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March 27, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

Jeremy T. Williams v. State of Alabama

Court of Criminal Appeals of Alabama

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: CR-2024-0290

• Judges: Presiding Judge Windom

• Opinion

• Authorities (32)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (2.7K)

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Combined Opinion

                        by [Mary Becker Windom](https://www.courtlistener.com/person/6169/mary-becker-windom/)

Rel: March 27, 2026

Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance sheets of Southern Reporter.
Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue,
Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-0650), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections
may be made before the opinion is published in Southern Reporter.

Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals
OCTOBER TERM, 2025-2026

---

CR-2024-0290

---

Jeremy T. Williams

v.

State of Alabama

Appeal from Russell Circuit Court
(CC-22-210, CC-22-211, CC-22-212, CC-22-213, and CC-22-791)

WINDOM, Presiding Judge.

Jeremy T. Williams appeals his guilty-plea convictions for murder

made capital because he intentionally caused the death K.H., who was

less than 14 years of age, see § 13A-5-40(a)(15), Ala. Code 1975; for

murder made capital because he intentionally caused the death of K.H.
CR-2024-0290

during the course of a first-degree kidnapping, see § 13A-5-40(a)(1); for

murder made capital because he intentionally caused the death of K.H.

during a first-degree rape, see § 13A-5-40(a)(3); and for murder made

capital because he intentionally caused the death of K.H. during a first-

degree sodomy, see § 13A-5-40(a)(3), and his resulting sentence of death.1

On March 13, 2024, Williams filed a notice of his intent to plead

guilty to the capital-murder charges as well as to various other offenses.

At a hearing held on that date, the Russell Circuit Court, in accordance

with Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969), and Rule 14.4, Ala. R.

Crim. P., informed Williams of the rights he would be waiving by

pleading guilty and questioned him to ensure that his decision was

knowing and voluntary. (R. 16-46.) After determining that Williams's

1 Williams included on his notice of appeal case numbers related to

his guilty plea convictions for first-degree sodomy, see § 13A-6-63(a)(3),
Ala. Code 1975; for sexual abuse of a child less than 12 years old, see §
13A-6-69.1, Ala. Code 1975; production of obscene material, see § 13A-
12-197, Ala. Code 1975; for abuse of a corpse, see § 13A-11-13, Ala. Code
1975; for first-degree human trafficking, see § 13A-6-152, Ala. Code 1975,
and for conspiracy to commit first-degree human trafficking, see §§ 13A-
4-3 and 13A-6-152, Ala. Code 1975. However, because Williams neither
preserved nor reserved an issue for appeal before pleading guilty nor filed
a written motion to withdraw his guilty pleas, he failed to invoke his
limited right to appeal those convictions. See Ingram v. State, 882 So. 2d
374, 376-77 (Ala. Crim. App. 2003). Therefore, we dismiss this appeal
insofar as it relates to those convictions.
2
CR-2024-0290

decision was knowing and voluntary and not the result of any coercion,

threats, or promises, the circuit court accepted Williams's guilty pleas. A

jury trial was conducted on the capital-murder charges, see § 13A-5-42,

Ala. Code 1975, after which the jury found Williams guilty of the charges

of capital murder beyond a reasonable doubt. (R. 860-61.)

Following the jury's verdict, the penalty phase of Williams's trial

began. Williams waived the jury's participation in his capital sentencing

and waived his right to present evidence in mitigation. (R. 60-71.) See §

13A-5-44(c), Ala. Code 1975. At the sentencing phase, the circuit court

sentenced Williams to death for his capital-murder convictions.

Facts

On December 13, 2021, K.H., a five-year-old girl, was reported

missing in Columbus, Georgia. Sergeant Ryan Vardman of the Columbus

Police Department interviewed K.H.'s mother, Kristy Siple. Siple did not

have legal custody of K.H., but K.H.'s father, who had been vested with

sole custody, had left K.H. in Siple's care.2 After his interview with Siple,

Sgt. Vardman sought an interview with Williams, who was one of the last

2 Siple lost custody of K.H. due to her substance-abuse issues. At
the time of K.H.'s death, a juvenile court had in a place a noncontact order
between Siple and K.H.
3
CR-2024-0290

individuals to be seen with K.H. Sgt. Vardman, though, was unable to

speak with Williams about her disappearance.

