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March 19, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

Peo v. Mills

Colorado Court of Appeals

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: 23CA0855

• Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

• Opinion

• Authorities (20)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (34.7K)

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Combined Opinion

23CA0855 Peo v Mills 03-19-2026

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 23CA0855
Adams County District Court No. 22CR766
Honorable Donald S. Quick, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

Christopher Richard Mills,

Defendant-Appellant.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED

Division I
Opinion by JUDGE LUM
J. Jones and Meirink, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced March 19, 2026

Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Caitlin E. Grant, Assistant Attorney
General, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Megan A. Ring, Colorado State Public Defender, Mackenzie R. Shields, Deputy
State Public Defender, Denver, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellant
¶1 Defendant, Christopher Richard Mills, appeals the judgment of

conviction entered after a jury found him guilty of two counts of

sexual assault on a child by one in a position of trust as a pattern

of abuse. We affirm.

I. Background

¶2 Mills’s stepdaughter, C.V., alleged that Mills had sexually

assaulted her on two occasions in the family home. On one

occasion, Mills put his hands up her shirt and down her pants

when they were sitting together in the kitchen. On the other

occasion, Mills took C.V. to his bedroom, where he licked her vagina

and touched her buttocks. A year after the incidents, C.V.

disclosed the abuse to her mother and said that Mills had begun

making hand gestures indicating that he wanted to sexually assault

her again.

¶3 Mills was charged with sexual assault on a child by one in a

position of trust as a pattern of abuse and two aggravated sex

offense sentence enhancers. A jury convicted him as charged, and

the trial court sentenced him to twenty-five years to life in the

custody of the Department of Corrections.

1
II. Child Hearsay Statements

¶4 Mills first contends that the trial court erred by denying his

request to call C.V. as a witness in a pretrial hearing regarding the

admissibility of her forensic interview.1 He also argues that even if

the court properly excluded C.V.’s testimony, its reliability findings

were erroneous. We disagree.

A. Additional Background

¶5 Before trial, the prosecution filed notice of its intent to

introduce child hearsay statements — C.V.’s forensic interview — at

trial under section 13-25-129, C.R.S. 2025. During a pretrial

conference, the prosecutor asked the court to make findings as to

the reliability of C.V.’s interview statements based on the video of

the interview. Defense counsel objected and requested that the

court hold a separate hearing to question C.V. about certain

reliability factors. The court concluded that the video reflected

1 During the pretrial hearing, defense counsel requested a separate

hearing with testimony from C.V. and “with the forensic interviewer
potentially.” To the extent that Mills raises an argument
challenging the exclusion of the forensic interviewer on appeal, this
argument isn’t developed, and we decline to address it. See People
v. Liggett, 2021 COA 51, ¶ 53 (noting that appellate courts don’t
address undeveloped arguments), aff’d, 2023 CO 22.

2
“sufficient indicia” of reliability (for example, C.V.’s age-appropriate

language, the interviewer’s open-ended questions, and the lack of

apparent bias in the interview) to allow the hearsay to be introduced

at the trial, particularly because C.V. would be testifying subject to

cross-examination. Accordingly, the court denied defense counsel’s

request to question C.V.

¶6 At trial, the forensic interview was played for the jury with

certain redactions requested by defense counsel.

B. Applicable Law and Standard of Review

¶7 Hearsay statements are out-of-court statements offered to

prove the truth of the matter asserted. CRE 801(c); People v.

Phillips, 2012 COA 176, ¶ 61. Hearsay is inadmissible in a criminal

prosecution unless an exception applies. CRE 802. One such

exception is the one created by the child hearsay statute, which

provides that out-of-court statements made by a child that describe

unlawful sexual conduct are admissible if the court finds that the

“time, content, and circumstances of the statement[s] provide

sufficient safeguards of reliability.” § 13-25-129(5)(a).

¶8 The Colorado Supreme Court has articulated eight factors (the

reliability factors) that may guide a trial court’s analysis in

3
evaluating the reliability of a child’s hearsay statement: (1) whether

the statement was made spontaneously; (2) whether the statement

was made while the child was still upset or in pain from the alleged

abuse; (3) whether the language of the statement was likely to have

been used by a child the age of the declarant; (4) whether the

allegation was made in response to a leading question; (5) whether

either the child or the hearsay witness had any bias against the

defendant or any motive to lie; (6) whether any other event occurred

between the time of the abuse and the time of the statement that

could account for the contents of the statement; (7) whether more

than one person heard the statement; and (8) the general character

of the child. People v. Dist. Ct., 776 P.2d 1083, 1089-90 (Colo.

1989).

