042 (Pa. 2016)).

When reviewing a trial court’s denial of a motion for JNOV,
we must consider all of the evidence admitted to decide if there
was sufficient competent evidence to sustain the verdict. In so
doing, we must also view this evidence in the light most favorable
to the verdict winner, giving the victorious party the benefit of
every reasonable inference arising from the evidence and
rejecting all unfavorable testimony and inference. Concerning any
questions of law, our scope of review is plenary. Concerning
questions of credibility and weight accorded the evidence at trial,
we will not substitute our judgment for that of the finder of fact.
If any basis exists upon which the [court] could have properly

• 12 - J-A06021-26

made its award, then we must affirm the trial court’s denial of the
motion for JNOV. A JNOV should be entered only in a clear case.

Tong-Summerford v. Abington Mem’l Hosp., 190 A.3d 631, 641 (Pa.

Super. 2018); see also Young, 251 A.3d at 415 (“In reviewing a challenge

to the sufficiency of the evidence, an appellate court will reject all evidence

that does not support the verdict.”); Hagans v. Hosp. of the Univ. of

Pennsylvania, 343 A.3d 251, 264 (Pa. Super. 2025) (“JNOV is an extreme

remedy that should only be granted in a clear case. If there is any basis upon

which the [fact-finder] could have properly made its award, the denial of the

motion for [JNOV] must be affirmed.” (citations and quotation marks

omitted)).

When reviewing a sufficiency of the evidence claim in a civil
case …, an appellate court, viewing all the evidence and
reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the
verdict winner, must determine whether the evidence was
sufficient to enable the fact-finder to find that all the elements of
the causes of action were established by a preponderance of the
evidence. Whether a claim was established under a
preponderance of the evidence standard is tantamount to a more
likely than not inquiry.

Jones v. Foods on First III, Inc., 345 A.3d 231, 247 (Pa. Super. 2025);

see also Medina v. Green, 348 A.3d 1113, 1117 (Pa. Super. 2025) (“A

preponderance of the evidence standard is defined as the greater weight of

the evidence, i.e., enough to tip a scale slightly.”); Off. of Disciplinary

Couns. v. Anonymous Att’y, 331 A.3d 523, 534 (Pa. 2025) (observing that

a preponderance of the evidence standard “is the lowest burden applied in

civil cases.”).

• 13 - J-A06021-26

“The three elements needed to establish breach of contract are the

existence of a contract, a breach of duty imposed by the contract, and

damages.” Kalili v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 330 A.3d 396, 403 (Pa.

Super. 2024). The instant claim involves Appellant’s alleged breach of the

Agreement’s provision that the work “be completed in a substantial

workmanlike manner….” Agreement, 11/1/17, at 2 (unpaginated).6 “Modern

jurisprudence defines ‘workmanlike manner,’ as ‘doing the work in an

ordinarily skilled manner as a skilled workman should do it.’” Jack Frost

Constr., Inc. v. Bertothy, 307 A.3d 638, 2023 WL 6534085, *6 n.5 (Pa.

Super. 2023) (unpublished memorandum)7 (quoting PHILIP L. BRUNER & PATRICK

J. O’CONNOR, JR., BRUNER & O’CONNOR ON CONSTRUCTION LAW, § 9:77 (2022)).

Instantly, in its Rule 1925(a) opinion, the trial court analyzed Appellant’s

first claim as follows:

At trial, [Meek] proved that [Appellant] performed certain work
that was not satisfactory. [Meek] proved that siding on a portion
of the house, and soffit and fascia on that same portion, were not
installed in a workmanlike manner. [Meek] contacted [Appellant]
several months after the siding was installed. [Meek] repeatedly
contacted [Appellant], and [Appellant] did nothing to remedy the
situation.

