Mrs. Sujata Shekhar Shetty And Ors. vs Vivek Madhavlal Pittie And Ors. - Civil Revision Application

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Mrs. Sujata Shekhar Shetty And Ors. vs Vivek Madhavlal Pittie And Ors. on 27 March, 2026

2026:BHC-AS:15358
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                        IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
                                CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

                          CIVIL REVISION APPLICATION NO.621 OF 2025

          1        Sujata Shekhar Shetty
          2        Shamira Shekhar Shetty
          3        Saurabh Shekhar Shetty
          4        Shivani Shekhar Shetty                                              .... Applicants

                          V/S

          1        Vivek Madhavlal Pittie
          2        Unknown Heirs and Legal
                   Representatives of Blossom John D'silva
          3        Administrator General of Maharashtra                                .... Respondents

                                                   _________

          Mr. Venkatesh Dhond a/w Mr. Prateek Pansare, Mr. Alhan Kayser and
          Ms. Varsha Vasave i/b Mr. Avesh Kayser for the Applicant.

          Mr. Bhushan Deshmukh a/w Mr. Arun Unnikrishnan and Urvi Gulechha
          i/b Jadeja & Satiya for Respondent No.1.
                                          __________

                                             CORAM : SANDEEP V. MARNE, J.
                                             DATE : 27 MARCH 2026.

          JUDGMENT 1.          Applicants have filed the present Revision Application
         challenging judgment and decree dated 14 October 2025 passed by the
         Appellate Bench of the Small Causes Court allowing Appeal No.123 of
         2013 and setting aside judgment and decree dated 7 September 2013
         passed by the learned Judge, Small Causes Court in R.A.E. Suit
         No.369/612 of 2004. The Appellate Bench has decreed R.A.E. Suit

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No.369/612 of 2004 and has directed the Defendants to handover vacant
and peaceful possession of suit premises to the Plaintiff with further
direction for conduct of enquiry into mesne profits under Order XX Rule
12 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (the Code) from the date of the
suit.

1. Plaintiff/Respondent No.1 is the Court Receiver of immovable properties appointed in Suit No.224 of 1961. One of the properties, in respect of which Plaintiff is appointed as Court Receiver, is Shivlal Motilal Mansion/Compound comprising of several buildings bearing House Nos. 1 to 23 and Nos. 294 to 307 with several sheds situated at junction of Dr. Bhadkamkar Marg and Bellasis Road, Mumbai - 400 008. Flat No. E-22 in of the said building consists of four rooms namely A, B, C, and D with common passage and sanitary block at the rear. Room No. A of Flat No. E-22 situated on third floor of the said building are the 'suit premises'. It is Plaintiff's case that one Rosario D'silva was the original tenant in respect of the suit premises. After his death, his son John D'silva became the tenant. According to Plaintiff, the tenant John D'silva sub-let the suit premises to several persons without the consent of the landlord. Plaintiff accordingly filed R.A.E. Suit No.3246 of 1985 against Mr. John D'silva as well as against the inductees. According to the Plaintiff, the inductees of the suit premises left the same and accordingly Plaintiff withdrew the said R.A.E. Suit No.3246 of 1985. Plaintiff alleged that after death of the tenant John D'silva, Defendant Nos.1 and 2 (Mary and Blossom) were the legal heirs who never resided in the suit premises. According to the Plaintiff, suit premises are unauthorizedly sub-let to Defendant No.3-Shekhar N. Shetty. Plaintiff

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also alleged various structural additions and alterations of permanent
nature in the suit premises.

1.   Plaintiff accordingly filed R.A.E. Suit No. 369/612 of 2004 in the
   

   Court of Small Causes seeking eviction of the three Defendants (two
   tenants and the sublettee) on the grounds of unauthorized sub-letting,
   non-use, and additions and alterations. Defendant No.1 passed away
   during pendency of the suit and Defendant No.2 did not file Written
   Statement. Defendant No.3 (sublettee) resisted the suit by filing Written
   Statement. Based on pleadings, the Trial Court framed issues. Plaintiff
   examined five witnesses. Defendant examined himself. After considering
   the pleadings, documentary and oral evidence, the Trial Court proceeded
   to dismiss the suit by rejecting the grounds of non-use, unauthorized
   sub-letting, change of use and construction of permanent nature. The
   Trial Court also held that withdrawal of R.A.E. Suit No.3246 of 1985 had
   adversely effected maintainability of the fresh suit.

