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March 25, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

Kenneth S. Hoffman v. Saad Holdings, LLC

Court of Appeals of South Carolina

• Citations: None known

• Docket Number: 2024-000794

• Opinion

• Authorities (19)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (3.3K)

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Syllabus

Kenneth S. Hoffman, Linda J. Hoffman, Harold W. Walters, Terrence Whitlock, and Barrie Whitlock appeal the denial of their request for an injunction, arguing the circuit court erred in (1) failing to find restrictive covenants clear and unambiguous; (2) failing to declare what constitutes "residential purposes" under the covenants; (3) characterizing use of property as in compliance with the covenants; and (4) interpreting the covenants as violative of public policy. We affirm.

Combined Opinion

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

Kenneth S. Hoffman, Linda J. Hoffman, Harold W.
Walters, Terrence Whitlock, and Barrie Whitlock,
Appellants,

v.

Saad Holdings, LLC, and Carl L. Jones, as Personal
Representative of the Estate of Anne E. Jones, deceased,
Respondents.

Appellate Case No. 2024-000794

Appeal From Anderson County
R. Scott Sprouse, Circuit Court Judge

Opinion No. Op. 6138
Heard November 12, 2025 – Filed February 18, 2026
Withdrawn, Substituted, and Refiled March 25, 2026

AFFIRMED

Daniel L. Draisen, of The Injury Law Firm, PC, of
Anderson, for Appellants.

Joshua Brent Raffini, of Pruitt & Pruitt, of Anderson, for
Respondents.

THOMAS, J.: Kenneth S. Hoffman, Linda J. Hoffman, Harold W. Walters,
Terrence Whitlock, and Barrie Whitlock (collectively, Homeowners) filed this
declaratory judgment action against Saad Holdings, LLC, and Carl L. Jones, as
Personal Representative of the Estate of Anne E. Jones, deceased (Respondents),
seeking to enjoin Gregory Saad 1 from walking across his undeveloped real
property. Homeowners appeal the denial of their request for an injunction, arguing
the circuit court erred in (1) failing to find restrictive covenants clear and
unambiguous; (2) failing to declare what constitutes "residential purposes" under
the covenants; (3) characterizing Saad's use of his property as in compliance with
the covenants; and (4) interpreting the covenants as violative of public policy. We
affirm.

FACTS

The parties own property in the Providence Point subdivision on Lake Hartwell in
Anderson County. All lots at issue are subject to restrictive covenants. The
covenant relevant to this action provides as follows:

LAND USE AND BUILDING TYPE:
No lot shall be used for other than residential purposes.
No residential building shall be erected, altered, placed or
permitted to remain on any lot other than one detached
single family dwelling . . . . (Emphasis added.)

An amendment to the covenants further provides that "[n]o residence shall be
constructed closer than twenty (20) feet to the front lot line, front lot line being
defined as that line bordering public street, nor nearer than ten (10) feet to any side
lot line."

Saad Holdings, LLC2 purchased three lots in Providence Point in 2021 from Jones.
These lots were originally one lot at the entrance of the subdivision, and the lack of
depth of the lots made home construction in compliance with the covenants
difficult, if not impossible.

Saad applied for and was granted two dock permits by the U.S. Army Corps of
Engineers – Lake Hartwell. 3 He ran power and water across his lots to the docks.
The parties stipulated that the Corps owns the shoreline of Lake Hartwell and that
each of Saad's docks is inside that shoreline. Furthermore, there was no evidence

1
Although Carl Jones, as the Personal Representative of the Estate of Anne E.
Jones, is a respondent, Saad Holdings, LLC is the primary respondent.
2
Saad is the owner of Saad Holdings, LLC. Hereinafter, we reference Saad and
the LLC as Saad.
3
Every lot owner in Providence Point has a dock.
that Saad was using the docks for a commercial activity; no structures were built
on the lots; and Saad's sole use of the lots was to park on them and walk across
them to access his docks. Homeowners filed this action, alleging Saad's use
violated the covenants because his use was recreational, not residential.

At the hearing, Homeowners argued Saad could walk the property to maintain it or
to get somewhere else, but he could not use it solely for recreational purposes.
Homeowners further argued Saad's sole means of accessing his docks under the
covenants would be to "go to a landing, get on a boat, and boat over to these
docks." Homeowners admitted Saad was not creating a nuisance; however, they
were concerned he could in the future.

Saad argued the amendment to the covenants solely affected Jones' lots and no
other lots in the subdivision, making it impossible to build on those lots. He also
argued the covenants intended to maintain the subdivision as a residential
neighborhood and Homeowners based their complaint on one sentence taken from
the covenants rather than looking at the covenants as a whole. According to Saad,
one homeowner took the position that he could not even sit on his property to
watch birds because it would violate the covenants. Saad maintained that he did
not "recreate" on the property; rather, he walked across it to access his docks. Saad
next argued that the harm to him under Homeowners' interpretation of the
covenants so greatly exceeded any benefit received by Homeowners that injunctive
relief should be denied. Saad finally argued any nuisance in the future, as
potentially alleged by Homeowners, was speculative.

