Jermaine Lewis v. Jesus Guadarrama et al. - Prisoner Civil Rights

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April 21, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

Jermaine Lewis v. Jesus Guadarrama, et al.

District Court, D. Connecticut

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: 3:25-cv-01178

• Precedential Status: Unknown Status

• Opinion

• Authorities (52)

• Cited By (0)

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Trial Court Document

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT
--------------------------------------------------------------- x
JERMAINE LEWIS, :
:
Plaintiff, :
:
v. : 25-CV-1178 (SFR)
:
JESUS GUADARRAMA, et al, :
:
Defendants. :
--------------------------------------------------------------- x

INITIAL REVIEW ORDER

Plaintiff Jermaine Lewis, an individual serving a sentence in the custody of the
Connecticut Department of Correction (“DOC”),1 brings a civil rights action, pro se and in
forma pauperis, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against eighteen defendants who work at MacDougall-
Walker Correctional Institution (“MWCI”): Warden Guadarrama, Deputy Warden Doe,
Lieutenant Santiago, Lieutenant Henry Laprey, Correction Officer Gross, Correction Officer
Anderson, Correction Officer Santana, Correction Officer Adeyin, Correction Officer
Mathews, Correction Officer Zsyk, Lieutenant Cage, Nurse Tony, Mental Health/Social
Worker John Doe, Mental Health/Social Worker Jane Doe, Correction Officer John Doe 1,
Correction Officer John Doe 2, Correction Officer John Doe 3, and Administrative Remedies
Coordinator (“ARC”) Walker. He also names as a defendant Cheshire Correctional Institution
(“Cheshire C.I.”) ARC Becker. Lewis’s Complaint suggests violation of his First, Fourteenth

1 I may “take judicial notice of relevant matters of public record.” Giraldo v. Kessler, 694 F.3d
161, 164 (2d Cir. 2012). A search on the publicly available DOC website under the inmate search
function shows that Lewis was sentenced on June 7, 2024, and is now housed at Osborn
Correctional Institution.
and Eighth Amendment rights during his confinement at MWCI. He sues all defendants in
their individual capacities for damages.
The Prison Litigation Reform Act requires that I conduct an initial review of this

complaint because Lewis is an incarcerated plaintiff who seeks relief from government
employees. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). I have thoroughly reviewed all factual allegations in the
Complaint.
I. BACKGROUND
I accept as true the following well-pleaded facts in the Complaint. I do not set forth all
of the facts alleged in the Complaint but summarize Lewis’s basic factual allegations here to
give context to its rulings below.

On July 14, 2024, Lewis was involved in a physical altercation with another
incarcerated individual, Anthony McCants. Compl. 9, ¶ 1. Lewis sustained a concussion and
serious injuries. Id. Prior to the altercation, McCants had discussions with Officer John Doe 1,
either through verbal conversations or notes being passed through the door. Id. at 9, ¶ 2.
Lieutenant Cage secured, detained and videotaped Lewis for his removal from A-Pod
to the infirmary. Id. at 9, ¶ 3. While Lewis was in the infirmary, Cage attempted to have him
press charges against McCants even as he minimized Lewis’s claim of self-defense. Id. Lewis

had a “snarky back and forth” with Cage and “surmi[ses]” that “this was the catalyst for the
retaliation [he] was about to endure.” Id.
Nurse Tony conducted Lewis’s initial injury assessment at the infirmary. Id. at 9, ¶ 4.
Tony recommended that Lewis be seen more thoroughly at UConn Medical, where Lewis was
eventually sent for care. Id.
After the infirmary, Lewis was placed in the Restricted Housing Unit (“RHU”), Cell
S09. Id. at 10, ¶ 5. Lieutenant Laprey visited Lewis at Cell S09 and tried to “coerce” him to
make police report against McCants. Id. The Complaint contends that Laprey lied by stating

to Lewis that McCants was pressing charges against Lewis with the State Police. Id. After
Lewis refused to press any charges, Laprey mocked and belittled Lewis by calling him the
“Nibbler,” which was a reference to Lewis biting McCants during their altercation. Id.
Approximately ten or fifteen minutes after his conversation with Laprey, Lewis was
again transferred to the prison infirmary, where he was monitored for complications with two
fractured ribs. Id. at 10, ¶ 6.
The following day, Lewis was served with a disciplinary report, an RHU status order

of five days, and two other sanctions. Id. From July 14 through July 19, 2024, Lewis completed
the disciplinary actions taken against him without issue. Id. at 10, ¶ 7.
On the morning of July 19, 2024, Lewis did not contest his confinement because he had
seen his medical records and medication being transferred to the Admitting and Processing
Room (“A&P Room”). Id. at 11, ¶ 8. But after waiting for his transfer to the A&P Room, Lewis
observed his medical records and medication being returned. Id.

Later in the evening, Lewis stopped Lieutenant Santiago during his tour of the
infirmary. Id. at 11, ¶ 9. Lewis explained that his “time in the RHU was up” and asked what
could be done to “rectify this mishap?” Id. Santiago explained that Lewis should “write a
grievance and get [his] fucking money.” Id. Lewis “was still scratching [his] head” about why
Santiago would not act on the information that Lewis had completed his time in the RHU. Id.
On the morning of July 21, McCants knocked on Lewis’s cell window in the infirmary.
Id. at 11, ¶ 10. McCants apologized to Lewis through the window for his unprovoked and
irrational action to attack him. Id. McCants questioned the infirmary Correction Officer about
why Lewis was still in the RHU while he (McCants) had been released. Id.
On July 22, Nurse Tony called a Lieutenant to release Lewis from his “RHU status.”

