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March 27, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

Com. v. Toliver, I.

Superior Court of Pennsylvania

• Citations: 2026 Pa. Super. 63
• Docket Number: 2395 EDA 2024

• Judges: Ford Elliott

• Opinion

• Authorities (23)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (9.5K)

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Lead Opinion

                        by [Kate Ford Elliott](https://www.courtlistener.com/person/8229/kate-ford-elliott/)

J-S30038-25 2026 PA Super 63

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
Appellant :
:
:
v. :
:
:
IMAIR B. TOLIVER : No. 2395 EDA 2024

Appeal from the Order Entered August 21, 2024
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at
No(s): CP-51-CR-0004775-2023

BEFORE: OLSON, J., MURRAY, J., and FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E. *

OPINION BY FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.: FILED MARCH 27, 2026

Appellant, the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, appeals the August 21,

2024 order granting the omnibus pre-trial suppression motion filed by

Appellee, Imair B. Toliver.1 After careful review, we reverse the suppression

order and remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

In this case, the police charged Appellee with carrying a firearm without

a license and carrying a firearm on public streets or public property in

Philadelphia.2 See Bills of Information, 7/18/23, 1. The suppression court

summarized the relevant facts and suppression ruling as follows:

---

• Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

1 The Commonwealth certified that the suppression court’s August 21, 2024

order will terminate or substantially handicap its prosecution of this case. See
Notice of Appeal, 8/29/24, 1.

2 18 Pa.C.S. §§ 6106(a)(1), 6108.
J-S30038-25

The evidence adduced at the [suppression] hearing showed that[,]
on June 19, 2023, [i]n the 700 block of West Erie Avenue, Police
Officer Chris Irwin and his partner conducted a vehicle stop for
expired registration. [Appellee] was the front seat passenger in
the vehicle[,] and his father was the driver. Officer Irwin’s body
worn camera video of the vehicle stop was played for th[e c]ourt
at the hearing. When Officer Irwin initially approached the
vehicle, he first spoke to [Appellee’s] father and asked him for his
license and registration. He also asked whether anyone in the
vehicle had a license to carry a firearm. [Appellee’s] father denied
having a license to carry while [Appellee] stared straight ahead
and did not respond. Officer Irwin then asked whether there was
a firearm in the vehicle and both [Appellee] and his father shook
their heads[,] “[N]o.”

Officer Irwin testified that he returned to his police vehicle to run
their [identification cards], and from where he was sitting inside
the police vehicle, he could “see movement to the right and left of
the vehicle, reaching around, stuff that kind of just was maybe
suspicious.” He further testified that [Appellee] was “bending in
an abnormal position,” and “you could tell they were not reaching
for something that you normally reach for. It was a quicker
movement on the side of both seats.”

Officer Irwin exited his police vehicle and approached [Appellee]
on the passenger side. He testified that[,] as he approached, he
saw [Appellee] reach down “to the right side between the arm and
the door as to be clenching something. Not in his fist, almost like
his forearm against his body, which made me suspicious.” Officer
Irwin asked the driver to turn off the vehicle[,] and he took
possession of the keys. He then ordered [Appellee] and his father
to exit the vehicle. Once [Appellee] was out of the vehicle, Officer
Irwin placed [Appellee’s] hands on the roof of the car. Officer
Irwin then noticed the butt end of a pistol sticking out of the rear
pocket of [Appellee’s] athletic shorts and immediately put him in
handcuffs. While he was placing the [hand]cuffs, Officer Irwin
asked [Appellee] whether he had a license to carry a firearm and
[Appellee] responded, “[N]o.” Officer Irwin then placed [Appellee]
into the back of the police vehicle.

At the conclusion of the argument from both counsel, th[e
suppression c]ourt granted [Appellee’s] motion to suppress,
finding that Officer Irwin did not have independent reasonable
suspicion, under [Commonwealth v. Hicks, 208 A.3d 916 (Pa.

-2-
J-S30038-25

2019)], to inquire whether [Appellee] had a license to carry a
firearm.

Suppression Court Opinion, 12/20/24, 2-3 (record citations omitted; section

breaks added).

In their proper context, Officer Irwin described the movement he saw in

the vehicle as follows:

Q. Can you describe the movement you saw?

A. Bending in an abnormal position. It wasn’t like reaching
forward to the glove box, it was more like reaching down to the
left side of the seat in between the center console, reaching down
to the right side.

Q. And where was the movement coming from?

A. The passenger side.

Q. Passenger side. Did you notice anything else in terms of
movement? How quick were they?

A. They were, like I said, you could tell they were not reaching
for something that you normally reach for. It was a quicker
movement on the side of both seats.

N.T. Suppression Hearing, 8/21/24, 14-15. Officer Irwin testified that the

observed movements continued upon the officers’ return to the vehicle after

conducting the identification check:

Q. Can you just describe why took you [sic] the actions you
took in the portion [of the body camera footage] that we just saw?

A. The vehicle was still on as I approached the passenger side.
[Appellee] immediately reached down to the right side of his leg
in between --

Q. Excuse me. The passenger you said?

-3-
J-S30038-25

A. Yes. As you go inside of the vehicle, he reached down to
the right side between the arm and his [sic] of the door as to be
clenching something. Not in his fist, almost like his forearm
against his body, which made me suspicious. You can’t see it on
the camera, my partner is still in the vehicle[,] and I asked him to
approach with me. He comes up, just for a safety measure, I ask
them to turn the vehicle off and took possession of the keys.

Id. at 16.

Officer Irwin testified that he saw the end of the pistol sticking out of

the pocket of Appellee’s shorts upon Appellee’s removal from the vehicle:

A. … [W]e had the passengers come of the vehicle. Coming
out of the vehicle, I placed [Appellee’s] hands on the vehicle[,]
and I noticed the butt end of the pistol. He had kind of like athletic
shorts on, so it was sticking out of the pocket, the right pocket. I
then placed my hand over the top, just to verify it was not a cell
phone or wallet. At that time[,] it was an L-shaped metal object.
Like I said, I could see the butt end of a pistol and he was
detained.

---

I noticed the buttstock on [the gun] from the texture. I could see
the magazine as well.

N.T. Suppression Hearing, 8/21/24, 16-17. Officer Irwin then asked Appellee

“for a second time if he was licensed to carry,” to which Appellee said, “No.”

Id. at 18. “At that time[, Appellee] was detained and arrested and put in the

back of the car.” Id.

At the suppression hearing, Officer Irwin was the lone testifying witness.

See N.T. Suppression Hearing, 8/21/24, 9-25. Appellee’s counsel did not

contest the reason for the car stop. See id. at 4. Prior to the presentation of

the evidence, Appellee argued that the gun and Appellee’s answer to the post-

discovery-of-the-gun question about whether he had a firearm license should

-4-
J-S30038-25

have been suppressed because he was arrested without probable cause and

the officers asked him “too late” about firearm licensing:

[APPELLEE’S COUNSEL]: … Upon approach of the vehicle,
according to the officers, my client was acting nervous[,] and they
ordered my client to be removed from the vehicle. I’ll suggest
ordinarily they can ask people to be removed from the vehicle.
However, I would suggest their detention went further than what
the law has allowed. They immediately cuffed him and[,] at some
point, they claimed to have seen a firearm on his person or in a
pocket nearby. In the midst of that, they cuff him and then ask
him -- after he’s detained and arrested, I would suggest they ask
him if he had a license to carry when he was not Mirandized for
that. I’ll suggest it does not reach the requisite probable cause to
take those actions and ask questions under Hicks. I suggest it’s
too late. It’s not under a mere encounter while my client was in
custody, he wasn’t Mirandized at that point. So[,] for those
reasons, Judge, I would move to suppress the firearm and the
statement for my client that they elicited suggesting that he did
not have a license to carry, which I would suggest also would
eradicate the arrest in this case.

---

I would suggest that he was more than detained. I would also
suggest that it is not what the officer’s opinion is, it’s going to be
Your Honor’s opinion based on the officer’s body cam[era] and
him saying, I’m only detaining you, but I’ll suggest at that point,
it’s common sense to say they’re not.

