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March 27, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

In the Int. of: O.N., Appeal of: M.N.

Superior Court of Pennsylvania

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: 1155 WDA 2025
• Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

• Judges: Murray

• Opinion

• Authorities (13)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (14.6K)

• PDF

Lead Opinion

                        by Murray

J-A06026-26

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

IN THE INTEREST OF: O.N., A : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
MINOR : PENNSYLVANIA
:
:
APPEAL OF: M.N., MOTHER :
:
:
:
: No. 1155 WDA 2025

Appeal from the Order Entered September 9, 2025
In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County Orphans' Court at
No(s): CP-02-AP-0000077-2024

BEFORE: OLSON, J., MURRAY, J., and BECK, J.

MEMORANDUM BY MURRAY, J.: FILED: March 27, 2026

M.N. (Mother) appeals from the order granting the petition filed by the

Allegheny County Office of Children, Youth and Families (CYF), and

involuntarily terminating Mother’s parental rights to her daughter, O.N.

(Child), born in May 2022.1 After careful review, we affirm.

The orphans’ court described how the family came to CYF’s attention,

and CYF’s subsequent involvement with the family:

Child’s family was identified by [CYF in] October 2020. CYF’s
involvement at that time was [based on] a referral [alleging the]
medical neglect of Child’s elder [brother], J.R.; intimate partner

---

1 At the termination of parental rights (TPR) hearing, the parties stipulated
that Mother identified R.R. (Father) as Child’s biological father. N.T., 7/31/25,
at 26. In addition to terminating Mother’s parental rights, the orphans’ court
involuntarily terminated the parental rights of Father and unknown father.
See id. (the parties stipulating that, “as [Father] is not on [Child’s] birth
certificate, she has an unknown father.”). Father and unknown father are not
parties to the instant appeal.
J-A06026-26

violence (“IPV”); and substance abuse. CYF accepted service of
the family on December 8, 2020, and [] closed [service] on April
21, 2021, because the family did not engage with [CYF].

A second referral occurred in October 2022 following a
report that Child missed medical appointments and had not been
seen [by medical professionals] since she was 4 weeks old. CYF
[filed] a dependency petition to compel [the] family’s compliance.
Mother was found to have substance abuse issues, and both
parents were ordered to cooperate with KidsVoice, sign releases,
and bring Child and … J.R. [(collectively, Children)] up to date
medically. [The dependency proceedings were continued pending
Mother and Father’s compliance.]

The case did not close out because of an incident that
occurred at a motel room [(the motel)] in Monroeville,
P[ennsylvania], on December 23, 2023. [On that date, Children]
were removed from the care of [Mother and Father], and placed
into emergency protective custody, after Monroeville Police
responded to the [motel] for a noise complaint. Upon arrival,
police officers found [the family was] living in the motel []. A
subsequent search of the [motel] revealed narcotics and drug
paraphernalia. Father admitted to using heroin, while Mother
denied the same to police. [Mother and Father] were charged with
[endangering the welfare of children] and possession of controlled
substances and paraphernalia.2

[Children] were placed, [through] Auberle [Family Healing
Center (Auberle)], [into the] care of H. and F.P.; however,
[Children] were ultimately placed, [through] A Second Chance
foster home, [into the care] of B.J.L. and D.L., who are
[Children’s] maternal grandparents[ (Grandparents)].3

---

2 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 4304(a)(1); 35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(16), (32). On August 9,
2023, Mother pled guilty to all offenses, and, that same date, the trial court
imposed an aggregate sentence of two years’ probation. See CYF Exhibit 10
(Mother’s certified criminal records).

3 Grandparents are pre-adoptive resources for Child. At the TPR hearing,
licensed psychologist Gregory A. Lobb, Ph.D. (Dr. Lobb), testified that Mother
and Father consented to Grandparents’ adoption of J.R. N.T., 9/8/25, at 19.
The record does not disclose when Mother and Father consented to J.R.’s
proposed adoption, or the status of any adoption proceedings involving J.R.

-2-
J-A06026-26

Mother admitted to [engaging in] IPV with Father. … [Child]
was not up to date with medical care. Child Protective Services
(“CPS”) and General Protective Services (“GPS”) [reports] were
[generated] as a result of a Child[L]ine investigation. [The] CPS
[report] indicated a reasonable likelihood of bodily harm [to
Children from] both [Mother and Father]. [The] GPS [report]
rated, as valid, [allegations of Mother’s and Father’s illegal
controlled] substance use ….

On April 12, 2023, [following a hearing, the orphans’ court]
adjudicated [Children] dependent. Mother [was] ordered to
[submit to] random [drug] screens, [engage in] IPV counseling,
[and] attend and participate in the recommended level of care.

Orphans’ Court Opinion, 10/9/25, at 3-5 (punctuation modified; two footnotes

added; footnotes in original omitted).

