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March 27, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

William Dale Watson v. State of Alabama

Court of Criminal Appeals of Alabama

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: CR-2025-0768

• Judges: Judge Kellum

• Opinion

• Authorities (21)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (959)

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Combined Opinion

                        by [J Elizabeth Kellum](https://www.courtlistener.com/person/6150/j-elizabeth-kellum/)

Rel: March 27, 2026

Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance sheets of Southern Reporter.
Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue,
Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-0650), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections
may be made before the opinion is published in Southern Reporter.

Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals
OCTOBER TERM, 2025-2026

---

CR-2025-0768

---

William Dale Watson

v.

State of Alabama

Appeal from Limestone Circuit Court
(CC-13-57.62)

KELLUM, Judge.

William Dale Watson appeals the circuit court's summary dismissal

of what he styled as "Motion for Relief of Post Conviction and Sentencing,

Pursuant to Rule 45, Alabama Rules of Appellate Procedure, Error

Without Injury," in which he challenged his 2017 convictions and
CR-2025-0768

sentences for 6 counts of sexual abuse of a child less than 12 years old

and 4 counts of second-degree sexual abuse, involving 3 victims. (C. 3.)

This Court affirmed Watson's convictions and sentences on direct appeal

in an unpublished memorandum issued on June 29, 2018. Watson v.

State (No. CR-17-0384), 279 So. 3d 40 (Ala. Crim. App. 2018) (table). This

Court issued a certificate of judgment on July 18, 2018.

Watson filed his motion on July 23, 2025, alleging, as best we can

discern, that (1) the trial court committed plain error when, after it had

ruled that the State could not introduce evidence of his abusing victim

E.B. after E.B. had turned 12 years old, it allowed the State to introduce

into evidence a statement he made to police in which he referred to

incidents of abuse that occurred after E.B. was 12 years old; (2) the trial

court committed plain error when it did not require the State to elect on

which offense it wanted to proceed and did not give the jury a unanimity

instruction; (3) the State withheld from the jury evidence indicating that

he had had visitation with the victims while the charges were pending

against him, which, he said, contradicted the testimony of the three

victims that they had not seen him since his arrest; and (4) the trial court

lacked personal jurisdiction over him because, he said, he was not

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CR-2025-0768

arraigned in court and the waiver-of-arraignment form submitted to the

trial court was forged and not signed by him. In its response, the State

argued that Watson's motion was due to be denied because, it said, Rule

45, Ala. R. App. P., applies only in appellate courts and not in the circuit

courts. On August 11, 2025, the same day the State filed its response,

the circuit court issued an order stating: "ORDERED, Motion for Relief

of Post-Conviction and Sentencing, pursuant to Rule 45, Alabama Rules

of Appellate Procedure, is hereby DENIED." (C. 29.) Watson timely filed

a notice of appeal.

It is well settled that " '[t]he substance of a motion and not its style

determines what kind of motion it is.' " Ex parte Deramus, 882 So. 2d

875, 876 (Ala. 2002) (quoting Evans v. Waddell, 689 So. 2d 23, 26 (Ala.

1997)). In his motion, Watson raised claims challenging his convictions

and sentences, claims that are cognizable in a Rule 32, Ala. R. Crim. P.,

petition for postconviction relief. Therefore, his motion, although

incorrectly labeled, was a Rule 32 petition and must be treated as such.

It is equally well settled that circuit judges "are presumed to know the

law and to follow it in making their decisions." Ex parte Slaton, 680 So.

2d 909, 924 (Ala. 1996). Thus, this Court has recognized that, on appeal

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CR-2025-0768

from the denial or dismissal of a mislabeled petition, if there is no

affirmative indication in the record that the circuit court improperly

treated the petition according to its style, this Court will presume that

the circuit court properly treated the petition according to its substance

and proceed to consider the appeal. See, e.g., Knight v. State, 252 So. 3d

1108, 1111 (Ala. Crim. App. 2017), and Bagley v. State, 186 So. 3d 488,

489 (Ala. Crim. App. 2015). On the other hand, if the record affirmatively

reflects that the circuit court improperly treated the petition according to

its style, the presumption does not apply, and this Court will reverse the

circuit court's judgment and remand the cause for the circuit court to

treat the petition according to its substance. See, e.g., Wedgeworth v.

State, 286 So. 3d 78, 79 (Ala. Crim. App. 2019), and Shapley v. State, 260

So. 3d 69, 71 (Ala. Crim. App. 2018).