Id. at 12, ¶ 11. After the withdrawal of his RHU status, Lewis was placed back in the RHU
after seeing a doctor. Id. Lewis asked Nurse Tony why he was in the RHU again and indicated
his opinion that his placement was arbitrary. Id. Nurse Tony allegedly answered that “someone
fucked up.” Id.
During his time in the infirmary, Lewis was subjected to a 24-hour lockdown, a shower
every three days, and no access to clean underclothing “after the initial 5 days.” Id. at 12, ¶ 12.
Lewis did not have access to pen, paper, his allotted six daily telephone calls, or the mandatory

minimum amount of recreation and/or out-of-cell time. Id. Lewis recalls that he was the only
prisoner in this “post,” and he made every correction officer aware that he was not supposed
to be in the RHU or under RHU status as of July 19, 2025. Id. at 12, ¶ 13.
Correction Officer Santana looked up the date of Lewis’s RHU placement and put on
a yellow sticky note to his door stating: “Inmate Lewis shouldn’t be here and this shouldn’t be
his status.” Id. at 13, ¶ 14. Lewis states that this gesture brought tears to his eyes because she

“heard” him. Nonetheless, Lewis remained in the RHU. Id.
Lewis overheard Correction Officer Gross discussing his part-time work for Door Dash
and that he would not be working overtime if Lewis had not been in the RHU infirmary. Id. at
13, ¶ 15. Lewis claims that he heard other officers making similar comments such as, “[w]hen
he leaves, no one will be here for weeks,” or questioning whether their posting to RHU was
real. Id. at 13, ¶ 16.
When Warden Guadarrama and his entourage of Deputy Warden Doe, Doe 2, and Doe
3 toured on several occasions, they did not correct Lewis’s situation or check the RHU’s log
book. Id. at 13, ¶ 17. Lewis’s anxiety and paranoia increased dramatically. Id.

Lewis discussed his fears of being harmed or killed with Correction Officer Anderson.
Id. at 14, ¶ 18. Officer Anderson expressed her belief that “someone dropped the ball” and
tried to assure him that she had no interest in having anything happen to him during her watch.
Id. Lewis claims he later heard Anderson tell Officer Mathews that she was placed in a
situation that her superior knew was not “right.” Id. After Lewis and Anderson established a
rapport, Lewis “humorously” informed her that she would be named in his lawsuit. Id.
Lewis also recalls that Officer Zysk was at the RHU post but “failed to act.” Id. at 14,

¶ 19.
Defendants John and Jane Doe Mental Health/Social Workers had offices just a few
feet away from Lewis’s cell. Id. at 14, ¶ 20. They both ignored and brushed him off whenever
he asked for mental health assistance during a mental health crisis. Id.
While he was transferring from the infirmary, Lewis spoke to both Jane and John Doe
Mental Health/Social Workers about his frustrations with being ignored by both of them and

the system in general. Id. They apologized and John Doe agreed that “someone dropped the
ball.” Id. Lewis perceived that John Doe put their meeting into the computer. Id. Lewis
repeatedly asked if John Doe did so because Lewis did not “believe anything that was
happening.” Id. Lewis claims that he either had a “complete disconnect with reality” or “was
intentionally being manipulated.” Id.
Lewis also established a rapport with Officer Adeyin. Adeyin failed to rectify Lewis’s
situation but did inform others that Lewis’s RHU status was wrong. Id. at 15, ¶ 21. Lewis
claims that Adeyin felt badly about Lewis being “repeatedly mistreated” and volunteered to
escort Lewis to the “Traditional RHU” so that he could provide “positive encouragement that
things would get better.” Id.

While confined in “Traditional RHU” cell S05, Lewis stopped Laprey to clarify his
situation. Id. at 15, ¶ 22. Laprey immediately referred to him as the “Nibbler” and then yelled
that the State Police were coming to speak to Lewis about filing charges against McCants. Id.
Lewis asserts that Laprey’s representation was false and that Laprey made a “conscious
decision” to put Lewis at risk of harm. Id. Lewis refused to continue the conversation with
Laprey. Id.
Lewis initiated the grievance process by speaking with “Brass, Rank and File” for his

attempt at informal resolution of his issues. Id. at 16, ¶ 23. After Lewis was ignored on all
levels, he attempted to contact his MWCI counselor. Id. After 17 days he had received no
response and filed a Level 1 Grievance at Cheshire C.I. Id. His Level 1 Grievance was denied,
and Lewis noticed that MWCI Warden Guadarrama had signed the bottom of his Level 1
Grievance. Id. Lewis maintains that the Warden gave a “completely false account for his
reasoning” for denying the Level 1 Grievance. Id. Lewis filed a Level 2 Grievance Appeal. Id.

