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March 27, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

D.D.B. v. State of Alabama

Court of Criminal Appeals of Alabama

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: CR-2025-0386

• Judges: Judge Cole

• Opinion

• Authorities (68)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (54.4K)

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Combined Opinion

                        by [J William Cole](https://www.courtlistener.com/person/6143/j-william-cole/)

Rel: March 27, 2026

Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance sheets of Southern Reporter.
Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue,
Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-0650), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections
may be made before the opinion is published in Southern Reporter.

Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals
OCTOBER TERM, 2025-2026

---

CR-2025-0386

---

D.D.B.

v.

State of Alabama

Appeal from Tuscaloosa Juvenile Court
(JU-24-372.01)

COLE, Judge.
CR-2025-0386

D.D.B. appeals his delinquency adjudication based on the charge of

certain persons forbidden to possess a pistol, a violation of § 13A-11-72(b),

Ala. Code 1975. 1 For the reasons discussed below, we reverse.

Facts and Procedural History

On June 20, 2024, a delinquency petition was filed in the

Tuscaloosa Juvenile Court, alleging that, on June 19, 2024, D.D.B., a

minor, possessed or owned a pistol, a violation of § 13A-11-72(b). The

juvenile court appointed D.D.B. counsel, and D.D.B. then filed two

motions with the juvenile court.

The first motion that D.D.B. filed challenged the constitutionality

of § 13A-11-72(b) under the Second Amendment to the United States

Constitution and Art. I, § 26 of the Alabama Constitution. Specifically,

D.D.B. argued that § 13A-11-72(b) was facially unconstitutional because

nothing within either the United States Constitution or the Alabama

Constitution limited the right to possess a firearm to adults and that,

historically, minors had been permitted to possess firearms. The second

motion that D.D.B. filed was a motion to suppress the evidence gathered

1Because this appeal involves a juvenile-delinquency adjudication,

initials are used to protect D.D.B.'s anonymity. See Rule 52, Ala. R. App.
P.
2
CR-2025-0386

on June 19, 2024, because, he said, the Terry2 stop that led to the

discovery of that evidence was unlawful. A hearing on those motions was

held on March 18, 2025.

At the hearing, both D.D.B. and the State argued their respective

positions regarding D.D.B.'s constitutional challenge to § 13A-11-72 (b).

Then, regarding the motion to suppress, the State called Corporal Jason

Seibert, with the Tuscaloosa Police Department ("TPD"), to testify as

follows. On June 19, 2024, Cpl. Seibert, along with his partner Officer

Logan Wilson, were patrolling in the City of Tuscaloosa. That day, Cpl.

Seibert patrolled in the 300 block of 24th Avenue East, which is "Alberta

City." Cpl. Seibert explained that the TPD "patrol[s] Alberta City pretty

heavily because there's been a bit of gang violence and UB&Es [(unlawful

breaking and enterings)] in the area." (R. 21.)3 Based on those crimes,

the TPD put on "extra patrol" for "about two weeks," which involved

officers "routinely patrol[ling] that area" to ensure that "there's nobody

2Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).

3The transcript in the record on appeal is not consecutively
paginated. References to testimony from the reporter's transcript of the
suppression hearing held on March 18, 2025, will be referred to with an
"R."
3
CR-2025-0386

walking around pulling on door handles, nobody stealing packages,

people driving through neighborhoods shooting firearms out a window,

stuff like that." (R. 21.) On June 19, 2024, extra patrols were ordered in

Alberta City based on "weapons discharges coming from vehicles." (R.

39.)

While Cpl. Seibert was patrolling in Alberta City, he encountered

D.D.B. Cpl. Seibert explained that a homeowner on 24th Avenue East

had "requested … on three different occasions" for him to drive by and

check on her house "because she ha[d] a lot of gang kids hanging out in

her driveway, parking out front of her street, and trying to elicit her son

to participate in some of these gang activities." (R. 22, 41.) Cpl. Seibert

testified that the homeowner's son "was already a gang member" and that

the individuals loitering by her house were attempting to get him back.

(R. 40.) About "two weeks" before June 19, 2024, the homeowner's house

"had been shot into from a car standing out front just like [D.D.B.'s] was."