2.   Aggrieved by dismissal of the suit, Plaintiff-Court Receiver filed
   

Appeal No.123 of 2013 before Appellate Bench of Small Causes Court
challenging the decree of the Trial Court dated 7 September 2013. By
impugned judgment and order dated 14 October 2025, the Appellate
Court has proceeded to allow the Appeal and has set aside Trial Court's
decree dated 7 September 2013. The Appellate Court has decreed RAE
Suit No.369/612 of 2004 with costs, directing Defendants to handover
possession of the suit premises to the Plaintiff with further direction for
conduct of enquiry into mesne profits under Order XX Rule 12 of the
Code from the date of filing of the Suit.

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1.   Applicants are legal heirs of Defendant No.3 and have filed the
   

   present Revision Application challenging the eviction decree passed by
   the Appellate Court.

2.   Mr. Dhond, the learned Senior Advocate appearing for the
   

Applicants would submit that the Appellate Court has erroneously
reversed the Trial Court's decree in absence of any perversity in the
findings recorded by the Appellate Court. That the Trial Court had
rightly held that withdrawal of earlier R.A.E. Suit No.3465 of 1988 had
adversely affected the maintainability of the present Suit. That fresh
Suit was clearly barred under provisions of Order XXIII Rule 1(4)(b) of
the Code. That fresh suit is not maintainable in respect of same subject
matter. That Plaintiff cannot be permitted to file multiple suits in
respect of the same subject matter. That with withdrawal of the previous
suit, the allegation of unlawful sub-letting was clearly dropped.
Similarly, Plaintiff had also raised allegation of unauthorized additions
and alterations of permanent nature in the suit premises in the previous
suit and having withdrawn the said suit, he cannot bring second suit on
same cause of action.

1. Mr. Dhond further submits that Plaintiff's suit was clearly barred by limitation. He submits that Defendant No.3 has admittedly come into suit premises in the year 1990. That MHADA's plan/list of occupants included the name of Defendant No.3. That therefore sub-letting, if any, has taken place in the year 1990 and the suit filed in the year 2004 was clearly barred by limitation. That the Appellate Court has erroneously reversed the said finding of the Trial Court.

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1.    Mr. Dhond further submits that the ground of non-user of the suit
   

   premises was baseless and raised belatedly after 14 years of entry of
   Defendant No.3 in the suit premises. He submits that even the ground of
   carrying out additions and alterations was rightly rejected by the Trial
   Court after appreciating the evidence on record. Mr. Dhond would
   accordingly pray for setting aside the impugned decree passed by the
   Appellate Court.

2.    Mr. Bhushan Deshmukh, the learned counsel appearing for
   

   Respondent No.1/Plaintiff opposes the Revision Application contending
   that the Appellate Court has rightly decreed the suit by reversing the
   erroneous order passed by the Trial Court. He submits that sub-letting
   constitutes continuous cause of action and relies on judgment of this
   Court in Shree Durga Trading Company vs. Ateeq Anwar Agboatwala and
   another1. He submits that the Applicants admit sub-letting by the
   original tenants. That since sub-letting is not disputed, the Appellate
   Court's decree does not warrant any interference. That sub-letting also
   proves the factum of non-use of the suit premises by the tenants. He
   submits that additional grounds of unauthorized additions, alterations
   and changing the use of the suit premises are also established against
   the Applicants. He therefore prays for dismissal of the Revision
   Application.

3.   Rival contentions urged on behalf of the parties now fall for my
   

consideration.

1 2024 SCC OnLine Bom 3065

k 6/15 5 cra 621.25 J as.doc 11. Mr. Dhond had principally argued two points before me viz. that
fresh suit was barred under the provisions of Order XXIII Rule 1(4)(b) of
the Code, and that the suit was barred by limitation.