Id. at 5.

During arguments by counsel following the presentation of the

evidence, the court agreed that Appellee did not respond to the first question

about whether he had a license to carry a firearm. See N.T. Suppression

Hearing, 8/21/24, 26. Appellee’s counsel then renewed his earlier argument

that Appellee was under arrest at the moment he was handcuffed, there was

-5-
J-S30038-25

no probable cause for that arrest, and any response to the second question

about licensure was inadmissible in the absence of a Miranda3 warning:

[Appellee’s Counsel]: He actually nodded his head no to the
weapon. The only time any audible or inaudible response came
to a question -- now we’re talking about Hicks … the only time an
audible response came with regards to that question was after he
was placed in [hand]cuffs. You Honor can clearly hear as I
suggested, he was pulled out of a car, if we’re taking the officer’s
credibility, he saw a firearm in plain view, I would suggest he’s
within his rights, I guess, [to] secure himself, but not question
him with regards to whether or not he had a license to carry or
not without Miranda [warnings] because he is in custody at that
point. The keys to the vehicle have been turned off, he’s in
[hand]cuffs, there’s armed police officers, we’re no longer in the
mere encounter stage. The mere encounter stage is when we
walk up. So I would suggest that this arrest was therefore
unlawful. There was no probable cause. The way they could have
gotten probable cause was a variety of ways. First, do a check to
say, [“]Hey, we recovered a gun,[”] let me check. Two, Mirandize
him and then ask him to give [an] answer or whatever it is. But
that didn’t happen here. What happened is what happened.

So what happened was … no question was asked of him. I would
suggest if I was in the car with dad, and they asked him if he had
a license [to] carry, that doesn’t matter. I don’t even know -- said
father-son relationship, but even in the sequestration that didn’t
make it on this record -- but even if that was the case, we’re on a
slippery slope of what dad of an adult son knows or doesn’t know.
That question, I suggest, was not posed to him and if it was, there
was no answer. I just want to point those two facts out, Judge.

Id. at 26-27.

The Commonwealth argued in response that the police officers were

permitted to remove Appellee from the car at which time they saw the gun

---

3 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).

-6-
J-S30038-25

protruding from Appellee’s shorts and were allowed to frisk him to confirm the

existence of the gun:

[The Prosecutor]: … We then move back to the police vehicle,
where this officer specifically testified that he sees for the duration
of about a minute, the passenger side movements within the
vehicle. As if, you know, ducking down and what have you in
terms of the movements that he sees in the vehicle from, you
know, I think he said an estimate of 30 seconds to a minute in
the vehicle itself. That, again, raises his decisions that there may
be something present in the vehicle like a firearm. That’s why he
then moves during the second interaction, moving up to the
vehicle on the passenger side. So whatever he saw in that vehicle
made him respond to that passenger side of the vehicle. During
that interaction, Your Honor, I think the officer once again asks
those questions of [Appellee] and, again, I’ll defer to the video,
but I don’t believe -- I believe at one point [Appellee] did give a
response and shook his head no or said no. In regards to that,
You Honor, the officer did say that he saw [Appellee] on that
second approach, put his arm down, I think he said clenching or
said he looked to be moving his arm quick down to his side. He
then approaches the -- because the vehicle is still running -- the
driver’s side, he asks for the driver to turn off the vehicle and the
keys. The officer then goes back to the passenger side and asked
the passenger to get out of the vehicle, which according to
Pennsylvania v. Mimms, [434 U.S. 106 (1977),] he has a right
to do. He then sees in plain view, a butt of a firearm sticking out
of the gym shorts of [Appellee]. He then, again pats down
[Appellee] to confirm that it is indeed what he believes to be,
because it’s the same model and type that he carries. And just
upon plain touch, he can tell immediately that it is a firearm given
the fact that those prior interactions, the prior observations, and
I would say, the prior statement that there is no weapon in the
vehicle, no firearm in the vehicle, definitely rises to the level of a
lawful stop here in regards to detaining [Appellee] because he now
has just confirmed there is indeed not only a firearm in the vehicle,
but on [Appellee’s] specific person who we just observed and
heard from during his interactions with the vehicle during the stop.

And then in regards to the statement made after when he’s in
essentially handcuffs about the license to carry, I think is only
confirming what he already knows to be true in terms of that there

-7-
J-S30038-25

is a firearm in the vehicle and that he, [Appellee], does not have
a license to carry. But, again, I would say that there’s already
statements made beforehand that are not made prior for any kind
of arrest, I would say.

N.T. Suppression Hearing, 8/21/24, 28-30.

The two issues focused on in the ensuing arguments of counsel were

whether Appellee was subjected to an arrest lacking in probable cause, and,

if the firearm was recovered as a result of that arrest, whether Appellee’s

admission as to his lack of a license to carry a concealed firearm was the

product of a custodial interrogation absent any Miranda warning. See N.T.

Suppression Hearing, 8/21/24, 25-46. After consideration of the arguments

made, the court granted the suppression motion based on its understanding

that the ruling was dictated by our Supreme Court’s decision in Hicks:

THE COURT: I have to grant this motion to suppress. Hicks is
the winner today. There is case[ ]law that suggested being
arrested, even being [hand]cuffed, even being put in the back of
a police car[,] may not constitute an arrest, the custodial
detention is a totality of the circumstances issue, but that Hicks
case says that [the] officer should have checked before he asked
this question.

N.T. Suppression Hearing, 8/21/24, 46.

The Commonwealth timely appealed. See Notice of Appeal, 8/29/24,

1. The Commonwealth and the suppression court have both satisfied their

obligations under Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 1925. See Order

(Rule 1925(b)), 10/21/24, 1; Rule 1925(b) Statement, 10/29/24, 1;

Suppression Court Opinion, 12/20/24, 1-12.

-8-
J-S30038-25

In its Rule 1925(a) opinion, the suppression court expands its original

explanation for the grant of the suppression motion, rejecting the existence

of furtive movements by Appellee and finding that Appellee’s lie about the

absence of a weapon in the car did not amount to reasonable suspicion of

criminal activity:

In the case at bar, the police improperly asked [Appellee] whether
he had a firearms license without reasonable suspicion during an
otherwise valid motor vehicle stop. The record shows that the
police pulled over [Appellee’s] father for driving with an expired
registration and lawfully requested identification, asked whether
there were any weapons in the car, instructed both [Appellee] and
his father to exit the vehicle, and placed [Appellee] in handcuffs
for officer safety. However, after listening to Officer Irwin’s
testimony and watching the body worn camera footage at the
suppression hearing, th[e suppression c]ourt found that the police
officers had no reasonable suspicion to further investigate whether
[Appellee] had a valid firearms license. A review of the record
shows that when police asked whether [Appellee] or his father had
a license to carry, [Appellee] remained silent and did not reply.
Granted, [Appellee] was untruthful about whether he had
a gun in the car; however, telling a lie while not under oath
is not a crime. In addition, Officer Irwin testified that from where
he was sitting in the police car behind [Appellee’s] father vehicle
he could see “movement,” “reaching around, stuff that kind of just
was maybe suspicious” and that “you could tell they were not
reaching for something that you would normally reach for.”
Officer Irwin further stated that[,] as he approached[,] he saw
[Appellee] reach to the right side and clench something.
However, th[e suppression c]ourt did not find that these
were “furtive movements” that would give rise to the
reasonable suspicion that [Appellee] was engaged in
criminal activity as the officer was extremely vague and
equivocal when he testified regarding what he claimed he
could see. Th[e suppression c]ourt further found that there was
no evidence that [Appellee] displayed any nervousness.

-9-
J-S30038-25

Suppression Court Opinion, 12/20/24, 8-9 (emphasis added; record and

caselaw citations omitted). The court’s post-hearing findings that Appellee’s

movements were not furtive, and did not give rise to reasonable suspicion

differed from the court’s contemporaneous remarks to counsel at the

suppression hearing. See N.T. Suppression Hearing, 8/21/24, 34 (“These

could all be considered furtive movements.”); id. at 43 (“You reminded me

somehow that this pat down happened, I hope you’re listening, [Appellee’s

counsel], because he’s [(the prosecutor)] getting this reasonable suspicion

which even though he has right to take him out of the car to pat him down

based on all of the furtive movements, but he sees the gun.”).