While researching Williams's background, Sgt. Vardman learned

that, a few days earlier, an adult female had reported to law-enforcement

officers that Williams had forcibly sodomized her. A detail from the

report of that incident that Sgt. Vardman found of particular interest was

that Williams was alleged to have stated to the victim that he had taught

a five-year-old girl named "[K.]" how to perform oral sex and that he

wanted the victim to perform oral sex on him like K. (R. 637, 647.) Sgt.

Vardman surmised, albeit incorrectly,3 that perhaps the victim had

misheard Williams and that K. was K.H., who had a similar first name

and was also five years old. Sgt. Vardman interviewed the victim and

confirmed her statement. Sgt. Vardman then obtained an arrest warrant

for Williams in the sodomy case as well as a search warrant for Williams's

property in Columbus.

While executing the search warrant, Sgt. Vardman located a shed

in the backyard. Inside was a child-sized foam chair and a peanut-butter

sandwich that had a child-sized bite taken out of it. Williams's wife

3 In fact, K. is Williams's oldest daughter.

4
CR-2024-0290

arrived home during the search and asked about the purpose of the

search. Sergeant Braden Dobbins spoke with her, and, with a "look of

terror on her face," Williams's wife gave the Sgt. Dobbins the address of

a duplex in Phenix City "where that child would be if [Williams] had done

anything to her." (R. 642, 657.)

Around that time, officers with the Russell County Sheriff's Office

located Williams at a motel in Phenix City and took him into custody.

Inside his motel room, officers recovered electronic devices and drug

paraphernalia. An interview with Williams, however, did not lead to the

whereabouts of K.H.

Sgt. Dobbins and other officers traveled to the Phenix City address

given to him by Williams's wife. The officers entered the empty duplex;

in the basement, K.H.'s naked body was found under a tarp. Investigator

Brad Evans of the Russell County Sheriff's Office described the horrific

sight: "What did I see? A five-year-old little girl. Rigor mortis had

obviously set in. Legs up, spread. Ligature marks around her wrists,

around her throat, bruising on the face, bleeding from the vagina and

anus. That's what I saw." (R. 728.)

5
CR-2024-0290

A couple of weeks later, on Christmas night, Williams notified the

detention staff at the Russell County Jail that he wanted to speak with

Lieutenant Steve Johnson. Williams told Lt. Johnson that he "had been

praying the night before" and wanted "to speak about similar crimes [to]

get it off of his chest." (R. 678.)

During the interview, Williams told Lt. Johnson, among other

things, about his daughter K. Williams "stated that he had sexually

molested [K.] probably on a daily basis while they were [living in Alaska]"

and that his abuse continued when the family relocated to Texas. (R.

683-84.) Williams admitted that the sexual abuse typically took the form

of oral sex and that he had shown K. pornography to teach her how to do

it. Williams also spoke of his addictions to cocaine and then, for the last

several years, methamphetamine. The interview turned to victims

following the family's move from Texas to Phenix City, and Williams

admitted that he had molested other young girls, though he could not

remember all of their names. They spoke specifically about K.H., and Lt.

Johnson told Williams that a body had been found in a basement.

Williams responded: "[W]ell, then, I did it." (R. 686.) Williams also asked

if the body had been found under a tarp. Lt. Johnson confirmed that fact,

6
CR-2024-0290

and Williams again acknowledged his guilt: "[W]ell, then, I did it, I

remember that."

Williams told Lt. Johnson that he knew K.H.'s mother, Kristy Siple,

through "a prostitute web page called Skip the Game." (R. 688.) Williams

had a sexual relationship with Siple, and the two abused

methamphetamine together. Williams stated that, on at least one

occasion, he had been entrusted with Siple's children while Siple

answered a prostitution call. This had surprised Williams, because he

had already told Siple that he "liked to have sex with smaller kids." (R.