(R. 23.) Cpl. Seibert conceded that he did not get any service calls

regarding the 24th Avenue East home on June 19, 2024; that no previous

complaints had involved a description of D.D.B.'s vehicle; and that the

previous complaints had not described the individuals involved.

4
CR-2025-0386

However, Cpl. Seibert testified that, on June 19, 2024, he approached

D.D.B.'s vehicle because it was near the 24th Avenue East home.

According to Cpl. Seibert, D.D.B.'s vehicle was merely "parked …

on the street next to the curb in front of [the 24th Avenue East] house."

(R. 24-25.) Moreover, D.D.B.'s vehicle was legally parked. There was

also no loud music coming from D.D.B.'s vehicle, and Cpl. Seibert had

heard no gunshots. (R. 43-44.) Nonetheless, once Cpl. Seibert observed

D.D.B.'s vehicle, he "flip[ped] [his emergency] lights on and [he] got

behind [D.D.B.'s] vehicle." (R. 25.) Cpl. Seibert explained that he

intended "[t]o conduct a [Terry] stop of [D.D.B.'s] vehicle." (R. 25.) The

Terry stop, according to Cpl. Seibert, was based on previous criminal

activity and previous complaints from the homeowner on other occasions,

to which he had testified. Cpl. Seibert radioed dispatch that he was

"conducting a suspicious vehicle stop," and Officer Wilson began

approaching the passenger's side of D.D.B.'s vehicle. (R. 26.)

Before Cpl. Seibert and Officer Wilson "turned [their emergency]

lights on," the passenger doors of D.D.B.'s vehicle were closed. (R. 26.)

Officer Wilson exited the police car to "make contact with the front seat

passenger, who also stepped out of [D.D.B.'s] vehicle" but did not run. (R.

5
CR-2025-0386

27 (emphasis added).) Cpl. Seibert also approached the vehicle and "put

[him]self in between … the car and the front seat passenger" so that "[the

passenger] [was]n't able to escape outwards or inside the vehicle." (R. 28

(emphasis added).) While Cpl. Seibert was speaking with D.D.B., he

observed what he believed to be marijuana candy on the front passenger

seat. Then Cpl. Seibert smelled the odor of marijuana coming from

D.D.B.'s vehicle. Cpl. Seibert had D.D.B. step out of his vehicle so that

he could conduct a search of the vehicle, and Cpl. Seibert then saw "a

firearm in the floorboard." (R. 30-31.) At the time, D.D.B. was only 17

years old. D.D.B. lived just "around the corner" from where the Terry

stop occurred.

When asked to explain his reasonable suspicion for the Terry stop,

Cpl. Seibert stated:

"Okay. Suspicion when it comes to our extra patrols gets very
broad. We are told to make contact with anyone in the area
that could possibly be committing any crimes or doing
anything, especially -- it's the same when it comes to your
patrolling a neighborhood at midnight and there's people in
hoodies walking around your area, it's the same specific type
of patrol and contact made with someone."

(R. 42-43.) Cpl. Seibert agreed that he made contact with D.D.B. while

"[t]he sun was still out" but that it was "in the evening." (R. 37.)

6
CR-2025-0386

Moreover, Cpl. Seibert agreed that the location of a person or a vehicle

alone can "sometimes" be the only suspicion. When asked on what

evidence, other than D.D.B.'s proximity to the homeowner's house, his

reasonable suspicion was based, Cpl. Seibert said that "two weeks" before

June 19, 2024, a vehicle parked on the street in front of the house had

shot at the house. (R. 44.) However, Cpl. Seibert conceded that the

vehicle involved in the prior incident was a red vehicle and that D.D.B.

was driving a white SUV (sport-utility vehicle).

The juvenile court denied both of D.D.B.'s motions. Thereafter,

D.D.B. reserved his constitutional challenge and suppression argument

for appellate review and admitted to being delinquent for possessing a

pistol as a minor. The trial court adjudicated D.D.B. delinquent and

ordered him to serve probation.

Discussion

On appeal, D.D.B. argues that the juvenile court erred by: (1)

denying his constitutional challenge to § 13A-11-72(b) and (2) denying his

suppression motion. Because we find D.D.B.'s suppression argument to

be dispositive, we pretermit discussion of the constitutional challenge

raised by D.D.B.