In this case, there is no affirmative indication in the record that the

circuit court improperly treated Watson's petition according to its style

instead of its substance. The petition was assigned a .6 designation,

specifically .62, which is commonly used for Rule 32 petitions. Although

the circuit court's order referred to Watson's petition according to its

style, this Court held in Bagley, 186 So. 3d at 489, that "[t]he circuit

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CR-2025-0768

court's identification of [a] petition according to its style is not alone

sufficient to overcome the presumption that the circuit court followed the

law when dismissing [the] petition." Moreover, nothing else in the record

indicates that the circuit court did not properly treat Watson's petition

as a Rule 32 petition. The record does indicate that the State improperly

treated the petition according to its style; it argued in its response that

Watson was due no relief because Rule 45, Ala. R. App. P., applies only

in appellate courts. However, the circuit court neither mentioned the

State's response in its order nor otherwise indicated that it was

dismissing the petition based on the State's argument. The circuit court

merely dismissed the petition without comment. Therefore, we presume

that the circuit court knew and followed the law when it dismissed

Watson's petition, i.e., that it properly treated the petition as a Rule 32

petition, and we proceed to consider this appeal.

Watson reasserts on appeal each of the four claims he raised in his

petition, and he argues that the circuit court erred in summarily

dismissing his petition without affording him an evidentiary hearing. We

disagree.

"A Rule 32 petitioner is entitled to an evidentiary hearing on
a claim in a postconviction petition only if the claim is

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CR-2025-0768

'meritorious on its face.' Ex parte Boatwright, 471 So. 2d
1257, 1258 (Ala. 1985). A postconviction claim is 'meritorious
on its face' only if the claim (1) is sufficiently pleaded in
accordance with Rule 32.3 and Rule 32.6(b); (2) is not
precluded by one of the provisions in Rule 32.2; and (3)
contains factual allegations that, if true, would entitle the
petitioner to relief."

Kuenzel v. State, 204 So. 3d 910, 914 (Ala. Crim. App. 2015).

Rule 32.3, Ala. R. Crim. P., provides that "[t]he petitioner shall have

the burden of pleading ... the facts necessary to entitle the petitioner to

relief." Rule 32.6(b), Ala. R. Crim. P., requires that the petition

"contain a clear and specific statement of the grounds upon
which relief is sought, including full disclosure of the factual
basis of those grounds. A bare allegation that a constitutional
right has been violated and mere conclusions of law shall not
be sufficient to warrant any further proceedings."

As this Court noted in Boyd v. State, 913 So. 2d 1113 (Ala. Crim. App.

2003):

" 'Rule 32.6(b) requires that the petition itself disclose
the facts relied upon in seeking relief.' Boyd v. State, 746 So.
2d 364, 406 (Ala. Crim. App. 1999). In other words, it is not
the pleading of a conclusion 'which, if true, entitle[s] the
petitioner to relief.' Lancaster v. State, 638 So. 2d 1370, 1373
(Ala. Crim. App. 1993). It is the allegation of facts in pleading
which, if true, entitle[s] a petitioner to relief. After facts are
pleaded, which, if true, entitle the petitioner to relief, the
petitioner is then entitled to an opportunity, as provided in
Rule 32.9, Ala. R. Crim. P., to present evidence proving those
alleged facts."

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CR-2025-0768

913 So. 2d at 1125.

"The burden of pleading under Rule 32.3 and Rule 32.6(b) is a
heavy one. Conclusions unsupported by specific facts will not
satisfy the requirements of Rule 32.3 and Rule 32.6(b). The
full factual basis for the claim must be included in the petition
itself. If, assuming every factual allegation in a Rule 32
petition to be true, a court cannot determine whether the
petitioner is entitled to relief, the petitioner has not satisfied
the burden of pleading under Rule 32.3 and Rule 32.6(b). See
Bracknell v. State, 883 So. 2d 724 (Ala. Crim. App. 2003)."

Hyde v. State, 950 So. 2d 344, 356 (Ala. Crim. App. 2006).

We have thoroughly reviewed Watson's petition, and we conclude

that none of his claims were pleaded with sufficient specificity to satisfy

the requirements in Rule 32.3 and Rule 32.6(b). Of particular import, we

point out that Watson identified the crimes for which he was convicted,

named the victims of those crimes, and attached to his petition a copy of

the indictment, but he failed to allege any facts in his petition regarding

those crimes nor did he state what evidence was introduced at trial. Cf.

Bracknell v. State, 883 So. 2d 724 (Ala. Crim. App. 2003) (holding that

Rule 32 petitioner failed to satisfy his burden of pleading claims of

ineffective assistance of counsel when the petitioner failed to include

specific facts in his petition regarding the crimes or the evidence

introduced at trial). Although "[t]his Court may take judicial notice of its

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CR-2025-0768

own records ..., we are not required, in the context of a Rule 32

proceeding, to search the record from a petitioner's direct appeal to

ascertain the factual basis for a postconviction claim." Mashburn v.

State, 148 So. 3d 1094, 1124 (Ala. Crim. App. 2013). See also Moody v.

State, 95 So. 3d 827 (Ala. Crim. App. 2011).