The orphans’ court conducted permanency review hearings on

September 6, 2023; February 7, October 2, and November 20, 2024; and May

7, 2025. At each hearing, the orphans’ court found Child’s placement to be

necessary and appropriate. The orphans’ court consistently noted, in its

permanency review orders, Mother’s failure to comply with various of its

directives. See, e.g., CYF Exhibit 7 (Court orders), Permanency Review

Order, 2/7/24, at 2 (the orphans’ court finding that Mother had failed to

engage in drug and alcohol treatment, and tested positive for fentanyl on

January 10, 2024); id., Permanency Review Order, 10/2/24, at 3 (the

orphans’ court finding that Mother was still abusing illicit “drugs into her 8th

-3-
J-A06026-26

month of pregnancy with [her third child, P.R.,4] and was not in compliance

with her reunification goals.” (footnote added)).

The orphans’ court explained that on May 7, 2025,

[a]t the final [permanency review hearing], Mother was arrested
for an outstanding warrant for retail theft. Mother had active
criminal cases at that time in the municipalities of Monroeville and
Oakmont[, Pennsylvania,] for theft and public intoxication.
Mother denied being intoxicated [at the May permanency review
hearing]. Mother testified at the hearing that she did not have
any substances [in her system] other than her prescribed
methadone. Mother admitted, however, that she had a bottle of
Tito’s vodka in her purse ….

Orphans’ Court Opinion, 10/9/25, at 12 (footnotes omitted).

In the interim, on April 19, 2024, CYF filed its TPR petition. Therein,

CYF alleged that Mother “is unable to parent [Child,] as she has failed to

comply with, or make sufficient progress on, the goals/outcomes established

for her by []CYF or in court orders.” TPR Petition, 4/19/24, ¶ 9.

The matter proceeded to a TPR hearing on July 31 and September 8,

1. Mother appeared, represented by court-appointed counsel. Child,

approximately three years old at the time, did not appear, but was

represented by a guardian ad litem (GAL). Child’s GAL indicated there was no

---

4 Mother gave birth to a daughter, P.R., in May 2024. N.T., 7/31/25, at 99.
At the TPR hearing, the parties stipulated that P.R. was placed into emergency
protective custody shortly after her birth, and was adjudicated dependent on
October 1, 2024. Id. at 27, 28. The status of P.R.’s dependency case at the
time of the TPR hearing is not apparent from the record; however, as of May
7, 2025, P.R. was placed in a foster home separate from Children. See
Permanency Review Order, 5/7/25, at 4.

-4-
J-A06026-26

conflict between Child’s best and legal interests. See N.T., 7/31/25, at 4; see

also N.T., 9/8/25, at 69 (the GAL indicating Child was “unable to provide an

articulate preference regarding this TPR proceeding today. It is in her legal

and best interests” that Mother’s parental rights be terminated); Order,

10/2/24, at 1 (the orphans’ court finding that “no conflict exists” in the GAL’s

representation of Child); see also Interest of H.H.N., 296 A.3d 1258, 1264

(Pa. Super. 2023) (“[W]here there is no conflict between a child’s legal and

best interests, an attorney-guardian ad litem representing the child’s best

interests can also represent the child’s legal interests.”); In re T.S., 192 A.3d

1080, 1092 (Pa. 2018) (“[I]f the preferred outcome of a child is incapable of

ascertainment because the child is very young and pre-verbal, there can be

no conflict between the child’s legal interests and his or her best interests[.]”).

At the hearing, CYF presented the testimony of numerous witnesses,

including CYF caseworker James Kloshen (Mr. Kloshen); Allegheny County

Health Department lab technician Tarraca Jackson (Ms. Jackson); Tadiso

Incorporated (Tadiso) drug and alcohol abuse counselor Cassandra Aguglia

(Ms. Aguglia); Sharon Klapec, M.D. (Dr. Klapec); CYF caseworker supervisor

Rhonda Nixon (Ms. Nixon); Pennsylvania Organization for Women in Early

Recovery (POWER) program director Rachel Wagner (Ms. Wagner); and Dr.

Lobb. Mother presented the testimony of, inter alia, Allegheny Family Network

(AFN) certified recovery specialist Heather Spencer (Ms. Spencer). Mother

elected not to testify.

-5-
J-A06026-26

Mr. Kloshen testified that Mother’s family plan established the following

goals: (1) maintain sobriety, (2) attend parenting classes, (3) secure

appropriate housing, and (4) address IPV concerns. N.T., 7/31/25, at 95. Mr.

Kloshen explained that Mother’s substance abuse was concerning, because

[t]here were criminal charges that [Mother] had [incurred
throughout] the life of the [dependency] case that were
associated with [substance ab]use. [Mother] had [] positive tests
for fentanyl. [Mother] was positive [for fentanyl] at the birth of
her other daughter, P[.R.], and then when [Child] was … brought
into [CYF’s] care, [Child] had tested positive for [controlled]
substances.

Id.; see also id. (Mr. Kloshen testifying that J.R. had reported observing

Mother consuming illegal drugs).