7
CR-2025-0386

"In State v. Landrum, 18 So. 3d 424 (Ala. Crim. App.
2009), this Court explained:

" ' "This Court reviews de novo a circuit court's
decision on a motion to suppress evidence when
the facts are not in dispute. See State v. Hill, 690
So. 2d 1201, 1203 (Ala. 1996); State v. Otwell, 733
So. 2d 950, 952 (Ala. Crim. App. 1999)." State v.
Skaggs, 903 So. 2d 180, 181 (Ala. Crim. App.
2004).'

"State v. Landrum, 18 So. 3d at 426. Because the evidence
presented at the suppression hearing is not in dispute, the
only issue before this Court is whether the circuit court
correctly applied the law to the facts presented at the
suppression hearing, and we afford no presumption in favor
of the circuit court's ruling.

" 'All evidence obtained by a search that is
conducted in violation of the Constitution of the
United States is inadmissible in a state court.
Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 81 S. Ct. 1684, 6 L.
Ed. 2d 1081 (1961); Loyd v. State, 279 Ala. 447,
186 So. 2d 731 (1966). The Fourth Amendment to
the Constitution of the United States bans all
unreasonable searches. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1,
88 S. Ct. 1848, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889 (1968). Whether a
search is unreasonable depends on the facts and
circumstances of the particular case. Sibron v.
New York, 392 U.S. 40, 88 S. Ct. 1889, 20 L. Ed.
2d 917 (1968). Warrantless searches are per se
unreasonable, unless they fall within a recognized
exception. Ex parte Hilley, 484 So. 2d 485 (Ala.
1985). Those exceptions include: objects in plain
view, consensual searches, a search incident to a
lawful arrest, hot pursuit or emergency situations,
probable cause coupled with exigent
circumstances, and a Terry [v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1

8
CR-2025-0386

(1968),] "stop and frisk" situation. Daniels v.
State, 290 Ala. 316, 276 So. 2d 441 (1973). Where
a search is executed without a warrant, the burden
falls upon the State to show that the search falls
within an exception. Kinard v. State, 335 So. 2d
924 (Ala. 1976).'

"Ex parte Tucker, 667 So. 2d 1339, 1343 (Ala. 1995).

" ' "Under Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 20 L.
Ed. 2d 889 (1968), law enforcement officers may conduct
investigatory stops of persons or vehicles if they have a
'reasonable suspicion that criminal activity has occurred, is
occurring, or is about to occur.' " ' State v. Davis, 7 So. 3d 468,
470 (Ala. Crim. App. 2008), quoting Wilsher v. State, 611 So.
2d 1175, 1179 (Ala. Crim. App. 1992) (internal citations
omitted). When an officer stops a suspect pursuant to Terry,
the officer ' " ' "is entitled for the protection of himself and
others in the area to conduct a carefully limited search of the
outer clothing of such persons in an attempt to discover
weapons which might be used to assault him." [Terry,] 392
U.S. at 30, 88 S. Ct. 1868.' " ' Smith v. State, 884 So. 2d 3, 9
(Ala. Crim. App. 2003), quoting Riddlesprigger v. State, 803
So. 2d 579, 582 (Ala. Crim. App. 2001).

" 'This Court has recognized that a traffic
stop is " ' "more analogous" to the brief
investigative detention authorized in Terry' " than
custody traditionally associated with a felony
arrest. Sides v. State, 574 So. 2d 856, 858 (Ala.
Crim. App. 1990), quoting Pittman v. State, 541
So. 2d 583, 585 (Ala. Crim. App. 1989), quoting in
turn Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 439, 104
S. Ct. 3138, 82 L. Ed. 2d 317 (1984). In stopping a
vehicle for a traffic violation, a police officer has,
in Fourth Amendment terms, seized the driver,
Cains v. State, 555 So. 2d 290, 292 (Ala. Crim. App.
1989), quoting Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648,

9
CR-2025-0386

653, 99 S. Ct. 1391, 59 L. Ed. 2d 660 (1979), as well
as any passenger, Brendlin v. California, 551 U.S.
249, 127 S. Ct. 2400, 168 L. Ed. 2d 132 (2007).
Furthermore, so long as the police officer has
properly seized the occupants of the car, the officer
may order the driver, Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434
U.S. 106, 111, 98 S. Ct. 330, 54 L. Ed. 2d 331
(1977), or a passenger, State v. Hails, 814 So. 2d
980 (Ala. Crim. App. 2000), cert. denied, 814 So. 2d
988 (Ala. 2001), recognizing Maryland v. Wilson,
519 U.S. 408, 415, 117 S. Ct. 882, 137 L. Ed. 2d 41
(1997), out of the car without violating the Fourth
Amendment. See, State v. Abner, 889 So. 2d 52,
53-54 (Ala. Crim. App. 2004) (recognizing the
applicability of Mimms and Wilson in Alabama).

