District of Columbia v. R.W. — Certiorari Granted, Fourth Amendment Reasonable Suspicion Standard Clarified

--------- *The District of Columbia conceded that "Officer Vanterpool seized IR. W. when he first asked R. W. to put his hands up," so the D. C. Court of Appeals decided only "whether the facts then known by Officer

weight of each of the factors bearing on reasonable suspi- cion" before "weigh[ing] that information all together." Id., at 600 (internal quotation marks omitted). In the first step of this analysis, it held that the trial court had erred by con- sidering two factors: the radio dispatch call and the flight of R. W.'s companions. It "excis[ed]" those factors from the analysis. Id., at 597. It then concluded that, without more, the remaining facts--the late hour and the car's move- ment--did not give rise to reasonable suspicion. After the

1. C. Court of Appeals ruled, the District of Columbia sought certiorari. II The question is whether the facts available to Officer Vanterpool--before he ordered R. W. to put his hands up-- warranted the stop. In other words, we ask whether Officer Vanterpool had a reasonable suspicion that R. W. was en- gaged in criminal wrongdoing. Sokolow, 490 U. S., at 7-8. Such reasonable suspicion arises when, based on the "'to-

tality of the circumstances,' " the detaining officer had a " 'particularized and objective basis' " for suspecting crimi- nal wrongdoing. Arvizu, 534 U. S., at 273 (quoting United

States v. Cortez, 449 U. S. 411, 417 (1981)). Reasonable sus-

picion " 'depends on the factual and practical considerations

of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent men, not

legal technicians, act.' " Kansas v. Glover, 589 U. S. 376,

380 (2020) (quoting Prado Navarette v. California, 572 U. S.

393, 402 (2014)). It permits officers to make "'commonsense

judgments and inferences about human behavior.' " Glover, 589 U. S., at 380-381 (quoting Illinois v. Wardlow, 528

1. S. 119, 125 (2000)). On the facts of this case, Officer Vanterpool clearly had reasonable suspicion to stop R. W. Already on alert from

------------ Vanterpool created an objectively reasonable suspicion that criminal ac- tivity was afoot." 334 A. 3d, at 599 (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1, 21 (1968)).

4 DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA v. R.W.

the late-night dispatch call about a suspicious vehicle, the officer observed every person in R. W.'s car respond strangely to an approaching police car. Two people took off running. We have observed that "unprovoked flight upon noticing the police . . . . is certainly suggestive" of wrongdo- ing. Id., at 124. The driver, R. W., did not run from the car, but his companions' flight cast his presence in a suspicious light. After all, we have observed that " 'a car passenger . . .

will often be engaged in a common enterprise with the

driver, and have the same interest in concealing the fruits or the evidence of their wrongdoing.' " Maryland v. Pringle,

540 U. S. 366, 373 (2003) (quoting Wyoming v. Houghton,

526 U. S. 295, 304-305 (1999)). We need not determine whether that connection alone supported reasonable suspicion because R. W. was in the driver's seat and--after the passengers fled from the car-- began backing out of the parking space, ignoring the car's open back door. For most drivers, it would be a surprising event for their back-seat passengers to exit the car and run headlong away from them. But we doubt that most would respond by putting their car into reverse and attempting to drive away without at least checking whether the doors were closed. R. W.'s own actions--combined with the pan- icked flight of his companions--strongly suggested that he was (like them) engaged in unlawful conduct he wished to hide from police. See Sibron v. New York, 392 U. S. 40, 66 (1968) (recognizing that "deliberately furtive actions and flight at the approach of . . . law officers are strong indicia of mens rea"). III The D. C. Court of Appeals reached a different conclusion by "excis[ing]" the radio dispatch and the conduct of R. W.'s companions from the analysis, and considering only "the lateness of the hour and the slight movement of the car." 334 A. 3d, at 597. The totality-of-the-circumstances test,

5 Cite as: 608 U. S. ____ (2026)

however, "precludes this sort of divide-and-conquer analy- sis." Arvizu, 534 U. S., at 274. As our precedents have rec- ognized, "the whole is often greater than the sum of its parts--especially when the parts are viewed in isolation."

District of Columbia v. Wesby, 583 U. S. 48, 60-61 (2018).

