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March 25, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

State v. James M. Brown

Court of Appeals of South Carolina

• Citations: None known

• Docket Number: 2021-000469

• Opinion

• Authorities (47)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (45.9K)

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Syllabus

James M. Brown appeals his conviction and sentence for murder. He argues the trial court erred in not suppressing evidence seized pursuant to a search warrant obtained for his cell phone records. He contends the search-warrant affidavit was overbroad and vague. He asserts the affidavit contained one specific allegation and the State stipulated that allegation was false. He also maintains the trial court erred in denying his motion for a directed verdict because no direct or substantial circumstantial evidence that he committed an overt act was presented to support the State's accomplice liability theory. We affirm.

Combined Opinion

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

The State, Respondent,

v.

James Monroe Brown, Appellant.

Appellate Case No. 2021-000469

Appeal From Chesterfield County
Paul M. Burch, Circuit Court Judge

Opinion No. 6143
Heard May 6, 2025 – Filed March 25, 2026

AFFIRMED

Chief Appellate Defender Wanda H. Carter and Former
Chief Appellate Defender Robert Michael Dudek, of
Columbia, for Appellant.

Attorney General Alan McCrory Wilson, Deputy
Attorney General Donald J. Zelenka, Senior Assistant
Deputy Attorney General Melody Jane Brown, and J.
Anthony Mabry, all of Columbia; and Solicitor William
Benjamin Rogers, Jr., of Bennettsville, all for
Respondent.

KONDUROS, J.: James M. Brown appeals his conviction and sentence for
murder. He argues the trial court erred in not suppressing evidence seized pursuant
to a search warrant obtained for his cell phone records. He contends the search-
warrant affidavit was overbroad and vague. He also asserts the affidavit contained
one specific allegation and the State stipulated that allegation was false.
Additionally, he maintains the trial court erred in denying his motion for a directed
verdict because no direct or substantial circumstantial evidence that he committed
an overt act was presented to support the State's accomplice liability theory. We
affirm.

FACTS/PROCEDURAL HISTORY

James Henderson Jr. (Victim) lived in a mobile home park on Hillian-Edwards
Road in Chesterfield County. His girlfriend, Moniquah Ingram (Girlfriend), and
his two children also lived there. Victim had previously lived in the same mobile
home park but in a different mobile home, which was next door to Shameika
Ingram (Neighbor).

On January 21, 2017, Victim received a series of text messages and phone calls
from multiple phone numbers. Some of those messages and calls were from his
cousin, Kasean Smalls, who went by the nickname S.dot. Brenton Davis also sent
Victim text messages appearing to ask him to come to Marlboro County, which
Victim did not do. At 8:24 p.m., Smalls called Brown. Smalls sent a text message
to Victim at 8:27 p.m. that stated, "Call me ASAP." Smalls called Victim one
minute later. Davis called Victim at 8:29 p.m. Smalls called Victim again at 8:33
p.m. At 8:35 p.m., Victim called Smalls. Seconds later, Victim called Davis.
Davis called Victim one minute later. At 8:37 p.m., Smalls sent Victim a text
message containing only a phone number, which belonged to Brown. Victim
called Smalls at 9:12 p.m., and Victim called Davis at 9:21 p.m.

Around 10:30 p.m. on January 21, Neighbor awoke when she heard a car door
close and saw car headlights shining outside of her home. Neighbor thought
relatives of her boyfriend, Thomas Lyle, were returning home and told him to let
them into the home. Neighbor began hearing men outside her home calling for
Victim by his nickname, S.B., and yelling for him to come outside. Lyle told
Neighbor some of the men outside had guns. Lyle went outside to talk to the men,
and Neighbor looked out the window and saw five men, several of whom were
carrying guns, standing in her yard. She saw some of the men load firearms. The
group of men believed Lyle was the person they were looking for but he eventually
convinced him that he was not and showed the group the mobile home where
Victim now lived. Some of the men got back in the car and others walked in front
of the car while it drove to the mobile home where Victim had moved. A second
car pulled around to the back of Victim's home but no one exited that car. The
men in the first car all exited the car. Several but not all the men were carrying
firearms. One man in the group was screaming into his cell phone for Victim to
come outside and "answer to him." Victim, Girlfriend, and his two young children
were at the mobile home when the group arrived. Neighbor could see Victim
standing in his bedroom window.

Victim received several phone calls in rapid succession 1 and after a phone
conversation that lasted a few seconds, he went outside and approached the group
of men. Shortly thereafter, shots were fired. Victim began running away into the
woods and was chased by one person.

Officers responded to Victim's residence due to a report of shots fired. Girlfriend
told authorities that Victim was missing. Officers saw bullet holes and shell
casings in the area and began searching for Victim. Law enforcement "pinged"
Victim's cell phone several times and eventually found his body.

On January 24, 2017, the Chesterfield County Sheriff's Office (the Sheriff's Office)
obtained a search warrant for cell phone records from January 21 to 22, 2017, for a
specific phone number. The application for the warrant sought "[d]irect connect
detail(s), call detail(s), caller identification(s), and cellular site record(s)" for that
specific phone number. Captain Wayne Jordan Jr., who at the time was a
supervisory lieutenant in the detective unit of the Sheriff's Office, swore an
affidavit to obtain the warrant. The affidavit stated, "That on January 21st, 2017[,]
[Victim] was shot and killed at his home in Cheraw, South Carolina and during this
incident he received several phone calls from the target number minutes before his
murder. This is an ongoing Murder investigation." 2 Captain Jordan gave
supplemental testimony to obtain the warrant; he testified he informed the
magistrate that the phone number for which he sought the warrant was "associated
with" sending numerous threats to Victim's phone number and was part of an

1
Davis called Victim at 10:40, 10:42, and 10:43 p.m.
2
The affidavit contained no other information specific to this crime or phone
number. The affidavit contained several statements about the usefulness of cell
phone records in criminal investigations. The affidavit explained "cell phone
records . . . can link an offender to a crime scene or a particular location" and
through the records, law enforcement would be able to determine the physical
location of the individual using the phone number. The affidavit also noted the
phone records, in addition containing the records of calls made, "may provide
evidence of the crimes being investigated or leads into the identities of the
perpetrators" because "[c]ell phones are commonly used for email, text messaging,
video, and photos."
ongoing murder investigation. The records obtained from Verizon as a result of
the search warrant identified Brown as the owner of the cell phone number.

