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March 26, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

Timothy Wayne Snider Jr. v. the State of Texas

Texas Court of Appeals, 11th District (Eastland)

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: 11-24-00122-CR
• Nature of Suit: Poss With Intent to Deliver a Controlled Substance

• Disposition: Affirmed

• Opinion

• Authorities (22)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (1.8K)

• PDF

Disposition

Affirmed

Lead Opinion

Opinion filed March 26, 2026

In The

Eleventh Court of Appeals

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No. 11-24-00122-CR

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TIMOTHY WAYNE SNIDER JR., Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the 90th District Court
Young County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. CR11969

MEMORANDUM OPINION
A jury found Appellant, Timothy Wayne Snider Jr., guilty of the first-degree
felony offense of possession of methamphetamine with intent to deliver in an amount
of four grams or more but less than two hundred grams. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY
CODE ANN. § 481.112(d) (West Supp. 2025). The trial court assessed his punishment
at forty years’ imprisonment in the Institutional Division of the Texas Department
of Criminal Justice and a $5,000 fine. In three issues, Appellant argues that (1) the
evidence is insufficient to link him to the methamphetamine, (2) the trial court erred
by denying his motion for directed verdict, and (3) the evidence is insufficient to
show he possessed methamphetamine with the intent to deliver. We affirm.
Factual and Procedural History
On March 2, 2022, Officer Joshua Hufstedler with the Graham Police
Department was on patrol near a residence known for drug activity, the Burkett
house. Officer Hufstedler had reason to believe a man named Paris Kimberling, who
had an outstanding federal arrest warrant for possession of methamphetamine with
intent to deliver, frequented that residence. Officer Hufstedler followed a vehicle
that he observed leaving the Burkett house and stopped the vehicle for a traffic
violation—failure to signal a turn. Ashley Merrill, Appellant’s girlfriend, was
driving the vehicle, and Appellant was in the front passenger seat. Officer Hufstedler
confirmed Ashley’s identity, but Appellant said that he did not have his driver’s
license with him. Appellant told Officer Hufstedler an incorrect driver’s license
number. According to Officer Hufstedler, Appellant became defensive and
confrontational. Sergeant Christopher Post arrived at the scene to help identify
Appellant. Officer Hufstedler asked both Appellant and Ashley to get out of the
vehicle.
Appellant and Ashley told Officer Hufstedler that a friend of theirs named
Jaycie Burkett had rented the vehicle and that they had driven her to court that
morning “so she could surrender to begin a sentence in federal prison for delivery of
methamphetamine.” Officer Hufstedler knew Jaycie and believed that she lived at
the Burkett house. Officer Hufstedler asked Ashley for permission to search the
vehicle, but she declined. Officer Hufstedler then called for a K-9 officer to come

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to the scene. The K-9 alerted to the presence of narcotics in the front passenger door
of the vehicle. Officer Hufstedler then conducted a search of the vehicle.
The jury viewed Officer Hufstedler’s bodycam video, which depicted the
search of the vehicle. Behind the driver’s seat of the vehicle was a pink cosmetic
bag containing two smaller baggies. Officer Hufstedler described that inside of the
baggies there was a “crystalline substance” that was determined to be
methamphetamine. One of the bags contained approximately seven grams of
methamphetamine and the other approximately five grams. The bag also contained
marihuana. Officer Hufstedler testified that the bag was within reach of Appellant.
In the passenger side door storage compartment of the vehicle, there was a
small bottle wrapped in electrical tape that contained a liquid substance Officer
Hufstedler believed to be liquid methamphetamine. There was a black backpack
behind the passenger seat that contained a wallet with Appellant’s identification.
Inside of the black backpack was a glass pipe used to smoke methamphetamine.
Officer Hufstedler found digital scales in the vehicle that he testified are used in
weighing and packaging illegal narcotics. Officer Hufstedler described that he found
another glass pipe used for smoking methamphetamine in the grass area where
Appellant had been sitting after getting out of the vehicle.
Appellant testified at trial that he had been staying at the Burkett house
because he was helping with repairs on the house. He stated, however, that it was
“not a drug house.” Appellant explained that he was agitated on the day of the
offense because Jaycie had failed to pay him for his work on the house. According
to Appellant, Jaycie was going to jail so she rented the vehicle and placed her
belongings in it to take to her father’s house. Ashley was driving Appellant to his
parents’ house in another town so that he could leave for a job in Arizona.