Watson's failure to allege any facts regarding the crimes and the

evidence presented at trial is fatal to his first three claims because those

claims are fact dependent. Even assuming every factual allegation in

Watson's Rule 32 petition to be true, this Court cannot determine

whether he is entitled to relief on his first three claims without knowing

the facts of the crimes and the evidence presented at trial. As for his final

claim, Watson alleged only that he was not arraigned in court and that

the waiver-of-arraignment form submitted to the trial court was forged

and not signed by him. Those bare and conclusory allegations, however,

are not sufficient, by themselves, to indicate that the trial court lacked

personal jurisdiction over him. See, e.g., State v. Bennett, 727 So. 2d 863

(Ala. Crim. App. 1997) (holding that the trial court acquired personal

jurisdiction over the defendant when the defendant voluntarily appeared

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CR-2025-0768

at the proceedings). Therefore, Watson failed to satisfy his burden of

pleading.

Rule 32.7(d), Ala. R. Crim. P., authorizes the circuit court to

summarily dismiss a petitioner's Rule 32 petition

"[i]f the court determines that the petition is not sufficiently
specific, or is precluded, or fails to state a claim, or that no
material issue of fact or law exists which would entitle the
petitioner to relief under this rule and that no purpose would
be served by any further proceedings ...."

See also Hannon v. State, 861 So. 2d 426, 427 (Ala. Crim. App. 2003);

Cogman v. State, 852 So. 2d 191, 193 (Ala. Crim. App. 2002); Tatum v.

State, 607 So. 2d 383, 384 (Ala. Crim. App. 1992). Because all of Watson's

claims were insufficiently pleaded, summary disposition of his Rule 32

petition without an evidentiary hearing was appropriate.

Based on the foregoing, the judgment of the circuit court is

affirmed.

AFFIRMED.

Windom, P.J., and Cole, J., concur. Minor, J., concurs in the result,

with opinion. Anderson, J., concurs in the result.

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CR-2025-0768

MINOR, Judge, concurring in the result.

I agree with this Court's conclusion that William Dale Watson's

"Motion for Relief of Post Conviction and Sentencing, Pursuant to Rule

45, Alabama Rules of Appellate Procedure, Error Without Injury" is in

substance a petition for postconviction relief under Rule 32, Ala. R. Crim.

P., and I agree with this Court's affirmance of the Limestone Circuit

Court's judgment summarily dismissing that petition.

That said, I think this appeal fits within the rule set forth in

Wedgeworth v. State, 286 So. 3d 78 (Ala. Crim. App. 2019), and Shapley

v. State, 260 So. 3d 69 (Ala. Crim. App. 2018) ("the Wedgeworth-Shapley

rule"), that this Court will reverse a circuit court's judgment "if the record

affirmatively reflects that the circuit court improperly treated [a Rule 32]

petition according to its style" rather than its substance. Watson, the

State, and the circuit court all called the "motion" the wrong thing. But

the main opinion looks beyond all that and presumes that the circuit

court properly treated the motion as a Rule 32 petition. I do not see the

distinction the main opinion draws here. And I note that the State views

the record the same way I do. Indeed, the State's only assertion on appeal

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is that this Court should reverse the judgment and remand the case to

the circuit court for that court to treat the motion properly.

In my experience, this Court is inconsistent in applying the

Wedgeworth-Shapley rule. What's more, this Court sometimes uses the

rule to reverse a judgment without first answering the threshold question

of subject-matter jurisdiction. Indeed, that was the reason for my dissent

in Wedgeworth -- the record did not show that the circuit court had

jurisdiction. Thus, I would have remanded the case to answer that

threshold question. See Wedgeworth, 286 So. 3d at 79-81 (Minor, J.,

dissenting). This Court should not -- indeed it cannot -- reverse a

judgment if the lower court did not have jurisdiction.1 See, e.g., Madden

v. State, 885 So. 2d 841, 844 (Ala. Crim. App. 2004) ("A void judgment

will not support an appeal.").

1After our opinion in Wedgeworth, the circuit court summarily
dismissed Wedgeworth's petition, and Wedgeworth again appealed. This
Court remanded the matter to determine whether the circuit court had
jurisdiction. It did not have jurisdiction, and, on return to remand, we
thus dismissed the appeal by unpublished order. Wedgeworth v. State
(No. CR-18-1116, May 20, 2020), 329 So. 3d 693 (Ala. Crim. App. 2020).
Here, Watson paid the filing fee, and the circuit court thus acquired
jurisdiction. (C. 26.)
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CR-2025-0768

Regardless, under most circumstances, we may affirm a judgment

if it is correct for any reason. See, e.g., Bush v. State, 92 So. 3d 121, 134

(Ala. Crim. App. 2009). Under Bush, I reach the same result as the main

opinion -- the circuit court's judgment is due to be affirmed. Thus, I

concur in the result.

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