Brown, Jamarcus Sellers, Davis, and others were arrested and charged with
Victim's murder.3 A grand jury indicted Brown for murder.

At the start of Brown's trial, the trial court held a hearing on Brown's motion to
suppress his cell phone records the Sheriff's Office obtained by search warrant.
Brown argued the warrant was vague and overbroad and lacked probable cause.
Captain Jordan provided the only testimony at the suppression hearing. Captain
Jordan testified he had appeared before a magistrate to obtain search warrants for
cell phone records for several phone numbers that were on Victim's phone.
Captain Jordan testified he supplemented his affidavit with testimony in front of
the magistrate. He stated he told the magistrate, "[T]his number was also
associated with . . . [V]ictim's phone as far as numerous threats and it was part of
an ongoing murder investigation." At the suppression hearing, he testified that to
the best of his recollection, Brown's number showed up on Victim's phone. On
cross-examination, Captain Jordan indicated he learned of Brown's phone number
during the investigation through the collection of witnesses' statements. He was
unable to identify which officer had obtained the number or which witness
provided the number. He then stated the number came from Victim's phone.
When asked if he had later learned that Brown's phone number never called
Victim's phone number, Captain Jordan answered that he did not know if that was
true or not. He also did not know whether Brown's phone number had sent a text
message to Victim's phone number. Captain Jordan also could not answer whether
Brown's phone number was saved in Victim's phone, because he said Victim's
phone was never recovered, despite testifying earlier in the hearing that Victim's
phone had been recovered. He subsequently testified he did not know if Victim's
phone was recovered or not. 4

On redirect examination, the State stipulated that "we do not have any phone calls
being made between . . . [V]ictim's phone number and to [Brown]'s phone." The
State asked Captain Jordan to look at a phone extraction report for Victim's phone
number. Captain Jordan testified the report indicated that Victim received and read
a text message on January 21, 2017, at 8:37 p.m. from Smalls that provided
Brown's phone number. On recross-examination, Brown asked Captain Jordan,

3
Davis pled guilty to manslaughter. Sellers died sometime after Victim's murder.
4
During trial, another officer with the Sheriff's Office testified law enforcement
recovered Victim's phone and he analyzed the data on it.
"[W]e know that [Brown's] phone never called [V]ictim's phone; right?" The State
again stipulated, "The defendant's phone never actually called . . . [V]ictim's
phone." Captain Jordan answered, "Not without me going through all this, I mean,
I don't know." Brown asked, "[W]e can stipulate that defendant's phone never
text[ed] . . . [V]ictim's phone?" and Captain Jordan answered, "I guess so, yes."
Brown then asked, "So what we have is someone else texting . . . [Brown's] phone
number to . . . [V]ictim; correct?" Captain Jordan responded, "That's part of it, yes.
Like I said, during the investigation, we had folks giving us information, giving us
names." Brown next asked, "And that was not -- but that information was not on
the search warrant; correct?" and Captain Jordan replied, "No, sir." On redirect
after recross-examination, Captain Jordan testified the cell phone location data
received from Brown's and Davis's phone records showed both their phones in the
vicinity of Hillian-Edwards Road during the requested time period.

At the close of the suppression hearing, the trial court found the evidence was
admissible, stating, "I don't see any problem with the warrant."

At trial, Neighbor identified Brown as one of the men outside her home who had
later approached Victim's home. She testified Brown had been six feet from her
window.5 She indicated that some of the men had guns, which she saw them
loading, but she did not see Brown with a gun at any point. Neighbor also
identified Davis and Sellers as being two of the men she saw in her yard. Neighbor
testified she saw Brown and some of the other men get back in the car and drive to
Victim's new home. She explained that the other men walked in front of the car
during the short drive. She stated that the men in the car, including Brown, all
exited the car at Victim's new home. Neighbor testified that as the group stood in
Victim's yard, she began hearing and seeing gunfire and saw Victim running while
being chased. Neighbor confirmed that Brown was "an active participant" in what
was happening even though she did not see him with a gun.

Girlfriend testified that on the night Victim was shot, "[h]e was concerned,
worried[,] and in disbelief." She provided that Victim told her "they want to put
me in the box." Girlfriend testified she thought Victim meant he would be in the
middle of a group and have to fight multiple men at one time. She testified that
shortly before exiting the home, Victim hugged his children and told them he loved
them. Once Victim went outside, Girlfriend saw him talking to one man with a

5
Brown challenged Neighbor's identification of him. Following a hearing
pursuant to Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188 (1972), the trial court allowed the
identification.
vehicle's headlights shining on them, while several other men stood around. She
identified the man Victim spoke to as "Bliz" 6 but could not identify any of the
other men. Girlfriend testified she stopped looking outside because she went to
check on the children and then heard gunshots and ducked. She then went outside
to look for Victim, and two men asked her where Victim was. She went back
inside, and law enforcement arrived shortly thereafter. She testified she could not
see or hear what took place just before the gunshots began.

Dr. Janet Ross, a pathologist, testified Victim was shot four times, all on the back
side of his body, with one of those shots being fatal. Suzanne Cromer with the
South Carolina State Law Enforcement Division (SLED) testified that based on the
ammunition collected from the crime scene and Victim's body, three to four
different weapons had been fired at the scene.