690.) Lt. Johnson asked about Williams's taking K.H., and Williams

disclosed that he had done so with Siple's knowledge. In fact, he had

haggled with Siple over a price for taking "[K.H.] with him for a little

while [for] a little head, meaning oral sex." (R. 692-93.) The two settled

on $2,500 for Williams's taking K.H. for one hour for "oral sex only." (R.

693.)4

Around 2:00 a.m. on December 13, Williams took K.H. to his house

in Columbus. Eventually, though, he and K.H. were seen by Williams's

4 Williams admitted to Lt. Johnson, though, that he had no money

and never intended to pay Siple.
7
CR-2024-0290

wife, who told him: "[Y]ou can't be here with her, you have to leave." (R.

694.) Williams left around 6:20 a.m., taking K.H. to the duplex in Phenix

City. On the way, Williams showed K.H. pornography; according to

Williams, K.H. stated, " 'I'm not going to do this,' and [Williams] punched

her in the head." (R. 696.) Williams parked on the side of the duplex so

that his aunt, who lived across the street, would not know he was there.

Williams again showed pornography to K.H. Williams also smoked

methamphetamine and made K.H. smoke it, too. Williams described for

Lt. Johnson the sexual acts that he forced K.H. to perform, including oral,

vaginal, and anal sex. The abuse lasted an hour to an hour and a half,

and Williams characterized it as "very rageful and sexually driven." (R.

699.) Williams killed K.H. by choking her, and her death did not come

quickly:

"According to [Williams], it took 10 to 15 minutes for her
to die. … [A]t one point … he thought she was dead, and he
let go of her because his hands were tired. And he said, the
baby, [K.H.] sat up and gasped for air and then fell back down.
And he said, 'I went back to choking her again.' "

(R. 701.) Williams used his cell phone to take photographs and to record

videos of his sexual abuse of K.H., which, Williams admitted, occurred

8
CR-2024-0290

both before and after K.H.'s death. Investigators recovered the

photographs and videos from Williams's cell phone.

Standard of Review

Rule 45A, Ala. R. App. P., as amended effective January 12, 2023,

provides:

"In all cases in which the death penalty has been
imposed, the Court of Criminal Appeals may, but shall not be
obligated to, notice any plain error or defect in the proceedings
under review, whether or not brought to the attention of the
trial court, and take appropriate appellate action by reason
thereof, whenever such error has or probably has adversely
affected the substantial right of the appellant."

This Court will continue to review the entire record for plain error

in all cases in which the death penalty has been imposed.

" 'The standard of review in reviewing a claim under the
plain-error doctrine is stricter than the standard used in
reviewing an issue that was properly raised in the trial court
or on appeal.' Hall v. State, 820 So. 2d 113, 121 (Ala. Crim.
App. 1999), aff'd, 820 So. 2d 152 (Ala. 2001). Plain error is
'error that is so obvious that the failure to notice it would
seriously affect the fairness or integrity of the judicial
proceedings.' Ex parte Trawick, 698 So. 2d 162, 167 (Ala.
1997), modified on other grounds, Ex parte Wood, 715 So. 2d
819 (Ala. 1998). 'To rise to the level of plain error, the claimed
error must not only seriously affect a defendant's "substantial
rights," but it must also have an unfair prejudicial impact on
the jury's deliberations.' Hyde v. State, 778 So. 2d 199, 209
(Ala. Crim. App. 1998), aff'd, 778 So. 2d 237 (Ala. 2000). 'The
plain error standard applies only where a particularly
egregious error occurred at trial and that error has or

9
CR-2024-0290

probably has substantially prejudiced the defendant.' Ex
parte Trawick, 698 So. 2d at 167. '[P]lain error must be
obvious on the face of the record. A silent record, that is a
record that on its face contains no evidence to support the
alleged error, does not establish an obvious error.' Ex parte
Walker, 972 So. 2d 737, 753 (Ala. 2007). Thus, '[u]nder the
plain-error standard, the appellant must establish that an
obvious, indisputable error occurred, and he must establish
that the error adversely affected the outcome of the trial.'
Wilson v. State, 142 So. 3d 732, 751 (Ala. Crim. App. 2010).
'[T]he plain error exception to the contemporaneous-objection
rule is to be "used sparingly, solely in those circumstances in
which a miscarriage of justice would otherwise result." '
United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 15, 105 S. Ct. 1038, 84 L.
Ed. 2d 1 (1985) (quoting United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152,
163 n. 14, 102 S. Ct. 1584, 71 L. Ed. 2d 816 (1982))."