"….

" ' "[I]n a traffic-stop setting, the first
Terry condition -- a lawful
investigatory stop -- is met whenever it
is lawful for police to detain an
automobile and its occupants pending
inquiry into a vehicular violation. The
police need not have, in addition, cause
to believe any occupant of the vehicle is
involved in criminal activity. To justify
a patdown of the driver or a passenger
during a traffic stop, however, just as
in the case of a pedestrian reasonably
suspected of criminal activity, the
police must harbor reasonable
suspicion that the person subjected to
the frisk is armed and dangerous."

" '[Arizona v. Johnson,] 555 U.S. [323] at 327, 129
S. Ct. [781] at 784 [(2009)].'

10
CR-2025-0386

"B.A.H. v. State, 28 So. 3d 29, 32 (Ala. Crim. App. 2009)
(internal emphasis omitted).

"….

" ' "Reasonable suspicion is a less demanding standard
than probable cause," Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 330,
110 S. Ct. 2412, 2416, 110 L. Ed. 2d 301 (1990), requiring only
that the detaining officers "have a particularized and
objective basis for suspecting the person detained of criminal
activity," Webb v. State, 500 So. 2d 1280, 1281 (Ala. Crim.
App.), cert. denied, 500 So. 2d 1282 (Ala. 1986).' Wilsher v.
State, 611 So. 2d 1175, 1179 (Ala. Crim. App. 1992). 'To
justify the investigatory stop and patdown search, the officer's
actions must not be in response "to his inchoate and
unparticularized suspicion or 'hunch,' but [must be in
response] to the specific reasonable inferences which he is
entitled to draw from the facts in light of his experience." ' Ex
parte James, 797 So. 2d 413, 415 (Ala. 2000) (quoting Terry,
392 U.S. at 26) (emphasis omitted). Thus, '[i]f a reasonably
prudent person [in the officer's shoes with the officer's
experience and training] would believe that his safety, or the
safety of others, is endangered, [the officer] may conduct a
limited search of outer clothing to discover any weapons.'
State v. Taylor, 46 So. 3d 504, 508 (Ala. Crim. App. 2010)
(citations and quotations omitted). ' "This process allows
officers to draw on their own experience and specialized
training to make inferences from and deductions about the
cumulative information available to them that 'might well
elude an untrained person.' " [United States v.] Arvizu, 534
U.S. [266] at 273, 122 S. Ct. 744 (2002).' Muse v. State, 42 So. 3d 789, 792 (Ala. Crim. App.
2009)."

Grantham v. City of Tuscaloosa, 111 So. 3d 174, 178-80 (Ala. Crim. App.

2012).

11
CR-2025-0386

Every encounter between a police officer and an individual does not

constitute a seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.

"The test used to determine whether a seizure has occurred
for Fourth Amendment purposes is 'whether the police
engaged in a show of authority that would lead a reasonable
person, innocent of any crime, to conclude that the person was
not free to go under all the circumstances. United States v.
Castellanos, 731 F.2d 979 (C.A.D.C. 1984).' "

Williams v. State, 716 So. 2d 753, 754 (Ala. Crim. App. 1998) (quoting

Bush v. State, 695 So. 2d 70, 123 (Ala. Crim. App. 1995)). The United

States Supreme Court explained the seizure inquiry in United States v.

Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980), as follows:

"We conclude that a person has been 'seized' within the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment only if, in view of all of the
circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person
would have believed that he was not free to leave. Examples
of circumstances that might indicate a seizure, even where
the person did not attempt to leave, would be the threatening
presence of several officers, the display of a weapon by an
officer, some physical touching of the person of the citizen, or
the use of language or tone of voice indicating the compliance
with the officer's request might be compelled."

(Emphasis added.)

Moreover, "[r]easonable suspicion may be found when the accused

is in a high-crime area and his 'conduct contributed to the police officer's

suspicion.' " Williams, 716 So. 2d at 755 (quoting Gaskin v. State, 565 So.