First Sergeant Graig Burns with the Sheriff's Office testified he responded to the
crime scene and helped in the search for Victim. He provided that while he was
searching the woods for Victim, he overheard men talking. He explained that
because of what he overheard, he searched for information about three people's
names, which led him to Marlboro County. He indicated the people he
investigated as a result were Brown, Sellers, and Davis. He testified that law
enforcement located Brown's car in Davis's back yard. First Sergeant Burns
testified that when he interviewed Brown, Brown denied being in Chesterfield
County on the evening of the murder.

First Sergeant Burns testified he performed an extraction on Victim's cell phone,
which is a process that downloads photos, phone numbers, phone call logs, and
text messages. He stated he reviewed the cell phone records of Davis, Brown, and
Victim to see the communication between them. He testified Brown claimed to
have lost his phone on the day of Victim's murder but law enforcement determined
that was untrue.

First Sergeant Burns testified Davis sent a text message to Victim on January 21,
the day of the murder, at 5:34 p.m. that stated, "Yo, you couldn't make it?" At 8:02
p.m. Davis texted Victim, "Yo, bro, you need to get here." At 8:24 p.m. Smalls—
Victim's cousin—called Brown. At 8:27 p.m., Smalls texted Victim, "Call me
ASAP." At 8:37 p.m., Smalls texted Victim just a phone number, which First
Sergeant Burns provided belonged to Brown. First Sergeant Burns testified the

6
Later testimony from an officer with the Sheriff's Office indicated Davis used the
nickname Bliz.
cell phone records demonstrated Davis and Brown called each other multiple times
in the early morning hours on the day of the murder, January 21. The records
showed Brown calling Sellers at 10:34, 10:45, 10:50, 11:23, and 11:29 p.m. on
January 21. When asked if the break in the phone calls between 10:50 and 11:23
p.m. corresponded to the time of Victim's murder, First Sergeant Burns responded
yes, "[i]t was a window we were notified of a shooting in progress." Records also
showed Davis calling Sellers at 10:48 p.m. on January 21 and 12:25 a.m. on
January 22. On cross-examination, First Sergeant Burns confirmed he heard
during an interview that Davis and Brown were good friends. He also agreed
Brown and Victim never called one another or sent text messages to each other.

SLED Lieutenant Christopher Johnson testified he analyzed Davis's and Brown's
cell phone location information obtained from their cell phone records using cell
phone towers to establish mapping records. He testified Brown's cell phone record
showed the phone was in Marlboro County at 7:01, 7:57, and 7:59 p.m. on January
21. It also showed Brown's phone at a different location in Marlboro County at
8:24 and 9:46 p.m. Lieutenant Johnson believed Brown's phone changed which
towers it was utilizing because the phone was traveling. Lieutenant Johnson
provided the phone "was moving around in [Marlboro County] a good bit" based
on the phone's use of several towers. Lieutenant Johnson further testified the
record showed Brown's phone in Chesterfield County, moving closer to Hillian-
Edwards Road, at 10:34 p.m. on January 21. Lieutenant Johnson indicated the
record placed the phone in Chesterfield County at 10:50 p.m. He testified Brown's
cell phone location information put his phone "in the vicinity that would be
consistent with Hillian-Edwards Road." Lieutenant Johnson stated Brown's phone
record showed locations in Marlboro County again at 11:17 and 11:23 p.m., on
January 21 and 1:22 a.m. on January 22.

After the State rested its case, Brown moved for a directed verdict. Brown argued
no evidence had been presented he committed an overt act or acted in furtherance
of any common scheme or plan, as was required for culpability under the theory
that a hand of one is the hand of all. The trial court denied the motion. The court
found the evidence presented of Brown continuing from the mistaken location to
Victim's actual home, the testimony about "the box," and the cell phone evidence
demonstrating Brown traveled across the county line provided sufficient evidence
to deny the directed verdict motion. Brown renewed his motion after waiving his
right to testify, and the trial court again denied it. Following deliberations, the jury
convicted Brown of murder. The trial court sentenced him to thirty-five years'
imprisonment. This appeal followed.
STANDARD OF REVIEW

"In criminal cases, the appellate court sits to review errors of law only." State v.
Baccus, 367 S.C. 41, 48, 625 S.E.2d 216, 220 (2006). Thus, an appellate "[c]ourt
is bound by the trial court's factual findings unless they are clearly erroneous." Id.

LAW/ANALYSIS

I. Search Warrant

Brown argues the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress his cell phone
records seized pursuant to a search warrant because the State failed to produce the
probable cause necessary for a search warrant. He contends the search-warrant
affidavit was vague and overbroad and the State stipulated that the one specific
allegation in the affidavit—that Brown's phone called Victim's phone before the
murder—was false. We disagree.

"The admission of evidence is within the discretion of the trial court and will not
be reversed absent an abuse of discretion." State v. Pagan, 369 S.C. 201, 208, 631
S.E.2d 262, 265 (2006). "An abuse of discretion occurs when the conclusions of
the trial court either lack evidentiary support or are controlled by an error of law."
Id.; see also State v. Wise, 359 S.C. 14, 21, 596 S.E.2d 475, 478 (2004) ("The
admission or exclusion of evidence . . . will not be disturbed in the absence of a
manifest abuse of discretion accompanied by probable prejudice.").

"[A]ppellate review of a motion to suppress based on the Fourth Amendment
involves a two-step analysis." State v. Frasier, 437 S.C. 625, 633, 879 S.E.2d 762,
766 (2022). "This dual inquiry means we review the trial court's factual findings
for any evidentiary support, but the ultimate legal conclusion . . . is a question of
law subject to de novo review." Id. at 633-34, 879 S.E.2d at 766.