DeBlase v. State, 294 So. 3d 154, 182-83 (Ala. Crim. App. 2018). That

said,

"[b]ecause plain-error review is now discretionary, it is no
longer necessary for this Court to address in its opinions every
issue that is subject only to plain-error review and, even if we
choose to address those issues, we are not required to engage
in the type of in-depth analyses as we have in the past."

Iervolino v. State, 402 So. 3d 844, 862 (Ala. Crim. App. 2023). With these

principles in mind, this Court will address Williams's appeal.

Discussion

In early 2025, Williams mailed the Office of the Attorney General a

series of letters that stated his desire to drop his appeals and to have an

execution date set. Although Williams could not drop his appeals because

10
CR-2024-0290

his capital-murder convictions and sentence of death were subject to

automatic review, see §§ 13A-5-53 and 13A-5-55, Ala. Code 1975, it

appeared to the parties and to this Court that Williams sought to invoke

his state-law right to represent himself on appeal. See Ex parte Scudder,

789 So. 2d 837, 841 (Ala. 2001) (holding that, "taken together, §§ 12-22-

130 and 15-12-22(b)[, Ala. Code 1975,] confer upon a defendant in a

criminal case the right to represent himself on appeal if he desires to do

so"). To ensure that his decision was voluntarily and knowingly made,

see Johnson v. State, 40 So. 3d 753, 757 (Ala. Crim. App. 2009), this Court

on May 7, 2025, remanded the cause to the circuit court with instructions

for it to conduct a hearing at which it should apprise Williams of the

dangers and possible disadvantages of waiving his right to appellate

counsel and invoking his right to represent himself.

On May 23, 2025, the circuit court conducted a hearing in

accordance with this Court's instructions. During the hearing, the circuit

court thoroughly informed Williams of the disadvantages and

consequences of self-representation and a refusal to file an appellate

brief. (Rem. R. 3-12.) The circuit court determined, based on his

interactions with Williams during the hearing and before, during, and

11
CR-2024-0290

after trial, that Williams's decisions were knowing and voluntary. (Rem.

R. 13.)

Williams has indeed chosen not to file an appellate brief on his

behalf, but his decision does not end this Court's review. Because

Williams was convicted of capital murder and sentenced to death, his

appeal is automatic, and this Court must review the propriety of the

circuit court's finding that Williams's decision to represent himself on

appeal and to forgo filing a brief on appeal was knowing and voluntary,

the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain his convictions, and the

propriety of his sentence of death. See §§ 12-22-150, 13A-5-53, and 13A-

5-55, Ala. Code 1975; Rule 45A Ala. R. App. P. See also Sibley v. State,

775 So. 2d 235, 240 (Ala. Crim. App. 1996); Block v. State, 744 So. 2d 404,

406 (Ala. Crim. App. 1996).

I.

First, this Court must review the circuit court's finding that

Williams's decision to represent himself on appeal and his waiver of

appellate counsel was knowing and voluntary. Sibley, 775 So. 2d at 240;

Block, 744 So. 2d at 406. This Court must also review whether Williams's

decision to forgo filing a brief on appeal was knowing and voluntary. Id.

12
CR-2024-0290

In Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 819-22 (1975), the United

States Supreme Court explained that, although a defendant has a right

to represent himself and waive the assistance of counsel, the intelligence

of the waiver of counsel must be scrutinized. "When an [appellant]

manages his own [appeal], he relinquishes ... many of the traditional

benefits associated with the right to counsel." Id. at 835. Because an

appellant who invokes his state-law right to represent himself and

refuses to file a brief on his own behalf waives many traditional benefits,

" 'in order to represent himself the [appellant] must "knowingly and

intelligently" forgo those relinquished benefits' " and " 'should be made

aware of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation, so that

the record will establish that "he knows what he's doing and his choice is

made with eyes open." ' " Sibley, 775 So. 2d at 242-43 (opinion on return

to remand) (quoting Faretta, 422 U.S. at 835). "While it is desirable that

the trial court engage, as it did in this case, in a colloquy in which it

expressly advises the defendant of 'the dangers and disadvantages of self-

representation,' such a colloquy is not mandated." Moody v. State, 888

So. 2d 532, 554 (Ala. Crim. App. 2003) (quoting Tomlin v. State, 601 So.