Indeed, this case reveals the perils of reviewing facts piecemeal and without context. Take the passengers' flight from the car. We have little doubt that, in some circum- stances, an officer could not reasonably attribute his suspi- cion of a fleeing individual to bystanders milling nearby. Cf. Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U. S. 85, 91 (1979) (recognizing that "a person's mere propinquity to others independently suspected of criminal activity does not, without more, give rise to probable cause to search that person"). But the "whole picture" here tells a different story. Cortez, 449

1. S., at 417. After watching two people flee from a suspicious car, a reasonable officer surely would question the driver's next move. Why would the driver hurriedly back up the car without even closing a car door left open by his fleeing com- panions? Perhaps one could imagine an innocent explana- tion for such unusual behavior--the court below, for exam- ple, surmised that R. W. "may not even have noticed that his companions left the door open." 334 A. 3d, at 605. "But we have consistently recognized that reasonable suspicion 'need not rule out the possibility of innocent conduct.' "

Navarette, 572 U. S., at 403 (quoting Arvizu, 534 U. S., at

277). Based on everything the officer observed on the night in question, he drew the "commonsense inference" that all three people in the car--including the driver--were trying to hide wrongdoing from the police. Glover, 589 U. S., at

381.

"[T]he Fourth Amendment requires . . . that a court 'slosh [its] way through' a 'factbound morass.' " Barnes v. Felix,

605 U. S. 73, 80 (2025) (quoting Scott v. Harris, 550 U. S.

372, 383 (2007)). There may be no " 'easy-to-apply legal

6 DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA v. R.W.

test' " or " 'on/off switch' " in this context, Barnes, 605 U. S., at 80 (quoting Scott, 550 U. S., at 382-383), but one thing is clear: "The 'totality of the circumstances' requires courts to consider 'the whole picture,' " Wesby, 583 U. S., at 60 (quoting Cortez, 449 U. S., at 417). The D. C. Court of Ap- peals expressly declined to do that. 334 A. 3d, at 599. It instead considered only the observations that "(1) it was 2:00 a.m. and (2) R. W. reversed a few feet in a parking spot while the vehicle's rear door was open." Id., at 605. Ex- pressly "excis[ed]" from its analysis was, for example, the compelling fact that two individuals fled the vehicle as soon as they spotted the police car. Pretending that the most revealing aspect of the encounter did not happen is incom- patible with the totality-of-the-circumstances approach re- quired by our precedents.

• * * The petition for certiorari and R. W.'s motion to proceed

in forma pauperis are granted, the judgment of the District

of Columbia Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.

It is so ordered.

JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR would deny the petition for a writ of certiorari.

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA v. R.W.

ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA COURT OF APPEALS No. 25-248. Decided April 20, 2026

JUSTICE JACKSON, dissenting. The Fourth Amendment may require courts to "slosh . . . through a factbound morass." Ante, at 5 (internal quotation marks omitted). It does not require readers of judicial opin- ions to do the same. Any readable analysis will, of neces- sity, tick through factors, finding some weighty, others less so, and still others not at all, before piling them on a scale and assessing the result. That is what the court below did here, and it was right to do so. Announcing a conclusion without providing reasoning along the way is not helpful to the parties, the public, or the development of the law. To its credit, the Court applies a similar, factor-by-factor approach here. That the Court's analysis is comprehensible shows as much. Like the court below, the per curiam takes account of the facts in turn: a "late-night dispatch call about a suspicious vehicle"; R. W.'s companions' "unprovoked flight"; R. W.'s shift into reverse with a car door still ajar. Ante, at 4 (internal quotation marks omitted). And like the court below, the per curiam explains how much weight it assigns to each. Unprovoked flight, the Court says, is "cer- tainly suggestive" of wrongdoing. Ibid. (internal quotation marks omitted). "[C]ombined" with the flight, the Court continues, R. W.'s abrupt reversal "strongly suggested" wrongdoing. Ibid. This is how courts write opinions. So I am not sure why our Court sees fit to intervene in this case, let alone to do so summarily. If the intervention reflects a worry that the District of Columbia Court of Ap- peals (DCCA) misunderstands the Fourth Amendment's to- tality-of-the-circumstances analysis, that worry seems