The court also explains in its Rule 1925(a) opinion that the statement

confirming the absence of a concealed carry license had to be suppressed

because – given its finding of a lack of reasonable suspicion – the police had

no reason to inquire as to Appellee’s licensing status:

Without any independent reasonable suspicion to believe that
criminal activity was afoot, the police had no basis to investigate
whether [Appellee] had a license to carry the firearm concealed
on his person. As discussed above, simply carrying a firearm,
even a concealed one, is not a sufficient basis “to create a
reasonable suspicion that the individual may be dangerous, such
that an officer can approach the individual and briefly detain him
in order to investigate whether the person is properly licensed.”
Once [Appellee] was outside of the car in handcuffs, and the gun
was secure, there was no reason for the police to inquire whether
he had a license to carry as this was not in any way connected to
the purpose of the routine traffic stop for expired registration.
Since police did not have any reasonable suspicion to believe
[Appellee] was involved in any kind of criminal activity, this
[c]ourt properly granted [Appellee’s] motion to suppress the gun
and the statements given to police.

• 10 - J-S30038-25

Suppression Court Opinion, 12/20/24, 9-10 (citations omitted).

The court clarified that it concluded there was nothing unlawful about

the manner in which the police came into the possession of Appellee’s gun,

but it reasoned that the questioning about whether Appellee had a firearms

license required suppression of both the gun and Appellee’s statement in

response to the licensing question:

This [c]ourt acknowledges that under the law of this
Commonwealth, the police had the lawful right to seize
[Appellee’s] firearm for officer safety during a motor vehicle stop.
However, the police did not have reasonable suspicion to ask
[Appellee] about whether he had a license to carry a firearm and
then arrest him for firearms violations when he said he did not.
[T]his [c]ourt did not give great weight to Officer Irwin’s testimony
regarding alleged furtive movements and did not find that
[Appellee] displayed any nervousness during the traffic stop that
would give rise to suspicion. Without any independent basis for
believing [Appellee] was engaged in criminal activity, the police
had no reasonable basis to inquire into [whether Appellee had a]
license to carry a firearm.

Suppression Court Opinion, 12/20/24, 10 (citation omitted). The suppression

court further explained that the lack of a Miranda warning played no factor

in its suppression decision: “At no time did this [c]ourt find that [Appellee]

was subjected to custodial interrogation; rather, this [c]ourt found that the

police officers, who already had [Appellee’s] identification, should have

checked their databases before questioning [Appellee] regarding his licensure

status.” Id. at 10-11.

The Commonwealth presents the following questions for our review:

• 11 - J-S30038-25

I. Did the trial court err by suppressing a firearm seized from
[Appellee] during a lawful Terry[4] frisk, after he lied to
police about possessing a firearm and made furtive,
reaching movements in the vehicle?

II. Did the trial court err by suppressing [Appellee’s] admission
that he did not have a permit to possess a firearm, as well
as the firearm itself as a supposed fruit of that admission,
based on the court’s apparent conclusion that the officer
could theoretically have verified [Appellee’s] permit status
by a different method?

Appellant’s Brief, 3 (references to answers of the suppression court omitted;

emphasis in original, citation formatted).

In the first issue presented, the Commonwealth asserts that the

suppression court erred by misapplying Hicks: “Because Hicks does not

prohibit police officers from relying on contextual factors beyond the mere

presence of a firearm to determine whether reasonable suspicion exists, the

suppression court’s legal conclusion was erroneous.” Appellant’s Brief, 10

(emphasis in original). The Commonwealth concedes that, under Hicks, the

mere possession of a firearm is not suggestive of criminal activity, but asserts

that there were “specific and articulable facts and rational inferences from

those facts,” beyond mere possession of a firearm, that gave rise to

reasonable suspicion in order to permit an investigative detention of Appellee.

See Appellant’s Brief, 11-12. In support of a finding of reasonable suspicion,

the Commonwealth relies on Appellee’s denial of the presence of a firearm in

the car, prior to the plain view discovery of the firearm protruding from his

---

4 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).

• 12 - J-S30038-25

pocket, and the furtive movements described by the investigating police

officer. See id. at 12-14.

In response, Appellee argues that the firearm was improperly seized by

police as a result of a Terry frisk that was improperly conducted in the

absence of reasonable suspicion. See Appellee’s Brief, 7-12. He

acknowledges that the police officers were generally permitted to remove him

from his father’s vehicle and concedes that the officers lawfully handcuffed

him and took possession of the firearm from him for their safety, but he

maintains that point “should have been the end of the traffic stop, as it related

to [him].” Id. at 10-11. He alleges that police “had no reason to continu[e]

the questioning of [him], after obtaining all [the] necessary information to

complete the traffic investigation of [his] father,” and that there was a lack of

reasonable suspicion “to pursue an additional investigation of [him].” 5 Id. at

11. He notes that the suppression court was “unconvinced by the vague

testimony pertaining to ‘furtive movements’” and that the court found that

there was no evidence of any nervousness on his part. Id. at 11-12. Although

the suppression court found that he lied about the absence of a firearm in the

car, see Suppression Court Opinion, 12/20/24, 9 (“Granted, [Appellee] was

untruthful about whether he had a gun in the car…”), Appellee’s analysis of

---

5 To the extent that Appellee asserts that the car stop had already concluded

with respect to his father at the time of the recovery of the firearm from him,
the suppression court did not make any such finding and we unable to discern
any evidence from the record reflecting that the car stop otherwise concluded
prior to the firearm’s recovery.

• 13 - J-S30038-25

the instant issue instead suggests that no lie occurred and that he was merely

unresponsive as to the question about the existence of a firearm in the car.

See Appellee’s Brief, 10 (“Officers further questioned the occupants regarding

any firearms located within the vehicle, to which Appellee did not respond.”). 6

We must review the order granting Appellee’s motion to suppress under

the following standard:

When the Commonwealth appeals from a suppression order, we
follow a clearly defined standard of review and consider only the
evidence from the defendant’s witnesses together with the
evidence of the prosecution that, when read in the context of the
entire record, remains uncontradicted. The suppression court’s
findings of fact bind an appellate court if the record supports those
findings. The suppression court’s conclusions of law, however, are
not binding on an appellate court, whose duty is to determine if
the suppression court properly applied the law to the facts.

Our standard of review is restricted to establishing whether the
record supports the suppression court’s factual findings; however,
we maintain de novo review over the suppression court’s legal
conclusions.

---

6 The suppression court’s recitation of the facts and the body worn camera
footage reflect that, at the start of the traffic stop, Officer Irwin inquired both
about whether anyone in the vehicle had a license to carry a firearm and
whether there was a firearm in the vehicle. See Suppression Court Opinion,
12/20/24, 2; Police Body Camera Footage, 1:42-1:49. The court’s opinion
and the body worn camera footage reflect that Appellee did not offer a
response to the initial licensing question but responded, “No,” to the question
about whether there was a firearm in the car. See Suppression Court Opinion,
12/20/24, 2; Police Body Camera Footage, 1:42-1:49. In that same footage,
Appellee merely stares at the officer and gives no response to the licensing
question but clearly shakes his head to indicate, “No,” to the firearm question
and says, “No, sir,” to the officer. Id. at 1:46-1:49.

• 14 - J-S30038-25

Commonwealth v. Korn, 139 A.3d 249, 252-53 (Pa. Super. 2016) (citations

omitted and formatting altered).