Mr. Kloshen testified that, on an unspecified date prior to the filing of

CYF’s TPR petition, Mother completed a drug and alcohol treatment program

through UPMC’s Western Psychiatric Hospital. Id. at 99-100. Mr. Kloshen

testified that in October 2024—after CYF filed its TPR petition—Mother

successfully completed an inpatient drug and alcohol program through

Auberle. Id. at 97. But see id. (Mr. Kloshen testifying that Mother did not

attend recommended “after care for her mental health” at JADE Wellness

Center); see also id. at 159 (Mr. Kloshen testifying that Mother told him that

“she wanted to just stick with everything with Tadiso, … because it was just

easier for her that way.”). Mr. Kloshen testified that Mother had not completed

any additional drug and alcohol treatment programs, despite Mother’s

continued substance abuse. Id. at 98; see also id. at 100 (Mr. Kloshen

-6-
J-A06026-26

testifying that Mother admitted to consuming alcohol following her discharge

from inpatient treatment).

Concerning IPV, Mr. Kloshen testified that on January 10, 2024, Mother

completed an online domestic violence course through the North American

Learning Institute. Id. at 105. Mr. Kloshen explained that, after CYF filed its

TPR petition, Mother was the victim of IPV perpetrated by a former paramour,

and Mr. Kloshen was unaware of whether Mother participated in any additional

IPV programming. Id. at 106.

Mr. Kloshen testified that the purpose of Mother’s parenting goal was to

improve her parenting skills, generally, and to assist Mother in understanding

the effects of “parental substance abuse.” Id. Mr. Kloshen testified that CYF

referred Mother to Arsenal Family and Children’s Center (Arsenal) for

parenting classes. Id. According to Mr. Kloshen, Mother appeared at Arsenal

for an initial intake on April 5, 2023, as well as two additional sessions, but

failed to complete Arsenal’s program. Id.

Mr. Kloshen testified that Mother exercised unsupervised visitation with

Child from October 2024 (following her discharge from Auberle) to May 2025.

Id. at 108; see also Permanency Review Order, 5/7/25, at 3 (the orphans’

court ordering Mother’s visits with Child to be supervised following “Mother[’s]

arrest[] at today’s hearing for an active retail theft warrant.”). Mr. Kloshen

opined that Mother has not “developed an understanding about how substance

-7-
J-A06026-26

abuse [a]ffects her parenting[,]” as evidenced by Mother’s “various charges

for public intox[ication].” Id.; see also CYF Exhibit 10.

The orphans’ court summarized, as follows, Mr. Kloshen’s testimony

regarding Mother’s housing throughout CYF’s involvement with the family:

Historically, Mother struggled with housing. … [The family resided
at the motel] in Monroeville[] until their eviction. N.T., 7/31/25,
at 111. Mother then moved into an apartment in the Highland
Park section of Pittsburgh. Mother was eventually evicted from
that apartment as well. Id. Mother and Father lived together at
a third residence that caught fire. The Red Cross assisted Mother
and Father with shelter at the Extended Stay in Monroeville[.] Id.

Mother was evicted for trespassing at Extended Stay and
relocated to Roadway Inn[ in Monroeville]. Mother then moved
into a town home in Plum, P[ennsylvania,] with an unknown male
friend. Mother then moved again to an apartment in the South
Side section of Pittsburgh …. Id.

Orphans’ Court Opinion, 10/9/25, at 10-11 (record citations in footnotes

modified and moved to body).

Ms. Jackson testified that Mother attended 20 out of 83 random drug

screens requested by CYF. N.T., 7/31/25, at 34, 38-39. Of those 20 drug

screens, Ms. Jackson testified, Mother tested positive for fentanyl and/or its

metabolite, norfentanyl, on 10 occasions. Id. at 35-36; see also id. at 36

(Ms. Jackson testifying that Mother had tested positive for norfentanyl as

recently as June 10, 2025).5

---

5 At the TPR hearing, Mr. Kloshen testified that, on June 14, 2025, Mother
provided him with a “doctor’s note” indicating Mother was administered
fentanyl as part of a medical procedure. N.T., 7/31/25, at 103. Mr. Kloshen
(Footnote Continued Next Page)

-8-
J-A06026-26

Ms. Aguglia testified that she has been Mother’s drug and alcohol abuse

counselor since June 2, 2025, and that Mother had been a part of Tadiso’s

methadone program since June 27, 2024. Id. at 45. Ms. Aguglia explained

that Tadiso requires random drug screens on a monthly basis. Id. at 48.

According to Ms. Aguglia, on December 4, 2024, Mother tested positive for

cocaine, and on May 23, 2025, Mother tested positive for benzodiazepine. Id.

at 49.

Dr. Klapec testified that she was working at Forbes Regional Hospital’s

(the hospital) emergency room on March 31, 2025. N.T., 7/31/25, at 18-19.

Dr. Klapec testified that, on that date, Mother was transported by ambulance

to the hospital, because Mother “was reportedly choking at a restaurant.” Id.

at 19; see also id. at 20 (Dr. Klapec testifying Mother advised her that she

“choked on a piece of steak[,]” and “[b]ystanders at the restaurant [] had

called 911 for her.”). Dr. Klapec testified that Mother told her that she “had

a couple of alcoholic beverages before leaving her house[,] and then had a

couple more alcoholic beverages with dinner.” Id. at 20. According to Dr.