"The Fourth Amendment guarantees a person the right to be secure from
unreasonable searches and seizures." State v. Vickery, 399 S.C. 507, 514-15, 732
S.E.2d 218, 221 (Ct. App. 2012) (citing U.S. Const. amend. IV). "Evidence seized
in violation of the Fourth Amendment must be excluded from trial." State v.
Weaver, 374 S.C. 313, 319, 649 S.E.2d 479, 482 (2007). "A search or seizure is
reasonable under the Fourth Amendment when it is authorized by a warrant that is
supported by probable cause." State v. Crummey, 443 S.C. 94, 107, 902 S.E.2d
391, 398 (Ct. App. 2024) (quoting State v. Dill, 423 S.C. 534, 542, 816 S.E.2d 557,
562 (2018)).
"In South Carolina, the statutory warrant requirement is separate and distinct from
the prohibition in the federal and state constitutions against unreasonable searches
and seizures." State v. Covert, 368 S.C. 188, 195, 628 S.E.2d 482, 486 (Ct. App.
2006) (citing S.C. Code Ann. § 17-13-140 (2014); U.S. Const. amend. IV; S.C.
Const. art. I, § 10), aff'd as modified, 382 S.C. 205, 675 S.E.2d 740 (2009). "The
Constitutions of the United States and the State of South Carolina require that
search warrants be 'supported by oath or affirmation.'" State v. McKnight, 291 S.C.
110, 112, 352 S.E.2d 471, 472 (1987) (quoting U.S. Const. amend. IV; S.C. Const.
art. I, § 10). "This is a minimum standard, and state legislatures are free to enact
stricter requirements for the issuance of search warrants." Id. at 113, 352 S.E.2d at
472. Section "17-13-140 imposes stricter requirements than does the Fourth
Amendment." State v. Herring, 387 S.C. 201, 214, 692 S.E.2d 490, 497 (2009).
"A search warrant that would survive constitutional scrutiny may still be defective
under [section 17-13-140 of the South Carolina Code]." McKnight, 291 S.C. at
113, 352 S.E.2d at 472.

Section 17-13-140, often referred to as the search warrant statute, allows search
warrants to "be issued 'only upon affidavit sworn to before the magistrate . . .
establishing the grounds for the warrant.'" State v. Bellamy, 336 S.C. 140, 143,
519 S.E.2d 347, 348 (1999) (omission in original) (quoting § 17-13-140). That
section provides in pertinent part:

Any magistrate . . . may issue a search warrant to search
for and seize . . . (3) property which . . . has been used in
the commission of a criminal offense or . . . is concealed
to prevent a criminal offense from being discovered; (4)
property constituting evidence of crime or tending to
show that a particular person committed a criminal
offense; . . . .

....

A warrant issued hereunder shall be issued only upon
affidavit sworn to before the magistrate . . . establishing
the grounds for the warrant. If the magistrate . . .
abovementioned is satisfied that the grounds for the
application exist or that there is probable cause to believe
that they exist, he shall issue a warrant . . . .
S.C. Code Ann. § 17-13-140.

"A magistrate may issue a search warrant only upon a finding of probable cause."
Dupree, 354 S.C. at 684, 583 S.E.2d at 441. A search-warrant "affidavit must
contain sufficient underlying facts and information upon which the magistrate may
make a determination of probable cause." State v. Gore, 408 S.C. 237, 247, 758
S.E.2d 717, 722 (Ct. App. 2014) (quoting State v. Philpot, 317 S.C. 458, 461, 454
S.E.2d 905, 907 (Ct. App. 1995)). "The magistrate should determine probable
cause based on all of the information available to the magistrate at the time the
warrant was issued." Dupree, 354 S.C. at 684, 583 S.E.2d at 441. "A warrant is
supported by probable cause if, given the totality of the circumstances set forth in
the affidavit, there is a fair probability that . . . evidence of a crime will be found in
a particular place." Crummey, 443 S.C. at 107, 902 S.E.2d at 398 (quoting State v.
Kinloch, 410 S.C. 612, 617, 767 S.E.2d 153, 155 (2014)). "'The term "probable
cause" does not import absolute certainty. Rather, in determining whether a search
warrant should be issued, magistrates are concerned with probabilities and not
certainties.'" Id. (quoting Dupree, 354 S.C. at 683, 583 S.E.2d at 441).

"The veracity and the basis of knowledge of persons supplying the information in a
search-warrant affidavit are considerations in the determination of whether there is
probable cause to issue a search warrant." State v. Robinson, 415 S.C. 600, 605,
785 S.E.2d 355, 357 (2016). "Sworn oral testimony is permissible to supplement
search[-]warrant affidavits [that] are facially insufficient to establish probable
cause." Crummey, 443 S.C. at 107, 902 S.E.2d at 398 (quoting Dill, 423 S.C. at
542, 816 S.E.2d at 562); see also Herring, 387 S.C. at 214, 692 S.E.2d at 497 ("[A]
'search[-]warrant affidavit which itself is insufficient to establish probable cause
may be supplemented before the magistrate by sworn oral testimony.'" (quoting
McKnight, 291 S.C. at 113, 352 S.E.2d at 472)).