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Appellant testified that it was not his backpack behind the passenger seat and
that he did not know his wallet was in the backpack. He explained that he had lost
his wallet and that he believed Paris, the person Officer Hufstedler was originally
trying to locate for an outstanding warrant, had taken it. Appellant stated that the
digital scales did not belong to him and that he did not know the pink cosmetic bag
was in the vehicle. Appellant testified that the methamphetamine found in the
vehicle did not belong to him and that he did not know there was liquid
methamphetamine in the vehicle. During cross-examination, Appellant’s credibility
was impeached. Appellant admitted that he lied to Officer Hufstedler.1 He further
was impeached on cross-examination regarding the truthfulness of his sworn
application for a court-appointed attorney, to which he retorted, “I’m a liar. I’m a
liar. I just lie.”
Analysis
In his first issue, Appellant argues that the evidence is insufficient to link him
to the methamphetamine found during the search and, thus, insufficient to show that
he possessed methamphetamine. In his third issue, he argues that the evidence is
insufficient to show that he had the intent to deliver the methamphetamine.
A. Standard of Review
We review a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, regardless of
whether it is denominated as a legal or factual sufficiency challenge, under the
standard of review set forth in Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979). Brooks v.
State, 323 S.W.3d 893, 912 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010); Polk v. State, 337 S.W.3d 286,

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Appellant told Officer Hufstedler that he had worked making repairs to level the Burkett house.
He claimed that he had not been paid for his work. He “[swore] on [his] life” to the officer that he did not
know the phone number of his alleged employer Jerrod Burkett. But Appellant admitted on the stand that
he had lied to the officer about that. He then testified to separate payments he did receive for the work.

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288–89 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2010, pet. ref’d). Under the Jackson standard, we
review all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict to determine
whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the
charged offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319; Isassi v. State,
330 S.W.3d 633, 638 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010).
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict requires that
we consider all of the evidence admitted at trial, including improperly admitted
evidence. Winfrey v. State, 393 S.W.3d 763, 767 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013); Clayton v.
State, 235 S.W.3d 772, 778 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). As such, we defer to the
factfinder’s credibility and weight determinations because the factfinder is the sole
judge of the witnesses’ credibility and the weight their testimony is to be afforded.
Winfrey, 393 S.W.3d at 768; Brooks, 323 S.W.3d at 899; Clayton, 235 S.W.3d at
778. This deference accounts for the factfinder’s duty to resolve conflicts in the
testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to draw reasonable inferences from basic facts
to ultimate facts. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319; Clayton, 235 S.W.3d at 778. We may
not reevaluate the weight and credibility of the evidence to substitute our judgment
for that of the factfinder. Dewberry v. State, 4 S.W.3d 735, 740 (Tex. Crim. App.
1999). Therefore, if the record supports conflicting inferences, we presume that the
factfinder resolved the conflicts in favor of the verdict, and we defer to that
determination. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 326; Merritt v. State, 368 S.W.3d 516, 525–26
(Tex. Crim. App. 2012); Clayton, 235 S.W.3d at 778.
Because the standard of review is the same, we treat direct and circumstantial
evidence equally. Isassi, 330 S.W.3d at 638; Clayton, 235 S.W.3d at 778; Hooper v.
State, 214 S.W.3d 9, 13 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). It is not necessary that the evidence
directly prove the defendant’s guilt. Rather, circumstantial evidence is as probative