As Warden Guadarrama was “the initial arbiter of his own Grievance,” Lewis alleges
that ARC Walker and Becker did not do their due diligence in maintaining the integrity of the
Administrative Remedy procedure. Id. at 16, ¶ 24. Lewis represents that there was “some ‘3
Card Molly” paper shuffling.” Id. at 16, ¶ 25. Lewis maintains that Warden Guadarrama’s
grievance denial was “written in error,” but District Administrator Rodriguez “diligently came
to a factual conclusion” for the Level 2 Grievance appeal. Id.
II. LEGAL STANDARD
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, courts must review civil complaints in which a prisoner
seeks redress from a governmental entity and dismiss any portion that “(1) is frivolous,
malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted; or (2) seeks monetary

relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1)-(2).
Although highly detailed allegations are not required, the complaint must “contain
sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual
content that allows the Court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for

the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. This plausibility standard is not a “probability
requirement” but imposes a standard higher than “a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted
unlawfully.” Id. In undertaking this analysis, the court must “draw all reasonable inferences in [a
plaintiff’s] favor, assume all well-pleaded factual allegations to be true, and determine whether
they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.” Faber v. Metro Life Ins. Co., 648 F.3d 98,
104 (2d Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks omitted). But the court is not “bound to accept

conclusory allegations or legal conclusions masquerading as factual conclusions,” id., and “a
formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do,” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
With respect to pro se litigants, it is well-established that “[p]ro se submissions are
reviewed with special solicitude, and ‘must be construed liberally and interpreted to raise the
strongest arguments that they suggest.’” Matheson v. Deutsche Bank Nat’l Tr. Co., 706 F.
App’x 24, 26 (2d Cir. 2017) (summary order) (quoting Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474-75 (2d Cir. 2006) (per curiam)).
III. DISCUSSION
Lewis advances claims of retaliation in violation of the First Amendment, Eighth

Amendment claims related to his time in the RHU, and claims under the procedural due
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. All claims are brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §
1983.
Section 1983 “provides a private right of action against any person who, acting under
color of state law, causes another person to be subjected to the deprivation of rights under the
Constitution or federal law.” Blyden v. Mancusi, 186 F.3d 252, 264 (2d Cir. 1999). “The

common elements to all § 1983 claims are: ‘(1) the conduct complained of must have been
committed by a person acting under color of state law; and (2) the conduct complained of must
have deprived a person of rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution or laws
of the United States.’” Lee v. City of Troy, 520 F. Supp. 3d 191, 205 (N.D.N.Y. 2021) (quoting
Pitchell v. Callan, 13 F.3d 545, 547 (2d Cir. 1994)).
A plaintiff seeking monetary damages from a defendant must allege facts that establish
the personal involvement of that defendant in the alleged constitutional violation. See Wright

v. Smith, 21 F.3d 496, 501 (2d Cir. 1994) (stating that “personal involvement of defendants in
alleged constitutional deprivations is a prerequisite to an award of damages under § 1983”).
This is true with respect to supervisory officials as well. Tangreti v. Bachman, 983 F.3d 609,
620 (2d Cir. 2020) (“[T]he plaintiff must directly plead and prove that each Government-
official defendant, through the official’s own individual actions, has violated the
Constitution.”) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
A. First Amendment Retaliation
The Second Circuit has “instructed district courts to ‘approach prisoner retaliation
claims with skepticism and particular care, because virtually any adverse action taken against
a prisoner by a prison official—even those otherwise not rising to the level of a constitutional

violation—can be characterized as a constitutionally proscribed retaliatory act.’” Dolan v.
Connolly, 794 F.3d 290, 295 (2d Cir. 2015) (quoting Davis v. Goord, 320 F.3d 346, 352 (2d
Cir. 2003)).
The elements of a First Amendment retaliation claim are “(1) that the speech or conduct
at issue was protected, (2) that the defendant took adverse action against the plaintiff, and (3)
that there was a causal connection between the protected speech and the adverse action.”

Brandon v. Kinter, 938 F.3d 21, 40 (2d Cir. 2019) (quoting Gill v. Pidlypchak, 389 F.3d 379,
380 (2d Cir. 2004)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Lewis maintains that he was retained in the RHU beyond the period set forth for his
disciplinary offense as retaliation for his refusal to file a police report against McCants. See
Compl. 9, ¶ 3; see also id. at 18. He seeks to hold Lieutenant Cage, Nurse Tony, Lieutenant
Santiago, Lieutenant Laprey, Warden Guadarrama, Doe 2 and 3, and Correction Officers
Santana, Gross, Anderson, Adeyin, and Zsyk liable for First Amendment retaliation.

The Second Circuit has held that held “that inmates generally retain a First Amendment
interest in declining to speak.” See Burns v. Martuscello, 890 F.3d 77, 88 (2d Cir. 2018).
Accordingly, I assume for purposes of initial review that Lewis’s decision not to file a police
report is entitled to First Amendment protection.
As to the second element, “[o]nly retaliatory conduct that would deter a similarly
situated individual of ordinary firmness from exercising his or her constitutional rights
constitutes an adverse action for a claim of retaliation.” Davis, 320 F.3d at 353 (quoting Dawes
v. Walker, 239 F.3d 489, 493 (2d Cir. 2001) (internal quotation marks omitted). At this early
stage in the proceeding, Lewis’s extended RHU confinement beyond the period imposed for

his disciplinary offense supports a claim of adverse action. See Grinvalsky v. Cartwright, No.
3:23-CV-797 (OAW), 2025 WL 2719533, at *4 (D. Conn. Sept. 24, 2025) (stating that “an
inmate of ordinary firmness might forego advocating for themselves to avoid unpleasantness
and threats in housing”). In addition, Lewis may have also suffered adverse action as a result
of Lieutenant Laprey yelling that the state police were about to arrive for him to make a police
report as such conduct may have caused other prisoners to consider Lewis to be a prison
informant or snitch. See Burns, 890 F.3d at 91 (noting a prisoner may suffer from violence

after being labeled as a snitch).
As for the third element, a plaintiff can establish a causal connection to suggest
retaliatory intent by showing that his protected activity was close in time to the complained-of
adverse action. Espinal v. Goord, 558 F.3d 119, 129 (2d Cir. 2001) (citations omitted). Lewis’s
allegations indicate that he suffered the adverse action by Lieutenants Cage and Laprey soon
after he declined to make a police report against McCants. Compl. 9, ¶ 3; see also id. at 10, ¶