The court asked Homeowners, "[A]re you saying that [Saad] would be prohibited
from having a picnic . . . or camping out . . . on his lot?" Homeowners answered,
"Yes." Homeowners argued the property was unusable and the only reason Saad
could even maintain it under the covenants was because otherwise it would
become overgrown and create a nuisance. By order filed April 26, 2024, the
circuit court found Saad's use of accessing the docks by walking across his
property was not violative of the covenants and to interpret them in such a manner
"would lead to an absurd result that violates public policy in that it would
unreasonably interfere with the free use of property." Thus, the court denied the
request for an injunction. 4 The court also denied Homeowners' motion for
reconsideration. This appeal follows.

4
The court also denied Saad's counterclaim for attorney's fees, finding no evidence
was presented pertaining to the counterclaim.
STANDARD OF REVIEW

Our standard of review is governed as follows by Hanold v. Watson's Orchard
Property Owners Association, Inc., 412 S.C. 387, 395, 772 S.E.2d 528, 533 (Ct.
App. 2015) (alteration in original), aff'd, 419 S.C. 162, 797 S.E.2d 47 (2017):

"Declaratory judgments in and of themselves are neither
legal nor equitable." Campbell v. Marion Cnty. Hosp.
Dist., 354 S.C. 274, 279, 580 S.E.2d 163, 165 (Ct. App.
2003). "The standard of review for a declaratory
judgment action is therefore determined by the nature of
the underlying issue." Id.

"Restrictive covenants are contractual in nature." Hardy
v. Aiken, 369 S.C. 160, 166, 631 S.E.2d 539, 542 (2006).
An action to enforce restrictive covenants by means of
injunctive relief, however, is an action in equity. Cedar
Cove Homeowners Ass'n v. DiPietro, 368 S.C. 254, 258,
628 S.E.2d 284, 286 (Ct. App. 2006). In an equitable
action, we may find the facts in accordance with our own
view of the evidence. Id. "While this standard permits a
broad scope of review, an appellate court will not
disregard the findings of the [circuit] court, which saw
and heard the witnesses and was in a better position to
evaluate their credibility." Buffington v. T.O.E. Enters.,
383 S.C. 388, 391, 680 S.E.2d 289, 290 (2009).

LAW/ANALYSIS

1. Characterization of Use 5

Homeowners argue the circuit court erred in mischaracterizing the use of the
property. We find Homeowners abandoned this issue because they cite no
authority to support the argument. See First Sav. Bank v. McLean, 314 S.C. 361,
363, 444 S.E.2d 513, 514 (1994) (noting when a party fails to provide arguments
or supporting authority for his assertion, the party is deemed to have abandoned the
issue on appeal).

5
Homeowners' third issue.
2. Residential Purposes 6

Homeowners argue the circuit court erred in failing to address whether the
covenant restricting use to residential purposes was clear and unambiguous and
erred in failing to find Saad in violation of the covenant. Contrary to Homeowners'
argument that the circuit court failed to address whether the covenant was clear and
unambiguous, we first note the circuit court discusses the issue of ambiguity with
citation to authority and finds Saad's use did not violate the covenants. To the
extent the circuit court failed to specifically state the covenant was or was not
ambiguous, we find no reversible error.

"Restrictive covenants are contractual in nature." Hardy, 369 S.C. at 166, 631
S.E.2d at 542. Thus, "the paramount rule of construction is to ascertain and give
effect to the intent of the parties as determined from the whole document."
Palmetto Dunes Resort v. Brown, 287 S.C. 1, 6, 336 S.E.2d 15, 18 (Ct. App. 1985).
"Words of a restrictive covenant will be given the common, ordinary meaning
attributed to them at the time of their execution." Taylor v. Lindsey, 332 S.C. 1, 4,
498 S.E.2d 862, 863 (1998). However, "where the language of a restrictive
covenant is equally capable of two or more constructions, that construction will be
adopted which least restricts the property." Hamilton v. CCM, Inc., 274 S.C. 152,
157–58, 263 S.E.2d 378, 381 (1980). This "historical disfavor of restrictive
covenants by the law emanates from the widely held view that society's best
interests are advanced by encouraging the free and unrestricted use of land." Sea
Pines Plantation Co. v. Wells, 294 S.C. 266, 270, 363 S.E.2d 891, 893 (1987). "As
with any other action on a contract, the party who seeks to enforce a restrictive
covenant has the burden of proving that the non-moving party intended to create a
covenant." SPUR at Williams Brice Owners Ass'n v. Lalla, 415 S.C. 72, 83–84,
781 S.E.2d 115, 121 (Ct. App. 2015).