From the parties’ briefs, we can infer that two facts are in dispute: (1)

whether Appellant answered, “No, sir,” to the officer’s question about the

presence of firearms in the car; and (2) whether Officer Irwin observed furtive

movements by Appellee. Appellee denies that he offered a response to Officer

Irwin’s question about firearms. See Appellee’s Brief, 2. For that stance, he

relies on Officer Irwin’s testimony that was unclear on that point. See id.;

see also N.T. Suppression Hearing, 8/21/24, 21 (“I don’t know because he

was interacting with my partner or --”). Because the suppression court found

that Appellee answered, “No,” to the question, and that finding was supported

by the body worn camera footage viewed at the suppression hearing, it is

binding on us. See Suppression Court Opinion, 12/20/24, 2; Police Body

Camera Footage, 1:42-1:49.

As to the existence of furtive movements by Appellee, we noted above

that the suppression court’s position on that has been inconsistent. While the

court’s comments at the hearing suggested there was furtive movement, see

N.T. Suppression Hearing, 8/21/24, 34, 43, the court’s Rule 1925(a) opinion

conclusively finds that the actions described were not furtive movements. See

Suppression Court Opinion, 12/20/24, 10 (“th[e c]ourt did not find that these

were ‘furtive movements’ that would rise to reasonable suspicion”); id. at 11

(“th[e c]ourt did not give great weight to Officer Irwin’s testimony regarding

alleged furtive movements”). Given that the suppression court rejected

• 15 - J-S30038-25

Officer Irwin’s testimony on this point in its Rule 1925(a) opinion and the

officer’s body worn camera footage did not offer an adequate vantage point

for assessing the court’s finding, we are bound to accept the court’s finding as

to an absence of furtive movements.7 See Commonwealth v. Layer, 340

A.3d 352, 359 (Pa. Super. 2025) (en banc) (“it is the sole province of the

suppression court to weigh the credibility of the witnesses. Further, the

suppression court judge is entitled to believe all, part or none of the evidence

presented”).

The Commonwealth argues that the suppression court erred by

misapplying Hicks and determining that the police had no right to lawfully

seize the gun that the police officer saw protruding from Appellee’s pocket. 8

---

7 At the end of the suppression hearing, the court did not “enter on the record

a statement of findings of facts and conclusions of law” as required by our
rules of criminal procedure. See Pa.R.Crim.P. 581(I). We disapprove of such
non-compliance with the unambiguous mandate in Rule 581(I) as, among
other reasons, it may permit the losing party to make a more intelligent
assessment of whether or not to pursue an appeal, and, in the instant case,
would have provided a clearer record of the court’s findings of fact.
Notwithstanding the violation of that rule here, a remand would not serve the
interests of judicial economy or justice as we can discern the findings of facts
and conclusions of law of the suppression court from its Rule 1925(a) opinion.
See Commonwealth v. Millner, 888 A.2d 680, 689 (Pa. 2005) (we may
consider the merits of an appeal if “a remand for compliance [with Rule 581(I)]
would not serve the interests of judicial economy or justice”);
Commonwealth v. Reppert, 814 A.2d 1196, 1200 (Pa. Super. 2002) (en
banc) (proceeding with suppression review “constrained to focus” on a
suppression court’s Rule 1925(a) opinion, where the suppression court did not
enter findings of fact on the record at the conclusion of the suppression
hearing).

(Footnote Continued Next Page)

• 16 - J-S30038-25

As will be explained in greater detail below, we agree with the Commonwealth

that Hicks was inapplicable to the instant case because Appellee’s detected

lie about the absence of a firearm gave rise to reasonable suspicion to permit

an investigative detention of Appellee. Analysis of this claim requires us to

review, in addition to our general suppression standards, the holdings of our

Supreme Court in Hicks, which the suppression court stated below as its

primary basis for granting Appellee’s motion, and our own prior opinion in

Commonwealth v. Malloy, 257 A.3d 142 (Pa. Super. 2021), on which the

suppression court additionally relies.

“The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I,

Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution guarantee the right of the people

to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and possessions from

unreasonable searches and seizures.” Commonwealth v. Joyner, 348 A.3d

230, 236 (Pa. Super. 2025). Our Supreme Court has identified three types of

warrantless interactions between law enforcement and private citizens in the

context of suppression review:

---

8 The Commonwealth’s argument overlooks that the suppression court ruled

the gun was properly seized as a matter of ensuring the officers’ safety during
the car stop. See Suppression Court Opinion, 12/20/24, 10 (“Th[e c]ourt
acknowledges that under the law of this Commonwealth, the police had the
lawful right to seize [Appellee’s] firearm for officer safety during a motor
vehicle stop.”). Nevertheless, we must review the Commonwealth’s argument
that there was reasonable suspicion for the seizure as the record demonstrates
that the police obviously retained the firearm for purposes other than officer
safety, even if the gun was initially seized for officer safety.

• 17 - J-S30038-25

The first is a mere encounter, sometimes referred to as a
consensual encounter, which does not require the officer to have
any suspicion that the citizen is or has been engaged in criminal
activity. This interaction also does not compel the citizen to stop
or respond to the officer. A mere encounter does not constitute a
seizure, as the citizen is free to choose whether to engage with
the officer and comply with any requests made or, conversely, to
ignore the officer and continue on his or her way. The second
type of interaction, an investigative detention, is a temporary
detention of a citizen. This interaction constitutes a seizure of a
person, and to be constitutionally valid[,] police must have a
reasonable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot. The third, a
custodial detention, is the functional equivalent of an arrest and
must be supported by probable cause. A custodial detention also
constitutes a seizure.

No bright lines separate these types of encounters, but the United
State Supreme Court has established an objective test by which
courts may ascertain whether a seizure has occurred to elevate
the interaction beyond a mere encounter. The test, often referred
to as the “free to leave test,” requires the court to determine
whether, taking into account all of the circumstances surrounding
the encounter, the police would have communicated to a
reasonable person that he was not at liberty to ignore the police
presence and go about his business. Whenever a police officer
accosts an individual and restrains his freedom to walk away, he
has seized that person.

Commonwealth v. Adams, 205 A.3d 1195, 1199-1200 (Pa. 2019) (citations,

brackets, and some quotation marks omitted).

As to the second type of encounter, an investigative detention, our

Supreme Court has noted:

To maintain constitutional validity, an investigative detention
must be supported by a reasonable and articulable suspicion that
the person seized is engaged in criminal activity and may continue
only so long as is necessary to confirm or dispel such suspicion.
The asserted grounds for an investigative detention must be
evaluated under the totality of the circumstances. So long as the
initial detention is lawful, nothing precludes a police officer from
acting upon the fortuitous discovery of evidence suggesting a

• 18 - J-S30038-25

different crime than that initially suspected—such as the odor of
alcohol on the breath of a driver[.] However, an unjustified
seizure immediately violates the Fourth Amendment rights of the
suspect, taints the evidence recovered thereby, and subjects that
evidence to the exclusionary rule.

Hicks, 208 A.3d at 927-28 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).

At the start of this case, Appellee was a passenger in his father’s car

that was lawfully stopped with respect to an expired vehicle registration. We

note that the police officers were permitted to order Appellee to exit the car

without any need for reasonable suspicion prior to that removal. See

Commonwealth v. Pratt, 930 A.2d 561, 564 (Pa. Super. 2007) (“[F]ollowing

a lawful traffic stop, an officer may order both the driver and passenger of a

vehicle to exit the vehicle until the traffic stop is completed, even absent a

reasonable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot[.]”). After Appellee

complied and exited from the car, the investigating police officer was able to

see, in plain view, from a lawful vantage point, that the end of a gun was

protruding from Appellee’s pocket. See N.T. Suppression Hearing, 8/21/24,

1. The question for the suppression court, and now our Court, is whether

the viewing of that gun permitted the officers to deviate from their pursuit of

the traffic stop to subject Appellee to an investigative detention concerning

the legality of his possession of the gun. The Commonwealth maintains that

there was reasonable suspicion to subject Appellee to an investigative

detention whereas Appellee asserts that the removal of the gun “should have

been the end of the traffic stop, as it related to Appellee” and the officers

• 19 - J-S30038-25

should not have “extended the purpose of the traffic stop.” Appellee’s Brief,

11; see also Appellant’s Brief, 13-14.

