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March 18, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

State v. Lewis

Ohio Court of Appeals

• Citations: 2026 Ohio 904
• Docket Number: 25CA023

• Judges: Gormley

• Opinion

• Authorities (7)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (1.8K)

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Syllabus

Prosecutor did not engage in misconduct when questioning witnesses or vouch for witnesses during closing argument, so defense counsel's failure to object was not ineffective assistance.

Combined Opinion

[Cite as State v. Lewis, 2026-Ohio-904.]

COURT OF APPEALS
FAIRFIELD COUNTY, OHIO
FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

STATE OF OHIO, Case No. 25CA023

Plaintiff - Appellee Opinion & Judgment Entry

-vs- Appeal from the Fairfield County
Municipal Court,
JENNIFER L. LEWIS, Case No. CRB2401647

Defendant - Appellant Judgment: Affirmed

Date of Judgment: March 18, 2026

BEFORE: Craig R. Baldwin, Robert G. Montgomery, and David M. Gormley, Judges

APPEARANCES: James E. Young (City of Lancaster Law Director’s Office), Lancaster,
Ohio, for Plaintiff-Appellee; James L. Dye, Pickerington, Ohio, for Defendant-Appellant.

Gormley, J.

{¶1} Jennifer Lewis was convicted on a misdemeanor theft charge following a

jury trial in Fairfield County. She now appeals, arguing that the State committed

prosecutorial misconduct during direct examination and closing argument, and she

claims, too, that her trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object. Because we see

nothing untoward in the government’s handling of the case, we affirm the judgment.

The Key Facts

{¶2} The theft charge against Lewis stems from her visit to a Walmart store in

Lancaster, Ohio. In a self-checkout lane there, Lewis scanned the barcodes on 13 of the

20 items in her shopping cart, and then she tried to leave the store with all 20 items. Kyle

Ruckman — one of the store’s so-called asset-protection employees — approached Lewis
and asked her to come with him. Lewis complied, and a police officer then came to the

store and investigated the incident.

{¶3} Once that investigation concluded, Lewis was charged with one count of

misdemeanor theft. The case was tried before a jury, and both Ruckman and the police

officer testified. Lewis was convicted, and she now appeals.

No Prosecutorial Misconduct Occurred

{¶4} In her first assignment of error, Lewis argues that the State committed

prosecutorial misconduct during the direct examination of two witnesses and during

closing arguments.

{¶5} Because Lewis did not object to any of the alleged misconduct at trial, we

review only for plain error. State v. Bright, 2025-Ohio-725, ¶ 7 (5th Dist.). Plain error

exists only when the error is apparent on the record, palpable, and fundamental, such that

it should have been obvious to the trial court without objection. Id. at ¶ 10, citing State v.

Dunlap, 2004-Ohio-6652, ¶ 34 (8th Dist.). We embrace an allegation that plain error has

occurred with the utmost caution, under exceptional circumstances, and only to prevent

a manifest miscarriage of justice. Bright at ¶ 10, citing State v. Long, 53 Ohio St.2d 91

(1978), paragraph three of the syllabus.

{¶6} In determining whether prosecutorial misconduct has occurred, we first

consider whether the prosecutor’s remarks were improper and then, if so, whether they

prejudicially affected the substantial rights of the accused. State v. Montgomery, 2015-

Ohio-3066, ¶ 15 (5th Dist.).

{¶7} Lewis points to three instances of alleged misconduct. First, she cites the

State’s questioning of the police officer, who was asked whether he had ever found

Ruckman — the store employee — to be dishonest. The officer’s answer was “no.” Next,
Lewis objects to the fact that the State asked Ruckman whether he had any doubt that

Lewis intended to steal the unscanned items. Ruckman responded that he had no doubt.

Third, Lewis challenges the prosecutor’s closing argument, in which the prosecutor

reminded the jury about the officer’s testimony concerning Ruckman’s honesty.

{¶8} None of these questions or remarks constituted plain error.