Klapec, paramedics “reported … that by the time they arrived [at the

restaurant, Mother] was no longer choking; however, [Mother] did seem

intoxicated, with slurred speech and an unsteady gait ….” Id. at 20-21

(punctuation modified); see also id. at 21 (Dr. Klapec testifying that Mother’s

---

stated his belief, however, that Mother was not prescribed fentanyl following
her procedure. Id. at 159.

-9-
J-A06026-26

“presentation” was “most consistent with alcohol intoxication.”). But see id.

at 102 (Mr. Kloshen testifying that Mother “adamantly denied being

intoxicated” at the hospital).

Ms. Nixon testified that approximately two months prior to the TPR

hearing, on May 21, 2025, Mother reported to a CYF facility for a supervised

visit with Child. Id. at 168. Ms. Nixon testified that she terminated Mother’s

visit because Mother “appear[ed] to be under the influence of something.” Id.

at 169. According to Ms. Nixon, Mother stated that her methadone “dose may

have been high.” Id. Ms. Nixon advised Mother that she would need to report

for a drug screen that day, and offered Mother transportation to the Allegheny

Health Department. Id. Ms. Nixon testified that Mother declined this offer

and never appeared for the drug screen. Id.

Ms. Wagner testified as POWER’s program director of intake and

outpatient services. Id. at 58. Ms. Wagner testified that CYF referred Mother

to POWER on February 23, 2023; and February 7, April 8, and May 14, 2024.

Id. at 60. Ms. Wagner testified that, approximately two weeks prior to the

TPR hearing, Mother “presented [at POWER’s facility] for a walk-in

assessment.” Id. Ms. Wagner testified that Mother refused to sign a consent

permitting Tadiso to share treatment information with POWER. Id. at 66. Ms.

Wagner testified that Mother had not disclosed that she had admitted to Dr.

Klapec that she had consumed alcoholic beverages prior to Mother’s admission

to the hospital. Id. Ms. Wagner further testified that Mother never informed

• 10 - J-A06026-26

POWER about her positive test results for fentanyl. Id. at 67; see also id.

(Ms. Wagner testifying that, if disclosed, Mother’s alcohol and fentanyl use

would have been taken into consideration in POWER’s treatment

recommendations).

Finally, Dr. Lobb testified as “an expert in the area of child and forensic

psychology[.]” N.T., 9/8/25, at 7. Dr. Lobb confirmed that he authored three

reports, dated November 17, 2024; March 4, 2025; and August 8, 2025,

respectively. Id. at 7-8. The orphans’ court summarized Dr. Lobb’s testimony

and clinical findings as they related to Child’s bond with Mother, and Child’s

bond with Grandparents, as follows:

Although Mother and Child appeared to have a bond, Mother and
Child were evaluated [alongside J.R.] See CYF Exhibit 15
(Psychological evaluations). … [I]t was clear that J.R. harbored
deep resentment towards Mother due to Mother’s past behavior.
Id. J.R. was protective [of Child]. Id. Dr. Lobb testified … that
it is beneficial for [Child] to also have a relationship with [J.R.]
N.T., 9/8/25, at 20. ….

… Dr. Lobb [conducted] an interactional [evaluation] with
[Grandparents] and [Children]. See CYF Exhibit 15. Based on
the interactional[ evaluation], Dr. Lobb opined that Children have
a secure attachment with [] Grandparents[] that is the result of []
Grandparents being fully attuned to [] Children. Id.

[] Grandparents have been [Child’s] primary caretakers for
more than two years. Id. Dr. Lobb opined that Grandparents do
a “wonderful job” parenting[ Child]. Id. Dr. Lobb observed
Grandparents to be engaged, sensitive[,] and responsive to
[Children’s] needs. Id. [Dr. Lobb] further observed that
Grandparents cause Child to feel safe and secure[,] and are able
to communicate with [] Children that they are there for them when
needed. Id.

• 11 - J-A06026-26

Further, based on the interactional [evaluation] between []
Grandparent[s] and [Child], it was clear to Dr. Lobb that [Child]
views [Grandparents] as her psychological parents[; Child] is very
comfortable with [Grandparents;] and [Grandparents] are
[Child’s] “go-to” adults in her life. Id.

Orphans’ Court Opinion, 10/9/25, at 34-36 (record citations in footnotes

modified and moved to body; some capitalization modified); see also N.T.,

9/8/25, at 21 (Dr. Lobb recommending termination of Mother’s parental rights

to Child).

Ms. Spencer testified on Mother’s behalf, explaining that she has worked

as Mother’s recovery specialist since January 2024. N.T., 9/8/25, at 44. Ms.

Spencer described the support she provided to Mother.