"An appellate court reviewing the decision to issue a search warrant should decide
whether the magistrate had a substantial basis for concluding probable cause
existed." Dupree, 354 S.C. at 683, 583 S.E.2d at 441. "This review, like the
determination by the magistrate, is governed by the 'totality of the circumstances'
test." Id. (quoting State v. Jones, 342 S.C. 121, 126, 536 S.E.2d 675, 678 (2000)).
"In determining the validity of the warrant, a reviewing court may consider only
information brought to the magistrate's attention." Id. at 684, 583 S.E.2d at 441.
"An appellate court gives great deference to the issuing judge's probable cause
determination." Robinson, 415 S.C. at 605, 785 S.E.2d at 357. "Searches based on
warrants will be given judicial deference to the extent that an otherwise marginal
search may be justified if it meets a realistic standard of probable cause." Dupree,
354 S.C. at 683-84, 583 S.E.2d at 441. "We are mindful on review that affidavits
are not meticulously drawn by lawyers, but are normally drafted by non-lawyers in
the haste of a criminal investigation, and should therefore be viewed in 'a common
sense and realistic fashion.'" Gore, 408 S.C. at 247, 758 S.E.2d at 722 (quoting
State v. Sullivan, 267 S.C. 610, 617, 230 S.E.2d 621, 624 (1976)). "Our task is to
decide whether the magistrate had a substantial basis for concluding probable
cause existed." Id.

In State v. Baccus, our supreme court determined a magistrate improperly issued a
search warrant when the search-warrant affidavit was defective. 367 S.C. 41, 52,
625 S.E.2d 216, 222 (2006). The court explained the affidavit failed "to set forth
any facts as to why police believed [the defendant] committed the crime. The
language in the affidavit lack[ed] specifi[ci]ty and contain[ed] conclusory
statements." Id. The court concluded that under the totality of the circumstances,
"the issuing magistrate did not have a substantial basis to find probable cause." Id.
The supreme court held a search-warrant "affidavit must set forth particular facts
and circumstances underlying the existence of probable cause to allow the
magistrate to make an independent evaluation of the matter." Id. at 50-51, 625
S.E.2d at 221. Similarly, in State v. Smith, our supreme court determined an
affidavit was defective because it "set[ ] forth no facts as to why police believed"
the defendant had committed the robbery. 301 S.C. 371, 373, 392 S.E.2d 182, 183
(1990). The court provided, "Mere conclusory statements [that] give the
magistrate no basis to make a judgment regarding probable cause are insufficient."
Id.; see also State v. Weston, 329 S.C. 287, 291-92, 494 S.E.2d 801, 803 (1997)
(holding a search-warrant affidavit could not have provided a substantial basis for
finding probable cause to search the defendant's car when "the affidavit failed to
set forth any facts as to why police believed" the defendant committed the crime
and a large part of the affidavit consisted of conclusory statements).

"Under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, a
defendant has the right to challenge false statements in a search-warrant affidavit."
Robinson, 415 S.C. at 606, 785 S.E.2d at 358. "In order to obtain relief, the
defendant must prove the affiant knowingly and intentionally, or with reckless
disregard for the truth, included false statements in the search-warrant affidavit.
The burden is on the defendant to establish the falsity by a preponderance of the
evidence." Id.
"In Franks v. Delaware,[7] the United States Supreme Court held that the Fourth
and Fourteenth Amendments gave a defendant the right in certain circumstances to
challenge the veracity of a warrant affidavit after the warrant had been issued and
executed." State v. Brown, 437 S.C. 550, 570, 878 S.E.2d 364, 375 (Ct. App.
2022) (quoting State v. Missouri, 337 S.C. 548, 553, 524 S.E.2d 394, 396 (1999)).
"This challenge may be based on false information being included in the
search[-]warrant affidavit . . . ." Gore, 408 S.C. at 244, 758 S.E.2d at 720.

[W]he[n] the defendant makes a substantial preliminary
showing that a false statement knowingly and
intentionally, or with reckless disregard for the truth, was
included by the affiant in the warrant affidavit, and if the
allegedly false statement is necessary to the finding of
probable cause, the Fourth Amendment, as incorporated
in the Fourteenth Amendment, requires that a hearing be
held at the defendant's request.

Brown, 437 S.C. at 570-71, 878 S.E.2d at 375 (first alteration in original) (quoting
Franks, 438 U.S. at 154).

"Franks outlined a two-prong test for challenging the veracity of a search[-]warrant
affidavit." Gore, 408 S.C. at 244, 758 S.E.2d at 721 (citing Franks, 438 U.S. at
155-56). "First, to mandate an evidentiary hearing, there must be 'allegations of
deliberate falsehood or of reckless disregard for the truth [as to statements included
in the warrant affidavit], and those allegations must be accompanied by an offer of
proof.'" Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Franks, 438 U.S. at 171). "At the
hearing, the accused has the burden of proving the allegations of perjury or
reckless disregard for the truth by a preponderance of the evidence." Id.

"Second, if a deliberate falsehood or a reckless disregard for the truth has been
established, the court must exclude the false material and consider the remainder of
the affidavit to determine if it is sufficient to establish probable cause." Id. at 245,
758 S.E.2d at 721. "If the court determines no probable cause exists after the false
material is omitted from the analysis, 'the search warrant must be voided and the
fruits of the search excluded to the same extent as if probable cause was lacking on
the face of the affidavit.'" Id. (quoting State v. Davis, 354 S.C. 348, 360, 580
S.E.2d 778, 784 (Ct. App. 2003)).

7
Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978).
The Franks Court provided, "To mandate an evidentiary hearing, the challenger['s]
attack must be more than conclusory and must be supported by more than a mere
desire to cross-examine. There must be allegations of deliberate falsehood or of
reckless disregard for the truth, and those allegations must be accompanied by an
offer of proof . . . ." Missouri, 337 S.C. at 554, 524 S.E.2d at 397 (quoting Franks,
438 U.S. at 171). "If these requirements are met, and if, when [the] material that is
[the] subject of the alleged falsity or reckless[] disregard is set to one side, there
remains sufficient content in the warrant affidavit to support a finding of probable
cause, no hearing is required." Id. (quoting Franks, 438 U.S. at 171-72).