{¶9} Prosecutors are of course not permitted to vouch for the credibility of a

witness at trial. State v. Myers, 2018-Ohio-1903, ¶ 145. Vouching occurs when the

prosecutor states or implies that he or she has knowledge of facts outside the record,

expresses a personal belief or opinion about the credibility of a witness, or otherwise

places his or her personal credibility in issue. Id. See also State v. Adkins, 2018-Ohio-

2588, ¶ 106 (6th Dist.) (“prosecuting attorneys may not express their personal beliefs or

opinions as to the credibility of a witness, as to the guilt of the accused, or to matters which

will not be supported by admissible evidence because the attorney implies knowing

something outside the evidence”).

{¶10} Here, the prosecutor never offered his own opinion about any witness’s

credibility. Rather, the prosecutor elicited testimony from the police officer about that

witness’s own professional experience with Ruckman over multiple prior theft

investigations and then summarized that testimony during closing argument. This was

not vouching. The prosecutor presented testimony and then later reminded jurors about

it, and at no point did the prosecutor express his own views about the credibility of either

witness or imply that he had any personal knowledge or opinions about their truthfulness.

{¶11} As for the closing argument, a prosecutor may comment on the evidence

presented and may urge jurors to draw certain inferences from it. State v. Encarnacion,

2017-Ohio-5530, ¶ 9 (10th Dist.). The prosecutor’s statements in closing did no more
than recap the testimony the jury had already heard. This does not constitute

prosecutorial misconduct or vouching, much less plain error.

{¶12} Regarding the question to Ruckman about Lewis’s intent, we see nothing

improper. To be sure, a question such as “What was the defendant’s intent?” could rightly

draw an objection, as none of us can read someone else’s mind. Here, though, Ruckman

— who had observed Lewis’s conduct in the store and had heard Lewis’s responses to

police questioning about that conduct minutes later — was asked if he was sure about the

conclusion that he had drawn from what he had seen and heard. He said that he had no

doubt about his initial impression that Lewis intended to steal some items. Ruckman’s

answer to the question could arguably be seen as helpful to the jury in its evaluation of

the weight to be given to his testimony. We cannot say that the question was an improper

one, let alone one that resulted in plain error.

{¶13} Even had the question been improper, no prejudice flowed from Ruckman’s

answer to it. The jury’s certainty or lack thereof was what mattered, and surely the

prosecutor’s question and Ruckman’s answer to it was not outcome determinative. Jurors

heard Lewis herself testify that she had not scanned seven of the items in her shopping

cart, though she claimed that she did not intend to steal them. The jury was free to weigh

that claim against other testimony in the case and then draw its own conclusions about

Lewis’s intent.

{¶14} Lewis’s first assignment of error is overruled.

Lewis’s Trial Counsel Did Not Provide Ineffective Assistance

{¶15} In her second assignment of error, Lewis argues that her trial counsel was

ineffective by failing to object to the State’s questions and the closing argument discussed

above.
{¶16} To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance, a defendant must satisfy a

familiar two-pronged test. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984).

First, the defendant must show that counsel’s performance fell below an objective

standard of reasonableness. Id. at 688. Second, the defendant must show prejudice,

which means that the defendant must be able to demonstrate a reasonable probability

that, but for counsel’s errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. Id.

at 694.

{¶17} We have already concluded that the State’s questioning and closing

argument were not improper. That necessarily means that Lewis’s trial counsel cannot

be faulted for failing to object. See State v. Elliott, 2024-Ohio-3376, ¶ 148 (10th Dist.)

(“Trial counsel is not ineffective for failing to object to admissible testimony”); State v.

Alford, 2024-Ohio-4637, ¶ 80 (5th Dist.) (where “the prosecutor’s comments were well

within the boundaries of commentary on the evidence, . . . trial counsel’s performance did

not fall below an objective standard of reasonable representation by failing to object”).

{¶18} Lewis’s second assignment of error is overruled.
{¶19} For the reasons explained above, the judgment of the Fairfield County

Municipal Court is affirmed. Costs are to be paid by Appellant Jennifer Lewis.

By: Gormley, J.;

Baldwin, P.J. and

Montgomery, J. concur.