1. I therefore permit Lewis to proceed on First Amendment retaliation claims for damages against Lieutenant Cage and Lieutenant Laprey. But I dismiss Lewis’s claims against Nurse Tony, Lieutenant Santiago, Warden Guadarrama, Doe 2 and 3, and Correction Officers Santana, Gross, Anderson, Adeyin, and Zsyk, who are not alleged to have been aware of Lewis’s refusal to report McCants to the state police. See Schlosser v. Manuel, No. 3:19-CV- 1444 (SRU), 2020 WL 127700, at *4 (D. Conn. Jan. 10, 2020) (dismissing retaliation claims where plaintiff had not alleged that the defendant was aware of his protected activity). B. Other Claims Related to Delayed Release from RHU The Complaint states that Lewis should have been released from the RHU no

later than July 19, 2025. Compl. 12, ¶ 13. But despite his efforts to alert prison officials, Lewis
remained in the RHU at least through July 22, 2025. Id. at 12, ¶ 11. I consider whether Lewis
can state plausible claims related to the time he was held in RHU past July 19, 2025. This
allegation supports a claim under the Eighth Amendment as well as under the Procedural Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
1. Eighth Amendment: Delayed Release from RHU Without
Penological Purpose
“Confinement in a prison or in an isolation cell is a form of punishment subject to
scrutiny under Eighth Amendment standards.” Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 685 (1978).
“The unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain constitutes cruel and unusual punishment
forbidden by the Eighth Amendment.” Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 737 (2002) (citation and

internal quotation marks omitted; alterations adopted). “We have said that ‘[a]mong
‘unnecessary and wanton’ inflictions of pain are those that are ‘totally without penological
justification.’” Id. (quoting Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 346 (1980)). Defendants may
therefore be liable under the Eighth Amendment because the Complaint plausibly alleges that
Lewis was held in RHU past July 19, 2025 without any legitimate penological purpose.2 See,

2 “Because of a general reluctance ‘to expand the concept of substantive due process,’ ‘[w]here a
particular Amendment provides an explicit textual source of constitutional protection against a
particular sort of government behavior, that Amendment, not the more generalized notion of
substantive due process, must be the guide for analyzing these claims.” H’Shaka v. O’Gorman,
e.g., H’Shaka v. O’Gorman, 444 F. Supp. 3d 355, 378 (N.D.N.Y. 2020) (concluding that there
was “a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether the DOCCS Defendants had a legitimate
penological justification for retaining Plaintiff in Ad Seg”); Grenning v. Miller-Stout, [739 F.3d

1235, 1240](https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2649563/neil-grenning-v-maggie-miller-stout/#1240) (9th Cir. 2014) (“The existence of a legitimate penological justification has . . .
been used in considering whether adverse treatment is sufficiently gratuitous to constitute
punishment for Eighth Amendment purposes.”); Porter v. Clarke, 923 F.3d 348, 362 (4th Cir.
2019), as amended (May 6, 2019) (“[I]f a prison official lacks a legitimate penological
justification for subjecting an inmate to a condition of confinement that poses a substantial risk
of serious harm . . . then the official is presumptively acting with deliberate indifference to that
risk.”); Thomas v. Bryant, 614 F.3d 1288, 1311 (11th Cir. 2010) (stating that “where chemical

agents are used unnecessarily, without penological justification, or for the very purpose of
punishment or harm, that use satisfies the Eighth Amendment’s objective harm requirement”).
Accordingly, for purposes of initial review, I conclude the Complaint plausibly supports the
inference that the same Defendants implicated in his procedural protection claim, discussed
further below, are liable for this claim under the Eighth Amendment. These Defendants include
Lieutenant Cage, Nurse Tony, Warden Guadarrama, and Deputy Warden Doe.

1. Procedural Due Process I construe these same factual circumstances to support claims under the Procedural Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. “[T]he Due Process Clause provides that certain 444 F. Supp. 3d 355, 371 (N.D.N.Y. 2020) (quoting Cnty. of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 842 (1998)). The Complaint makes clear that Lewis was serving a sentence of imprisonment at the time he was in the RHU. See Compl. 10, ¶ 7 (stating that Lewis was disciplined on July 14, 2024); supra n.1 (taking judicial notice that Lewis was sentenced on June 7, 2024). I therefore analyze his claims only under the rubric of the Eighth Amendment rather than under the substantive due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. substantive rights—life, liberty, and property—cannot be deprived except pursuant to constitutionally adequate procedures.” Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 541 (1985). “To prevail on a procedural due process claim, a plaintiff must demonstrate that