12
CR-2025-0386

2d 675, 678 (Ala. Crim. App. 1990)) (emphasis added). However, presence

in a high-crime area or "in an area known for drug activity" is insufficient

in and of itself to establish reasonable suspicion that an individual is

engaged in criminal activity. Childs v. State, 671 So. 2d 781, 782 (Ala.

Crim. App. 1995).

We hold that Cpl. Seibert lacked reasonable suspicion to conduct an

investigatory stop of D.D.B. Although he conceded that D.D.B.'s vehicle

was parked legally on a public residential street, Cpl. Seibert used " 'a

show of authority' " when he turned on his patrol vehicle's emergency

lights and pulled his vehicle behind D.D.B.'s vehicle. Williams, 716 So.

2d at 754 (citations omitted).

"In his treatise on search and seizure, LaFave discusses
the issue as follows:

" '[W]hat does it mean, then, to say that a
reasonable person "would have believed that he
was not free to leave"? [United States v.]
Mendenhall [446 U.S. 544, 100 S. Ct. 1870, 64 L.
Ed. 2d 497 (1980)], [Florida v.] Royer [460 U.S.
491, 103 S. Ct. 1319, 75 L. Ed. 2d 299 (1983)], and
[Immigration & Naturalization Service v.]
Delgado [466 U.S. 210, 104 S. Ct. 1758, 80 L. Ed.
2d 247 (1984)] make it perfectly clear that it takes
something more than mere questioning by a police
officer. Thus, if an officer merely walks up to a
person standing or sitting in a public place (or,
indeed, who is seated in a vehicle located in a

13
CR-2025-0386

public place) and puts a question to him, this alone
does not constitute a seizure….

" '[T]he mere approach and questioning of [persons
seated within parked vehicles] does not constitute
a seizure. The result is not otherwise when the
officer utilizes some generally accepted means of
gaining the attention of the vehicle occupant or
encouraging him to eliminate any barrier to
conversation. The officer may tap on the window
and perhaps even open the door if the occupant is
asleep. A request that the suspect open the door
or roll down the window would seem equally
permissible, but the same would not be true of an
order that he do so. Likewise, the encounter
becomes a seizure if the officer orders the suspect
out of the car. So too, other police action which one
would not expect if the encounter was between two
private citizens -- boxing the car in, approaching it
on all sides by many officers, or use of flashing
lights as a show of authority -- will likely convert
the event into a Fourth Amendment seizure.'

"W. LaFave, 3 Search & Seizure § 9.2(h) (2d ed. 1987)
(footnotes omitted)."

Ex parte Betterton, 527 So. 2d 747, 749-50 (Ala. 1988) (emphasis added).

To be sure, not all uses of a patrol vehicle's emergency lights will be a

show of authority, see Doucette v. State, 10 So. 3d 117, 122-23 (Ala. Crim.

App. 2008), but the use of them to stop a vehicle is a show of authority.

See, e.g., Sawyer v. City of Marion, 666 So. 2d 113, 115 (Ala. Crim. App.

1995). Indeed, the State acknowledged in its arguments at the

14
CR-2025-0386

suppression hearing "that the lights would make a normal person feel

like they couldn't leave." (R. 55.) However, contrary to the assertion in

the dissent, this Court is not holding that the activation of a patrol

vehicle's emergency lights alone to make contact with the occupants of a

parked vehicle resulted in a "seizure" of D.D.B. In determining whether

an encounter with law-enforcement officers constitutes a "seizure," we

must consider the totality of the circumstances. Here, the activation of

the emergency lights combined with the "threatening presence" of two

officers approaching D.D.B.'s vehicle, one of whom tried to block the

passenger and prevent his "escape," constituted a show of authority that

elevated this encounter to a seizure. Under the totality of these

circumstances, a reasonable person would not have believed himself free

to leave. Thus, we hold that Cpl. Seibert seized D.D.B. on June 19, 2024.

