Jump To

Top Caption Combined Opinion

Support FLP

CourtListener is a project of Free
Law Project, a federally-recognized 501(c)(3) non-profit. Members help support our work and get special access to features.

Please become a member today.

Join Free.law Now

March 24, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

Allison Shoemaker v. Zachary Thacher

Court of Appeals of South Carolina

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: 2025-001310

• Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

• Opinion

• Authorities (8)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (17K)

• PDF

Combined Opinion

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

Allison Shoemaker, Appellant,

v.

Zachary Thacher, Respondent.

Appellate Case No. 2025-001310

Appeal From Lexington County
W. Greg Seigler, Family Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2026-UP-148
Heard March 18, 2026 – Filed March 24, 2026

AFFIRMED

James Emerson Smith, Jr., of James E. Smith, Jr., PA, of
Columbia, for Appellant.

George Murrell Smith, Jr., of Smith Robinson Holler
DuBose Morgan, LLC, of Sumter, Austin Tyler Reed and
Frederick Newman Hanna, Jr., of Smith Robinson Holler
DuBose Morgan, LLC, of Columbia, and Carrie Ann
Warner, of Warner Law Firm, LLC, of Columbia, all for
Respondent.
PER CURIAM: This case arises from the family court's order granting
Respondent Zachary Thacher's (Father) motion to dismiss for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement
Act 1 (UCCJEA). On appeal, Appellant Allison Shoemaker (Mother) argues the
family court erred by (1) finding New York to be Child's home state under the
UCCJEA, (2) dismissing the case without considering Child's best interests, (3)
dismissing the case when Father purposely availed himself of South Carolina
jurisdiction, and (4) failing to make sufficient findings to support the relief granted
pursuant to Rule 60(b), SCRCP. We affirm.

1. Mother argues the family court erred in finding New York to be the home state of Child under the UCCJEA. Mother also argues New York lacks exclusive and continuing jurisdiction because South Carolina was the first to make a finding that it had jurisdiction. We disagree. "Subject matter jurisdiction is 'the power to hear and determine cases of the general class to which the proceedings in question belong.'" S.C. Dep't of Soc. Servs. v. Tran, 418 S.C. 308, 314, 792 S.E.2d 254, 257 (Ct. App. 2016) (quoting Dove v. Gold Kist, Inc., 314 S.C. 235, 237–38, 442 S.E.2d 598, 600 (1994)). "[T]he UCCJEA govern[s] subject matter jurisdiction in interstate custody disputes." Id. at 315, 792 S.E.2d at 257 (quoting Anthony H. v. Matthew G., 397 S.C. 447, 451, 725 S.E.2d 132, 134 (Ct. App. 2012)). Pursuant to the UCCJEA, South Carolina has jurisdiction to make an initial child custody determination only if:

(1) this State is the home state of the child on the date of
the commencement of the proceeding, or was the home
state of the child within six months before the
commencement of the proceeding and the child is absent
from this State, but a parent or person acting as a parent
continues to live in this State;
(2) a court of another state does not have jurisdiction
under item (1), or a court of the home state of the child
has declined to exercise jurisdiction on the ground that
this State is the more appropriate forum under [s]ection
63-15-342 or 63-15-344, and:
(a) the child and the child's parents, or the child and at
least one parent or a person acting as a parent, have a
significant connection with this State other than mere
physical presence; and

1
S.C. Code Ann. §§ 63-15-300 to -394 (2010 & Supp. 2025).
(b) substantial evidence is available in this State
concerning the child's care, protection, training, and
personal relationships;
(3) all courts, having jurisdiction under item (1) or (2),
have declined to exercise jurisdiction on the ground that a
court of this State is the more appropriate forum to
determine the custody of the child under [s]ection 63-15-
342 or 63-15-344; or
(4) no court of any other state would have jurisdiction
under the criteria specified in item (1), (2), or (3).

§ 63-15-330(A) (2010). Under the UCCJEA, the home state is defined as "the
state in which a child lived with a parent or a person acting as a parent for at least
six consecutive months immediately before the commencement of a child custody
proceeding." S.C. Code Ann. § 63-15-302 (7) (2010). For children less than six
months old, the home state is where the child lived from birth with a parent or
person acting as a parent. Id. Importantly, periods of temporary absence by the
child or parent are included in calculating the six-month period. Id.