In this case, Brown argues the search-warrant affidavit did not establish probable
cause because the one specific allegation in the affidavit—that Brown's phone
called Victim's phone before the murder—was false. The State does not dispute
the search-warrant affidavit included a statement that the State later stipulated was
not true—that Victim had received several phone calls from that phone number
minutes before his murder. The State stipulated during the pretrial hearing that
Brown's phone number never called Victim. However, when an affidavit contains
a statement the defendant alleges should be excluded because it is false, the proper
avenue to make that challenge is through a Franks hearing. See Gore, 408 S.C. at
244, 758 S.E.2d at 721 ("Franks outlined a two-prong test for challenging the
veracity of a search[-]warrant affidavit." (citing Franks, 438 U.S. at 155-56)).
Brown made no showing the false information was provided intentionally or
recklessly. See Robinson, 415 S.C. at 606, 785 S.E.2d at 358 ("In order to obtain
relief, the defendant must prove the affiant knowingly and intentionally, or with
reckless disregard for the truth, included false statements in the search-warrant
affidavit."); Gore, 408 S.C. at 244, 758 S.E.2d at 721 ("[T]here must be
'allegations of deliberate falsehood or of reckless disregard for the truth . . . , and
those allegations must be accompanied by an offer of proof.'" (emphasis added)
(quoting Franks, 438 U.S. at 171)); id. at 245-46, 758 S.E.2d at 721 (agreeing with
a defendant that an affidavit improperly omitted information but noting the
omission did not per se invalidate the search warrant and the defendant had to
make a preliminary showing that the affiant included a deliberate falsehood or
recklessly disregarded the truth to mislead the magistrate). As the defendant,
Brown had the burden of making that showing. See Gore, 408 S.C. at 244, 758
S.E.2d at 721 ("[T]he accused has the burden of proving the allegations of perjury
or reckless disregard for the truth by a preponderance of the evidence."); see also
State v. Porch, 417 S.C. 619, 627, 790 S.E.2d 440, 444 (Ct. App. 2016) ("A party
attempting to demonstrate information was intentionally or recklessly omitted from
an affidavit bears a heavy burden of proof." (quoting State v. Lynch, 412 S.C. 156,
179, 771 S.E.2d 346, 358 (Ct. App. 2015))). Brown did not attempt to make that
showing here; he only demonstrated the statement was false. Accordingly, this
court must review the affidavit with the false statement included when deciding
whether the magistrate had probable cause to issue the warrant.

Additionally, Brown argues the search warrant-affidavit was vague and overbroad.
Captain Jordan provided in the affidavit that Victim received several phone calls
from the phone number minutes before he was shot; the affidavit also provided an
explanation of how cell phone records can link a suspect to a crime scene. As
described above, this court considers the affidavit on its face, including the false
statement, and any supplemental testimony given to the magistrate. See Crummey,
443 S.C. at 107, 902 S.E.2d at 398 ("Sworn oral testimony is permissible to
supplement search[-]warrant affidavits [that] are facially insufficient to establish
probable cause." (quoting Dill, 423 S.C. at 542, 816 S.E.2d at 562)). Captain
Jordan supplemented the affidavit with testimony in front of the magistrate when
applying for the warrant. The supplemental testimony added that the specific
phone calls mentioned in the affidavit were associated with numerous threats to
Victim. The affidavit and supplemental testimony contain what the crime was,
when the crime occurred, and some information regarding why Captain Jordan
believed that phone number's records would contain evidence about the crime. See
State v. Thompson, 419 S.C. 250, 256-57, 797 S.E.2d 716, 719 (2017) (providing
the magistrate must decide "whether, under the totality of the circumstances set
forth in the affidavit, there is a fair probability that evidence of a crime will be
found in the particular place to be searched"); cf. Weston, 329 S.C. at 291-92, 494
S.E.2d at 803 (concluding a search-warrant affidavit could not have provided a
substantial basis for finding probable cause for a search when "the affidavit failed
to set forth any facts as to why police believed" the defendant committed the
crime); Smith, 301 S.C. at 373, 392 S.E.2d at 183 (determining an affidavit was
defective because it "set[ ] forth no facts as to why police believed" the defendant
had committed the crime). The information combined from the affidavit and the
testimony were sufficient to demonstrate probable cause to the magistrate.
Accordingly, the trial court did not err in denying Brown's motion to suppress the
cell phone records for his phone number.

II. Directed Verdict

Brown contends the trial court erred in denying his motion for a directed verdict
because no direct or substantial circumstantial evidence was presented to establish
Brown committed any overt act under the theory of accomplice liability to aid or
abet another person or persons in killing Victim. We disagree.
"When ruling on a motion for a directed verdict, the trial court is concerned with
the existence or nonexistence of evidence, not its weight." State v. Weston, 367
S.C. 279, 292, 625 S.E.2d 641, 648 (2006). When reviewing a trial court's denial
of a defendant's motion for a directed verdict, an appellate court must view the
evidence in the light most favorable to the State. State v. Venters, 300 S.C. 260,
264, 387 S.E.2d 270, 272 (1990). Additionally, an appellate court must find the
trial court properly submitted a case to the jury if any direct evidence or any
substantial circumstantial evidence reasonably tended to prove the guilt of the
accused. Weston, 367 S.C. at 292-93, 625 S.E.2d at 648. "A case should be
submitted to the jury when the evidence is circumstantial 'if there is any substantial
evidence which reasonably tends to prove the guilt of the accused or from which
his guilt may be fairly and logically deduced.'" State v. Bostick, 392 S.C. 134, 139,
708 S.E.2d 774, 776 (2011) (quoting State v. Mitchell, 341 S.C. 406, 409, 535
S.E.2d 126, 127 (2000)). "[T]he trial court should grant a directed verdict motion
when the evidence presented merely raises a suspicion of guilt." Id. at 142, 708
S.E.2d at 778. "Circumstantial evidence . . . gains its strength from its combination
with other evidence, and all the circumstantial evidence presented in a case must
be considered together to determine whether it is sufficient to submit to the jury."
State v. Rogers, 405 S.C. 554, 567, 748 S.E.2d 265, 272 (Ct. App. 2013). "[W]hen
the State relies exclusively on circumstantial evidence and a motion for a directed
verdict is made, the trial [court] is concerned with the existence or non-existence of
evidence, not with its weight." State v. Pearson, 415 S.C. 463, 469, 783 S.E.2d
802, 805 (2016).