At first[,] … we did more just engagement with my lived
experiences, you know, building rapport because I have been
through similar situations, and then we transitioned into going out
to meetings, getting healthy support from like N[arcotics]
A[nonymous], A[lcoholics] A[nonymous] meetings and recovery,
and then also [AFN] has a drug and alcohol group once a month.
[Mother] attended that every time.

Id. at 45.

Ms. Spencer testified that Mother “had completed all her goals” set by

AFN, and AFN was preparing to “clos[e] out” Mother’s case. Id. at 44-45.

But see id. at 55 (Ms. Spencer conceding that AFN “cannot close out until

CYF is finished… or if they pulled a referral.”). Ms. Spencer opined that Mother

“has done leaps and bounds,” and “has done very well” in her recovery from

substance abuse. Id. at 47; see also id. at 50 (when asked whether “a

person with an opioid addiction [should] drink alcohol,” Ms. Spencer testifying,

• 12 - J-A06026-26

“I have met people that could socially drink that were in recovery from heroin.

So it really all depends on how you look at it.”).

After the close of evidence, Child’s GAL recommended that the orphans’

court terminate Mother’s parental rights, opining as follows:

As we heard from Dr. Lobb, regardless of the bond that may exist
between [Child] and [Mother], due to the ongoing concerns for
[Child], Dr. Lobb believes that [Mother] would not be able to
provide the safety and security that would be needed at this time.
….

In addition, [Child] has been with [G]randparents for 3[0]
months at this point. … [B]eing with [Grandparents] for that
long[,] it is clear that [Child] needs [Grandparents] as her
psychological parents[,] as they are the ones that have been
meeting all of [Child’s] needs.

Id. at 74.

The orphans’ court heard arguments from counsel and took the matter

under advisement. On September 9, 2025, the orphans’ court entered an

order terminating Mother’s parental rights to Child pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. §

2511(a)(2), (5), (8), and (b). Mother filed a timely notice of appeal and

contemporaneous Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)(2)(i) concise statement. On October 9,

2025, the orphans’ court filed a Rule 1925 opinion.

Mother raises the following issues:

1. Did the [orphans’] court abuse its discretion and/or err as a
   matter of law by involuntarily terminating Mother’s parental rights
   pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.[A.] §[ ]2511(a)(2), (5), and (8)?

2. Did the [orphans’] court abuse its discretion and/or err as a
   matter of law in concluding that CYF met its burden of proving by
   clear and convincing evidence that termination of Mother’s

• 13 - J-A06026-26

parental rights would best serve the needs and welfare of [Child]
pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.[A.] §[ ]2511(b)?

Mother’s Brief at 8.

We review the termination of parental rights for an abuse of discretion.

See Interest of N.A.S., 338 A.3d 191, 196 (Pa. Super. 2025). This standard

of review requires appellate courts to

accept the findings of fact and credibility determinations of the
trial court if they are supported by the record. If the factual
findings are supported, appellate courts review to determine if the
trial court made an error of law or abused its discretion. As has
been often stated, an abuse of discretion does not result merely
because the reviewing court might have reached a different
conclusion. Instead, a decision may be reversed for an abuse of
discretion only upon demonstration of manifest
unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will.

As the Pennsylvania Supreme Court discussed in In re:
R.J.T., 9 A.3d 1179, 1190 (Pa. 2010), there are clear reasons for
applying an abuse of discretion standard of review…. Unlike trial
courts, appellate courts are not equipped to make fact-specific
determinations on a cold record, where trial judges are observing
the parties during the relevant hearing and often presiding over
numerous other hearings regarding the child and parents. R.J.T.,
9 A.3d at 1190. Therefore, even where the facts could support an
opposite result, as is often the case in dependency and
termination cases, an appellate court must resist the urge to
second guess the trial court and impose its own credibility
determinations and judgment; instead, we must defer to the trial
judges so long as the factual findings are supported by the record
and the court’s legal conclusions are not the result of an error of
law or an abuse of discretion.

Interest of K.T., 324 A.3d 49, 56 (Pa. Super. 2024) (brackets omitted)

(quoting In re Adoption of S.P., 47 A.3d 817, 826-27 (Pa. 2012)); see also

In re Adoption of C.P.D., 324 A.3d 11, 24 (Pa. Super. 2024) (“[T]he trial

court, as the finder of fact, is the sole determiner of the credibility of witnesses

• 14 - J-A06026-26

and all conflicts in testimony are to be resolved by the finder of fact.” (citation

and brackets omitted)).

Termination of parental rights is governed by Section 2511 of the

Adoption Act, which requires a bifurcated analysis:

Initially, the focus is on the conduct of the parent. The party
seeking termination must prove by clear and convincing evidence
that the parent’s conduct satisfies the statutory grounds for
termination delineated in [Section] 2511(a). Only if the court
determines that the parent’s conduct warrants termination of his
or her parental rights does the court engage in the second part of
the analysis pursuant to [Section] 2511(b): determination of the
needs and welfare of the child under the standard of best interests
of the child. One major aspect of the needs and welfare analysis
concerns the nature and status of the emotional bond between
parent and child, with close attention paid to the effect on the child
of permanently severing any such bond.