Based on our de novo review, we find the family court's home state determination
was supported by a preponderance of the evidence. See Simmons v. Simmons, 392
S.C. 412, 414, 709 S.E.2d 666, 667 (2011) ("In appeals from the family court, this
[c]ourt reviews factual and legal issues de novo."); Greene v. Greene, 439 S.C.
427, 439–40, 887 S.E.2d 157, 164 (Ct. App. 2023) ("The appellant bears the
burden of convincing the appellate court that the family court committed error or
the preponderance of the evidence is against the family court's findings."). At the
time Mother filed the South Carolina action, Father had already initiated a custody
proceeding in New York. Mother admitted she was aware of the New York
proceedings, and New York never denied jurisdiction. In fact, immediately after
the South Carolina dismissal order was entered, a hearing was held in New York to
address custody and visitation issues. Although Mother argues she resided in
South Carolina continuously with Child from his birth on December 23, 2024, until
April 2025, and any visits to New York during that period were merely temporary,
we find the evidence in the record does not support such a finding. Rather, the
evidence establishes that although Child was born in South Carolina, most of his
life was spent in New York. Mother's own filings reflecting various addresses
evidence a lack of permanent residence in South Carolina. Child visited New York
pediatricians on January 26, February 2, February 24, and March 24. 2 At each
visit, Mother listed her address as her Brooklyn apartment. These visits coincide
with Father's testimony that Mother and Child lived in New York for 76 days
spanning from January 23 to April 9, with the exception of a six-day visit to South
Carolina from March 17 to March 22. We find further support for Father's
argument that Mother was not living permanently in South Carolina prior to April
9 in the April 10 email correspondence between the parties' counsels. In the
correspondence, two days after mediation in New York, Mother's counsel
indicated, "she'll be living in SC now[,]" and further stated he was "unaware
[Father and Father's counsel] were unaware" of the change in her location. These
facts support a finding that Mother left New York, unbeknownst to Father, in the
middle of the mediation process. Additionally, the baby registry created in
Mother's name indicated her address was in New York, and although Mother was
permitted to work remotely during her time in South Carolina, her employment
remained in New York.

We hold the family court did not err when it found New York to be Child's home
state under the UCCJEA. See § 63-15-340(A) (providing that "a court of this State
may not exercise its jurisdiction . . . if, at the time of the commencement of the
proceeding, a proceeding concerning the custody of the child has been commenced
in a court of another state having jurisdiction . . . unless the proceeding has been
terminated or is stayed by the court of the other state"); Tran, 418 S.C. at 317, 792
S.E.2d at 259 (holding South Carolina lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to issue
final orders removing a child from custody and terminating parental rights because
Georgia was the child's home state, there was a custody order in Georgia, and no
evidence showed Georgia had declined jurisdiction); Matthew G., 397 S.C. at 454–
55, 725 S.E.2d at 136 (finding South Carolina lacked jurisdiction to terminate
parental rights and grant a stepfather's adoption petition because Georgia courts
had entered an initial custody order and retained exclusive, continuing jurisdiction,
with no evidence that Georgia declined to exercise jurisdiction or determined
South Carolina was a more convenient forum).

2
Although Mother provided pediatric records from South Carolina, those records
reflect Child was treated on three occasions: December 27, 2024, January 17,
2025, and April 24, 2025. Notably, Father testified he drove Mother and Child
back to New York on January 23, 2025. Thus, the first two visits were prior to her
return to New York, and the third visit was after the family court entered its initial
order on Mother's motion, determining South Carolina had jurisdiction.
2. Mother argues the family court erred in dismissing the case without
adequately considering Child's best interests. Specifically, Mother argues, "The
UCCJEA prioritizes the best interests of the child by ensuring that custody
determinations are made in the state with the closest connections to the child and
where evidence concerning the child's care and relationships is most readily
available." Mother avers there was substantial evidence of significant connections
in South Carolina, and the court erred "in failing to recognize these connections
and evidence." We disagree. Under section 63-15-330(A)(2), a South Carolina
court may exercise jurisdiction based on significant connections only if "a court of
another state does not have jurisdiction under item (1), or a court of the home state
of the child has declined to exercise jurisdiction on the ground that this State is the
more appropriate forum." "When the child has no home State, the court must
'examine whether a sufficiently significant connection and substantial evidence
exists to exercise jurisdiction.'" Doe v. Baby Girl, 376 S.C. 267, 283, 657 S.E.2d
455, 463 (2008) (quoting In re Amberley D., 775 A.2d 1158, 1164 (Me. 2001)).

Here, we find the significant connections analysis was not required based on the
family court's determination that New York was Child's home state. New York
retained jurisdiction as the home state and never declined to exercise such
jurisdiction. As such, an alternative analysis for jurisdiction was unnecessary.
However, even if the analysis was necessary, we still find South Carolina would
not meet the significant connections threshold for jurisdiction. See Cullen v.
Prescott, 302 S.C. 201, 206, 394 S.E.2d 722, 725 (Ct. App. 1990) (explaining the
purpose of the UCCJEA "is to ensure custody litigation takes place in the state
with the closest connections to the child and his parent(s) and where evidence
concerning care, protection, training, and personal relationship is most readily
available" and holding "[c]ourts will exercise jurisdiction based upon these criteria
if there are sufficient contacts . . . to justify legitimate state interest in the outcome
of the dispute," while clarifying that "'substantial evidence' was never intended to
be used as a substitute for 'some evidence' but is intended to require a high degree
of connection and access to evidence."). We hold evidence in the record, as
detailed above, supports a finding that Child's significant connections were in New
York, not South Carolina.

