Jump To

Top Caption Disposition Combined Opinion

Support FLP

CourtListener is a project of Free
Law Project, a federally-recognized 501(c)(3) non-profit. Members help support our work and get special access to features.

Please become a member today.

Join Free.law Now

March 18, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

State v. Long

Court of Appeals of Oregon

• Citations: 347 Or. App. 880
• Docket Number: A180741
• Precedential Status: Non-Precedential
• Judges: Pag n

• Disposition: Affirmed.

• Opinion

• Authorities (4)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (0)

• PDF

Disposition

Affirmed.

Combined Opinion

880 March 18, 2026 No. 217

This is a nonprecedential memorandum opinion
pursuant to ORAP 10.30 and may not be cited
except as provided in ORAP 10.30(1).

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE
STATE OF OREGON

STATE OF OREGON,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
ROBERT JOEL LONG,
aka Robert Long,
Defendant-Appellant.
Clackamas County Circuit Court
20CR37339; A180741

Ann M. Lininger, Judge.
Submitted October 23, 2024.
Ernest G. Lannet, Chief Defender, Criminal Appellate
Section, and Emily P. Seltzer, Deputy Public Defender, Office
of Public Defense Services, filed the brief for appellant.
Ellen F. Rosenblum, Attorney General, Benjamin Gutman,
Solicitor General, and Erica L. Herb, Assistant Attorney
General, filed the brief for respondent.
Before Shorr, Presiding Judge, Powers, Judge, and
Pagán, Judge.
PAGÁN, J.
Affirmed.
Nonprecedential Memo Op: 347 Or App 880 (2026) 881

PAGÁN, J.
Defendant appeals his judgment of conviction of two
counts of first-degree sexual abuse, ORS 163.427. Defendant
argues that several statements in the state’s closing argu-
ments constituted improper referral to facts not in evi-
dence and improper vouching for the witness’s credibility.
Defendant did not object to those statements during trial
and asks us to conclude that the statements were plain error
and to exercise our discretion to reverse defendant’s convic-
tions. We affirm.
BACKGROUND
Because defendant was convicted, the facts are
presented in the light most favorable to the state. State v.
Johnson, 342 Or 596, 598, 157 P3d 198 (2007), cert den, 552
US 1113 (2008).
In early 2019, defendant’s daughter, S, lived with
defendant when she was 11. The Oregon Department of
Human Services (ODHS) first became involved with the
family in March of 2019 when it received a report through
its child abuse hotline. ODHS arranged for S to have a
forensic interview at the Children’s Center, during which
she reported witnessing domestic violence and experiencing
physical abuse, but did not report any sexual abuse. S was
moved into a foster home.
When asked who she first told about the sexual
abuse, S stated that she first told a few friends her same age
and then later told a few adults, including her foster mother.
In her second interview at the Children’s Center on March
17, 2020, S reported that defendant had sexually abused
her.
At trial, S testified to her “unstable” upbringing,
recounting the many people she had lived with and the
many places where she had lived. She stated that moving so
often had been hard. When asked to explain why she did not
report sexual abuse at the first interview, S stated that she
was “too scared that no one was going to believe [her].”
During closing statements, the state argued that
the jury should not infer a lack of credibility from S not
882 State v. Long

reporting the sexual abuse during the first forensic inter-
view. The state emphasized S’s unstable and difficult life,
arguing that the lack of trustworthy adults explained why S
did not disclose earlier. The state further argued for the jury
to credit S’s testimony, stating that “[S] was honest when
she said she didn’t remember something. * * * I would sub-
mit to you that the nature and quality of her testimony is
trustworthy, and you should trust it.”
The jury found defendant guilty of two counts of
first-degree sexual abuse, and the trial court entered a
judgment of conviction. Defendant timely appealed.
ANALYSIS
Defendant contends that the prosecutor’s state-
ments during closing argument were plain error because (1)
they improperly referred to facts not in evidence and (2) they
constituted impermissible vouching. We find neither argu-
ment persuasive.
As a preliminary matter, defendant concedes that
he did not object to the claimed improper statements at trial;
and, thus, the claimed errors were not preserved. Defendant
therefore asserts that the statements were plain error. To
show plain error, the burden is on defendant to “prove that
the claimed error is one of law, is obvious and not reasonably
in dispute, and appears on the record.” State v. Perez, 373 Or
591, 604, 568 P3d 940 (2025).
Here, we determine that defendant has not estab-
lished that it was plain error for the trial court to allow the
prosecutor’s statements because it is not “obvious and not
reasonably in dispute” that those statements referred to
facts not in evidence or were improper vouching.
First, defendant’s argument that the prosecutor’s
assertion that S did not have adults she could trust and
had a “pretty bad life” were overgeneralizations and refer-
ences to facts not in evidence is unpersuasive because those
claims were reasonable inferences that could be drawn from
S’s testimony. S testified that it was hard moving so often
and that her seeming to be “passed around” between rela-
tives made her feel “unstable.” She further stated that she
Nonprecedential Memo Op: 347 Or App 880 (2026) 883

did not report the sexual abuse at first because she was “too
afraid no one would believe [her].” Those statements provide
an evidentiary basis for the prosecutor’s closing argument,
and thus it is not “obvious” from this record that the prose-
cutor’s statements were improper.
Second, defendant’s claim that the prosecutor’s
statements improperly vouched for the credibility of the
witness does not persuade us because the claimed vouching
comments were arguments intended to persuade the jury
that the evidence supported S’s credibility. See State v. Slay,
331 Or App 398, 403-04, 545 P3d 768, rev den, 372 Or 560
(2024) (acknowledging that “[a]ttorneys play an important
role in synthesizing evidence and advocating for their client
based on that evidence” and “[a]dvocacy * * * would be nearly
impossible if attorneys were not able to comment on a wit-
ness’s credibility, provided that their argument is grounded
in the evidence in the record”). In the prosecutor’s closing
statement, the arguments about the trustworthiness of the
witness were based on S’s statements and demeanor during
her testimony and predominately accompanied by language
such as “I submit to you” and “I would ask you,” which
emphasized that the prosecutor was trying to persuade
the jury to view the evidence in a favorable way and was
thus entirely proper. Moreover, in the leadup to the claimed
vouching statements, the prosecutor reminded the jury that
it was the sole arbiter of credibility. Thus, when the claimed
vouching statements are viewed in context, whether the
prosecutor’s statements were error could be reasonably
disputed, and thus we conclude those statements were not
plainly erroneous.
Defendant argues that his case is like State v.
Montgomery, 327 Or App 655, 662, 536 P3d 627 (2023),
rev den, 371 Or 825 (2024), in which we determined that
the prosecutor’s vouching comments warranted exercising
our discretion to correct the plain error. This comparison is
inapposite because in that case, the prosecutor repeatedly
referred to the defendant as a liar and to his testimony as
lies instead of pointing the jury to evidence in the record
that cast doubt on defendant’s testimony or lent credibility
to the state’s witnesses. Id. at 658-60. We articulated that
884 State v. Long

the problem was that the prosecutor’s argument was “in the
nature of ‘take my word for it,’ not ‘let me show you.’ ” Id. at
660-61 (internal citations removed). Here, in contrast, the
prosecutor’s statements were not so obviously detached from
the evidence that they constituted plain error.
Affirmed.