1. So far as the ground of Plaintiff's suit being Order XXIII Rule 1(4)

(b) is concerned, the same is premised on filing and withdrawal of the
RAE Suit No.3246 of 1988. Plaintiff is a Court Receiver appointed by this
Court in respect of the structure in which suit premises are situated. He
had instituted R.A.E. Suit No.3246 of 1985 alleging that the erstwhile
tenant John D'silva had sub-let the suit premises illegally to several
persons including Mr. Antony B. Lewis, Mr. Lobo, Mr. Shakeel Ahmed
Kazi and Mr. Kadar Ahmed Kazi. It was Plaintiff's case that one of the
inductees-Mr. Lobo had stopped residing in the suit premises. The suit
remained pending till 4 February 1999 and the Plaintiff contended that
the other inductees left the suit premises and accordingly the suit was
withdrawn. Thus, R.A.E. Suit No.3246 of 1985 was filed on a complete
separate cause of action relating to unauthorized sub-letting to
Mr. Lobo, Mr. Lewis, Mr. Shakeel Kazi and Mr. Kadar Kazi. As against
this, RAE Suit No.369/612 of 2004 was filed alleging unauthorized sub-
letting to Defendant No.3-Shekhar N. Shetty. It can happen that a
tenant can induct multiple persons at multiple points of time. Every
time a new person is inducted by the tenant in the suit premises, fresh
cause of action arises. Each act of sub-letting can give cause to the
landlord to file a suit. To illustrate, the tenant inducts multiple licensees
for tenure of 11 months at different points of time, multiple suits can be
filed for each act of subletting and even if the suit in the respect of first
licensee is dismissed, the same does not bar maintainability of the

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second suit against another licensee. Therefore, the act of induction of
Defendant No.3-Shekhar N. Shetty gave rise to a fresh cause of action.
Unfortunately, the Trial Court did not appreciate the simple legal
position and erroneously accepted the contention that the fresh suit was
barred under provisions of Order XXIII Rule 1(4)(b) of the Code. The
Appellate Court has correctly set aside the finding of the Trial Court on
issue No.6. I do not find any reason to interfere in the said finding of
the Appellate Court.

1. So far as the next ground that suit being barred by limitation is

concerned, same is referable to Petitioner's entry/induction into the suit
premises in the year 1990. It is contended on behalf of the Applicants
that since induction occurred in the year 1990, the suit ought to have
been filed within a period of 12 years under Articles 66 and 67 of the Limitation Act, 1963. This issue is no more res integra and is covered by
judgment of this Court in Shree Durga Trading Company (supra) in
which it is held that the act of sub-letting constitutes continuous cause
of action. This Court held in paragraphs 10 to 18 of the judgment as
under:

1. Articles 66 and 67 of the Limitation Act, 1963 (Limitation Act) provide thus: Description of suit Period of Time from which limitation period begins to run

         66.       For possession of immovable Twelve years                 When the forfeiture
                   property when the plaintiff                              is incurred or the
                   has become entitled to                                   condition is broken.
                   possession by reason of any
                   forfeiture or breach of
                   condition.

         67.       By landlord to recover Twelve years                      When the tenancy
                   possession from a tenant.                                is determined.

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1. Though Dr. Thorat has submitted that Article 67 would be attracted in the
   present case and not Article 66, in my view, it is not necessary to enter into
   that debate. What needs to be considered is whether the cause of action for
   recovery of possession on account of act of subletting is continuous in nature.
   The concept of continuous wrong is traceable to Section 22 of the Limitation
   Act, reading as under:

2. Continuing breaches and torts.- In case of a continuing breach of
   contract or in the case of a continuing tort, a fresh period of limitation
   begins to run at every moment of the time during which the breach or
   the tort, as the case may be, continues.