Homeowners' primary argument is that Saad's use of the property is recreational
rather than residential and the restrictive covenant restricts use of the land to
residential use. Most cases in South Carolina discussing "residential use" in
restrictive covenants concern residential vis-à-vis commercial use. See, e.g.,
Cothran v. Stroman, 246 S.C. 42, 45, 142 S.E.2d 368, 369 (1965) (finding the
operation of a beauty shop violated a covenant restricting use to "residential
purposes"); Kinard v. Richardson, 407 S.C. 247, 266–67, 754 S.E.2d 888, 898 (Ct.
App. 2014) (finding the use of the property as an equestrian center that sold horses
violated the restrictive covenant that prohibited any use other than single-family

6
Homeowners' first and second issues.
residential use); Buffington, 383 S.C. at 393–94, 680 S.E.2d at 291–92 (finding a
car dealership's use of land for parking vehicles violated the covenant restricting
use to "residential purposes"). However, we also note Donald E. Baltz, Inc. v. R.
V. Chandler & Co., 248 S.C. 484, 489, 151 S.E.2d 441, 444 (1966), in which our
supreme court enforced restrictive covenants when the purchaser of a lot, which
was restricted by a covenant prohibiting the use of the lot for anything except non-
trailer residential purposes, built a road through the middle of the lot to access a
mobile home located on a contiguous tract. The court found the use was "not a
residential use within the meaning of the covenants." Id.

Saad cites other jurisdictions that have considered "residential purposes" in
restrictive covenants. In White v. Town of Emerald Isle, 346 S.E.2d 176, 179 (N.C.
Ct. App. 1986), covenants of a beach community subdivision restricted use to
residential purposes except permitting hotels, motels, apartment houses or other
buildings for the purpose of providing residence. The court found the building of a
municipal parking lot by the Town did not violate the covenants, relying on the law
mandating strict construction in favor of the unrestrained use of land and the fact
that parking lots are commonly associated with the use of beaches. Id. at 178–79.
Likewise, the Supreme Court of New Hampshire concluded a covenant restricting
the use of property to a single-family dwelling per lot and for residential purposes
only was not violated by a property owner that used an otherwise vacant lot solely
for dock access. Voedisch v. Town of Wolfeboro, 612 A.2d 902, 905 (N.H. 1992).
In finding the use of a dock is a usual residential use, the court stated, "Generally,
covenants restricting the use of property to 'residential purposes' merely limit the
use of the property to living purposes as distinguished from business or
commercial purposes . . . ." Id.

We are persuaded by the reasoning of the North Carolina Court of Appeals in
Villazon v. Osborne, 922 S.E.2d 498 (N.C. Ct. App. 2025). In Villazon, the
plaintiff purchased a series of lots in a lake community governed by a restrictive
covenant that provided that "[l]ots shall be used only for residential purposes." Id.
at 501. The plaintiff also purchased a "lakefront lot in the community, where she
would store her kayaks, 'have a dock,' and 'maybe entertain, have a barbecue.'" Id.
After neighbors complained about the plaintiff's use of the lakefront lot, she filed
an action for declaratory judgment seeking a ruling that her use did not violate the
residential purposes covenant. Id. at 502.

In construing the covenant, the court found "no reading of the [covenant] that
supports [the defendants'] insistence that the phrase 'residential purposes'
necessarily 'requires habitation.'" Id. at 509. Furthermore, like Homeowners in
this case did, the defendants in Villazon "offer[ed] a plethora of possible extreme,
imagined recreational uses that might be permitted in other hypothetical cases if
[the p]laintiff's use of Lot 177 were allowed, such as 'ball fields, concert venues,
dirt tracks, [and] paintball course[s].'" Id. at 510 (third and fourth alterations in
original). The court found the suggested "'parade of horribles' . . . ignore[d] the
well-settled rule of the interpretation of restrictive covenants that '[e]ach case must
be determined on its own particular facts.'" Id. (quoting Long v. Branham, 156
S.E.2d 235, 242 (N.C. 1967)). The court accordingly affirmed the trial court's
grant of a directed verdict to the plaintiff regarding the alleged violation of the
residential purpose covenant. Id.

Here, we agree with Homeowners that the covenant is not ambiguous. However,
based on the particular facts of this case, we disagree that Saad's use violated the
covenant. Thus, we affirm the circuit court's finding that Saad was not in violation
of the covenant.

1. Public Policy 7

Homeowners argue the circuit court erred in finding their interpretation of the
covenants violated public policy. Because we affirm the circuit court's finding that
Saad was not in violation of the covenants, we need not address whether the
covenant violated public policy. See Futch v. McAllister Towing of Georgetown,
Inc., 335 S.C. 598, 613, 518 S.E.2d 591, 598 (1999) (declining to address
remaining issues when resolution of a prior issue is dispositive).

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the order on appeal is

AFFIRMED.

WILLIAMS, C.J., and CURTIS, J., concur.

7
Homeowners' fourth issue.