[Meek] introduced exhibits and proved that the exterior
siding was warped and/or buckling, and falling off the exterior
walls. Also[,] the soffit and fascia were loose and not properly
installed. [Mooney] visited [Meek’s] home and prepared an

---

6 There is no dispute as to the existence of the contract.

7 Pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 126(b), unpublished non-precedential decisions of this

Court filed after May 1, 2019, may be cited for persuasive value.

• 14 - J-A06021-26

estimate in the amount of $19,602.87 to replace the faulty work
of [Appellant]. … Mooney expressed legitimate concerns that
given the warped and loose siding, … replacement [rather than]
repair was appropriate. [The trial court] agreed…. [Meek] proved
liability and damages by the appropriate standard.

---

The [trial] court considered all exhibits presented at trial,
and viewed witness testimony. The parties did not dispute that
there was in fact a contract. The sole issue in dispute revolved
around a determination of the workmanlike manner of
[Appellant’s] work…. In viewing the evidence, the court ruled that
there was sufficient evidence to find in favor of [Meek] and against
[Appellant]. The court was convinced, and therefore determined,
that [Appellant] failed to perform his duties in a workmanlike
manner.

Trial Court Opinion, 9/23/25, at 2-4 (some capitalization and punctuation

modified).

We agree with the trial court’s analysis and conclusion. Our review

confirms that the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to Meek, was

sufficient to establish that Appellant failed to perform in a workmanlike

manner. The photos taken within months of the project’s completion support

Meek’s characterization of the problems with the siding—including buckling,

warping, loosening, and detaching—as “pervasive.” N.T., 7/1/25, at 24; see

also Exhibit 3. Mooney testified that significant portions of the siding were

“not fastened correctly,” and the problems were the result of Appellant’s poor

• 15 - J-A06021-26

“craftsmanship.” N.T., 7/1/25, at 52.8 Mooney further testified “the siding

was in such disrepair” that it needed to be fully replaced to provide correct

fastening “and make sure that it didn’t happen again.” Id. at 50, 51.9 Viewed

under our standard of review, this evidence is sufficient to support an

inference that Appellant did not install the siding in a workmanlike manner,

and therefore breached the Agreement. As our review confirms the evidence

provides a “basis upon which the [fact-finder] could have properly made its

---

8 In a footnote, Appellant’s brief asserts this Court “has previously held that

specialized knowledge beyond that of an ordinary layperson is necessary to
determine whether a service has been performed in a workmanlike manner.”
Appellant’s Brief at 14 n.4 (citing Electron Energy Corp. v. Short, 597 A.2d
175, 180 (Pa. Super. 1991)). Contrary to Appellant’s assertion, Electron
Energy Corp. did not hold that specialized knowledge is always necessary to
determine whether a service was performed in a workmanlike manner. See
Electron Energy Corp., 597 A.2d at 180. Rather, it recognized the general
rule that expert testimony is necessary “when the matter is beyond the
experience of the ordinary layman[.]” Id. (holding expert testimony was
necessary to determine whether there was a design defect in a heating and
cooling system installed by an industrial engineering firm). Instantly,
Appellant develops no argument that the matter before the trial court was
beyond the experience of the ordinary layman. See generally Appellant’s
Brief; see also Trust Under Deed of Wallace F. Ott, 271 A.3d 409, 421
(Pa. Super. 2021) (stating that “an appellant waives any issue he fails to
develop sufficiently”).

9 Appellant’s reliance on Mooney’s testimony regarding a potential
manufacturing defect is unavailing. Mooney testified he “probably would
have” asked the manufacturer about “one place on the house” where siding
had warped. N.T., 7/1/25, at 52 (emphasis added). However, Mooney also
identified incorrect fastening and poor craftsmanship as the cause of the
broader siding failure. See id. Even assuming arguendo that warping in “one
place on the house” could not be attributed to Appellant’s performance,
Mooney’s testimony that the siding’s broader “disrepair” required complete
replacement nevertheless sufficiently supports the same damages award. Id.
at 50, 52.