The State failed to show that there was sufficient reasonable

suspicion for Cpl. Seibert's seizure of D.D.B. at the time he activated his

patrol vehicle's emergency lights and, thus, initiated a "stop." At the

suppression hearing, Cpl. Seibert testified that (1) he stopped D.D.B.'s

vehicle because it was near the 24th Avenue East home where reported

problems had occurred in the past (R. 23), (2) that suspicion gets "very

15
CR-2025-0386

broad" when on extra patrols because he has been "told to make contact

with anyone in the area who could possibly be committing any crimes or

doing anything" (R. 42-43), and (3) that "two weeks" before June 19, 2024,

an occupant of a "red vehicle" parked on the street had shot at the

homeowner's house. (R. 44-45.)

When considering whether " ' "reasonable suspicion existed for a

particular stop, the totality of the circumstances" ' " must be considered.

Hebert v. State, 180 So. 3d 919, 923 (Ala. Crim. App. 2014) (quoting State

v. Washington, 623 So. 2d 392, 395 (Ala. Crim. App. 1993), quoting in

turn Arnold v. State, 601 So. 2d 145, 149 (Ala. Crim. App. 1992)).

Considering the totality of the circumstances, Cpl. Seibert lacked

reasonable suspicion to seize D.D.B. D.D.B.'s white sport-utility vehicle

was legally parked on a residential street, and Cpl. Seibert testified that

no complaints had been made regarding D.D.B. or his vehicle. The only

articulable facts that Cpl. Seibert testified to were that the 24th Avenue

East home had been shot into two weeks before and that D.D.B. was

parked on the street by that house. The fact that the 24th Avenue East

home had been shot into before was insufficient, in part, because Cpl.

Seibert conceded that the homeowner's previous complaints did not

16
CR-2025-0386

involve a "white" vehicle, like D.D.B.'s. Nor did D.D.B. match any

description because the previous reports did not describe the purported

individuals involved. Cpl. Seibert also did not testify to any acts that

occurred before he seized D.D.B. that led to his belief that there was

reasonable suspicion of a crime afoot. Rather, he testified that he "would

have approached any vehicle that [he] saw in that area." (R. 46.)

Although Cpl. Seibert could have approached D.D.B.'s vehicle to engage

D.D.B. in a conversation or could have continued to observe D.D.B. to see

if any suspicious actions occurred, Cpl. Seibert instead used a show of

authority, by turning on his patrol vehicle's emergency lights, to seize

D.D.B. Based on the totality of the circumstances, Cpl. Seibert lacked

reasonable suspicion to seize D.D.B. The illegal seizure of D.D.B.

requires that any evidence obtained as a result of D.D.B.'s illegal seizure

be suppressed. The juvenile court thus erred in denying D.D.B.'s motion

to suppress the evidence secured as a result of his unlawful seizure, and

D.D.B. was entitled to the suppression of the unlawfully seized evidence.

17
CR-2025-0386

Conclusion

For these reasons, the juvenile court's judgment is reversed, and

this case is remanded for additional proceedings consistent with this

opinion.

REVERSED AND REMANDED.

Windom, P.J., and Kellum and Anderson, JJ., concur. Minor, J.,

dissents, with opinion.

18
CR-2025-0386

MINOR, Judge, dissenting.

The Court reverses D.D.B.'s delinquency adjudication based on the

charge of possessing a pistol while falling within the class of certain

persons forbidden to possess a pistol, see § 13A-11-72(b), Ala. Code 1975,

because, the Court holds, the Tuscaloosa Juvenile Court erred in denying

D.D.B.'s motion to suppress. I respectfully dissent.4

4Based on its resolution of the suppression issue in D.D.B.'s favor,

the Court does not address D.D.B.'s constitutional challenge to § 13A-11-
72(b), Ala. Code 1975. I likewise express no opinion on the merits of that
claim. I note, however, that the record shows that D.D.B. expressly
refused to serve the attorney general with a copy of his motion, asserting
that he need not do so under Boyd v. State, 960 So. 2d 717 (Ala. Crim.
App. 2006). (C. 17-18.)