5
as direct evidence in establishing the guilt of an actor and can, without more, be
sufficient to establish guilt. Carrizales v. State, 414 S.W.3d 737, 742 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2013) (citing Hooper, 214 S.W.3d at 13). A guilty verdict does not require
that every fact must directly and independently prove a defendant’s guilt. Hooper,
214 S.W.3d at 13. Instead, the cumulative force of all the incriminating
circumstances is sufficient to support the conviction. Id. Therefore, in evaluating
the sufficiency of the evidence, we must consider the cumulative force of the
evidence. Villa v. State, 514 S.W.3d 227, 232 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017); Murray v.
State, 457 S.W.3d 446, 448 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015).
B. Applicable Law: Affirmative Links
“Possession” is defined as “actual care, custody, control, or management.”
HEALTH & SAFETY § 481.002(38); see also TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 1.07(a)(39)
(West Supp. 2025). In this regard, to prove unlawful possession of a controlled
substance, the State must establish that the accused exercised care, control, or
management over the contraband and knew that the substance was contraband.
Poindexter v. State, 153 S.W.3d 402, 405 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). The elements of
possession may be proven through direct or circumstantial evidence, but
“[r]egardless of whether the evidence is direct or circumstantial, it must establish
that the defendant’s connection with the drug was more than fortuitous.” Evans v.
State, 202 S.W.3d 158, 161 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006).
Appellant’s mere presence in the same place as the controlled substance is
insufficient to support a possession finding. Evans, 202 S.W.3d at 162. But presence
or proximity, when combined with other evidence, either direct or circumstantial,
may establish possession. Id.

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Texas courts have formulated the “affirmative links rule,” which provides that
“[w]hen the accused is not in exclusive possession of the place where the substance
is found, it cannot be concluded that the accused had knowledge of and control over
the contraband unless there are additional independent facts and circumstances
which affirmatively link the accused to the contraband.” Poindexter, 153 S.W.3d at
406 (alteration in original) (quoting Deshong v. State, 625 S.W.2d 327, 329 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1981)); see Evans, 202 S.W.3d at 162 n.12 (listing affirmative links
recognized by courts); see also Tate v. State, 500 S.W.3d 410, 413–14 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2016) (citing Evans, 202 S.W.3d at 162 n.12). The affirmative links rule is
routinely employed to establish possession when the accused is not in exclusive
possession of the place where the drugs are found, and it is designed “to protect the
innocent bystander from conviction based solely upon his fortuitous proximity to
someone else’s drugs.” Poindexter, 153 S.W.3d at 406.
The following links have been applied to infer knowledge that relate to the
possession of contraband:
(1) the defendant’s presence when a search is conducted; (2) whether
the contraband was in plain view; (3) the defendant’s proximity to and
the accessibility of the narcotic; (4) whether the defendant was under
the influence of narcotics when arrested; (5) whether the defendant
possessed other contraband or narcotics when arrested; (6) whether the
defendant made incriminating statements when arrested; (7) whether
the defendant attempted to flee; (8) whether the defendant made furtive
gestures; (9) whether there was an odor of contraband; (10) whether
other contraband or drug paraphernalia were present; (11) whether the
defendant owned or had the right to possess the place where the drugs
were found; (12) whether the place where the drugs were found was
enclosed; (13) whether the defendant was found with a large amount of
cash; and (14) whether the conduct of the defendant indicated a
consciousness of guilt.

7
Tate, 500 S.W.3d at 414 (quoting Evans, 202 S.W.3d at 162 n.12). It is not the
number of identified links that is dispositive; rather, it is the logical force of all of
the evidence, both direct and circumstantial, that is the determining factor. Evans,
202 S.W.3d at 162.
C. Sufficiency of the Evidence
Appellant argues that before the State could prove that he intended to deliver
methamphetamine, it had to first prove that he possessed it. Further, because he was
not in exclusive possession of the place where the methamphetamine was found, the
State had to affirmatively link Appellant to the methamphetamine. While he
acknowledges that there are some affirmative links between him and the contraband,
Appellant maintains that the “logical force of all the evidence” does not support his
conviction.
Officer Hufstedler testified that the pink cosmetic bag with the
methamphetamine was “easily” within Appellant’s reach. He explained that it was
not unusual for a male to put narcotics in a bag typically used by women because
drug users and sellers hide drugs in a variety of containers and objects. Officer
Hufstedler found a glass pipe used to smoke methamphetamine inside of the
backpack that contained Appellant’s wallet. A second glass pipe was found in the
grass on the side where Appellant was sitting during the search of the vehicle. There
were also digital scales used for weighing and packaging illegal narcotics inside of
the vehicle. A small glass bottle containing a liquid substance that Officer
Hufstedler believed to be liquid methamphetamine was found in the accessible
passenger side door compartment of the vehicle where Appellant had been sitting.
The jury is the sole judge of the witnesses’ credibility—including
Appellant’s—and the weight their testimony was to be afforded. See Winfrey, 393