When considering a directed verdict motion, the trial court must view the evidence
in the light most favorable to the State and submit the case to the jury if any
substantial evidence "reasonably tends to prove the guilt of the accused" or if any
substantial evidence exists "from which his guilt may be fairly and logically
deduced." State v. Bennett, 415 S.C. 232, 236-37, 781 S.E.2d 352, 354 (2016)
(quoting State v. Littlejohn, 228 S.C. 324, 329, 89 S.E.2d 924, 926 (1955)). "[T]he
court must concern itself solely with the existence or non-existence of evidence
from which a jury could reasonably infer guilt. This objective test is founded upon
reasonableness." Id. at 237, 781 S.E.2d at 354 (emphasis omitted). "Accordingly,
in ruling on a directed verdict motion whe[n] the State relies on circumstantial
evidence, the court must determine whether the evidence presented is sufficient to
allow a reasonable juror to find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt."
Id.

"Ordinarily, the State convicts a defendant of a crime by proving that he personally
committed the criminal act." State v. Johnson, 444 S.C. 442, 449, 908 S.E.2d 102,
105-06 (2024) (quoting State v. Sellers, 442 S.C. 140, 148, 898 S.E.2d 116, 120
(2024)). "The law of accomplice liability provides, however, that a person may be
guilty of a crime even though he did not personally commit the criminal act." Id.
at 449, 908 S.E.2d at 106. "The doctrine of accomplice liability arises from the
theory that 'the hand of one is the hand of all.'" State v. Reid, 408 S.C. 461, 472,
758 S.E.2d 904, 910 (2014) (quoting 23 S.C. Jur. Homicide § 22.1 (2014)).
"Under this theory, one who joins with another to accomplish an illegal purpose is
liable criminally for everything done by his confederate incidental to the execution
of the common design and purpose." Id. "In a murder case, . . . if two people plan
or agree to commit the murder, and both of them are present at the scene of the
crime, but only one of them actually shoots and kills the victim, both participants
in the plan or agreement are nevertheless guilty of the murder." Johnson, 444 S.C.
at 449, 908 S.E.2d at 106.

"A person must personally commit the crime or be present at the scene of the crime
and intentionally, or through a common design, aid, abet, or assist in the
commission of that crime through some overt act to be guilty under a theory of
accomplice liability." Reid, 408 S.C. at 472-73, 758 S.E.2d at 910. "Mere
presence at the scene is not sufficient to establish guilt as an aider or abettor."
State v. Mattison, 388 S.C. 469, 480, 697 S.E.2d 578, 584 (2010) (quoting State v.
Leonard, 292 S.C. 133, 137, 355 S.E.2d 270, 272 (1987)). "[T]he State must
present evidence the participant knew of the principal's criminal conduct." Reid,
408 S.C. at 473, 758 S.E.2d at 910. "[P]resence at the scene of a crime by
pre-arrangement to aid, encourage, or abet in the perpetration of the crime
constitutes guilt as a principle." Mattison, 388 S.C. at 480, 697 S.E.2d at 584
(quoting State v. Hill, 268 S.C. 390, 395-96, 234 S.E.2d 219, 221 (1977)); see also
id. ("Any person who is present at a homicide, aiding and abetting, is guilty of the
homicide as a principal, even though another does the killing." (quoting State v.
Zeigler, 364 S.C. 94, 103, 610 S.E.2d 859, 864 (Ct. App. 2005))). "If 'a person
was present abetting while any act necessary to constitute the offense [was] being
performed through another, he could be charged as a principal—even though [that
act was] not the whole thing necessary.'" Reid, 408 S.C. at 473, 758 S.E.2d at 910
(alterations in original) (emphases omitted) (quoting Rosemond v. United States,
572 U.S. 65, 72 (2014)).

"Accomplice liability can be proven by circumstantial evidence." State v.
Campbell, 443 S.C. 182, 193, 904 S.E.2d 441, 446 (2024). "In order to establish
the parties agreed to achieve an illegal purpose, thereby establishing presence by
pre-arrangement, the State need not prove a formal expressed agreement, but
rather can prove the same by circumstantial evidence and the conduct of the
parties." Id. at 193, 904 S.E.2d at 447 (quoting State v. Gibson, 390 S.C. 347, 354,
701 S.E.2d 766, 770 (Ct. App. 2010)).

The trial court did not err in denying Brown's motion for a directed verdict. The
evidence when viewed in the light most favorable to the State amounted to
substantial circumstantial evidence that Brown was involved in a common scheme
or plan. Neighbor identified 8 Brown as being present in Victim's yard at the time
of Victim's murder and confirmed he was an "active participant." Brown's cell
phone location data was consistent with being at the crime scene around the time
of the murder. Although no one testified they saw him with a weapon, when he
was in Neighbor's yard, multiple people around him had firearms, which they
loaded while standing in the yard. Brown then got back in the car with some of
those people, rode to Victim's new address, exited the car there, and stayed with
the group. Staying with the group after they loaded their weapons and then
traveling to the correct location amounted to evidence of an overt act by Brown,
showing he was acting in concert with the group. Additionally, he traveled with
the group to the mobile home park from Marlboro County and texted frequently
leading up to the time of Victim's murder with others identified as being involved
in the murder. See Mattison, 388 S.C. at 480, 697 S.E.2d at 584 ("[P]resence at the
scene of a crime by pre-arrangement to aid, encourage, or abet in the perpetration
of the crime constitutes guilt as a principle." (quoting Hill, 268 S.C. at 395-96, 234
S.E.2d at 221)). Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's denial of Brown's motion
for a directed verdict.