2d 124, 128 (Ala. 1991)). "The ultimate test is whether it 'appear[s] from

13
CR-2024-0290

the record as a whole that a defendant's waiver of counsel and decision

to represent himself were knowing and intelligent.' " Moody, 888 So. 2d

at 554 (quoting Teske v. State, 507 So. 2d 569, 571 (Ala. Crim. App.

1987)). "Under this approach, the focus of the inquiry is on 'the particular

facts and circumstances involved, "including the background, experience,

and conduct of the accused." ' " Moody, 888 So. 2d at 554 (quoting Tomlin,

601 So.2d at 128-29, quoting in turn Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464

(1938)).

A trial court may consider the following factors in determining

whether a defendant's decision to represent himself was knowing and

voluntary:

" '(1) the background, experience and conduct of the defendant
including his age, educational background, and his physical
and mental health; (2) the extent to which the defendant had
contact with lawyers prior to the trial; (3) the defendant's
knowledge of the nature of the charges, the possible defenses,
and the possible penalty; (4) the defendant's understanding of
the rules of procedure, evidence and courtroom decorum; (5)
the defendant's experience in criminal trials; (6) whether
standby counsel was appointed, and the extent to which he
aided the defendant; (7) whether the waiver of counsel was
the result of mistreatment or coercion; or (8) whether the
defendant was trying to manipulate the events of the trial.' "

Sibley, 775 So. 2d at 239 (opinion on original submission) (quoting

Strozier v. Newsome, 871 F.2d 995, 998 (11th Cir. 1989)). See also United

14
CR-2024-0290

States v. Cash, 47 F.3d 1083, 1088-89 (11th Cir. 1995) (listing the same

factors). " 'All factors need not point in the same direction.' " Sibley, 775

So. 2d at 243 (opinion on return to remand) (quoting Cash, 47 F.3d at

1089).

Williams was 40 years old at the time of the Faretta hearing; he

was a high-school graduate and a veteran of the United States Air Force.

There was no evidence indicating that Williams suffered from any

physical or mental issues that would have affected his decision making

or that he was under the influence of any drugs, legal or otherwise, or

alcohol at the time of the hearing. Williams, having already been through

a trial at which he was acquitted of child abuse, was quite familiar with

the criminal judicial process.5 It appears from the record that Williams

had ample contact with his counsel both before and during trial. Before

trial, counsel told the circuit court that he had been "over and over" "in

detail" the implications of Williams's decision to waive the presentation

of mitigation evidence (R. 64); the only expressed frustration, if it could

be called that, was from Williams's counsel, who told the circuit court

5 Williams admitted to Lt. Johnson that he had, in fact, committed

the act of child abuse for which he had been acquitted. (R. 704-05.)
15
CR-2024-0290

that Williams had been uncooperative in their attempts to gather

mitigation evidence. (R. 75.) There was no question that Williams

understood the significance of his convictions and his sentence -- in

entering his guilty pleas, Williams explained to the circuit court that he

wanted to "expedite the process" (R. 26), and Williams agreed with the

circuit court at the Faretta hearing that his "execution was what we're

discussing here today." (Rem. R. 5.) Williams testified that he had not

been forced, coerced, or threatened in any way in making his decision to

represent himself.

At the Faretta hearing, the circuit court informed Williams that he

had the right to counsel and that, if he could not afford counsel, counsel

would be appointed for him. (Rem. R. 6.) The circuit court thoroughly

informed Williams of the dangers and difficulty of self-representation,

particularly as an inmate without formal legal training. (Rem. R. 6-9.)