¶9 The reliability factors serve as a guide for the trial court’s

analysis, “but they are not mandatory,” and a “[f]ailure to establish

all factors favoring admission does not foreclose the admissibility of

a statement.” People v. Rojas, 181 P.3d 1216, 1219 (Colo. App.

2008). While the trial court should make specific findings on

factors that establish “sufficient guarantees of reliability,” its

decision to admit the statement will be affirmed absent such

4
findings if the record demonstrates an adequate factual basis to

support the trial court’s determination. People v. Bowers, 801 P.2d

511, 521-22 (Colo. 1990).

¶ 10 While a defendant may subpoena a child victim to testify at a

pretrial reliability hearing, “there is no requirement that the court

must take such testimony,” and the defendant must show that the

child’s testimony would be both “relevant and necessary.” People v.

Thompson, 2017 COA 56, ¶ 142 (quoting People v. Snyder, 849 P.2d

837, 838 (Colo. App. 1992)).

¶ 11 We review a trial court’s decision to admit a child’s hearsay

statement for an abuse of discretion. Rojas, 181 P.3d at 1219. A

trial court abuses its discretion when its decision is manifestly

arbitrary, unreasonable, or unfair, or is based on a

misunderstanding or misapplication of the law. Thompson, ¶ 91.

C. Exclusion of C.V.’s Testimony at the Pretrial Hearing

¶ 12 We reject Mills’s argument that C.V.’s testimony was

necessary to establish the reliability of her statements. See id. at

¶ 142 (a defendant may subpoena a child victim to testify at a

pretrial hearing upon a showing that the child’s testimony is both

5
“relevant and necessary” for the court’s reliability determination

(citation omitted)).

¶ 13 The trial court said that it had “watched the entirety of” the

recorded forensic interview and was able to make a reliability

determination based on review of the video alone. The court noted

that it was able to observe the interview environment; the types of

questions the interviewer asked; C.V.’s language, demeanor, and

character; and concerns that C.V. raised during the interview.

While C.V.’s testimony may have been helpful to assist the court in

determining certain reliability factors (e.g., whether she was still in

pain from the abuse and whether she had bias against Mills or a

motive to lie at the time of her forensic interview), the factors aren’t

mandatory. See Rojas, 181 P.3d at 1219. Rather, they are merely a

guide, and a “[f]ailure to establish all factors favoring admission

does not foreclose the admissibility of a statement.” Id. We also

note that C.V. alleged that the abuse first happened in 2019, her

interview took place in 2021, and the pretrial hearing occurred in

1. Thus, her testimony about statements she had made more

than a year before the pretrial hearing “would not add anything

meaningful to the court’s analysis because it had ample evidence

6
from the time when [C.V.] had made those statements.” Thompson,

¶ 144.

¶ 14 We also reject Mills’s contention that the trial court’s ruling

declining his request to question C.V. at the pretrial hearing denied

him the “ability to participate in the hearing,” thereby violating his

right to due process. See People v. Oglethorpe, 87 P.3d 129, 133

(Colo. App. 2003) (“Procedural due process involves the manner in

which state action occurs and requires notice and a fair opportunity

to be heard.”).

¶ 15 Mills’s reliance on People v. Brown, 749 P.2d 436 (Colo. App.

1987), to support his due process argument is misplaced. In

Brown, a division of this court concluded that a reliability hearing

was inadequate because the defendant had “no reasonable notice

that the hearsay statements . . . would be offered and no knowledge

as to the details of the statements.” Id. at 438. In contrast, the

prosecution in this case gave Mills notice of the statements, and he

meaningfully participated in the hearing through his counsel —

including making the argument that he should be permitted to

subpoena C.V. to testify. And as noted above, a court isn’t required

7
to allow a defendant to question a child victim unless it is necessary

for a reliability determination. See Thompson, ¶ 142.

D. Reliability Findings

¶ 16 Mills next argues that even if the pretrial hearing was

adequate, the trial court’s reliability findings were erroneous. He

contends that (1) the trial court didn’t consider the timing of the

interview, which occurred two years after the abuse; (2) C.V.’s

statements weren’t spontaneous; (3) there was “no evidence that

C.V. was still in pain or upset from the alleged abuse”; and (4) the

court made “no findings” about bias. These factors, he argues,

weigh against reliability. We discern no error.

¶ 17 The trial court made the following findings regarding the

reliability factors:

• C.V. knew that the interview was being video-recorded

(and therefore that multiple people might hear her

statements).

• “[T]he language was consistent with the court’s

experience of a 10-year-old child. There was no language

that seemed inappropriate or abnormal for a

10-year-old.”

8
• C.V. “had eye contact” and was “responsive” and

“diligent.”

• “[T]here were no leading questions in the forensic

interview. They were all open-ended questions.”