8
Although Brown questions the reliability of Neighbor's identification in his
appellant's brief while attacking the sufficiency of the evidence, he does not
challenge the admission of the identification as a separate issue on appeal. Thus,
any argument on the admission of the identification is abandoned. See R & G
Constr., Inc. v. Lowcountry Reg'l Transp. Auth., 343 S.C. 424, 437, 540 S.E.2d
113, 120 (Ct. App. 2000) ("An issue is deemed abandoned if the argument in the
brief is only conclusory."); see also Jones v. Leagan, 384 S.C. 1, 17, 681 S.E.2d 6,
15 (Ct. App. 2009) ("An issue that is not argued in the brief is deemed abandoned
and precludes consideration on appeal."). During Neighbor's testimony in front of
the jury, she identified Brown in the courtroom as being the person she recognized
from outside her home and Victim's home at the time of the murder. Neighbor
explained she initially had been unable to pick Brown out of a photo lineup
because multiple people in the lineup looked similar. On cross-examination, she
stated she had identified Brown prior to the photo lineup when law enforcement
showed her a photo of him taken from social media.
CONCLUSION

Accordingly, the trial court did not err in denying the motion to suppress the
information received as a result of the search warrant for Brown's cell phone
records. Additionally, the trial court did not err in denying Brown's motion for a
directed verdict.9 Therefore, Brown's conviction and sentence is

AFFIRMED.

VINSON, J., concurs.

MCDONALD, J., concurring in result only.

With the greatest respect to my colleagues, I must write separately because the
warrant affidavit in this case was vague, overbroad, and lacking in the specifics
necessary to allow the issuing magistrate to make a proper determination of
probable cause. As the majority opinion recognizes, this affidavit contained one
specific allegation, and the State stipulated during the pretrial hearing that this
allegation was false. Captain Jordan's testimony in no way alleviated these
concerns—rather, his testimony revealed he lacked the knowledge necessary to
have adequately supplemented the defective affidavit with the "sworn oral
testimony" contemplated by our jurisprudence. See, e.g., State v. Warner, 436 S.C.
395, 404–05, 872 S.E.2d 638, 642–43 (2022) (finding affidavit attached with
warrant request "provided the magistrate no facts or circumstances whatsoever" to
support a finding of probable cause and remanding for determination of whether
magistrate properly required requesting detective to supplement with sworn
testimony).

9
The State makes arguments for affirming Brown's issues on appeal that are
essentially additional sustaining grounds the State did not raise at trial. Because
we affirm both of Brown's issues based on the merits, we decline to reach any of
these arguments by the State. See Walterboro Cmty. Hosp. v. Meacher, 392 S.C.
479, 493, 709 S.E.2d 71, 78 (Ct. App. 2011) (declining to address additional
sustaining grounds when affirming on other grounds); see also Futch v. McAllister
Towing of Georgetown, Inc., 335 S.C. 598, 613, 518 S.E.2d 591, 598 (1999)
(providing an appellate court need not review the remaining issues when its
determination of a prior issue is dispositive of the appeal).
Under the circumstances of this case, however, I would find that the requesting
officers acted in good faith in seeking the warrant for Brown's phone and cell site
location data (CSLI). As the majority acknowledges, the affidavit inaccurately
states that on the evening of January 21, 2017, the victim "received several phone
calls from the target number minutes before his murder." An accurate statement
would have explained that on the day of the murder, Brown called victim's cousin
(Smalls a/k/a S-Dot), Smalls forwarded Brown's number to victim, and Brown
called Smalls again just minutes before the group of men gunned down the victim.
Moreover, a witness positively identified Brown as a member of the group who
came into the neighborhood that night loudly hunting for the victim. Had this
information been provided to the magistrate, his probable cause determination
would have been sound.
But there is another reason to decline to suppress Brown's phone data and CSLI
obtained from his Verizon records. Law enforcement obtained this warrant on
January 24, 2017, some seventeen months before the Supreme Court's Carpenter
decision. See Carpenter v. United States, 585 U.S. 296, 319 (2018) (narrowly
addressing seven days of CSLI obtained without a warrant and holding that "even
though the Government will generally need a warrant to access CSLI, case-specific
exceptions may support a warrantless search of an individual's cell-site records
under certain circumstances"). The State persuasively argues that this warrant
sought only two days of data and urges us to recognize law enforcement's good
faith attempt to obtain a proper warrant during the pre-Carpenter era when no
warrant was required. See e.g., State v. Carter, 445 S.C. 157, 163–64, 912 S.E.2d
264, 268 (2025) (holding the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule
"forecloses suppression" when officers acted pursuant to the federal Stored
Communications Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2702 (c)(4), in obtaining real time cell site
location information); see also United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 918–21 (1984)
(finding the good faith exception permits admission of evidence where an officer
reasonably relies upon a warrant later determined to lack probable cause); United
States v. Chavez, 894 F.3d 593, 608 (4th Cir. 2018) (recognizing the purpose of the
exclusionary rule—to deter future Fourth Amendment violations—is not served
when investigators act "with an objectively reasonable good-faith belief that their
conduct is lawful").

For these reasons, while I cannot agree that this warrant properly issued based
upon the scant, erroneous information provided to the magistrate, I do agree with
the State as to the application of the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule.
Thus, like the majority, I would affirm Brown's conviction and sentence.