The circuit court discussed with Williams this Court's automatic review

of his convictions and sentence and the standard of review this Court

would apply if he failed to file an appellate brief. (Rem. R. 10-11.) More

to the point, the circuit court asked Williams if he understood that, "if

16
CR-2024-0290

you don't make any additional appeals, you will face execution sooner."

(Rem. R. 11.) Williams answered that he understood.

Given the record before this Court, we have no trouble concluding

that Williams "not only knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily, waived

his right to counsel, but also his right to present issues to this court as it

reviews his conviction and his sentence of death." Sibley, 775 So. 2d at

243 (opinion on return to remand). Additionally, we have no doubt "that

when [Williams] 'decided to forgo presentation of any issues in the review

of his conviction and death sentence he could appreciate his position and

he knew that his life was at stake.' " Johnson v. State, 40 So. 3d 753, 758

(Ala. Crim. App. 2009) (quoting Sibley, 775 So. 2d at 244 (opinion on

return to remand)). Therefore, the circuit court did not err in allowing

Williams to exercise his right to self-representation on appeal.

II.

This Court is obligated to review the sufficiency of the State's

evidence to sustain Williams's guilty-plea convictions for capital murder.

See § 13A-5-42, Ala. Code 1975. Williams pleaded guilty to four capital

offenses -- murder made capital because he intentionally caused the

death of K.H., who was less than 14 years of age, see § 13A-5-40(a)(15);

17
CR-2024-0290

murder made capital because he intentionally caused the death of K.H.

during the course of a first-degree kidnapping, see § 13A-5-40(a)(1);

murder made capital because he intentionally caused the death of K.H.

during a first-degree rape, see § 13A-5-40(a)(3); and murder made capital

because he intentionally caused the death of K.H. during a first-degree

sodomy, see § 13A-5-40(a)(3).

"In determining the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain a

conviction, a reviewing court must accept as true all evidence introduced

by the State, accord the State all legitimate inferences therefrom, and

consider all evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution." Powe

v. State, 597 So. 2d 721, 724 (Ala. 1991) (citing Faircloth v. State, 471 So.

2d 485 (Ala. Crim. App. 1984)). " 'The test used in determining the

sufficiency of evidence to sustain a conviction is whether, viewing the

evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, a rational finder

of fact could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable

doubt.' " Nunn v. State, 697 So. 2d 497, 498 (Ala. Crim. App. 1997)

(quoting O'Neal v. State, 602 So. 2d 462, 464 (Ala. Crim. App. 1992)).

" ' "When there is legal evidence from which the jury could, by fair

inference, find the defendant guilty the trial court should submit [the

18
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case] to the jury, and, in such a case, this court will not disturb the trial

court's decision." ' " Sale v. State, 8 So. 3d 330, 338 (Ala. Crim. App. 2008)

(citations omitted). " ' "The role of appellate courts is not to say what the

facts are. Our role ... is to judge whether the evidence is legally sufficient

to allow submission of an issue for decision [by] the jury." ' " Ex parte

Stewart, 900 So. 2d 475, 477 (Ala. 2004) (citations omitted). Further, in

a capital case in which the defendant pleads guilty, "[t]he guilty plea may

be considered in determining whether the state has met [its] burden of

proof." § 13A-5-42, Ala. Code 1975.

The common element through all four of Williams's capital-murder

convictions is that he intentionally caused the death of K.H. A person

commits an intentional murder if, with "intent to cause the death of

another person, he or she causes the death of that person." § 13A-6-

2(a)(1), Ala. Code 1975. K.H.'s body was found underneath a tarp in the

basement of Williams's duplex. Williams admitted to strangling K.H. to

death, which aligned with the forensic pathologist's finding that K.H.

died of asphyxia. (R. 788-90.) Williams explained to Lt. Johnson that he

killed K.H. because, although Siple had agreed that he could engage in

oral sex with K.H., "he got carried away and started raping her and

19
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penetrating her vagina and anus, and he knew that he would get caught

for that." (R. 702-03.) This was ample evidence that K.H. is dead and

that Williams intentionally caused her death.