1. Mother argues Father purposely availed himself of South Carolina's jurisdiction because he hired South Carolina counsel, entered into the Agreement regarding custody, visitation, and child support, and performed under the Agreement. We disagree. "[I]f a court of this State has jurisdiction under this article because a person seeking to invoke its jurisdiction has engaged in unjustifiable conduct, the court shall decline to exercise its jurisdiction unless: (1) the parents and all persons acting as parents have acquiesced in the exercise of jurisdiction[.]" § 63-15-344(A)(1). Section 63-17-40 governs settlement and voluntary agreements and makes clear that child support agreements must be in writing, properly verified, and approved by the court before they have any legal effect. S.C. Code Ann. § 63-17-40 (A) (Supp. 2025). It further requires that the agreement be accompanied by financial declarations and affidavits from the parents stating they understand and are voluntarily entering the agreement. Id. A nonresident of South Carolina does not subject themselves to jurisdiction in this state unless the formalities of § 63-17-40 are followed and the agreement is filed along with a summons and complaint. Id.

We hold Father did not purposely submit himself to South Carolina jurisdiction
solely because he entered into and performed under the Agreement prior to Child's
birth. As a threshold matter, the Agreement was never approved by the court. See
S.C. Code Ann. § 63-17-40 (A) ("Upon the court's approval, the settlement or
voluntary agreement becomes an order of the court."). The Agreement was signed
the day before Child's expected due date, and according to Father, it was a result of
Mother withholding birth plan information—such as the location, date, and time of
delivery. Father stated that because the parties were not married, he engaged South
Carolina counsel to ensure his access to Child was preserved via written contract.
Further, the Agreement itself was limited in scope, emphasizing its temporary
nature. The terms of the Agreement explicitly state it was executed to address
immediate issues and the terms would only remain in effect "until modified by a
subsequent court order or mutual written agreement." It deferred any future issues
relating to Child and made explicit visitation and support provisions for the first
ten days of Child's life. Father stated he paid child support pursuant to the South
Carolina guidelines because he felt it was legally and ethically right to provide
financial support as a non-custodial parent, not because he was submitting to
jurisdiction. His support payments were voluntarily made, not court ordered. Our
finding that Father did not purposely avail himself of South Carolina jurisdiction is
further supported by Father's South Carolina counsel filing a limited notice of
appearance solely to contest jurisdiction. The same day the limited notice was
filed, Father moved to dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction. He never
acquiesced to jurisdiction; rather, Father has spent much of the litigation rejecting
Mother's claims of South Carolina jurisdiction. We affirm.
4. Mother argues the family court erred in failing to make sufficient findings
of fact and conclusions of law to support the relief granted pursuant to Rule 60(b),
SCRCP. We disagree. We hold the family court did not err in dismissing the case
and vacating the previous order based on lack of subject matter jurisdiction and
Mother's conduct. See Rule 60(b)(3), SCRCP (granting relief from judgment based
on extrinsic fraud, misconduct, or misrepresentation by the adverse party). In the
June 30 order, the family court found Mother did not relocate to South Carolina
with Child until April 9, 2025. It further found Mother was aware of the New
York custody proceedings at the time she filed her South Carolina action. The
court held the evidence before it supported a finding that New York was the home
state because Child's pediatric records were in New York, the parties engaged in
mediation in New York, and although Child was born in South Carolina, Mother
returned to New York after the birth and that is where Child's significant contacts
and connections were located. It further found the New York courts had not
declined jurisdiction in its proceedings. Finally, the court cited section 63-15-344,
which allows the court to decline to exercise jurisdiction if the party seeking to
invoke its jurisdiction has engaged in unjustifiable conduct. The court held
Mother's conduct "constitutes an abuse of the jurisdictional process under the
UCCJEA." We hold the family court properly made findings and those findings
were supported by the preponderance of the evidence in the record. See Raby
Constr., L.L.P. v. Orr, 358 S.C. 10, 20, 594 S.E.2d 478, 483 (2004) ("[W]hen
considering whether to grant relief from final judgments, 'a court must balance the
interest of finality against the need to provide a fair and just resolution of the
dispute.'"). Accordingly, the order of the family court is

AFFIRMED.

THOMAS, MCDONALD, and TURNER, JJ., concur.