2 DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA v. R.W. J

unfounded. The DCCA has grasped the correct inquiry. Its precedents rightly observe that "[t]he issue is not whether any one factor individually justifies a stop, but rather whether 'collectively' the totality of the circumstances sup- ports a determination that the officers had reasonable sus- picion for an investigatory stop." Parker v. United States, 333 A. 3d 1162, 1175 (2025) (citing Mayo v. United States, 315 A. 3d 606, 637 (2024) (en banc)); see also, e.g., Maye v. United States, 260 A. 3d 638, 647 (2021); Golden v. United States, 248 A. 3d 925, 941 (2021). If today's decision instead reflects dissatisfaction with the DCCA's comment that it " 'excis[ed]' " certain factors from its analysis, ante, at 4-5, I do not contest that this was poor word choice, see United States v. Arvizu, 534 U. S. 266, 274 (2002) (rejecting a "divide-and-conquer analysis"). But I do not think that word choice reflects a methodological error. Courts excise facts from their analyses every day. Opinion- writing is an exercise in culling the irrelevant; in applica- tion, no "totality-of-the-circumstances" test really lives up to its name. Indeed, today's per curiam necessarily omits a number of facts the Court finds insignificant--e.g., the make and model of the car, the precise location of the stop, the color of R. W.'s friends' clothing. Though it does not say so, the Court "excises" those facts, too. It does not thereby misapply the Fourth Amendment. If, finally, the Court's decision to intervene reflects disap- proval of the DCCA's assessment of which particular facts to weigh and to what extent, I cannot fathom why that kind of factbound determination warranted correction by this Court. The DCCA assigned no weight to two facts--the dis- patch call and the unprovoked flight. The Court does not seem to take issue with the first. For good reason: The DCCA reasonably applied our decisions explaining that an officer may not obtain reasonable suspicion by relying on the unsupported hunch of a fellow officer. See Whiteley v. Warden, Wyo. State Penitentiary, 401 U. S. 560, 568 (1971);

United States v. Hensley, 469 U. S. 221, 232 (1985). The Court may be right that the second--the unprovoked flight--should have borne some rather than no weight. But if this context-specific adjustment is all the per curiam seeks to achieve, it does not merit the use of our summary discretion. Even if I would have assigned more heft to a particular fact in my own first-instance assessment, I would not word- smith a lower court in this fashion. In my view, this is not a worthy accomplishment for the unusual step of summary reversal. Therefore, I respectfully dissent.

SAMANTHA ESTEFENIA FRANCISCO CASTRO v. JOSE LEONARDO BRITO GUEVARA

ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 25-666. Decided April 20, 2026

The petition for a writ of certiorari is denied. Statement of J USTICE SOTOMAYOR respecting the denial of certiorari. The Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of Interna- tional Child Abduction was adopted "in response to the problem of international child abductions during domestic disputes." Abbott v. Abbott, 560 U. S. 1, 8 (2010). When one parent "abducts a child and flees to another country," the Convention "generally requires that country to return the child immediately if the other parent requests return within one year." Lozano v. Montoya Alvarez, 572 U. S. 1, 4 (2014). If, however, the request is filed more than one year after the abduction, then under the "well-settled de- fense," the child may be permitted to remain in the new

country if " 'it is demonstrated that the child is now settled

in [his or her] new environment,' " id., at 5.

This case concerns A. F., a child born in Venezuela to pe-

titioner and respondent. In 2021, when A. F. was three years old, petitioner took A.F. without respondent's consent and left Venezuela for the United States. Respondent im- mediately sought her return through Venezuelan and U. S. authorities, but did not file this lawsuit until 2023. The District Court found that A. F. was well settled in the United States and should not be returned to Venezuela. The Fifth Circuit reversed and ordered A. F. to be returned. Petitioner then sought an emergency stay from this Court pending disposition of this petition for certiorari, arguing

2 FRANCISCO CASTRO v. BRITO GUEVARA

that a stay was necessary to preserve the status quo to al- low this Court to review an important issue that has divided the courts of appeals. The Court denied the appli- cation in November 2025 over two noted dissents, including mine. See 607 U. S. ___. Petitioner now asks this Court to address a narrow ques- tion: What standard of review should a court of appeals ap- ply when reviewing a district court's finding of whether a child is well settled in a new environment? The Fifth Cir- cuit held in this case that such findings are primarily legal in nature, and thus should be reviewed de novo. 155 F. 4th, at 361-363. As the Fifth Circuit acknowledged, its decision deepened an entrenched split among the Federal Courts of Appeals. Id., at 363, n. 40. At least three Circuits agree with the Fifth Circuit's position and have applied de novo review. See Alcala v. Hernandez, 826 F. 3d 161, 171, n. 7 (CA4 2016); In re B. Del C. S. B., 559 F. 3d 999, 1008 (CA9 2009); see also Lomanto v. Agbelusi, 2024 WL 3342415, *2 (CA2, July 9, 2024) (applying de novo review). Two other Circuits, however, treat these findings as primarily factual, and thus review them for clear error. See Da Costa v. De