• “[T]here was not any bias that the court saw in the

interview. I recognize there might be a larger context for

the jury to determine [sic] with witnesses.”

• C.V. responded honestly when she didn’t know the

answer to a question, expressed concern that the

diagrams on which she marked the locations where Mills

touched her would be disclosed to her mother, and noted

to the interviewer at one point that she had “forgot[ten] to

tell her mom about something that had happened.” She

thus displayed “age-appropriate” and “responsive”

“concern as to either embarrassment or getting in

trouble.”

¶ 18 Mills doesn’t argue that any of the court’s findings are

unsupported by the record; he just contends that other factors

weighed against reliability. However, as discussed above, “the fact

that not all the relevant factors support admissibility does not

9
require exclusion of the statements.” Rojas, 181 P.3d at 1220.

Given the court’s thorough findings about “which factors establish

‘sufficient safeguards of reliability,’” we conclude that it didn’t abuse

its discretion by admitting C.V.’s interview. Id. at 1219 (citation

omitted); see also People v. Rhea, 2014 COA 60, ¶ 58 (“[U]nder the

abuse of discretion standard, the test is not ‘whether we would have

reached a different result but, rather, whether the trial court’s

decision fell within a range of reasonable options.’” (citation

omitted)).

III. Prosecutorial Misconduct

¶ 19 Mills next contends that his conviction should be reversed

because of prosecutorial misconduct. We discern no reversible

error.

A. Applicable Law and Standard of Review

¶ 20 We evaluate claims of improper argument in the context of the

argument as a whole and in light of evidence before the jury. People

v. Perea, 126 P.3d 241, 247 (Colo. App. 2005). A prosecutor has

wide latitude to make arguments based on facts in evidence and

reasonable inferences drawn from those facts. People v. McBride,

228 P.3d 216, 221 (Colo. App. 2009). However, the prosecutor may

10
not misstate the evidence, mislead the jury, or insert personal

opinion or personal knowledge. Domingo-Gomez v. People, 125 P.3d

1043, 1049-50 (Colo. 2005).

¶ 21 The trial court has discretion in determining whether a

prosecutor’s statements constitute inappropriate prosecutorial

argument, and we won’t disturb the court’s rulings absent a

showing of an abuse of that discretion. People v. Rodriguez, 2021

COA 38M, ¶ 27.

¶ 22 We review preserved challenges to prosecutorial misconduct

for harmless error. Wend v. People, 235 P.3d 1089, 1097 (Colo.

2010). An error is harmless if “there is no reasonable possibility

that it contributed to the defendant’s conviction.” People v. Vergari,

2022 COA 95, ¶ 17 (citation omitted). We review unpreserved

challenges for plain error. People v. James, 117 P.3d 91, 95 (Colo.

App. 2004). For prosecutorial misconduct to constitute plain error,

it “must be flagrant or glaring or tremendously improper, and it

must so undermine the fundamental fairness of the trial as to cast

serious doubt on the reliability of the judgment of conviction.”

People v. Weinreich, 98 P.3d 920, 924 (Colo. App. 2004), aff’d, 119

11
P.3d 1073 (Colo. 2005). Prosecutorial misconduct in closing

argument rarely constitutes plain error. Id.

B. Lowering the Burden of Proof

¶ 23 During closing argument, the prosecutor said,

[C.V.] is not a criminal mastermind. As
defense said, she is not a sociopath. Is it more
likely that [C.V.] concocted a very detailed
story about two incidents of sexual assault
occurring in two different rooms at the house
they used to live in, with different types of
sexual contact, in different arrangements, at a
bench, on a bed? Is it likely she made that up
and has stuck to that story all this time? Or is
it more likely that she is telling us that, she
told the forensic interviewer that, she told you
that because it happened.

¶ 24 Mills’s counsel objected, arguing that the prosecutor’s

comments about which “story” was “more likely” lowered the

prosecution’s burden of proof from “beyond a reasonable doubt” to

“more likely.” The trial court then told the jury, “You all know what

the burden of proof is. You have an instruction on it. I have given

it to you.” Mills repeats his argument on appeal.

¶ 25 While the prosecutor’s comments were perhaps inartful, we

don’t perceive them as commenting on or lowering the burden of

proof. Rather, they immediately followed an extensive discussion

12
about C.V.’s credibility and were a fair response to defense

counsel’s arguments that C.V. fabricated the allegations but

couldn’t “admit that,” so she “ma[d]e herself believe” them.

See People v. Roadcap, 78 P.3d 1108, 1114 (Colo. App. 2003) (“A

prosecutor has wide latitude to respond to a defendant’s ‘opening

salvos’ in closing argument.” (citation omitted)); see also infra Part

III.C.