As noted by other members of this Court and the Alabama Supreme
Court, I question whether Boyd remains valid on that point. See State v.
Billups, 223 So. 3d 954, 971 n.17 (Ala. Crim. App. 2016) (Joiner, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in the result) ("This Court, in
Townsend v. City of Mobile, 793 So. 2d 828 (Ala. Crim. App. 1998), rev'd
on other grounds, 793 So. 2d 835 (Ala. 2000), held that '§ 6-6-227[, Ala.
Code 1975,] is a provision included in the civil practice section of the Code
and is inapplicable in a criminal proceeding.' Townsend, however, has
been criticized by members of this Court and [of] the Alabama Supreme
Court. In a dissenting opinion joined by Justice Wise, who was then a
judge on this Court, Justice Shaw, when he was a member of this Court,
criticized our decision in Townsend, explaining that Townsend
'incorrectly states Alabama law.' Boyd v. State, 960 So. 2d 717, 721 (Ala.
Crim. App. 2006) (Shaw, J. dissenting). Justice See, in an opinion joined
by Justice Parker, concurred specially to the Alabama Supreme Court's
decision quashing the writ of certiorari in Boyd. Justice See echoed
Justice Shaw's sentiments, explaining that, '[b]y its terms, § 6-6-227, Ala.
19
CR-2025-0386

I disagree with the main opinion's conclusion that, under the

totality of the circumstances, Cpl. Jason Seibert's activation of his

emergency lights was a seizure of D.D.B.'s vehicle, which was already

stopped in front of the residence on 24th Avenue East. Absent the

activation of his lights, Cpl. Seibert could have parked behind D.D.B.'s

parked vehicle and got out to check on the vehicle and its occupants. See

Ex parte Betterton, 527 So. 2d 747, 749-50 (Ala. 1988). Among other

things, the State's evidence showed:

(1) that D.D.B.'s vehicle was parked in front of a residence in a
high-crime area;

(2) that the police department had ordered extra patrols of that
area;

(3) that someone in a parked car had shot into that same
residence within the last two weeks; and

(4) that the owner of the residence had asked law-enforcement
officers "on three different occasions" to drive by and check on
her home because gang members were "hanging out in her
driveway, parking out front of her street, and trying to elicit
her son to participate in some of these gang activities" (R. 22,
41).

Code 1975, applies to "any proceeding." The statute does not purport to
limit its application to civil statutes, nor does it exclude challenges to
criminal statutes.' Boyd v. State, 960 So. 2d 722, 724 (Ala. 2006) (See, J.,
concurring specially).").
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CR-2025-0386

Given those circumstances, I do not believe Cpl. Seibert's activation of

his emergency lights behind an already-stopped vehicle turned the

encounter into a seizure.

In Doucette v. State, 10 So. 3d 117 (Ala. Crim. App. 2008), this

Court cited several cases—including some in which emergency lights

were activated—holding that a law-enforcement officer's approaching a

parked vehicle is not automatically a seizure:

"See United States v. Baker, 290 F.3d 1276 (11th Cir. 2002)
(no seizure when police approach vehicle stopped in traffic);
United States v. Dockter, 58 F.3d 1284, 1287 (8th Cir. 1995)
('[The appellants] were not seized within the meaning of the
Fourth Amendment when [a police officer] pulled his vehicle
behind their parked car and activated his amber warning
lights.'); United States v. Kim, 25 F.3d 1426, 1430 (9th Cir.
1994) ('[W]here, as here, officers come upon an already parked
car, this disparity between automobile and pedestrian stops
dissipates and the driver is not clearly stopped in any sense
ab initio, except of his own volition.'); State v. Harris, 384 N.J.
Super. 29, 45, 894 A.2d 8, 17-18 (2006) ('Brief, non-intrusive
encounters with individuals on the street or in parked cars
implicate none of the privacy or security concerns engendered
by discretionary police spot checks of moving vehicles.'); State
v. Jack, 156 Ohio App. 3d 260, 263, 805 N.E.2d 187, 189 (2004)
('We begin by noting that approaching the occupants of a
parked car to ask questions does not constitute a seizure.');
Carrera v. State, 261 Ga. App. 832, 834, 584 S.E.2d 2, 5 (2003)
(' "It is well established that an officer's approach to a stopped
vehicle and inquiry into the situation [are] not a 'stop' or
'seizure' ...." '); State v. Gahner, 554 N.W.2d 818, 820 (N.D.
1996) ('The law distinguishes between approaching an
already stopped vehicle and stopping a moving one.'); In re the

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CR-2025-0386

Welfare of E.D.J., 502 N.W.2d 779, 782 (Minn. 1993) ('[T]he
mere act of approaching a person who is standing on a public
street or sitting in a car that is parked and asking questions
is not a "seizure." '); State v. Pulley, 863 S.W.2d 29, 30 (Tenn.
1993) ('A police officer may approach a car parked in a public
place and ask for driver identification and proof of vehicle
registration, without any reasonable suspicion of illegal
activity.')."