As we have addressed previously, police officers, during the course of a

traffic stop are permitted to take action to both “address the traffic violation”

as well as to “attend to related safety concerns” and, in the course of those

tasks, may inquire as to whether persons present in the stopped vehicle are

in possession of a weapon such as a firearm:

The “mission” of a traffic stop is to “address the traffic violation”
underlying the stop as well to “attend to related safety concerns.”
Commonwealth v. Ross, 297 A.3d 787, 792 (Pa. Super. 2023)
(citation omitted). An officer’s mission includes “inquiries incident
to the traffic stop[,] such as checking the driver’s license,”
registration[,] and insurance[,] and determining whether the
driver has any outstanding warrants. Id. (citation omitted).
Importantly:

[T]asks relating to officer safety are also part of a
traffic stop’s mission when done purely in an interest
to protect the officers. This safety interest stems from
the fact that traffic stops are especially fraught with
danger to police officers, so an officer may need to
take certain negligibly burdensome precautions to
complete his mission safely.

Id. at 792-93 (quotation marks and citations omitted).

As such, there are certain “actions police officers may undertake
during a lawful traffic stop based solely on concerns for their
safety and security and without independent justification or
cause.” Id. at 798. The legality of these actions involves
balancing of the public interest in ensuring the safety of police
officers against an “individual’s right to personal security free from
arbitrary interference by law officers.” Pennsylvania v. Mimms,
434 U.S. 106, 109 (citation omitted). In balancing those
interests, precedent has established, for example, that an “officer
may order the driver of a vehicle to exit the vehicle until the traffic

• 20 - J-S30038-25

stop is completed, even absent a reasonable suspicion that
criminal activity is afoot.” Commonwealth v. Wright, 224 A.3d
1104, 1109 (Pa. Super. 2019) (citations, ellipses and brackets
omitted). It has also established that, to protect their own safety,
officers may ask drivers whether they have a weapon as a matter
of course during a traffic stop. See Commonwealth v. Clinton,
905 A.2d 1026, 1031 (Pa. Super. 2006) (stating that asking of
such question unquestionably falls on the side of officer safety);
Ross, 297 A.3d at 793.

Commonwealth v. Hawkins-Davenport, 319 A.3d 537, 544-45 (Pa. Super.

2024).

While police officers may ask about the presence of firearms in a car

stopped for a traffic violation, Hicks overruled our prior decision in

Commonwealth v. Robinson, 600 A.2d 957 (Pa. Super. 1991), and held

that officers may not infer criminal activity from the mere possession of a

firearm. See Hicks, 208 A.3d at 936 (“We find no justification for the notion

that a police officer may infer criminal activity merely from an individual’s

possession of a concealed firearm in public.”). In Hicks, the mere possession

of a firearm was the sole reason for Hicks’ seizure and detainment. Police

stopped Hicks’ vehicle in a gas station parking lot based on information that

he was in possession of a firearm. Id. at 922. An officer restrained his arms

and removed his handgun from his holster, and a search of the vehicle

followed. Id. While the police later determined that Hicks possessed a valid

license to carry a concealed firearm, and Hicks was not later subjected to

firearms related charges, he was subsequently charged with driving under the

influence of alcohol, possession of a small amount of marijuana, and disorderly

conduct. Id. Upon finding a lack of antecedent justification for the stop in

• 21 - J-S30038-25

that case, our Supreme Court noted that Hicks’ possession of a concealed

firearm “alone [wa]s an insufficient basis for reasonable suspicion that

criminal activity is afoot.” Id. at 945.

Based on Hicks, Appellee’s mere possession of the concealed firearm

could not alone support reasonable suspicion justifying an investigative

detention. If the only consideration at issue was mere possession of a firearm,

then Hicks would control, as the suppression court stated at the suppression

hearing. In light of our determination on the suppression court’s findings of

fact, the lone factor for distinguishing Hicks is the police officer’s detection

that Appellee lied to him about the presence of a firearm in the vehicle upon

seeing the gun protruding from Appellee’s pocket.

Here, the suppression court summarily rejected that the detected lie

could have provided a basis for reasonable suspicion on the ground that lying

to a police officer does not independently constitute a criminal offense:

“Granted, [Appellee] was untruthful about whether he had a gun in the car;

however, telling a lie while not under oath is not a crime.” Suppression Court

Opinion, 12/20/24, 9. Regardless of whether lying to the officer in this fashion

was itself a crime, the suppression court’s disregarding of the lie entirely in its

reasonable suspicion analysis was clearly erroneous.

Reasonable suspicion does not require that the factors on which an

officer may rely be unquestionably criminal to support further investigation.

See Commonwealth v. Davis, 102 A.3d 996, 1000 (Pa. Super. 2014) (“the

totality of the circumstances test [for determining reasonable suspicion] does

• 22 - J-S30038-25

not limit our inquiry to an examination of only those facts that clearly indicate

criminal conduct”) (citation omitted). “Rather, even a combination of innocent

facts, when taken together, may warrant further investigation by the police

officer.” Id. (citation omitted). The totality of the circumstances test for

determining reasonable suspicion “is what it purports to be—it requires a

suspicion of criminal conduct that is reasonable based upon the facts of the

matter,” and potential innocent explanations for a defendant’s conduct may

not negate a police officer’s suspicion of criminal activity. Id. (citation

omitted; emphasis in original). By disregarding Appellant’s lie on the basis

that it was not unquestionably criminal, the suppression court here misapplied

the totality of the circumstances test and erroneously concluded there was no

reasonable suspicion.9

Having concluded that the suppression court erred by outright

disregarding Appellee’s lie about the firearm in its analysis, we must next

determine whether that lie supported reasonable suspicion, such that the

holding in Hicks is distinguishable from the present facts. Appellee and the

---

9 If the suppression court was correct, the seminal case of Terry v. Ohio,
would have been banished to the dustbin of history on the basis that the
defendant Terry and his conspirators were merely window shopping and thus
their observed conduct could not support a basis for reasonable suspicion.
See Terry, 392 U.S. at 6 (noting that, prior to the police stopping him, Terry
and a conspirator took turns, between five and six times apiece, going over to
the same store window, peering into the window, and returning to confer,
before a conference with a third man, and subsequently resuming their
“measured pacing, peering, and conferring” before the two men walked away
in the same direction taken earlier by the third man).

• 23 - J-S30038-25

suppression court cite our decision in Malloy as support for not finding

reasonable suspicion based on Appellee’s detected lie about the presence of a

firearm in the car. See Appellee’s Brief, 9-10; Suppression Court Opinion,

12/10/24, 6-7, 9. Our review thus turns to addressing the applicability of

Malloy.

Malloy involved an instance where a police officer initiated a traffic stop

of a car that appeared to lack a license plate. Malloy, 257 A.3d at 145. Upon

approaching the vehicle, the investigating officer saw a license tag on the car’s

rear windshield but noticed that it was not properly displayed and secured in

violation of 75 Pa.C.S. § 1332. See Malloy, 257 A.3d at 145. The officer

asked defendant, Malloy, who was a rear passenger in the car, whether he

had a firearm after Malloy produced an identification card attached to a

lanyard, which the officer knew to be a common practice for armed security

personnel. See id. Malloy informed the officer that he had a firearm on his

right hip. See id. The officer asked Malloy to exit the car so the officer could

secure the gun before continuing the investigation for the traffic stop. See

id. The officer subsequently asked Malloy for “his documents” and Malloy

produced an “Act 235” card10 that the officer noticed was expired. Id. at 146

& n.1. Malloy claimed that he had another Act 235 card at home and the

---

10 “Act 235” is a shorthand reference to the Lethal Weapons Training Act. See
Act No. 1974-235, P.L. 705 (Oct. 10, 1974), 22 P.S. §§ 41 to 50.1.

• 24 - J-S30038-25

officer “proceeded to run checks” which determined that Malloy’s Act 235

certification had expired. Id. at 146.