Defendants ‘deprived him of a cognizable interest in life, liberty, or property,’ and that they
did so ‘without affording him constitutionally sufficient process.’” Walker v. Bellnier, 146
F.4th 228, 251 (2d Cir. 2025) (quoting Proctor v. LeClaire, 846 F.3d 597, 608 (2d Cir. 2017)).
For purposes of initial review, I conclude that Lewis may proceed to service on claims that
Defendants (1) failed to offer procedural protections in service of his protected liberty interests
and (2) failed to conduct a periodic review of his placement in the RHU.
a. Procedural Protection

The Due Process Clause, standing alone, generally does not create a protected liberty
interest in conditions of confinement so long as the conditions are “within the normal limits or
range of custody which the conviction has authorized the State to impose.” Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 225 (1976). In Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472 (1995), the Supreme Court held
that a liberty interest warranting due process protection “will be generally limited to freedom
from restraint which, while not exceeding the sentence in such an unexpected manner as to
give rise to protection by the Due Process Clause of its own force . . . nonetheless imposes an

atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison
life.” Id. at 484. There is no bright line rule that a specific period of segregated confinement
“automatically fails to implicate due process rights.” Palmer v. Richards, 364 F.3d 60, 64 (2d
Cir. 2004) (stating that “harsh conditions endured for a brief interval and somewhat harsh
conditions endured for a prolonged interval might both be atypical”).
For purposes of initial review, I assume that retaining Lewis in the severely restrictive
infirmary past the date required for his disciplinary sanctions and then transferring him to the
RHU for continuing restrictive confinement constitutes an atypical and significant hardship

entitled to procedural protection.
The level of procedural protection required depends on the purpose of the hearing.
Bolden v. Alston, 810 F.2d 353, 357 (2d Cir. 1987). If the conditions were imposed for punitive
or disciplinary reasons, an individual is entitled to advance written notice of the charge,
adequate time to prepare a defense, a written statement of the reasons for the disciplinary action
taken, and a limited opportunity to present witnesses and evidence in his defense. Wolff v.
McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 561-70 (1974). An individual placed in administrative segregation

must receive notice of why he is being placed there and an opportunity to respond. Proctor, 846 F.3d at 609 (citing Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 476 (1983)). Decisions to place a person
in administrative or punitive segregation must also be supported by some evidence. Brown v.
Semple, No. 3:16CV376 (MPS), 2018 WL 4308564, at *12 (D. Conn. Sept. 10, 2018)
(observing that procedural due process requires that decision in connection with prison
disciplinary hearing be “supported by some evidence in the record”) (quoting Superintendent

v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 454 (1985). The Second Circuit has explained that a disciplinary
determination must be supported by some “reliable evidence” of guilt. Elder v. McCarthy, 967
F.3d 113, 129 (2d Cir. 2020) (quoting Luna v. Pico, 356 F.3d 481, 488 (2d Cir. 2004)).
Regardless of whether Lewis’s continued restrictive confinement should be
characterized as administrative or punitive, Lewis’s allegations support an inference that he
was not afforded the procedural protections required under either Hewitt or Wolff. Thus, I
permit Lewis to proceed on Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process claims against
Lieutenant Cage (whom the Complaint identifies as being involved with Lewis’s RHU
placement); Nurse Tony (whom the Complaint describes as responsible Lewis’s continued
RHU placement); and Warden Guadarrama and Deputy Warden Doe (whom Lewis says were

aware of Lewis’s continued RHU confinement and could have afforded him procedural
protections).
The Complaint alleges that Santiago, John Does 2 and 3, and Correction Officers
Santana, Gross, Anderson, Mathews, Adeyin, and Zsyk failed to act despite being aware of his
continued restrictive confinement. But the Complaint fails to support an inference that any of
these defendants had the capacity but failed to afford Lewis procedural protection for his
continued RHU confinement.

b. Periodic Reviews
I also read the Complaint to raise a procedural due process claim based on lack of
periodic reviews of RHU confinement. Once a prisoner has been confined to administrative
segregation, officials must engage in periodic review to assess whether the prisoner remains a
security risk. See Walker, 146 F.4th at 252 (“[T]he Due Process Clause requires meaningful
periodic review of an incarcerated person’s Ad Seg status.”); Proctor, 846 F.3d at 614 (“Once
an inmate has been confined in Ad Seg, Hewitt mandates that prison officials ‘engage in some

sort of periodic review of the confinement’ to verify that the inmate ‘remains a security risk’
throughout his term.”) (quoting Hewitt, 459 U.S. at 477 n.9).
For initial review purposes, I permit Lewis to proceed on his Fourteenth Amendment
procedural due process claim based on the lack of periodic reviews of his restrictive
confinement against Warden Guadarrama and Deputy Warden Doe in their individual
capacities.
C. Eighth Amendment Deliberate Indifference to Lewis’s Safety
In the context of an incarcerated plaintiff’s claim related to their conditions of
confinement, those conditions that are “restrictive or even harsh” do not violate the Eighth
Amendment because “they are part of the penalty that criminal offenders pay for their offenses

against society.” Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981). Although the Constitution
does not require “comfortable” prison conditions, it does not permit prison officials to maintain
conditions that inflict “unnecessary and wanton pain” or result in the “serious deprivation of
basic human needs” or the “minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities.” Id. at 347, 349.
A successful claim of deliberate indifference to health or safety due to unconstitutional
conditions of confinement requires an individual to satisfy both an objective and a subjective

element. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994). To meet the objective element, the
incarcerated plaintiff must established that he was incarcerated under a condition or a
combination of conditions that resulted in a “sufficiently serious” deprivation of a life necessity
or a “human need[ ]” or posed “a substantial risk of serious harm” to his health or safety. Id.;
see also Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 347. “The Supreme Court has identified the following basic
human needs or life necessities of an inmate: food, clothing, shelter, medical care, warmth,
safety, sanitary living conditions, and exercise.” Baltas v. Erfe, No. 3:19CV1820 (MPS), 2020