Matter of Adoption of L.C.J.W., 311 A.3d 41, 48 (Pa. Super. 2024) (citation

omitted). “The standard of ‘clear and convincing’ evidence is defined as

testimony that is so clear, direct, weighty, and convincing as to enable the

trier of fact to come to a clear conviction, without hesitance, of the truth of

the precise facts in issue.” Interest of C.S., 327 A.3d 222, 237 (Pa. Super.

2024) (quoting In re Adoption of C.L.G., 956 A.2d 999, 1004 (Pa. Super.

2008) (en banc)). Finally, this Court need only agree with the trial court as

to “any one subsection of [Section] 2511(a), in addition to [Section] 2511(b),

in order to affirm the termination of parental rights.” Int. of M.E., 283 A.3d

820, 830 (Pa. Super. 2022) (citation omitted).

In her first issue, concerning Section 2511(a)(8), Mother argues that

the “record failed to provide sufficient evidence to make a finding” that “the

• 15 - J-A06026-26

conditions which led to the removal or placement [of Child] … continue to

exist.” Mother’s Brief at 19 (quoting 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(8)). According

to Mother,

[t]he conditions that initially led to [] Child’s removal included
inadequate housing[,] which has now been addressed. Mother
had participated in bringing Child medically up to date after
[Child’s] removal[ from Mother’s care]. Mother has continued to
address her criminal matters and sobriety concerns, and she could
car[e] for [] Child with additional services.

Id. at 20; see also id. (Mother arguing the evidence demonstrated that “Child

has a strong and clear bond with [] Mother[,] which [] should be preserved

for the benefit of [] Child.”).

Instantly, the orphans’ court focused its analysis on Section 2511(a)(8),

which provides as follows:

(a) General rule--The rights of a parent in regard to a child may
be terminated after a petition filed on any of the following
grounds:

---

(8) The child has been removed from the care of the parent
by the court or under a voluntary agreement with an agency,
12 months or more have elapsed from the date of removal or
placement, the conditions which led to the removal or
placement of the child continue to exist and termination of
parental rights would best serve the needs and welfare of the
child.

23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(8).

To satisfy Section 2511(a)(8), the petitioner must prove that

(1) the child has been removed from the parent’s care for at least
12 months; (2) the conditions which led to the removal or
placement still exist; and (3) termination of parental rights would

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best serve the needs and welfare of the child. Section 2511(a)(8)
does not necessitate an evaluation of a parent’s willingness or
ability to remedy the conditions that led to the removal of the
child. Rather, our inquiry is focused upon whether the at-issue
conditions have been remedied such that reunification of parent
and child is imminent at the time of the hearing.

In re E.J.C., 335 A.3d 1222, 1230-31 (Pa. Super. 2025) (citations and

quotation marks omitted; emphasis in original).6

Pursuant to Section 2511(a)(8), “when one year has elapsed from the

children’s removal, the General Assembly has relieved the petitioner from the

burden of proving that the parent is incapable of, or unwilling to, remedy the

conditions, circumstances, or conduct that led to the children’s removal.” In

re Adoption of G.W., 342 A.3d 68, 87 (Pa. Super. 2025) (en banc); see also

id. (observing that, in a Section 2511(a)(8) analysis, “[t]he court’s inquiry is

no longer concerned with whether the parent is capable of change, or whether

the parent has tried to change, but seeks only to discern if the parent has, in

fact, changed.”). We have specifically observed that “a parent’s progress

toward remedying the conditions [necessitating her child’s placement] is

insufficient, as a matter of law, to warrant a finding in favor of the parent

under the second prong of Section 2511(8).” Id. (citing In re R.J.S.,

901 A.2d 502, 512 (Pa. Super. 2006)). Moreover, Section 2511(a)(8) does

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6 Mother does not dispute that Child has been removed from Mother’s care for

at least 12 months. See generally Mother’s Brief.

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not “require an evaluation of the availability or efficacy of [a child protective

services agency’s] services.” Id. at 88 (citation omitted).

Although Section 2511(a)(8)’s first two elements focus on the conduct

of the parent, its third element centers on the needs of the child, an area of

inquiry generally reserved for the court’s Section 2511(b) analysis. See 42

Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(8) (requiring the petitioner to prove “termination of

parental rights would best serve the needs and welfare of the child”); id. §

2511(b) (requiring the court to “give primary consideration to the

developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare of the child”). We

have recently observed that, even though Section 2511(a)(8) and (b) do not

share identical language, “our current precedent interprets the needs and

welfare analyses required under subsections (a)(8) and (b) to utilize the same

legal standards and to be based upon the same evidence.” G.W., 342 A.3d

at 89 n.20 (citing C.L.G., 956 A.2d at 1008-09, and Matter of Adoption of

M.A.B., 166 A.3d 434, 448 (Pa. Super. 2017)).