On appeal from a judgment of sentence imposed for two convictions of

violating the Uniform Firearms Act, Malloy challenged the denial of his motion

to suppress the firearm and his statements to the police officer. See Malloy,

257 A.3d at 146-47. We held that the suppression court erred by concluding

that the officer’s request for Malloy’s documented firearms authorization could

be pursued as incidental to the traffic stop. See id. at 152 (“We are convinced

that a passenger’s legal authority to own or possess a firearm is simply

unrelated to a driver’s authority to operate a motor vehicle, the existence of

outstanding warrants against the driver, and whether a lawfully detained

vehicle is properly registered or insured.”). We also rejected the suggestion

that the officer’s request about the firearms authorization documentation “fell

within the limited class of minimally intrusive and permitted demands police

officers may make, out of concern for officer safety and without independent

justification, during the course of a lawful traffic stop.” Id. Put simply, the

request for the documentation in Malloy was not related to officer safety

concerns because the officer had already secured Malloy’s firearm before the

documentation request. See id. at 153 (“[O]nce Officer Henry secured the

firearm, [Malloy]’s legal authority to own or possess a gun clearly bore no

discernible relationship to individual safety or security within the context of

the traffic stop.”).

• 25 - J-S30038-25

In the concluding analysis in Malloy, we reasoned that the officer in

that case possessed no evidence showing that Malloy was involved in criminal

activity, either separately or with others in the stopped car (apart from the

violation warranting the traffic stop of the car in which Malloy was a

passenger). See Malloy, 257 A.3d at 154. Principally, we noted that, based

on Hicks, Malloy’s mere possession of a firearm did not establish reasonable

suspicion to allow the investigative detention of him and thereby also did not

permit the request for his firearm license. See Malloy, 257 A.3d at 155.

Because there was no reasonable suspicion to support the detention, we

rejected the trial court’s conclusion that reasonable suspicion could be

supported by the combination of Malloy’s possession of the gun and the

expired Act 235 card, which was not produced until after the commencement

of the detention which began based only on Malloy’s mere possession of the

gun. See id., citing Commonwealth v. Mackey, 177 A.3d 221, 228 (Pa.

Super. 2017) (police must have reasonable suspicion at the moment of

detention; information developed after a police-citizen encounter moves from

consensual to coercive cannot be used to justify the detention). Accordingly,

we ruled that Malloy was entitled to suppression of the firearm and his

statements to the police officer. See Malloy, 257 A.3d at 156.

Appellee suggests that Malloy “is very instructive in the instant matter.”

Appellee’s Brief, 9. He asserts “it is … important to note that [Malloy] found

that a defendant lying about having a valid license to carry a firearm is not

enough to prove the necessary reasonable suspicion for an investigatory

• 26 - J-S30038-25

detention.” Id. at 10. Nevertheless, we conclude that his interpretation of

Malloy is inapt because he misunderstands the holding of that case. We did

not find that Malloy’s lie to the police officer about the existence of a valid Act

235 card was insufficient support for reasonable suspicion; instead, we held

that Malloy’s mere possession of a firearm was inadequate to support

reasonable suspicion at the initiation of an investigation detention, pursuant

to Hicks, and thus the police were not permitted to conduct the investigative

detention during which they asked for Malloy’s gun authorization

documentation. Accordingly, any subsequent information learned from

Malloy’s illegal detention, including a lie, had to be suppressed:

At that time [(the start of the investigative detention)], the only
information within Officer Henry’s possession was that [Malloy]
had a firearm holstered on his right hip. Under Hicks, that
information was insufficient as a matter of law to establish
reasonable suspicion. Moreover, Officer Henry’s receipt of the
expired Act 235 card after the start of the detention cannot be
used to justify the seizure. Because Officer Henry lacked
reasonable suspicion to detain [Malloy] and investigate his legal
authority to carry a firearm, the detention challenged on appeal
violated [Malloy’s] Fourth Amendment rights and all evidence
seized as a result of the investigation is subject to exclusion at
trial.

Malloy, 257 A.3d. at 155-56 (citations omitted). Upon disregarding

Appellee’s lie from its reasonable suspicion analysis, the suppression court

improperly adopts Appellee’s incorrect reading of Malloy suggesting that a lie

to a police officer cannot provide adequate support for reasonable suspicion.

See Suppression Court Opinion, 12/20/24, 9 (citing Malloy for the holding

• 27 - J-S30038-25

“finding no reasonable suspicion even where the defendant lied about having

a valid license to carry a firearm”).

Neither Hicks nor Malloy compels suppression in this case so long as

Appellee was not subjected to an investigative detention solely based on his

mere possession of a firearm. Hicks simply held that the mere possession of

a firearm is not alone suggestive of criminal activity and could not

independently support the finding of reasonable suspicion. See Hicks, 208

A.3d at 937. Properly applying Hicks, this Court noted, in Malloy, that a

request for documented firearms authorization could not be pursued as

incidental to a traffic stop, see Malloy, 257 A.3d at 152, and, instead, “any

encounter undertaken to investigate an individual’s firearm status” during a

car stop must be treated as “an investigative detention governed by the Fourth

Amendment.” Id. at 155.

While the suppression court improperly disregarded Appellee’s lie to the

police officer about the presence of firearms in the car in its reasonable

suspicion analysis, the Commonwealth’s first issue essentially asks us to

consider whether, in the totality of the circumstances, Appellee’s detected lie

to the police could independently support reasonable suspicion. 11 We

conclude that it does.

---

11 In a recent unpublished memorandum, we declined to address this precise

issue where the detected lie to a police officer about the absence of a firearm
on a defendant’s person was accompanied by additional factors supporting
reasonable suspicion including that the inquiry occurred in a high crime area
(Footnote Continued Next Page)

• 28 - J-S30038-25

In controlling case law, this Court has weighed the fact of providing

false information to police officers as a factor supporting reasonable suspicion

under the totality of the circumstances presented. See, e.g.,

Commonwealth v. Metz, 332 A.3d 92, 100 (Pa. Super. 2025) (finding

reasonable suspicion to extend a traffic stop to investigate Metz’s involvement

in illegal possession of controlled substances where, inter alia, Metz told the

investigating officer that he was coming from gambling, which the officer knew

to be a lie based upon prior surveillance); Commonwealth v. Williams, 73

A.3d 609, 616 (Pa. Super. 2013) (reasonable suspicion established where, in

a high crime area, Williams lied in response to a police officer’s inquiry

regarding what he was doing and provided the officer with a false name);

Commonwealth v. Shelly, 703 A.2d 499, 503 (Pa. Super. 1997) (finding

that “reasonable articulable suspicion” to justify a Terry pat-down frisk was

supported by, inter alia, the fact that Shelly lied about his identity by giving a

false name to the police), separate holding that providing false

identification is not a crime superseded by statute, 18 Pa.C.S. § 4914.

In our recent unpublished memorandum in Commonwealth v. Nolan,

2025 WL 2438383 (Pa. Super., filed Aug. 25, 2025), in the context of a case

in which a defendant lied to a police officer about the presence of a firearm on

---

and the defendant engaged in unprovoked flight. See Commonwealth v.
Nolan, 2025 WL 2438383, *4 (Pa. Super., filed Aug. 25, 2025) (“This is not
a case where we are deciding whether possessing a firearm and lying about
said possession, alone, established reasonable suspicion of criminal activity”).

• 29 - J-S30038-25

his person, we observed, “[c]ertainly, possessing a concealed firearm and

lying about that possession is suspicious.” Id. at *4. While this observation

in Nolan is not binding on us and Nolan can only be cited for persuasive

value, see Pa.R.A.P. 126(b)(2), we adopt that sentiment here.

We observe that “tasks relating to officer safety are also part of a traffic

stop’s mission when done purely in an interest to protect the officers.” Ross,

297 A.3d at 792. “This safety interest stems from the fact that traffic stops

are especially fraught with danger to police officers, so an officer may need to

take certain negligibly burdensome precautions in order to complete his

mission safely.” Id. at 792-93 (citations, internal quotation marks, and

brackets omitted). Accordingly, officers are allowed to ask drivers or

passengers whether they have a weapon or anything concerning to officer

safety as a matter of course during a traffic stop. See id. at 793; Clinton,

905 A.2d at 1031 (holding that a question by police regarding the presence of

a weapon during a traffic stop is constitutionally permissible, stating that such

a question “unquestionably and completely falls on the side of officer safety”

and “is clearly less intrusive than a request by police to exit the vehicle”)

(emphasis omitted).