WL 1915017, at *24 (D. Conn. Apr. 20, 2020) (citing Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 304 (1991); DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 200 (1989); Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 348). Conditions may be considered in the aggregate “only when they have a
mutually enforcing effect that produces the deprivation of a single, identifiable human need
such as food, warmth, or exercise.” Wilson, 501 U.S. at 304; see also id. (noting that “low cell
temperature at night combined with a failure to issue blankets” may establish an Eighth
Amendment violation). “[T]here is no static test to determine whether a deprivation is
sufficiently serious; the conditions themselves must be evaluated in light of contemporary
standards of decency.” Jabbar v. Fischer, 683 F.3d 54, 57 (2d Cir. 2012) (citation and internal

quotation marks omitted).
To meet the subjective element, an individual must show that the defendants possessed
culpable intent; that is, they knew that the plaintiff faced a substantial risk to his health or
safety and yet they disregarded that risk by failing to take corrective action. See Farmer, 511
U.S. at 834, 837. Thus, an allegation of “mere negligen[t]” conduct is insufficient. Id. at 835.
Rather, the subjective element requires that the individual contend that the defendants acted
with “a mental state equivalent to subjective recklessness, as the term is used in criminal law.”

Salahuddin v. Goord, 467 F.3d 263, 280 (2d Cir. 2006).
1. Eighth Amendment Failure to Protect from Attack by McCants
Prison officials have a duty to take reasonable measures to protect incarcerated
individuals from violence inflicted by others. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 833; see also Walker v.
Schult, 717 F.3d 119, 128 (2d Cir. 2013). To state an Eighth Amendment claim for failure to
protect from another incarcerated individual, the plaintiff must show that (1) the defendant
“had a realistic opportunity to intervene and prevent the harm; (2) a reasonable person in the

officer’s position would know that the victim’s constitutional rights were being violated; and
(3) the officer did not take reasonable steps to intervene.” Ryan v. Bell, No. 20CV602GLSDJS, 2024 WL 36591, at *3 (N.D.N.Y. Jan. 3, 2024) (citation and alteration omitted); see also
Anderson v. Branen, 17 F.3d 552, 557 (2d Cir. 1994) (“In order for liability to attach, there
must have been a realistic opportunity to intervene to prevent the harm from occurring.”)
(citation omitted).
Lewis claims that Officer John Doe acted with deliberate indifference to Lewis’s risk
of harm from McCants, who attacked Lewis on July 14, 2024. Compl. 18, ¶ 1. The Complaint
says that on the prior night, McCants complained to Officer Doe about Lewis, “either through

conversations or notes being passed through the door.” Id. at 9, ¶ 2. Although thin, these
allegations are sufficient for purposes of initial review to support the inference that Officer
Doe had advance warning that McCants posed a substantial danger to Lewis and that he could
have intervened to prevent an attack but nonetheless failed to take action. See Fleming v.
United States, 146 F.3d 88, 90 (2d Cir. 1998) (stating that cases brought by pro se plaintiffs
must be reviewed “with a lenient eye, allowing borderline cases to proceed”).
2. Verbal Harassment

Lewis complains that Lieutenant Laprey mocked and belittled him by calling him the
“Nibbler.” See Compl. 10, ¶ 5. But he does not allege any facts to suggest this name calling
caused some “appreciable injury.” See Willey v. Kirkpatrick, 801 F.3d 51, 70 (2d Cir. 2015);
Robbs v. DeCapua, No. 3:25-CV-74 (SVN), 2025 WL 1529317, at *3 (D. Conn. May 29,
2025) (stating that verbal harassment alone does not rise to the level of a constitutional
violation but observing that “some courts have held that where verbal harassment caused
psychological injury ‘as a form of punishment,’” that may constitute a constitutional violation).

Given the facts alleged here, I dismiss Lewis’s Eighth Amendment claim against Laprey
arising from this name calling.
Lewis also asserts that Laprey yelled for other prisoners to hear that the state police
were arriving so that Lewis could make his police report about McCants. Compl. 15, ¶ 22. I
construe Lewis to assert that Laprey sought to endanger Lewis by implying that Lewis was a
prison informant or snitch. For purposes of initial review, I find that Lewis has sufficiently
alleged Laprey acted to endanger him in violation of the Eighth Amendment. See Burns v.
Martuscello, 890 F.3d 77, 91 (2d Cir. 2018) (observing that “a number of courts have found
an Eighth Amendment violation where a guard publicly labels an inmate as a snitch, because

of the likelihood that the inmate will suffer great violence at the hands of fellow prisoners”).
Accordingly, Lewis may proceed for damages against Laprey for Eighth Amendment
indifference to Lewis’s safety.
3. Conditions
Lewis maintains that while in the RHU infirmary, he was subjected to a 24-hour
lockdown, a shower every three days, and no access to clean underclothing for the first five
days, and that he was deprived of the minimum amount of recreation and out-of-cell time, his
allotted amount of telephone calls, and access to paper and pen. Compl. 12, ¶ 12.3 I consider

whether Lewis has alleged any plausible Eighth Amendment deprivations arising from his
unsanitary and isolating conditions and lack of exercise.
a. Hygiene
Prisoners have a right to sanitary living conditions and the necessary materials to
maintain adequate personal hygiene. See Walker v. Schult, 717 F.3d 119, 127 (2d Cir. 2013).
The Second Circuit requires that “unsanitary conditions of confinement must be assessed
according to two components, severity and duration, on a case-by-case basis.” Darnell v.