3. While considering a pari materia provision, i.e., Section 23 of the
   Limitation Act, 1908, the Supreme Court in Balakirshna Savalram Pujari
   Waghmare v. Shree Dnyaneshwar Maharaj Sansthan, AIR 1959 SC 798, laid
   down the law that the very essence of a continuing wrong is that it is an act
   which creates a continuing source of injury and renders the doer of the act
   responsible and liable for the continuance of the said injury; however, if
   wrongful act causes an injury which is complete, there is no continuing wrong
   even though the damage resulting from the act may continue. The Court held
   thus:

4. It is then contended by Mr. Rege that the suits cannot be held to be
   barred under Article 120 because Section 23 of the Limitation Act
   applies; and since, in the words of the said section, the conduct of the
   trustees amounted to a continuing wrong, a fresh period of limitation
   began to run at every moment of time during which the said wrong
   continued. Does the conduct of the trustees amount to a continuing
   wrong under Section 23? That is the question which this contention
   raises for our decision. In other words, did the cause of action arise de
   die in diem as claimed by the appellants? In dealing with this
   argument it is necessary to bear in mind that Section 23 refers not to a
   continuing right but to a continuing wrong. It is the very essence of a
   continuing wrong that it is an act which creates a continuing source of
   injury and renders the doer of the act responsible and liable for the
   continuance of the said injury. If the wrongful act causes an injury
   which is complete, there is no continuing wrong even though the
   damage resulting from the act may continue. If, however, a wrongful
   act is of such a character that the injury caused by it itself continues,
   then the act constitutes a continuing wrong. In this connection it is
   necessary to draw a distinction between the injury caused by the
   wrongful act and what may be described as the effect of the said injury.
   It is only in regard to acts which can be properly characterised as
   continuing wrongs that Section 23 can be invoked. Thus considered it
   is difficult to hold that the trustees' act in denying altogether the
   alleged rights of the Guravs as hereditary worshippers and in claiming
   and obtaining possession from them by their suit in 1922 was a
   continuing wrong. The decree obtained by the trustees in the said
   litigation had injured effectively and completely the appellants' rights

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            though the damage caused by the said decree subsequently continued.
            Can it be said that, after the appellants were evicted from the temple
            in execution of the said decree, the continuance of their dispossession
            was due to a recurring act of tort committed by the trustees from
            moment to moment? As soon as the decree was passed and the
            appellants were dispossessed in execution proceedings, their rights
            had been completely injured, and though their dispossession
            continued, it cannot be said that the trustees were committing
            wrongful acts or acts of tort from moment to moment so as to give the
            appellants a cause of action de die in diem. We think there can be no
            doubt that where the wrongful act complained of amounts to ouster,
            the resulting injury to the right is complete at the date of the ouster
            and so there would be no scope for the application of 23 in such a case.
            That is the view which the High Court has taken and we see no reason
            to differ from it.

(emphasis added)

1. Applying the above ratio to the facts of the present case, the wrong
   committed by Defendant No. 1 in subletting the premises continued and
   thereby the injury caused to Plaintiffs also continued. This is not a case where
   the wrongful act of Defendant No. 1 in subletting the premises resulted in
   injury which was complete and only damages resulting out of such injury
   continued. Therefore in a case involving subletting, a continuous cause of
   action would arise so long as the act of subletting continues.

2. Section 16(1)(e) of the Maharashtra Rent Control Act, 1999, which creates
   a right in favour of landlord to seek recovery of tenanted premises on the
   ground of unlawful subletting, provides thus:

(e) that the tenant has,-

(i) on or after the 1st day of February 1973, in the areas to which the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947 applied; or

(ii) on or after the commencement of this Act, in the Vidarbha and
Marathwada, areas of the State,

unlawfully sub-let or given on licence, the whole or part of the premises or
assigned or transferred in any other manner his interest therein; or
15. Use of the words 'has sublet' in Section 16(1)(e) undoubtedly relates to
past event of subletting and the act of subletting need not continue on the
date of filing of the suit as against other grounds such
as bonafide requirement, non use, etc. which must continue on the date of
filing of the suit. However, if the tenant, who had sublet the premises prior to
12 years and continues subletting the same, the act would constitute
continuous breach of tenancy conditions and would give rise to continuous
cause of action.