Instantly, after thoroughly summarizing the above-described TPR

hearing testimony, the orphans’ court concluded CYF met its burden of proving

that termination of Mother’s parental rights was warranted pursuant to Section

2511(a)(8). Orphans’ Court Opinion, 10/9/25, at 31.

Concerning Mother’s sobriety goal, the orphans’ court emphasized that

Mother failed to appear for more than forty requested drug screens. Id. at

1. The orphans’ court noted that Mother tested positive for fentanyl and/or

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norfentanyl at ten of the twenty drug screens she attended, with the most

recent positive drug screen occurring approximately one month prior to the

TPR hearing. Id.; see also id. at 25 (the orphans’ court highlighting Mother’s

positive drug screens, administered by Tadiso, for cocaine on December 4,

2024, and benzodiazepine on May 23, 2025).

The orphans’ court explained that it did not find Ms. Spencer’s testimony

concerning Mother’s sobriety credible, observing that Ms. Spencer “was

unsure of Mother’s clean date[,]” and “unsure if Mother entered into JADE

Wellness” Center for recommended aftercare. Id. at 26; see also id. at 27

(the orphans’ court finding that “Ms. Spencer minimized Mother’s conduct of

alcohol usage[,]” and observing that Ms. Spencer “was not able to articulate

clear guidelines on what constitutes success for reaching a closed-out status”).

Regarding Mother’s requirement to address IPV concerns, the orphans’

court stated that, although Mother

was referred to the Women’s Center and Shelter on December 29,
2023[,] for counseling related to [] victims of IPV[,] … [she only]
attended one (1) session. Instead, Mother completed an online
course in the area of domestic violence at the North American
Learning Institute on January 10, 2024. The [orphans’] court is
unfamiliar with this company and its program. There was no
evidence presented [as to] whether this online course was a
curriculum for batterers or victims. The court does not accept this
as a substitute. Further, following the completion of the online
course, Mother reported another domestic violence incident. …
This incident occurred approximately five (5) months after the TPR
petition was filed. Mother never sought out any further IPV
treatment to address this goal following this incident. A
completion certificate of an online course does not satisfy the
court that any tools that may have been taught have been utilized.

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Id. at 27-28.

The orphans’ court additionally found that Mother failed to meet her

parenting goals. Id. at 29. The orphans’ court noted Mother did not complete

parenting classes at Arsenal, and, at the time of the TPR hearing, “Mother’s

visits [with Child had] reverted to supervised” “due to Mother’s criminal

charges and public intoxication[.]” Id.; see also id. at 30 (the orphans’ court

observing Mother “appear[ed] for a [supervised] visit [with Child] under the

influence[ of drugs/alcohol]”).

Finally, regarding her housing goal, the orphans’ court found that

“Mother never secured or maintained consistent housing throughout the

lifetime of the case.” Id. The orphans’ court noted that, “[a]lthough Mother

currently is being provided an apartment, she has not been financially

responsible as of the date of the [TPR] hearing to demonstrate compliance.”

Id.

The orphans’ court ultimately concluded that

CYF has provided Mother with all necessary services to remedy
the conditions that led to [] Child’s removal[.] … Mother chose
not to take advantage of those supports and services; rather[,]
Mother manipulated many of her [service] providers with
incomplete or inaccurate information. … [I]t is clear that the
conditions that led to [Child’s] removal have not been remedied
and[,] therefore[,] reunification is not imminent.

Id. at 31; see also id. at 40 (the orphans’ court concluding that termination

of Mother’s parental rights is in Child’s best interests).

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The orphans’ court’s factual findings are supported by the record, and

we agree with its legal conclusion. See K.T., 324 A.3d at 56. Upon review,

the record belies Mother’s claim that the TPR hearing record supplied

insufficient evidence that the conditions necessitating Child’s placement

continued to exist. As aptly summarized by the orphans’ court above, CYF

presented substantial evidence that Mother failed to meet each of the goals

set for her by CYF and the orphans’ court. The orphans’ court acted within its

discretion when it credited that evidence. See L.C.J.W, 311 A.3d at 48 (“It

is the province of the orphans’ court to assess credibility and resolve any

conflicts in the evidence, and in doing so it is free to believe all, part, or none

of the evidence presented.” (citation and quotation marks omitted)).

Accordingly, we discern no abuse of the orphans’ court’s discretion in

finding that CYF proved, by clear and convincing evidence, that the conditions

necessitating Child’s placement continued to exist at the time of the TPR

hearing, and (discussed further infra) that termination of Mother’s parental

rights serves Child’s best interests. Mother’s first issue merits no relief.7

Mother next claims that insufficient evidence supported the orphans’

court’s determination that termination of Mother’s parental rights best serves

the needs and welfare of Child. Mother’s Brief at 20. Mother argues that

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7 As we have concluded that the orphans’ court did not err in finding sufficient

evidence supported termination pursuant to Section 2511(a)(8), we need not
consider Mother’s claims concerning Section 2511(a)(2) or (5). See Int. of
M.E., 283 A.3d at 830.