Williams pleaded guilty to murder made capital because he

intentionally caused the death of K.H., who was less than 14 years of age,

see § 13A-5-40(a)(15). The State presented evidence that K.H. was five

years old at the time of her death. Thus, the State's evidence was

sufficient to prove that Williams intentionally caused the death of a child

less than 14 years of age.

Williams pleaded guilty to murder made capital because he

intentionally caused the death of K.H. during the course of a first-degree

kidnapping, see § 13A-5-40(a)(1). "A person commits the crime of

kidnapping in the first degree if he abducts another person with intent

to … [i]nflict physical injury upon him, or to violate or abuse him

sexually." § 13A-6-43(a)(4), Ala. Code 1975. "Abduct" means to " restrain

a person with intent to prevent his liberation by either … [s]ecreting or

holding him in a place where he is not likely to be found, or … [u]sing or

threatening to use deadly physical force." § 13A-6-40(2), Ala. Code 1975.

"Restrain" means to:

20
CR-2024-0290

"intentionally or knowingly restrict a person's movements
unlawfully and without consent, so as to interfere
substantially with his liberty by moving him from one place
to another, or by confining him either in the place where the
restriction commences or in a place to which he has been
moved. Restraint is 'without consent' if it is accomplished by:

"a. Physical force, intimidation or deception,
or

"b. Any means, including acquiescence of the
victim, if he is a child less than 16 years old or an
incompetent person and the parent, guardian or
other person or institution having lawful control or
custody of him has not acquiesced in the
movement or confinement."

§ 13A-6-40(1), Ala. Code 1975.

The State presented evidence indicating that Williams took K.H.

from Siple's Columbus home with Siple's permission. Yet, Williams did

not have consent under § 13A-6-40(1)b. because Siple did not have legal

custody of K.H.; sole custody had been vested with K.H.'s father.

Williams first took K.H. to his property in Columbus, but, when Williams

was seen by his wife with K.H., Williams took K.H. to his duplex in

Phenix City. Williams showed pornography to K.H. while they traveled

to Phenix City and struck her when she refused to perform the acts in

the pornography. Williams took steps to hide his vehicle at the duplex,

and he secreted K.H. in the basement of the duplex for the purpose of

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sexually abusing her. In the basement, Williams bound and sexually

abused K.H. and, ultimately, strangled her to death. Thus, the State's

evidence was sufficient to prove that Williams intentionally caused the

death of K.H. during a first-degree kidnapping.

Williams pleaded guilty to murder made capital because he

intentionally caused the death of K.H. during a first-degree rape, see §

13A-5-40(a)(3). "A person commits the crime of rape in the first degree if

he … [b]eing 16 years old or older, engages in sexual intercourse with

another person who is less than 12 years old." § 13A-6-61(a)(3), Ala. Code

1. "Sexual intercourse" "has its ordinary meaning and occurs upon

any penetration, however slight; emission is not required." § 13A-6-60(4),

Ala. Code 1975.

In addition to Williams's admission that he, an adult male, had

raped K.H., a five-year-old child, the officers who discovered K.H.'s body

saw that K.H. had experienced vaginal bleeding. Further, the forensic

pathologist noted tears and bruising to K.H.'s genitalia. Thus, the

State's evidence was sufficient to prove that Williams intentionally

caused the death of K.H. during a first-degree rape.

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Finally, Williams pleaded guilty to murder made capital because he

intentionally caused the death of K.H. during a first-degree sodomy, see

§ 13A-5-40(a)(3). "A person commits the crime of sodomy in the first

degree if he … [b]eing 16 years old or older, engages in sodomy with a

person who is less than 12 years old." § 13A-6-63(a)(3), Ala. Code 1975.

"Sodomy" is defined as "[a]ny sexual act involving the genitals of one

person and the mouth or anus of another person." § 13A-6-60(5), Ala.

Code 1975.

In addition to Williams's admission that he, an adult male, had

sodomized K.H., a five-year-old child, the officers who discovered K.H.'s

body saw that K.H. had experienced anal bleeding. The forensic

pathologist noted the same bloody discharge, and he testified that the

damage to K.H.'s rectum was consistent with being anally penetrated.