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1. Dr. Thorat has relied on judgment of Single Judge of this Court in Shri. Taherbhai T. Poonawala v. S. Hamid Hassan Patel (deceased by LRs) [AIR 2007 Bom 80] in which this Court has held in paras-9 to 12 as under:

1. Mr. Mandlik, the learned Counsel for Respondent Nos. 1A and 2, pointed out that the fact remains that this breach of tenancy was committed way back on 1st February, 1969 and cannot be ignored by the subsequent determination of tenancy on 9 th June, 1981 by the said notice. Applying Art. 66 of the Limitation Act, 12 years would be the period of limitation prescribed for filing a suit for possession of immovable property by reason of breach of condition of tenancy starting from the date when the condition of tenancy was broken. Therefore, Mr. Mandlik contended that on computation of the said period of limitation from 1st February, 1969, when the condition of tenancy was broken, suit was clearly barred by law of limitation.

1. Mr. Mandlik, in this behalf relied upon the judgment of the Supreme Court inGanpat Ram Sharma v.Gayatri Devi, [(1987) 3 SCC 576 : AIR 1987 SC 2016], specifically paragraph Nos. 21 to 23, which read as under:--

1. Before we discuss the other aspect the result of the several decisions to which reference has been made above indicate that the position in law is that the landlord in order to be entitled to evict the tenant must establish one of the alternative facts positively, either that the tenant has built, or acquired vacant possession of or has been allotted a residence. It is essential that the ingredients must be pleaded by the landlord who seeks eviction but after the landlord has proved or stated that the tenant has built, acquired vacant possession or has been allotted a residence, whether it is suitable or not, and whether the same can be really an alternative accommodation for the tenant or not, are within the special knowledge of the tenant and he must prove and establish those facts. The other aspect apart from the question of limitation to which we shall briefly refer is that the landlord must be quick in taking his action after the accrual of the cause of action, and if by his inaction the tenant allows the premises to go out of his hands then it is the landlord who is to be blamed and not the tenant. In the light of these, we have now to examine whether the suit in the instant case was barred by the lapse of time. But quite apart from the suit being barred by lapse of time, this is a beneficial legislation, beneficial to both the landlord and the tenant. It protects the tenant against unreasonable eviction and exorbitant rent. It also ensures certain limited rights to the landlord to recover possession on stated contingencies. (Emphasis supplied)

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1. The next aspect of the matter is which Article of the Limitation Act would be applicable. Reference was made to Arts. 66 and 67 of the Limitation Act, 1963 (hereinafter called the Limitation Act) which stipulates that for possession of immovable property the cause of action arises or accrues when the plaintiff has become entitled to possession by reason of any forfeiture or breach of condition. Article 67 stipulates a period of twelve years when the tenancy is determined. Article 113 deals with suit for which no period of limitation is provided elsewhere in this Schedule. On the facts of this case it is clear that Article 66 would apply because no determination in this case is necessary and that is well settled now. Determination by notice under Sec. 106 of the Transfer of Property Act is no longer necessary.

(Emphasis supplied)

1. It is well settled that time begins to run from the date of the knowledge. See in this connection the decision of Harbans Singh v. Custodian of Evacuee Property 'P' Block, AIR 1970 Del 82, though that was a case under a different statute and dealt with a different Article. See also Ujagar Singh v. Likha Singh, AIR 1941 All 48 at p. 30. The Division Bench of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Somdas (deceased) v. Rikhu Dev Chela Bawa Har Jagdass Narokari, PLR (1983) 85 P&H 184 held that in a suit for possession under Art. 113 of the Limitation Act, material date is one on which the right to sue for possession arises.