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“[t]he record clearly established that [] Child and Mother share an important

and meaningful bond.” Id. at 21. Mother represents that she “has an

extremely difficult prior relationship with [Grandparents,] and there is a high

probability that [] Child will never see [] Mother again following termination.”

Id. at 22. Additionally, Mother claims, “Child also has the potential for a

sibling relationship with … P.R.[,] which could [] be affected by termination.”

Id.

When the trial court finds grounds for termination under Section

2511(a), it must separately consider a child’s needs and welfare:

(b) Other considerations.--The court in terminating the rights
of a parent shall give primary consideration to the developmental,
physical and emotional needs and welfare of the child. The rights
of a parent shall not be terminated solely on the basis of
environmental factors such as inadequate housing, furnishings,
income, clothing and medical care if found to be beyond the
control of the parent. With respect to any petition filed pursuant
to subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not consider any
efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions described therein
which are first initiated subsequent to the giving of notice of the
filing of the petition.

23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(b).

“Notably, courts should consider the matter from the child’s perspective,

placing [their] developmental, physical, and emotional needs and welfare

above concerns for the parent.” Interest of K.T., 296 A.3d 1085, 1105 (Pa.

2023) (citation omitted). Courts must also “discern the nature and status of

the parent-child bond, with utmost attention to the effect on the child of

permanently severing that bond.” Id. at 1104 (citation omitted). However,

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“the parental bond is but one part of the overall subsection (b) analysis.” Id.

at 1113.

[B]ond, plus permanency, stability and all “intangible” factors may
contribute equally to the determination of a child’s specific
developmental, physical, and emotional needs and welfare, and
thus are all of “primary” importance in the Section 2511(b)
analysis. … [A]lthough the parental bond is a major aspect of the
Section 2511(b) analysis, it is nonetheless only one of many
factors to be considered by the court, in addition to the intangibles
such as love, comfort, security, and stability. Moreover, the court
must consider whether, in the context of all these factors, the
parental bond is necessary and beneficial to the child.

Id. at 1109 (citations and some quotation marks omitted); see also In re

T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251, 269 (Pa. 2013) (stating that “courts must keep the

ticking clock of childhood ever in mind. Children are young for a scant number

of years, and we have an obligation to see to their healthy development

quickly.”).

We have further observed that

when possible, the preservation of the family is the desired
outcome in custody matters. However, “[t]he goal of preserving
the family unit cannot be elevated above all other factors when
considering the best interests of the children, but must be weighed
in conjunction with other factors.” In re Adoption of G.R.L., 26
A.3d 1124, 1127 (Pa. Super. 2011) (citation omitted).

In re K.D., 144 A.3d 145, 153 (Pa. Super. 2016).

Instantly, in conducting its Section 2511(b) analysis, the orphans’ court

credited Dr. Lobb’s above-summarized clinical evaluation regarding Child’s

respective bonds with Mother and Grandparents. See Orphans’ Court Opinion,

10/9/25, at 34-36. The orphans’ court explained that, in finding sufficient

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evidence supported termination of Mother’s parental rights pursuant to

Section 2511(b),

the court gave primary consideration to the developmental,
physical, and emotional needs and welfare of [] Child. The court
examined whether there was an emotional bond between Mother
and Child as part of its best-interest analysis, but that is only one
of many factors the court considered in making its determination.

The court also examined the safety needs of [] Child, as well
as other intangibles that [] Child has with [Grandparents], such
as love, comfort, security, and stability. The court’s determination
included the importance of continuity of relationships and whether
any existing parent-child bond can be severed without detrimental
effects on [] Child. Although evidence of a bond [between Mother
and Child] exists, the bond is outweighed by Mother’s inability to
remedy the causes of Child’s placement, and by Child’s need for
permanence and stability. The court concluded that [Child’s] trust
and emotional support rests with [Grandparents]. Focusing on
the perspective of [] Child, [] Child enjoys a special relationship
with [Grandparents].

… The court relied upon [Dr. Lobb’s] expert opinion, and
found that Child will not suffer extreme and emotional
consequences by severing the bond between [] Child and Mother.
The court also considered whether termination of [Mother’s]
parental rights would destroy something positive. The court finds
that the termination is in the best interest of Child because Mother
has proven unwilling and unable to parent.

Id. at 38-39 (punctuation modified).

We agree with the reasoning and conclusion of the orphans’ court, as it

is supported by the record and free of legal error. See K.T., 324 A.3d at 56.

The orphans’ court recognized a bond between Mother and Child, but

appropriately exercised its discretion in determining Child’s bond with

Grandparents, as well as Child’s need for (and right to) permanency,

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outweighed that bond. See In the Int. of K.T., 296 A.3d at 1113.8

Accordingly, Mother’s second issue entitles her to no relief, and we affirm the

order terminating Mother’s parental rights.

Order affirmed.

DATE: 03/27/2026

---

8 Regarding Mother’s speculative claim that termination of her parental rights

to Child may impact Child’s relationship with P.R., we note there is nothing in
the record to suggest that Grandparents will prevent Child’s contact with P.R.

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