Thus, the State's evidence was sufficient to prove that Williams

intentionally caused the death of K.H. during a first-degree sodomy.

The evidence of Williams's guilt on all four capital-murder charges,

which included Williams's admission of guilt, was overwhelming.

Consequently, this Court has no trouble concluding that the State met

its burden of proof for each conviction.

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III.

Although no longer required by Rule 45A, Ala. R. App. P., we have

nonetheless reviewed the record in this case, and we find no plain error

or defect in the guilt or penalty phase of the trial. See § 13A-5-53(a), Ala.

Code 1975.

IV.

Pursuant to § 13A-5-53, Ala. Code 1975, this court is required to

address the propriety of Williams's capital-murder convictions and his

sentence of death. Williams was indicted for, and convicted of, murder

made capital because he intentionally caused the death of K.H., who was

less than 14 years of age, see § 13A-5-40(a)(15); murder made capital

because he intentionally caused the death of K.H. during the course of a

first-degree kidnapping, see § 13A-5-40(a)(1); murder made capital

because he intentionally caused the death of K.H. during a first-degree

rape, see § 13A-5-40(a)(3); and murder made capital because he

intentionally caused the death of K.H. during a first-degree sodomy, see

§ 13A-5-40(a)(3). The circuit court found the following three statutory

aggravating circumstances to exist based on the guilt-phase verdicts: 1)

the capital offense was committed while the defendant was engaged in

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the commission of a rape, see § 13A-5-49(4), Ala. Code 1975; 2) the capital

offense was committed while the defendant was engaged in a kidnapping,

see § 13A-5-49(4); and 3) the capital offense was committed when the

victim was less than 14 years of age, see § 13A-5-49(11), Ala. Code 1975.

In addition, the circuit court, as the sentencer, found that the State had

proven beyond a reasonable doubt that Williams's capital offenses were

especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel compared to other capital offenses,

see § 13A-5-49(8), Ala. Code 1975. The circuit court found only one

statutory mitigating circumstance to exist -- that Williams had no

significant history of prior criminal activity, see § 13A-5-51(1), Ala. Code

1. Noting that Williams had waived the presentation of mitigating

evidence, the circuit court found the existence of only one nonstatutory

mitigating circumstance -- that Williams had accepted responsibility for

his conduct.

The circuit court found that the aggravating circumstances

outweighed the mitigating circumstances and sentenced Williams to

death. Our review of the sentencing order demonstrates that the circuit

court properly weighed the aggravating circumstances and the

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mitigating circumstances and correctly sentenced Williams to death. The

record supports the circuit court's decision.

The record does not reflect that Williams's sentence of death was

imposed as the result of the influence of passion, prejudice, or any other

arbitrary factor. See § 13A-5-53(b)(1).

Section 13A-5-53(b)(2) requires this Court to reweigh the

aggravating circumstances and the mitigating circumstances to

determine whether Williams's sentence of death was proper. After

independently weighing the aggravating and mitigating circumstances,

this Court finds that Williams's death sentence is appropriate.

As required by § 13A-5-53(b)(3) this Court must determine whether

Williams's sentence is excessive or disproportionate when compared to

the penalties imposed in similar cases. Williams was convicted of four

counts of capital murder during his kidnapping, rape, and sodomy of five-

year-old K.H. A sentence of death has been imposed for similar crimes

throughout this State. See Lewis v. State, 889 So. 2d 623 (Ala. Crim.

App. 2003); Scott v. State, 937 So. 2d 1065 (Ala. Crim. App. 2005); Jones

v. State, 43 So. 3d 1258 (Ala. Crim. App. 2007). Therefore, this Court

finds that the sentence was neither excessive nor disproportionate.

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Accordingly, Williams's capital-murder convictions and his

sentence of death are affirmed. For the reasons stated in note 1, the

portion of Williams's appeal that relates to his noncapital convictions is

dismissed.

AFFIRMED IN PART; APPEAL DISMISSED IN PART.

Kellum, Cole, Minor, and Anderson, JJ., concur.

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