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March 18, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

State v. Grosser

Court of Appeals of Oregon

• Citations: 347 Or. App. 885
• Docket Number: A185248
• Precedential Status: Non-Precedential
• Judges: Jacquot

• Disposition: Affirmed.

• Opinion

• Authorities (7)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (0)

• PDF

Disposition

Affirmed.

Combined Opinion

No. 218 March 18, 2026 885

This is a nonprecedential memorandum opinion
pursuant to ORAP 10.30 and may not be cited
except as provided in ORAP 10.30(1).

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE
STATE OF OREGON

STATE OF OREGON,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
DEVIN SCOTT GROSSER,
aka Devin S. Grosser,
Defendant-Appellant.
Washington County Circuit Court
23CR51922; A185248

Erik M. Buchér, Judge.
Argued and submitted February 5, 2026.
Marc D. Brown, Deputy Public Defender, argued the
cause for appellant. Also on the brief was Ernest G. Lannet,
Chief Defender, Criminal Appellate Section, Oregon Public
Defense Commission.
Greg Rios, Assistant Attorney General, argued the cause
for respondent. Also on the brief were Dan Rayfield, Attorney
General, and Benjamin Gutman, Solicitor General.
Before Tookey, Presiding Judge, Kamins, Judge, and
Jacquot, Judge.
JACQUOT, J.
Affirmed.
886 State v. Grosser

JACQUOT, J.
Defendant pleaded guilty to one count of menacing
constituting domestic violence, ORS 163.190,1 and one count of
interference with making a report, ORS 165.572.2 On appeal,
he only challenges the imposition of a restitution award.
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial
court’s disposition, State v. Perdew, 304 Or App 524, 527, 467
P3d 70 (2020), accepting the trial court’s factual findings that
are supported by any evidence in the record, and reviewing
the imposition of restitution for errors of law, State v. Skeen,
309 Or App 288, 290, 481 P3d 402 (2021), we affirm.
Before the incident giving rise to defendant’s con-
victions, defendant and the victim, C, shared an apartment.
They have a son together; he was an infant at the time of the
relevant criminal conduct. C was employed prior to the birth
of their son, but she stopped working near the end of her
pregnancy. Defendant and C agreed that, once the baby was
born, C would stay home to care for the child and defendant
would cover their living expenses.
The conduct giving rise to defendant’s convictions
occurred after a dispute began between defendant and C.
Defendant became agitated, and C felt unsafe. She tried to
leave the apartment with the baby in her arms, and defen-
dant tried to grab the baby. Defendant threatened to kill
C. C screamed for help, a neighbor came to their door, and
C was able to exit the apartment. She called 911 from the
neighbor’s home.
After defendant pleaded guilty to two counts, the
trial court imposed a two-year term of probation on each
count, dismissed several other charges, and scheduled a
restitution hearing. Defendant agreed that he could be lia-
ble for restitution arising out of his relevant criminal con-
duct, including for conduct related to the dismissed charges.

1
“A person commits the crime of menacing if by word or conduct the person
intentionally attempts to place another person in fear of imminent serious phys-
ical injury.” ORS 163.190.
2
“A person commits the crime of interference with making a report if the
person, by removing, damaging or interfering with a telephone * * * intentionally
prevents or hinders another person from making a report to a law enforcement
agency * * *.” ORS 165.572.
Nonprecedential Memo Op: 347 Or App 885 (2026) 887

However, defendant argued that C did not suffer economic
damages and that, even if she did, no damages were a result
of his conduct.
At the contested restitution hearing, C testified
that she immediately moved into her parents’ home after
defendant’s criminal conduct. She testified that she moved
because she no longer felt safe staying in the apartment and
was afraid of defendant. C testified that she paid $1,200 in
rent per month to live at her parents’ house, and receipts of
her rental payments were accepted into evidence. Defendant
argued that C did not suffer economic damages because “pay-
ing rent is a basic necessity of living. * * * [H]er having to pay
[rent] as part of her moving out does not correlate to suffering
economic damages in the way that the statute is written.”
The trial court imposed $1,200 in restitution to C.
At the conclusion of the restitution hearing, the trial court
explicitly deemed C to be credible. The trial court also explic-
itly found that C was not paying any rent expenses prior to
the incident, that she was afraid of defendant because of his
criminal conduct, that “ ‘but for’ * * * defendant’s [criminal]
conduct, she would[ not] have moved out, [and] she would
still be living there,” and that she had to pay $1,200 in rent
after leaving the apartment. The trial court determined
that one month of rent was “reasonable” and imposed resti-
tution equal to one month of rent expenses.
In a single assignment of error, defendant argues
that the trial court erred by imposing the restitution award.
Defendant largely reprises the arguments he made to the
trial court, including that the record contains no evidence
that C suffered economic damages as a result of defendant’s
criminal conduct or otherwise. The state responds that it
proved that C suffered economic damages, and that she
suffered those damages as a result of defendant’s criminal
conduct.
ORS 137.106 authorizes a trial court to order res-
titution when a person is convicted of a crime that has
resulted in economic damages. Accord State v. Parsons, 287
Or App 351, 356, 403 P3d 497, adh’d to as modified on recons,
288 Or App 449, 403 P3d 834 (2017), rev den, 362 Or 545
888 State v. Grosser