Pineiro, 849 F.3d 17, 30 (2d Cir. 2017) (citing Willey, 801 F.3d at 68). In considering the
severity of a condition, the court considers “its qualitative offense to a prisoner’s dignity.” Id. 3 Lewis has not alleged serious deprivations of any basic human need arising from restriction on
his telephone calls or access to writing materials. See, e.g., Trimmier v. Cook, No. 3:20-CV-396
(KAD), 2020 WL 5231300, at *5 (D. Conn. Sept. 2, 2020).
at 31 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). “[C]ourts in this Circuit have held that
temporary denials of access to a shower for up to two weeks typically do not satisfy the
objective prong of an Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claim.” Carolina v. Feder,

No. 3:20-CV-658 (SRU), 2021 WL 268854, at *8 (D. Conn. Jan. 26, 2021).
Lewis has not alleged facts to suggest that a shower every three days prevented him
from maintaining his personal hygiene. See, e.g., Bernier v. Sweet, No. 15-CV-209 (RJA)
(HBS), 2018 WL 1047103, at *3 (W.D.N.Y. Feb. 26, 2018) (two showers per week did not
constitute sufficient deprivation under Eighth Amendment).
And even if Lewis’s lack of clean undergarments could satisfy the Eighth
Amendment’s objective element, Lewis has not alleged facts to satisfy the subjective element.

No facts suggest that any defendant was aware that he had not been provided with clean
undergarments after his initial five days in the infirmary. Accordingly, Lewis may not proceed
on any Eighth Amendment claims arising from unsanitary conditions.
b. Isolation
Lewis’s allegations suggest that he was subjected to isolating conditions while confined
in the RHU infirmary. Courts have found that prolonged periods of isolation or solitary
confinement can sometimes constitute cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth

Amendment. Conley v. Aldi, No. 3:18-CV-00824 (VAB), 2020 WL 1333501, at *6 (D. Conn.
Mar. 23, 2020) (collecting cases); see Porter v. Clarke, 923 F.3d 348, 353 (4th Cir. 2019), as
amended (May 6, 2019) (“The challenged conditions of confinement on Virginia’s death
row—under which Plaintiffs spent, for years, between 23 and 24 hours a day alone, in a small
. . . cell with no access to congregate religious, educational, or social programming—pose a
substantial risk of serious psychological and emotional harm.”).
As I explain above, the Complaint states a claim under the Eighth Amendment insofar
as it alleges Lewis was held in RHU beyond his release date of July 19, 2024 without
penological purpose. But for the purposes of his conditions of confinement claim, Lewis must

allege that his time in RHU posed a substantial risk of serious psychological and emotional
harm. Although the Complaint suggests that the time in RHU came at the expense of his mental
health, it does not appear that Lewis’s time in RHU rose to the level of isolation as to state a
claim under the Eighth Amendment. Cf. Paschal-Barros v. Quiros, No. 3:21-CV-00698
(SALM), 2022 WL 124544, at *5 (D. Conn. Jan. 13, 2022) (concluding that plaintiff’s
allegations of confinement in “near total isolation for approximately five years” resulting “in
[his] deteriorating mental health” satisfied the Eighth Amendment objective element).

c. Exercise
Exercise is an essential human need protected by the Eighth Amendment. See Wilson
v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 304-05 (1991). Prison officials may, however, limit the right to out-
of-cell exercise where there is a valid safety exception or certain unusual circumstances.
Williams v. Greifinger, 97 F.3d 699, 704 (2d Cir. 1996). A lack of indoor exercise and an
“occasional day without exercise” does not give rise to a constitutional claim where “outdoor
recreation space [is] provided and opportunity for its daily use [is] assured.” Anderson v.

Coughlin, 757 F.2d 33, 36 (2d Cir. 1985).
Lewis alleges that he was subjected to twenty-four-hour lockdowns and afforded a
minimal level of exercise, recreation and/or out-of-cell time while in the RHU infirmary. For
initial pleading purposes, these allegations are sufficient to support an inference of an Eighth
Amendment deprivation. Accordingly, I permit Lewis to proceed on Eighth Amendment
damages claims arising from inadequate opportunity for exercise, recreation and/or out-of-cell
time against Warden Guadarrama and Deputy Warden Doe, who plausibly were aware of these
conditions at the MWCI RHU infirmary.
D. Eighth Amendment Deliberate Indifference to Mental Health Needs
The Eighth Amendment prohibits both deliberate indifference to serious medical and

mental health needs of prisoners. Spavone v. New York State Dep’t of Corr. Servs., 719 F.3d
127, 138 (2d Cir. 2013). To state a claim for deliberate indifference to medical treatment, the
incarcerated plaintiff must show that “(1) objectively, the alleged deprivation of medical care
was ‘sufficiently serious,’ and (2) subjectively, that the defendants acted or failed to act ‘while
actually aware of a substantial risk that serious inmate harm will result.’” Washington v. Artus, 708 F. App’x 705, 708 (2d Cir. 2017) (summary order) (quoting Salahuddin, 467 F.3d at 279 -