• 16 - J-A06021-26

award,” we must affirm the trial court’s denial of Appellant’s motion for JNOV.

Hagans, 343 A.3d at 264. Appellant’s first issue merits no relief.

In his second issue, Appellant argues the verdict was “unsupported by

the weight of the evidence.” Appellant’s Brief at 15 (capitalization modified).

Appellant asserts that Meek “failed to set forth substantial evidence

connecting [Appellant’s] alleged poor workmanship to the damage to [] Meek’s

home.” Id. at 16. Appellant relies on Barrack v. Kolea, 651 A.2d 149 (Pa.

Super. 1994), which states as follows:

Evidence is substantial if relevant and adequate to support a
reasonable person’s conclusion. Inferences of fact which are mere
guesses, conjecture, or speculation will not support a verdict,
however. There must be evidence upon which logically its
conclusion may be based.

Barrack, 651 A.2d at 155 (citations, quotation marks, and brackets omitted).

Appellant maintains that, “without appropriate evidence of causation,” the trial

court’s “ruling is not reasonable and constitutes an abuse of discretion.”

Appellant’s Brief at 16.

As this Court has observed,

[a] motion for a new trial based on a claim that the verdict is
against the weight of the evidence is addressed to the discretion
of the trial court. A new trial should not be granted because of a
mere conflict in the testimony or because the judge on the same
facts would have arrived at a different conclusion. Rather, the
role of the trial judge is to determine that notwithstanding all the
facts, certain facts are so clearly of greater weight that to ignore
them or to give them equal weight with all the facts is to deny
justice. It has often been stated that a new trial should be
awarded when the [fact-finder’s] verdict is so contrary to the
evidence as to shock one’s sense of justice and the award of a

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new trial is imperative so that right may be given another
opportunity to prevail.

An appellate court’s standard of review when presented with
a weight of the evidence claim is distinct from the standard of
review applied by the trial court[.] Appellate review of a weight
claim is a review of the exercise of discretion, not of the underlying
question of whether the verdict is against the weight of the
evidence. Because the trial judge has had the opportunity to hear
and see the evidence presented, an appellate court will give the
gravest consideration to the findings and reasons advanced by the
trial judge when reviewing a trial court’s determination that the
verdict is against the weight of the evidence. One of the least
assailable reasons for granting or denying a new trial is the lower
court’s conviction that the verdict was or was not against the
weight of the evidence and that a new trial should be granted in
the interest of justice.

Ruff v. York Hosp., 257 A.3d 43, 49 (Pa. Super. 2021) (citation omitted;

paragraph break modified).

Instantly, Appellant’s weight argument merely rehashes his sufficiency

argument. See Appellant’s Brief at 15-16. He fails to identify the “certain

facts” which purportedly outweigh the other facts, Ruff, 257 A.3d at 49, but

instead relies on the supposed absence of evidence establishing causation.

Appellant’s Brief at 16. Moreover, Appellant cites no authority germane to a

weight claim. See id. at 15-16. Barrack’s statement that evidence must be

“substantial” enough “to support a reasonable person’s conclusion” is a

concept relevant to the sufficiency of the evidence, not its weight. Barrack,

651 A.2d at 155. For these reasons, we deem Appellant’s weight claim

waived. See Kalili, 330 A.3d at 406 (“This Court will not act as counsel and

will not develop arguments on behalf of an appellant.”); Foster v. Nuffer,

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286 A.3d 279, 284 n.2 (Pa. Super. 2022) (“Failure to cite relevant legal

authority constitutes waiver of the claim on appeal.”); Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a)

(requiring discussion and citation of pertinent authorities).

In his third issue, Appellant argues the trial court abused its discretion

in admitting the 2024 photos into evidence. Appellant’s Brief at 17-18.