10 So. 3d at 122. This Court in Doucette then stated:

"According to Ex parte Betterton, in evaluating whether
a police encounter with an individual in a parked vehicle is a
'seizure' we examine the particular facts of the case to
determine if there was a 'show of authority' by police. 527 So.
2d at 749.

" ' "Examples of circumstances that might indicate
a seizure, even where the person did not attempt
to leave, would be the threatening presence of
several officers, the display of a weapon by an
officer, some physical touching of the person of the
citizen, or the use of language or tone of voice
indicating that compliance with the officer's
request might be compelled." '

"State v. Foreman, 133 N.C. App. 292, 515 S.E.2d 488 (1999),
quoting State v. Farmer, 333 N.C. 172, 187, 424 S.E.2d 120,
129 (1993), quoting in turn United States v. Mendenhall, 446
U.S. 544, 554, 100 S. Ct. 1870, 64 L. Ed. 2d 497 (1980).
'Mendenhall establishes that the test for existence of a "show
of authority" is an objective one: not whether the citizen
perceived that he was being ordered to restrict his movement,
but whether the officer's words and actions would have
conveyed that to a reasonable person.' California v. Hodari D.,
499 U.S. 621, 628, 111 S. Ct. 1547, 113 L. Ed. 2d 690 (1991).

22
CR-2025-0386

"In this case, Doucette voluntarily got out of his vehicle
with his hands raised before Deputy Powell was able to exit
his patrol car; there was one police officer present; Deputy
Powell did not brandish his weapon; Deputy Powell's speech
was not intimidating; and Deputy Powell did not physically
touch Doucette until after he had looked in the driver's side
window and discovered the drug paraphernalia, at which time
he handcuffed Doucette and the passenger. There was no
testimony as to whether Doucette's vehicle was 'blocked in' by
the patrol car. Deputy Powell did testify that he had activated
the lights on his car. However, this fact alone did not elevate
the encounter to a seizure.

"The New Mexico Court of Appeals in State v.
Baldonado, 115 N.M. 106, 847 P.2d 751 (1992), noted the
danger of adopting an absolute rule that the activation of a
police officer's patrol lights is always a seizure:

" 'We can conceive of many situations in which
people in stopped cars approached by officers
flashing their lights would be free to leave because
the officers would be simply communicating with
them to ascertain that they are not in trouble.
Under such circumstances, depending on the facts,
the officers may well activate their emergency
lights for reasons of highway safety or so as not to
unduly alarm the stopped motorists. We are loathe
to create a situation in which officers would be
discouraged from acting to help stranded
motorists, from acting in the interest of the safety
of the traveling public, or from acting in the
interest of their own safety.'

" 115 N.M. at 109, 847 P.2d at 754. The Baldonado court
declined to adopt a per se rule that a seizure occurs when a
police officer pulls his patrol car behind a parked car with his
lights activated. See also United States v. Dockter, supra;
Martin v. State, 104 S.W.3d 298 (Tex. App. 2003) (court

23
CR-2025-0386

adopted the rationale of the Baldonado court); State v. Dubois,
75 Or. App. 394, 706 P.2d 588, 590 (1985) ('[A]n officer's use
of overhead lights alone does not necessarily cause an
encounter to be a stop.').

"Based on the totality-of-the-circumstances in this case,
we hold that Deputy Powell's encounter with Doucette was
not a seizure within the scope of the Fourth Amendment."

10 So. 3d at 122-23 (emphasis added). I believe that, under Doucette, Cpl.

Seibert's activation of his lights did not seize the already stopped vehicle.

Indeed, under the circumstances—high crime and specific complaints of

gang activity at the residence, including shooting into the residence from

a parked car—Cpl. Seibert's activation of the lights was reasonably

necessary to clearly and quickly identify that his vehicle was a law-

enforcement vehicle and did not otherwise pose a threat to the occupants

of the parked vehicle.

Under the facts of this case, I would hold that the activation of the

lights was not a seizure of D.D.B.'s vehicle. I would thus hold that the

circuit court did not err in denying D.D.B.'s motion to suppress.

24