To hold that a detected lie to a police officer in response to a question

lawfully posed for the purpose of ensuring the safety of the officer would not

independently support reasonable suspicion would run counter to our vast

precedent preserving the officer’s ability to pose questions about the presence

of weapons during a car stop. As we have previously stated:

• 30 - J-S30038-25

It bears emphasizing that balancing the constitutional rights of
motorists, the public protection objections, and police officer
safety is difficult, especially in the context of rapidly evolving
traffic stops. One particular concern for officers during a traffic
stop is the proliferation of guns, including the substantial increase
in the number of people possessing firearms, the rise in mass
shootings, and the ability to carry a concealed weapon in vehicles
in Pennsylvania. Clearly, neither the United States Constitution
nor the Pennsylvania Constitution require officers to gamble with
their personal safety during traffic stops. Therefore, in the context
of traffic stops, police officers may take reasonable precautions
when the circumstances give rise to legitimate safety concerns.

Ross, 297 A.3d at 797-98 (citations and footnote omitted). Where a suspect

– as a driver or passenger – during a lawful car stop has been caught in a lie

concerning the presence of a firearm on or about their person, we find that

the lie, by itself, is adequate to support reasonable suspicion permitting an

investigative detention. In the context of a traffic stop, a suspect’s combined

acts of possessing a concealed firearm and lying about that possession

provides a reasonable and articulable fact that the suspect is engaged in

criminal activity because it leads to natural inferences that the defendant has

lied because he wishes to hide the fact that he poses a lethal threat to the

officer or to hide that his possession of the concealed firearm is illegal. See

Commonwealth v. Stilo, 138 A.3d 33, 39 (Pa. Super. 2016) (stating that

when “conducting a reasonable suspicion inquiry, a suppression court is

required to afford due weight to the specific, reasonable inferences drawn

from the facts in the light of the officer’s experience[.]”) (citation omitted).

Accordingly, there was reasonable suspicion to conduct an investigative

• 31 - J-S30038-25

detention of Appellee at the time the police officer saw the gun protruding

from Appellee’s pocket and thereby detected Appellee’s lie about possession

of the gun during the lawful car stop.

Having determined the existence of reasonable suspicion prior to the

officer’s recovery of the firearm, we must next consider, with respect to the

Commonwealth’s first issue, whether the recovery of the gun was the result

of some improper police action or a violation of Appellee’s constitutional right

to be free from unreasonable search and seizure. Though Officer Irwin was

clearly able to see the end of the gun, the officer proceeded to conduct a frisk

of Appellee to confirm that the item he observed protruding from Appellee’s

pocket was, in fact, a firearm.

A police officer may conduct a frisk limited to what is necessary to

discover any weapons if the officer has both reasonable suspicion that criminal

activity may be afoot and reasonable belief that the subject is armed and

presently dangerous. See Commonwealth v. Taylor, 771 A.2d 1261, 1269

(Pa. 2001). “To justify a frisk incident to an investigatory stop,” the police

officer must be able to point to “specific and articulable facts” indicating that

the subject of the frisk “may be armed and dangerous.” Commonwealth v.

Cooper, 994 A.2d 589, 593 (Pa. Super. 2010) (emphasis omitted).

Here, we have already concluded there was reasonable suspicion to

subject Appellee to an investigative detention at the moment Officer Irwin saw

the gun protruding from Appellee’s pocket and detected Appellee’s lie about

• 32 - J-S30038-25

its presence. Therefore, the only question as to whether the frisk was proper

is whether Officer Irwin reasonably suspected that Appellee was armed and

dangerous. See Commonwealth v. Miller, 333 A.3d 470, 477 (Pa. Super.

2025) (“[T]o proceed from a stop to a frisk, the police officer must reasonably

suspect that the person is armed and dangerous.”) (citation omitted). “When

assessing the reasonableness of an officer’s decision to frisk an individual

during an investigatory detention, we are not permitted to consider an officer’s

unparticularized suspicion or hunch, but rather we must consider the specific

reasonable inferences which he is entitled to draw from the facts in light of his

experience.” Commonwealth v. Carver, 318 A.3d 386, 391 (Pa. Super.

2024) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). “Further common

sense concerns guide the inquiry and give preference to the safety of the

police officer during an encounter with a suspect where circumstances indicate

that the suspect may have, or may be reaching for, a weapon.” Id. (citation

and internal quotation marks omitted). In a circumstance where a police

officer discovers that a passenger during a car stop is armed with a firearm

and that same passenger lied to the officer about the presence of the firearm,

common sense reasonably dictates that the passenger has exhibited the

requisite dangerousness for a frisk.12 See Int. of T.W., 261 A.3d 409, 424

---

12 We note that our Supreme Court cautioned in Hicks that it “offer[ed] no

opinion as to whether a police officer who has effectuated a lawful
(Footnote Continued Next Page)

• 33 - J-S30038-25

(Pa. 2021) (Terry frisk was lawful even though the officer was not “absolutely

certain that the object in Appellant’s pocket was a weapon, rather, under the

applicable standard, he need only have reasonably suspected the object to be

a weapon in order to conduct a search of the pocket[.]”).

When a police officer observes a firearm in plain view in a vehicle while

conducting a lawful traffic stop, the officer is not required to ascertain whether

the driver is illegally possessing the firearm before securing it for their

protection. See Hawkins-Davenport, 319 A.3d at 547 (explaining that “this

safety justification is applicable to a firearm regardless of the possessor’s

licensure status” as “[t]here is no doubt a firearm can be used to harm a police

officer during a traffic stop whether it is legally possessed or not[.]”). We

conclude that the same safety concerns that permit an officer to secure a

firearm in plain view in a vehicle during a traffic stop are inherent in the instant

case where a passenger during a traffic stop lies about the presence of a

firearm and the officer sees the firearm protruding from the passenger’s

pocket. We find that the circumstance of Appellee’s lie about the firearm

justified the frisk leading to the recovery of the firearm. See, e.g., Hawkins-

Davenport, 319 A.3d at 546 (“[T]he Ross Court clearly contemplated that

---

investigative detention may treat the suspect’s possession of a firearm as per
se authorization to ‘frisk’ the detainee.” Hicks, 208 A.3d at 934.

• 34 - J-S30038-25

the mere presence of a firearm during a traffic stop can reasonably lead an

officer to believe that his safety is at risk.”).

In sum, with respect to the Commonwealth’s first issue, we hold that

the suppression court erred by misapplying the totality of the circumstances

test for assessing reasonable suspicion by concluding that Appellee’s detected

lie about the presence of the firearm could not support reasonable suspicion

because the lie by itself did not constitute the commission of a criminal

offense. Upon properly viewing the totality of the circumstances, Appellee’s

lie about the presence of the firearm followed by the officer’s plain view of the

firearm in Appellee’s pocket supported reasonable suspicion permitting an

investigative detention and a frisk, resulting in the police officer’s recovery of

the firearm. The facts of this case present more than the mere possession of

a firearm addressed in Hicks. In these circumstances, the police lawfully

recovered Appellee’s firearm without violating his rights under the Fourth

Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 8 of the

Pennsylvania Constitution.

In its second issue, the Commonwealth challenges the suppression of

Appellee’s statement in which he admitted he did not have a firearms license,

and the suppression of the firearm as the fruit of the supposed improper

questioning that yielded Appellee’s admission. See Appellant’s Brief, 15-18.

When the court announced its suppression ruling, it remarked, “[the]

Hicks case says that [the] officer should have checked before he asked the

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question.” N.T. Suppression Hearing, 8/21/24, 46. In its Rule 1925(a)

opinion, the suppression court expanded on that reasoning, explaining that

“the police improperly asked [Appellee] whether he had a firearms license

without reasonable suspicion during an otherwise valid motor vehicle stop.”