80).
Lewis sufficiently alleges that John and Jane Doe Mental Health/Social Workers
ignored his serious mental health treatment needs. See Compl. ¶ 20. Thus, I will permit Lewis
to proceed on his Eighth Amendment mental health deliberate indifference claims against Jane
and John Does in their individual capacities.
E. Administrative Directives and Grievance Procedures
Lewis contends that ARC Becker and Walker violated his Fourteenth Amendment
rights by not “maintaining the integrity of the Administrative Remedies procedure” for his

grievance review. Compl. 16, ¶ 24. Lewis also maintains that several defendants violated the
prison directives. Id. at 19, ¶¶ 3-5; see also id. at 20, ¶¶ 6-7.
“It is well-established that inmate grievance programs created by state law are not
required by the Constitution and consequently allegations that prison officials violated those
procedures do[ ] not give rise to a cognizable § 1983 claim.” Brown v. Ruiz, No. 3:18-CV-
1235 (JAM), 2019 WL 1533438, at *3 (D. Conn. Apr. 9, 2019) (internal quotation marks and
citations omitted); see also Davis v. Rinaldi, No. 3:19-cv-504 (CSH), 2019 WL 7879729, at
*7 (D. Conn. Oct. 31, 2019) (“Plaintiff does not have a protected liberty interest in having

correctional officials investigate his complaints, through the grievance process or otherwise.”);
Tafari v. McCarthy, 714 F. Supp. 2d 317, 347 (N.D.N.Y. 2010) (“[P]risoners do not have a
due process right to a thorough investigation of grievances.”) (citing Torres v. Mazzuca, 246
F. Supp. 2d 334, 341-42 (S.D.N.Y. 2003)).
Likewise, “allegations that a prison official violated the procedures set forth” in an
Administrative Directive or other policy “do not state a claim of a violation of an inmate’s
constitutional rights.” Olivencia v. Pun, No. 3:21CV00739 (KAD), 2021 WL 3173137, at *4

(D. Conn. July 27, 2021) (citing Swift v. Tweddell, 582 F. Supp. 2d 437, 445-46 (W.D.N.Y.
2008)). Accordingly, any claim based on an insufficient grievance review or administrative
directive violation must be dismissed.
IV. CONCLUSION AND ORDERS:
For the foregoing reasons, I conclude that Lewis may proceed on the following claims:
(1) First Amendment retaliation claim against Lieutenants Cage and Laprey;
(2) Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process violation against Lieutenant Cage,

Lieutenant Laprey, Nurse Tony, Warden Guadarrama, and Deputy Warden Doe for
extending Lewis’s restrictive confinement without procedural protection;
(3) Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process violation against Warden
Guadarrama and Deputy Warden Doe for retaining Lewis in restrictive confinement
without periodic review;
(4) Eighth Amendment claim against Lieutenant Cage, Lieutenant Laprey, Nurse Tony,
Warden Guadarrama, and Deputy Warden Doe for extending Lewis’s time in RHU
without penological purpose;

(5) Eighth Amendment violation against Lieutenant Laprey for deliberate indifference
to Lewis’s safety;
(6) Eighth Amendment violation for deliberate indifference to his exercise, recreation
and/or out-of-cell time deprivation against Warden Guadarrama and Deputy
Warden Doe;
(7) Eighth Amendment violation against Officer Doe for failure to protect Lewis from
the attack by McCants;

(8) Eighth Amendment violation against Mental Health/Social Workers Jane and John
Doe for deliberate indifference to Lewis’s mental health treatment needs.
All other claims are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
Lewis has two options as to how to proceed in response to this Initial Review
Order:
(1) If Cook wishes to proceed immediately only on the claims set forth above, he

may do so without further delay. If Lewis selects this option, he shall file a
notice on the docket on or before May 22, 2026 informing the court that he elects
to proceed with service as to the claims set forth in this paragraph. The court
will then begin the effort to serve process in the capacity described above.
(2) Alternatively, if Lewis wishes to attempt to replead any of the claims asserted
in his complaint that have been dismissed in order to attempt to state a viable
claim, he may file an amended complaint on or before May 22, 2026. An
amended complaint, if filed, will completely replace the complaint, and the
court will not consider any allegations made in the original complaint in
evaluating any amended complaint. The court will review any amended

complaint after filing to determine whether it may proceed to service of process
on any defendants named therein. If Lewis elects to file an amended complaint,
the complaint addressed by this Initial Review Order will not proceed to service
of process on any defendant.
If the court receives no response from Cook before May 22, 2026, the court will
presume that Lewis wishes to proceed on the complaint as to the claims permitted to go forward
in this Initial Review Order, and he will have to show good cause if he seeks to amend the

complaint in any manner in the future.
Changes of Address. If Lewis changes his address at any time during the litigation of
this case, Local Rule 83.1(c) provides that he MUST notify the court. Failure to do so may
result in the dismissal of the case. He must give notice of a new address even if he is
incarcerated. Lewis should write PLEASE NOTE MY NEW ADDRESS on the notice. It is
not enough to just put the new address on a letter without indicating that it is a new address. If

Lewis has more than one pending case, he should indicate all the case numbers in the
notification of change of address. Lewis should also notify Defendants or counsel for
Defendants of his new address.
SO ORDERED.

New Haven, Connecticut
April 21, 2026

/s/Sarah F. Russell
SARAH F. RUSSELL
United States District Judge