8
S.W.3d at 768; Brooks, 323 S.W.3d at 899; Clayton, 235 S.W.3d at 778. Therefore,
we defer to the jury’s credibility and evidentiary weight determinations and give due
deference to their resolution of conflicts in the testimony, the weight this jury gave
the evidence, and the reasonable inferences they drew from the testimony and
evidence. See Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319; Clayton, 235 S.W.3d at 778. In this regard,
the jury could have disbelieved Appellant’s testimony that he did not know that there
was methamphetamine in the vehicle and that it did not belong to him. Appellant
admitted that he was “a liar” and that he “just lie[s]”—having lied to Officer
Hufstedler and on his sworn application for a court-appointed attorney in this case.
Based on our review of all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the
verdict, we conclude that there is sufficient evidence from which a rational jury
could have found that Appellant possessed the methamphetamine. The cumulative
force of all the incriminating circumstances is sufficient to support the jury’s finding
on possession. We overrule Appellant’s first issue.
Appellant also argues that the State failed to prove that he intended to deliver
the methamphetamine. “Deliver” is defined as the “transfer, actually or
constructively, to another a controlled substance.” HEALTH & SAFETY § 481.002(8).
The intent to deliver may be established by circumstantial evidence. Hughitt v. State,
539 S.W.3d 531, 542 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2018), aff’d, 583 S.W.3d 623 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2019); Jones v. State, 300 S.W.3d 93, 97 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2009,
no pet.). In determining whether an individual had the intent to deliver, courts have
considered the following:
(1) the nature of the location at which the defendant was arrested; (2) the
quantity of controlled substance in the defendant’s possession; (3) the
manner of packaging; (4) the presence (or lack) of drug paraphernalia (for
either drug use or sale); (5) the defendant’s possession of large amounts
of cash; and (6) the defendant’s status as a drug user.

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Williams v. State, 902 S.W.2d 505, 507 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1994, pet.
ref’d). “The number of factors present is not as important as the logical force the
factors have in establishing the elements of the offense.” Jones, 300 S.W.3d at 97.
In addition, “[i]ntent can be inferred from the acts, words, and conduct of the
accused.” Patrick v. State, 906 S.W.2d 481, 487 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995); Hughitt,
539 S.W.3d at 542. Moreover, expert testimony from an experienced law
enforcement officer may be used to help establish intent to deliver. Jones, 300
S.W.3d at 97.
Appellant was leaving a residence known for drug activity. Officer Hufstedler
testified that the quantity of methamphetamine, approximately twelve grams total,
was consistent with delivery because it was larger than that typically possessed for
personal use. Sergeant Post testified that the typical amount for personal use is less
than one gram. There were digital scales found inside of the vehicle used for
weighing and packaging illegal narcotics. Officer Hufstedler explained that it would
be unusual for a person to have scales if the methamphetamine was merely for
personal use. Officer Hufstedler found two glass pipes used to smoke
methamphetamine during his search. We hold that there was sufficient evidence for
a rational jury to infer and find beyond a reasonable doubt that Appellant possessed
methamphetamine with the intent to deliver. We overrule Appellant’s third issue.
Appellant asserts in his second issue that the trial court erred in denying his
motion for a directed verdict. An appeal challenging the denial of a motion for
directed verdict is a challenge to the legal sufficiency of the evidence, and the same
standard of review applies in both instances. Williams v. State, 937 S.W.2d 479, 482
(Tex. Crim. App. 1996); Pollock v. State, 405 S.W.3d 396, 401 (Tex. App.—Fort
Worth 2013, no pet.). Having determined that the evidence is sufficient to support

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Appellant’s conviction, we hold that the trial court did not err in denying Appellant’s
motion for directed verdict. We overrule Appellant’s second issue.
This Court’s Ruling
We affirm the trial court’s judgment.

BRUCE WILLIAMS
JUSTICE

March 26, 2026

Do not publish. See TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).
Panel consists of: Bailey, C.J.,
Trotter, J., and Williams, J.

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