Suppression Court Opinion, 12/20/24, 8. The court inferred that, in the

absence of reasonable suspicion for an investigative detention and, with the

gun secured by the police for their safety, “there was no reason for the police

to inquire whether [Appellee] had a license to carry [the firearm] as this was

not in any way connected to the purpose of the routine traffic stop for [an]

expired registration.” Id. at 9.

The suppression court notes that it took no issue with the fact that the

police officer took possession of Appellee’s gun as a matter of concern for the

officer’s safety: “Th[e suppression c]ourt acknowledges that under the law of

this Commonwealth, the police had the lawful right to seize [Appellee’s]

firearm for officer safety during a motor vehicle stop.” Suppression Court

Opinion, 12/20/24, 10. Even though the court concluded that there was no

reasonable suspicion for an investigative detention related to the firearm, the

court assessed that the police officer should have researched whether Appellee

had a firearms license prior to even seeing the firearm on Appellee’s person:

“At no time did th[e suppression c]ourt find that [Appellee] was subjected to

unlawful custodial interrogation; rather, th[e c]ourt found that the police

officers, who already had [Appellee’s] identification, should have checked their

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databases before questioning [Appellee] regarding his licensure status.” Id.

at 10-11.

The Commonwealth characterizes the suppression court’s basis for

suppressing Appellee’s statement about his lack of a firearms license as

“confusing … and, to the extent discernible, legally disjointed.” Appellant’s

Brief, 15. It argues that there was no legal basis for the court to conclude

that Appellee’s statement should have been suppressed “on the supposed

basis that the officers could theoretically have discovered [Appellee’s]

licensure status in a different way through their computer.” Id. (emphasis in

original). It maintains that the question posed about the licensure status was

among the types of question that “are permitted by an officer in order to allay

or confirm the suspicions that gave rise to the investigative detention.” Id.

at 16. Lastly, the Commonwealth asserts that, assuming arguendo the

admission was suppressible, there was no basis for suppressing the firearm

“as a tainted fruit of that statement,” and Appellee’s non-licensure status was

inevitably discoverable. Id. at 17-18. We agree that the suppression court

erroneously suppressed Appellee’s admission and the firearm based on its

flawed analysis that the investigative detention was unlawful.

In Hawkins-Davenport, police officers conducted a traffic stop of the

defendant’s car because of a non-functioning brake light during which one of

the officers saw a gun laying on the front passenger’s seat of the vehicle. See

Hawkins-Davenport, 319 A.3d at 540. That officer asked Hawkins-

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Davenport, “[A]nd you don’t have a license for it?,” before Hawkins-Davenport

admitted that he did not. Id. at 541 & n.3. The officer then recovered the

gun and proceeded to ask him a second time if he had a license to carry the

gun which resulted in another response of, “No,” from Hawkins-Davenport.

Id. at 541. The suppression court suppressed the gun by determining that

the police officer improperly removed the firearm from the car before

ascertaining that Hawkins-Davenport did not have a license to carry the

firearm. Id. at 542. On appeal, we determined that the removal of the gun

was lawful because “police officers may, as a reasonable precaution for their

safety, remove a firearm they see in plain view that is accessible by the driver,

during an ongoing valid traffic stop as a matter of course.” Id. at 546.

With respect to Hawkins-Davenport’s admissions to not having a

firearms license, we agreed with the Commonwealth that the statements

should not have been suppressed because they were the result of a lawful

traffic stop and the lawful seizure of the gun. See Hawkins-Davenport, 319

A.3d at 550 (“As we have already determined that the initial traffic stop and

the removal of the gun were lawful, Hawkins-Davenport’s statements … during

that lawful traffic stop and after the officer removed the gun should not have

been suppressed on the basis that they were tainted.”). Similarly, here, we

have determined that the stop and frisk was supported by reasonable

suspicion and the police officer’s seizure of Appellee’s gun was lawful, thus,

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Hawkins-Davenport dictates that there is no taint compelling suppression

of Appellee’s admission in this case.

In addition, and also similar to Hawkins-Davenport, 319 A.3d at 548,

there was no issue raised here that the officer’s question improperly prolonged

the car stop at issue. See N.T. Suppression Hearing, 8/21/24, 45 (Appellee’s

counsel remarking, “So they could have prolonged the stop and gotten that,

but they didn’t,” while arguing that the statement was improperly ascertained

in the absence of a Miranda warning). To the extent that the suppression

court reasoned that Appellee’s admission was properly suppressed because

the police officer “should have checked their databases” for Appellee’s

licensure status “before questioning” Appellee on that issue, Suppression

Court Opinion, 12/20/24, 11, it cites no legal support for that point. Were we

to agree, we would essentially be mandating all police officers in the

Commonwealth run firearms licensing checks as a routine part of their car

stop investigations on the off chance that evidence of improper gun possession

subsequently arises, which would inevitably prolong all traffic stops. We

decline to accept the suppression court’s position as it directly contradicts our

holding in Malloy, which forbids the delay of a car stop to research a

passenger’s firearm licensing status in the absence of reasonable suspicion.

See Malloy, 257 A.3d at 156 (“Because Officer Henry lacked reasonable

suspicion to detain [Malloy] and investigate his legal authority to carry a

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firearm, … all evidence seized as a result of the investigation is subject to

exclusion at trial.”).

During a lawful investigative detention concerning a person’s concealed

possession of a firearm, i.e., a Terry stop supported by reasonable suspicion,

there should be no impediment to a police officer quickly resolving his

concerns about the detainee’s lawful possession of the gun by simply asking

the detainee if he has a license permitting him to carry the firearm. As a

matter of statute, we already mandate that a firearms licensee “produce the

license for inspection” where there is a “lawful demand of a law enforcement

officer.” See 18 Pa.C.S. § 6122(a) (“When carrying a firearm concealed on

or about one’s person or in a vehicle, an individual licensed to carry a firearm

shall, upon lawful demand of a law enforcement officer, produce the license

for inspection. Failure to produce such license either at the time of arrest or

at the preliminary hearing shall create a rebuttable presumption of non[-

]licensure.”). That the police officers in the instant case did not independently

research Appellee’s licensure status in advance of the discovery of the firearm

did not render improper the officer’s question posed to Appellee about his

licensing status. As Appellee was a passenger of his father’s vehicle during

the car stop, it was reasonable for the police officers to try to quickly resolve

their concerns about Appellee’s gun by asking the single licensing status

question, which also served to limit the duration of the existing detention of

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Appellee’s father.13 See Commonwealth v. Spence, 290 A.3d 301, 314 (Pa.

Super. 2023) (noting that a police officer “may ask the detainee a moderate

number of questions to determine his identity and to try to obtain information

confirming or dispelling the officer’s suspicions”), quoting Commonwealth

v. Wright, 224 A.3d 1104, 1109 (Pa. Super. 2019).

In conclusion, the suppression court erred by misapplying the totality of

the circumstances test for reasonable suspicion. The combined circumstances

of Appellee indicating to the officer that there was no firearm in his father’s

vehicle and then the officer seeing a firearm protruding from Appellee’s

pocket, demonstrating that Appellee had lied to the officer about the presence

of a firearm, supported reasonable suspicion permitting the officers to conduct

an investigatory detention of Appellee during which they could frisk Appellee

for the firearm. The removal of the gun from Appellee’s pocket following the

frisk was lawful. Moreover, the officers lawfully asked Appellee about his

firearms licensing status during the investigative detention. The suppression

court improperly suppressed the recovered firearm and Appellee’s statement

admitting his lack of a firearms license.

---

13 Because we agree with the Commonwealth that Appellee’s non-licensure
admission and, by extension, the firearm, were erroneously suppressed, we
need not address the Commonwealth’s alternative argument that suppression
of the non-licensure admission would be improper because the non-licensure
status would be inevitably discoverable. See Appellant’s Brief, 18.

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Order reversed. Case remanded for further proceedings. Jurisdiction

relinquished.

Date: 3/27/2026

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