Appellant characterizes the 2024 photos as “relating to alleged damage to

[Meek’s house] which occurred in 2024.” Id. at 17. Appellant argues the

2024 photos were irrelevant and unfairly prejudicial. Id. at 17-18 (citing,

inter alia, Pa.R.E. 401 (“Evidence is relevant if: (a) it has any tendency to

make a fact more or less probable than it would be without the evidence; and

(b) the fact is of consequence in determining the action.”), and Whyte v.

Robinson, 617 A.2d 380, 383 (Pa. Super. 1992) (stating “prejudice”

generally “means an undue tendency to suggest a decision on an improper

basis.”)). Appellant maintains that “evidence of any alleged damage to

[Meek’s house] which occurred in 2024 does not make [] Meek’s allegations

against [Appellant] more or less probable than [they] would be without the

evidence.” Appellant’s Brief at 17-18.

Meek counters that the “challenged evidence was plainly relevant.”

Meek’s Brief at 20. Meek argues that evidence “describing the progressive

deterioration of the siding system directly informed whether [Appellant’s]

work complied with the contractual requirement of workmanlike performance,

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and it assisted the [trial] court in determining the reasonable cost necessary

to remedy the failure.” Id. at 20-21.

When reviewing a challenge to an evidentiary ruling,

this Court defers to the trial court, and we reverse in limited
circumstances. … Admission of evidence is within the sound
discretion of the trial court, and we review the trial court’s
determinations regarding the admissibility of evidence for an
abuse of discretion. To constitute reversible error, an evidentiary
ruling must not only be erroneous, but also harmful or prejudicial
to the complaining party.

An “abuse of discretion” is not merely an error of judgment.
A trial court abuses its discretion by making a manifestly
unreasonable, arbitrary, or capricious decision; by failing to apply
the law; or by allowing prejudice, bias, or ill will to influence its
decision.

Calisto v. Rodgers, 271 A.3d 877, 884-85 (Pa. Super. 2022) (en banc)

(citations omitted).

“Relevant evidence is any evidence that ‘has any tendency to make a

fact more or less probable.’” Marshall v. Brown’s IA, LLC, 213 A.3d 263,

270 (Pa. Super. 2019) (quoting Pa.R.E. 401(a)). “Relevant evidence is

traditionally admissible, unless a rule applies to bar admission.” Janik v.

Zoological Soc’y of Philadelphia, 336 A.3d 257, 261 (Pa. Super. 2025)

(citing Pa.R.E. 402). Trial courts “enjoy broad discretion to determine whether

evidence is relevant[.]” Hutchinson v. Verstraeten, 304 A.3d 1268, 1274

(Pa. Super. 2023).

Instantly, in its order denying Appellant’s pre-trial motion in limine to

exclude the 2024 photos, the trial court stated that Appellant’s arguments

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about the photos “go to the weight of the evidence” rather than its

admissibility. Order, 6/17/24.10 At trial, Appellant renewed his objection to

the 2024 photos. See N.T., 7/1/25, at 24. Before ruling on the objection,

the trial court directed Meek’s counsel to lay a foundation for the photos

through Meek’s testimony. Id. Meek testified that the condition of the siding

continues to deteriorate; the siding looks “worse now” than it did in the 2018

photos; and the 2024 photos depict additional siding “that fell off[.]” Id. at

25-26. Following this testimony, the trial court overruled Appellant’s objection

and admitted the 2024 photos. Id. at 26.

We discern no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s decision to admit

the 2024 photos. Appellant advances no grounds for excluding the photos

apart from their alleged irrelevance. See Appellant’s Brief at 17-18. We agree

with Meek that the photos were relevant to the quality of Appellant’s

workmanship and the repairs needed to remedy the siding’s condition. See

Meek’s Brief at 20-21. We further agree with the trial court that Appellant’s

arguments address the weight of the evidence, not its admissibility. See

Order, 6/17/24. Appellant’s third and final issue therefore merits no relief.

Judgment affirmed.

---

10 The trial court did not address this issue in its Rule 1925(a) opinion. See
generally Trial Court Opinion, 9/23/25.

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3/25/2026

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