Lima, 94 F. 4th 174, 181 (CA1 2024); Cuenca v. Rojas, 99

1. 4th 1344, 1350 (CA11 2024). This Circuit split warrants this Court's attention. When Congress codified the Hague Convention, it expressly "rec- ognize[d] . . . the need for uniform international interpreta- tion of the Convention." 22 U. S. C. §9001(b)(3)(B). Con- sistent with this congressional mandate, this Court regularly grants review in Hague Convention cases to re- solve Circuit splits. See, e.g., Golan v. Saada, 596 U. S. 666, 676, and n. 6 (2022); Monasky v. Taglieri, 589 U. S. 68, 76 (2020); Lozano, 572 U. S., at 10; Abbott, 560 U. S., at 7. The Court's review is also necessary because the decision below may be erroneous. In Monasky, this Court held that a District Court's finding that a child habitually resides in a country (that is, whether the child is "at home" in that

country) is a primarily factual finding that turns on the to- tality of the circumstances and must be reviewed for clear error. 589 U. S., at 84. "Clear-error review," the Court ex- plained, also "has a particular virtue in Hague Convention cases" because it "speeds up appeals and thus serves the Convention's premium on expedition." Ibid. Although this Court has not previously addressed the test for when a child is settled in a new environment, the lower courts have coa- lesced around weighing as many as seven nondispositive factors like the child's age, the stability and duration of the child's residence, the child's attendance in school, the child's friends and family in the area, the child's immigra- tion status, and more. 155 F. 4th, at 360-361 (listing seven factors); accord, Alcala, 826 F. 3d, at 171; Lozano v. Alvarez, 697 F. 3d 41, 57 (CA2 2012), aff 'd on other grounds, 572 U. S. 1; In re B. Del C. S. B., 559 F. 3d, at 1009. This mul- tifactor test is similar to the totality-of-the-circumstances test for habitual residence that this Court adopted in

Monasky. See 155 F. 4th, at 369-373 (Douglas, J., dissent-

ing). Moreover, whether a child is "at home" in one country is the converse of whether the child has become "well set- tled" in another country. See In re B. Del C. S. B., 559 F. 3d, at 1008 (explaining that the two tests are "analogous"). As a result, Monasky suggests that clear-error review also should apply to a finding that a child is well settled. Nevertheless, I concur in the denial of certiorari in this case because it is not an appropriate vehicle for this Court's review. After this Court denied the emergency stay appli- cation, A. F. returned to Venezuela in January 2026. Even if this Court were to grant the petition for certiorari now and rule for petitioner next Term, A. F. likely would not re- turn to the United States for over a year, if not longer, given the Court's typical schedule for deciding cases and the pos- sible need for further proceedings on remand. By that point, the well-settled analysis would look very different. Then, it would not be clear that returning to this country a

4 FRANCISCO CASTRO v. BRITO GUEVARA

year from now would be in A. F.'s best interests. See Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, Mar. 26, 1986, T. I. A. S. No. 11670, S. Treaty Doc. No. 99-11, p. 7 (placing "paramount importance" on "the interests of children"). Today, A. F. is eight years old, and it could greatly disturb her formative years to uproot her life yet again. Had the Court granted a stay last fall, it would have pre- vented all this potential disruption and maintained the pre- suit status quo because A. F. could have stayed in the United States pending the disposition of this case. The Court should have done so: Preserving the presuit status quo to enable later review by this Court of an issue worthy of certiorari, after all, is a hallmark reason for this Court to grant emergency interim relief. See, e.g., Whole Woman's

Health v. Jackson, 594 U. S. __, __ (2021) (R OBERTS, C. J., dissenting from denial of application for injunctive relief) (slip op., at 2) ("I would grant preliminary relief to preserve the status quo ante"). The Court chose otherwise, and the predictable consequences have followed. I therefore concur in the denial of certiorari in light of these changed circum- stances and the Hague Convention's central emphasis on the child's well-being.