(Emphasis supplied)

1. Mr. Mandlik, the learned Counsel also relied upon another
   judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Shakuntala v.
   Hemchand, (1987) 3 SCC 211: (AIR 1987 SC 1823), wherein, the
   Hon'ble Supreme Court in paragraph 12 (para 11 of AIR) has
   observed as under:--

2. If that is so then on the strict grammatical meaning Art. 67 of the Limitation Act would be applicable. This is
   indubitably a suit by the landlord against the tenant to
   recover possession from the tenant. Therefore the suit
   clearly comes within Art. 67 of the Limitation Act. The
   suit was filed because the tenancy was determined by
   the combined effect of the operation of Sections 12 and
   13 of the Bombay Rent Act. In this connection, the terms
   of Sections 12 and 13 of the Bombay Rent Act may be
   referred to. At the most it would be within Art. 66 of the Limitation Act if we hold that forfeiture has been
   incurred by the appellant in view of the breach of the
   conditions mentioned in Section 13 of the Bombay Rent

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                               Act and on lifting of the embargo against eviction of
                               tenant in terms of the [Section 12](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1267250/) of the said Act. That
                               being so, either of the two, [Article 6](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/19636/) or [Article 67](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1944038/) would
                               be applicable to the facts of this case; there is no scope
                               of the application of [Art. 113](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/10691/) of the [Limitation Act](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1317393/) in
                               any view of the matter. Sections 12 and 13 of the
                               Bombay Rent Act co-exist and must be harmonised to
                               effect the purpose and intent of the legislature for the
                               purpose of eviction of the tenant. In that view of the
                               matter, [Article 113](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/10691/) of the [Limitation Act](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1317393/) has no scope of
                               application. Large number of authorities were cited. In
                               the view we have taken on the construction of the
                               provisions of Arts. 67 and 66 of the [Limitation Act](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1317393/) and
                               the nature of the cause of action in this case in the light
                               of Sections 12 and 13 of the Bombay Rent Act, we are of
                               the opinion that the period of limitation in this case
                               would be 12 years. There is no dispute that if the period
                               of limitation be 12 years, the suit was not barred.

1. After hearing both the learned Counsel, and after perusal of
   the trial Court judgment and the lower Appellate Court
   judgment, it is clear that in the instant case, though the
   tenancy was created in favour of Respondent No. 1, the
   Respondent No. 1 never stayed in the suit premises, right from
   inception, i.e. 1st February, 1969. On the contrary, the
   Respondent No. 1 had illegally sub-let the same to Respondent
   Nos. 2 and 3 from 1st February, 1969. If that be so, the breach of
   tenancy conditions occurred on 1st February, 1969, and the suit
   ought to have been filed within 12 years, as per Art. 66 of the Limitation Act. Ex-facie the suit is barred by law of limitation. I
   respectfully do not agree with the judgment of the Gujarat High
   Court, that in case of illegal subletting, there would be a
   continuing cause of action. The said view is contrary to the
   provisions of Art. 66 of the Limitation Act.

2. It appears that the learned Single Judge of this Court in Shri.
   Taherbhai T. Poonawala has differed with the view taken by the Gujarat
   High Court that in case of illegal subletting there would be continuous
   cause of action and has held that suit must be brought within 12 years
   of act of subletting under Article 66 of the Limitation Act. However, it
   appears that provisions of Section 22 of the Limitation Act were not
   brought to the notice of this Court. Also, the case involved peculiar
   facts where the Appellate Court therein had rendered a finding that
   though tenant had entered into the said tenancy agreement, he never
   stayed in the suit premises, right from inception. This Court has relied
   on two judgments of the Apex Court. The issue before the Apex Court
   in its judgment in Ganpat Ram Sharma v. Smt. Gayatri Devi (1987) 3
   SCC 576 : AIR 1987 SC 2016 was about application of Article 67 or

k 13/15 5 cra 621.25 J as.doc Article 113 in respect of the suit for recovery of possession from the
tenant. Similarly, was the case in the judgment of the Apex Court in Smt. Shakuntala S. Tiwari v. Hem Chand Singhania [(1987) 3 SCC 211].
Thus, in both the judgments of the Apex Court relied upon by the
learned Single Judge in Shri. Taherbhai T. Poonawala, the issue was not
about the act of subletting giving rise to continuous cause of action. In
my view therefore, the judgment in Shri. Taherbhai T. Poonawala,
rendered in peculiar facts of that case where the tenant had not
occupied the premises even for a single day, cannot be read in support
of an absolute proposition of law that in every case, the injury arising
out of act of subletting would be complete on the day when the
subletting first occurs and that such an act would not constitute
continuous cause of action under Section 22 of the Limitation Act.