(2018). To support an award of restitution, “the state must
provide sufficient evidence of (1) criminal activities, (2) eco-
nomic damages, and (3) a causal relationship between the
two.” Id. at 356-57. “[T]he defendant’s criminal activities
must be a ‘but for’ cause of the victim’s damages and * * * the
damages must have been a reasonably foreseeable result of
the defendant’s criminal activities.” Id. at 357. Damages are
reasonably foreseeable if “a reasonable person in the defen-
dant’s position would have foreseen that someone in the vic-
tim’s position could reasonably incur damages of the same
general kind that the victim incurred.” State v. Ramos, 358
Or 581, 597, 368 P3d 446 (2016).
In the context of restitution, “economic damages” are
“objectively verifiable monetary losses * * *[,]” ORS 31.705(2)
(a), excluding “future impairment of earning capacity,” ORS
137.103(2)(a). Here, evidence in the record supported the
trial court’s determination that C suffered economic dam-
ages in the form of rent expenses that she otherwise would
not have incurred. C testified, and the court explicitly cred-
ited her testimony that defendant and C had an agreement,
whereby C would care for their child and defendant would
pay living expenses including rent. Evidence, including
defendant’s testimony and a payment receipt, supported
a determination that C suffered economic damages in the
amount of $1,200 for one month of rental expenses.
Sufficient evidence, namely C’s testimony that she
moved immediately after the incident and that she did
so because she feared defendant, also supported the trial
court’s determination that but for defendant’s criminal con-
duct C would not have incurred rental expenses. See, e.g.,
State v. Pumphrey, 266 Or App 729, 735-36, 338 P3d 819
(2014), rev den, 357 Or 112 (2015) (restitution award was
supported where the defendant’s conduct caused the victim
to experience panic attacks and fear, and the victim subse-
quently incurred expenses to change her phone number and
locks to her home); State v. Buswell, 308 Or App 389, 395,
479 P3d 341 (2021) (restitution award was sufficiently sup-
ported based on evidence that the victim needed to take sev-
eral days off of work after being “traumatized” by a robbery).
Nonprecedential Memo Op: 347 Or App 885 (2026) 889

That determination is also supported by State v.
Pool, 338 Or App 19, 25, 565 P3d 73 (2025), in which we
determined that restitution was allowable where the victim
“move[d] on short notice” due to safety risks caused by the
defendant’s conduct. As a result of needing to move “unex-
pectedly,” the victim did not have time to clean her apart-
ment, and consequently, the landlord withheld $366 from
her security deposit. Id. at 25-26. We determined that the
“unexpected” nature of the move “caused her to incur” the
security deposit expense. Id. at 25. We explained that “[t]
he possibility” that “she might have moved at some point
in the future and, at that time, might—but would not nec-
essarily—have incurred similar costs does not prohibit the
inference that [the] defendant’s conduct caused her to incur
the [security deposit] expense[.]” Id. Likewise, in this case,
because of defendant’s conduct, the victim needed to move
unexpectedly and on short notice. In so doing, she incurred
rental expenses. The possibility that she “might—but would
not necessarily—have incurred” rental expenses in the
future does not prohibit the trial court’s determination that
defendant’s conduct caused her to incur the rental expenses.
It was reasonably foreseeable that C would incur
rental expenses as a result of defendant’s criminal conduct
because prior to that criminal incident C was reliant on defen-
dant paying rental expenses, while she cared for their child.
Given the agreement and ongoing practice of defendant pay-
ing rental expenses for C, a reasonable person in defendant’s
position would have foreseen that C could reasonably incur
rental expenses should defendant’s conduct make C’s living
arrangement unsafe. See Ramos, 358 Or at 597 (providing
the test for reasonably foreseeable damages). It was reason-
able for a victim in C’s position to immediately remove herself
and her child from the apartment where defendant threat-
ened her and attempted to pull the child from her arms. The
trial court acknowledged that defendant would not have an
indefinite responsibility to pay for C’s rental expenses, but
that restitution for one month of rental expenses was appro-
priate given C’s reasonable need to unexpectedly and imme-
diately pay rental expenses that she would not have had to
pay but for defendant’s criminal conduct. We agree.
Affirmed.