C. Disbelieving Testimony

¶ 26 Mills next argues that the following statements amount to

prosecutorial misconduct because they improperly told the jurors

they had to believe C.V. was lying in order to acquit Mills:

• “You have been given two theories as to what is going on

here. The defense theory is that she made this all up.

She calculated it. She is manipulative. She involved law

enforcement. She involved the DA’s office. She involved

you.”

• “Do you think that little girl is capable of what the

defense is alleging? There is absolutely no way that she

could have . . . got[ten] so mad, she was so furious that

13
in her head she said I am going home [to tell] my mom

that he sexually assaulted me.”

• “We all have experiences with kids, children. Isn’t the

more reasonable falsity that he hit me, he spanked me

really hard, he pushed me, he took something away from

me. She is a kid.” C.V. could say “a lot of things” if she

“wanted the defendant out of the house. But that he

sexually assaulted me, that makes absolutely no sense.”

• “If [C.V.] went into that forensic interview with the goal of

getting the defendant kicked out of the home, wouldn’t

she make up an outrageous story. Wouldn’t it be the

most aggressive, the most violent, the most atrocious

thing you ever heard if that is her goal.”

¶ 27 Because Mills’s attorney didn’t object to any of these

statements on the grounds on which Mills now appeals, we review

them for plain error. See People v. Ujaama, 2012 COA 36, ¶ 37 (an

14
issue isn’t preserved if the defendant objected on different grounds

than those raised on appeal).2

¶ 28 Mills argues this case is like People v. Cuellar, 2023 COA 20,

and United States v. Cornett, 232 F.3d 570 (7th Cir. 2000), in which

the courts concluded that the prosecutor had misstated the law by

telling the members of the jury that they couldn’t acquit the

defendant unless they believed key people had lied. Cuellar, ¶ 67

(The prosecutor improperly argued that the jury could not acquit

the defendant unless it believed that the child “fabricated this whole

entire thing, that she lied about this whole [thing].”); Cornett, 232

F.3d at 574 (The prosecutor improperly argued that the jury would

have to find witnesses are “lying about the evidence that they

presented” if they “are going to acquit [the defendant].”).

¶ 29 Mills’s reliance on Cuellar and Cornett is misplaced because

those cases are factually dissimilar to this one. Here, the

prosecutor didn’t argue that the jury was required to conclude that

C.V. was lying to acquit Mills; he merely argued that it was unlikely

2 While we note that defense counsel objected after the first

statement, he argued only that the defense’s theory was that the
prosecution hadn’t proved its case. Counsel didn’t object after any
of the other statements.

15
that C.V. had made up the sexual assault allegations. These

statements were a proper response to defense counsel’s closing, in

which counsel argued that C.V.’s allegations weren’t credible and

that she fabricated the abuse to “gain . . . a more peaceful home

life” by ensuring that Mills moved out. See Roadcap, 78 P.3d at

1114; see also People v. Duncan, 2023 COA 122, ¶ 32 (noting that a

prosecutor is allowed to “comment on the lack of evidence

confirming [a] defendant’s theory of the case.” (citation omitted)).

D. Injecting Personal Knowledge and Experience

¶ 30 Lastly, Mills argues that the prosecutor improperly injected his

personal knowledge and experience during closing argument when

he said, “If [C.V.] is a criminal mastermind, I haven’t seen anyone

do that ever. To maintain her story, her emotions, her demeanor,

her experiences for this long to this many strangers, wow. It is

almost too unimaginable.”

¶ 31 We agree that it was improper for the prosecutor to inject his

personal experience that he “ha[d]n’t seen anyone do that ever” and

imply that the prosecution had information that the jury didn’t.

See Domingo-Gomez, 125 P.3d at 1050 (“[P]rosecutorial remarks

that evidence personal opinion, personal knowledge, or inflame the

16
passions of the jury are improper.”); cf. People v. Ray, 2025 CO

42M, ¶ 129 (“Comments calculated to mislead the jury or that

suggest the prosecution has access to evidence the jurors don’t are

improper.”). But we discern no reversible error.

¶ 32 First, this comment was brief and not repeated. See Cuellar,

¶ 51 (concluding that improper statements were harmless due to

the brief nature of the argument and fact that the prosecutor did

not repeat the statements). Second, defense counsel didn’t object,

indicating that counsel didn’t see the argument as “overly

damaging.” People v. Lovato, 2014 COA 113, ¶ 65 (citation omitted).

Thus, this statement doesn’t cast serious doubt on the reliability of

Mills’s conviction. See Rhea, ¶ 71.

IV. Disposition

¶ 33 The judgment of conviction is affirmed.

JUDGE J. JONES and JUDGE MEIRINK concur.

17