1. In my view, the act of unauthorised subletting by a tenant constitutes a continuing breach of contract and therefore period of limitation would begin to run so long as the act of subletting continues. It is another case where the act of subletting comes to an end and Plaintiff fails to file the suit for recovery of possession within 12 years of reversal of act of subletting. In the present case, it is conclusively proved that Defendant No. 1 had allowed Defendant No. 2 to conduct business in the suit premises till the year 2000. Therefore, the suit filed in the year 2001 cannot be treated to be barred by limitation.

(emphasis added)

1. Thus if the act of subletting continues, the same would constitute

a continuous wrong within the meaning of Section 22 of the Limitation
Act, 1963. Since the act of sub-letting has continued as on the date of
filing of the suit, it has given rise to continuous cause of action. The
Trial Court had erred in holding that the suit was barred by limitation.
The Appellate Court has corrected the said error. I do not find any valid
reason to interfere in the finding recorded by the Appellate Court.

1. In the present case, Defendant No.3-himself has admitted that he

is occupying the suit premises. Defendant No.3 is not the tenant in
respect of the suit premises. Thus, the act of sub-letting is virtually
admitted by Defendant No.3.

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1.   Presence of Defendant No.3 in the suit premises also proves non-
   

   use thereof by Defendant Nos.1 and 2. Defendant Nos.1 and 2 did not
   show any interest in defending the suit, which shows that they are no
   longer interested in respect of their tenancy rights in the suit premises.
   Defendant No.3 was admittedly using the suit premises at the time of
   filing of the suit. Defendant No.3 did not produce any documentary
   evidence to indicate that he is a lawful tenant inducted in the suit
   premises with landlord's consent. His plea of manager of the Plaintiff
   granting permission for use and occupy the suit premises could not be
   established. There is nothing on record to indicate that the original
   tenants had surrendered their tenancy rights and a new tenancy was
   created in favour of Defendant No.3.

2.   So far as the ground of non-user is concerned, the Trial Court
   

itself had answered the issue in the affirmative but had still proceeded
to dismiss the suit. Thus, there are concurrent findings against the
Applicants on the issue of non-user.

1.   So far as the ground of unauthorized additions and alterations of
   

   permanent nature without prior written permission of the landlord is
   concerned, the Appellate Court has marshalled the evidence on record.
   It is established that there was no bathroom or WC inside the suit
   premises when the same were let out. However, evidence of PW2
   Krupashankar Tiwari establishes that Defendant No.3 had constructed a
   regular bathroom with WC in the south-west corner of the suit premises.
   He had demolished the eastern side load-bearing main wall and
   constructed entrance door near the staircase. It is further proved that

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         Defendant No.3 has removed the cast iron grills and wooden railing of
         the gallery and merged the gallery into suit the premises. He also
         constructed one mori in the western side of the gallery. There can be no
         dispute to the position that these constructions would squarely fall in to
         the mischief of [Section 16(1) (b)](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/131261698/) of the Maharashtra Rent Control Act,
         1999. Thus, even the ground of erection of unauthorized additions and
         alterations of permanent nature without landlords' consent is
         established.
   

2.       Considering the overall conspectus of the case, I am of the view
         that the Appellate Bench has rightly reversed the erroneous order
         passed by the Trial Court. Applicants have failed to make out a case of
         jurisdictional error or exercise of jurisdiction by the Appellate Court
         with material irregularity for this Court to interfere in exercise of
         revisionary jurisdiction under Section 115 of the Code.
   

3.       Civil Revision Application is devoid of merits. It is accordingly
         dismissed without any order as to costs.
   

(SANDEEP V. MARNE, J.)

       Digitally
       signed by
       SUDARSHAN

SUDARSHAN RAJALINGAM
RAJALINGAM KATKAM
KATKAM Date:

2026.04.01
14:45:32
+0530