Tommie Lee Jones v. Hutchinson Police Department — Civil Rights Action

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April 10, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

Tommie Lee Jones v. Hutchinson Police Department

District Court, D. Kansas

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: 5:26-cv-03049

• Precedential Status: Unknown Status

• Opinion

• Authorities (36)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (0)

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Trial Court Document

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF KANSAS

TOMMIE LEE JONES,

Plaintiff,

v. CASE NO. 26-3049-JWL

HUTCHINSON POLICE
DEPARTMENT,

Defendant.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
TO SHOW CAUSE

Plaintiff Tommie Lee Jones is hereby required to show good cause, in writing to the
undersigned, why this action should not be dismissed due to the deficiencies in Plaintiff’s
Complaint that are discussed herein.
I. Nature of the Matter before the Court
Plaintiff brings this pro se civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff is in custody
at the Reno County Correctional Facility in Hutchinson, Kansas. Plaintiff has been granted leave
to proceed in forma pauperis.
Plaintiff’s claims relate to his state criminal proceedings. Plaintiff alleges that on October
17, 2024, Hutchinson Police Department officials ordered him from his vehicle after an accident.
(Doc. 1, at 2.) Plaintiff complied, walking backwards toward the officials until told to stop and
lifting his shirt as ordered. Id. Plaintiff was then kicked in the back of the legs and knocked down. Id. Officers put their knees on his head, neck, and left hip. He was kicked on the left side and
tased. Id. Plaintiff alleges that these events occurred at the county dump, which is outside of the
HPD’s jurisdiction. He states that officers from three agencies were present but only HPD officers
participated in the use of force. Id. Plaintiff brings claims for police brutality and abuse of authority. He names the HPD as
the only defendant and seeks the dismissal of the criminal charges and payment of his medical

expenses. Id. at 6.
II. Statutory Screening of Prisoner Complaints
The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a
governmental entity or an officer or an employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a).
The Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if a plaintiff has raised claims that are
legally frivolous or malicious, that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that
seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1)–
(2).
“To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right secured by

the Constitution and laws of the United States, and must show that the alleged deprivation was
committed by a person acting under color of state law.” West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988)
(citations omitted); Northington v. Jackson, 973 F.2d 1518, 1523 (10th Cir. 1992). A court
liberally construes a pro se complaint and applies “less stringent standards than formal pleadings
drafted by lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). In addition, the court accepts
all well-pleaded allegations in the complaint as true. Anderson v. Blake, 469 F.3d 910, 913 (10th
Cir. 2006). On the other hand, “when the allegations in a complaint, however true, could not raise
a claim of entitlement to relief,” dismissal is appropriate. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544, 558 (2007).
A pro se litigant’s “conclusory allegations without supporting factual averments are
insufficient to state a claim upon which relief can be based.” Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106,
1110 (10th Cir. 1991). “[A] plaintiff’s obligation to provide the ‘grounds’ of his ‘entitlement to
relief’ requires “more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a
cause of action.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (citations omitted). The complaint’s “factual

allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level” and “to state a
claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. at 555, 570.
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals has explained “that, to state a claim in federal court, a
complaint must explain what each defendant did to [the pro se plaintiff]; when the defendant did
it; how the defendant’s action harmed [the plaintiff]; and, what specific legal right the plaintiff
believes the defendant violated.” Nasious v. Two Unknown B.I.C.E. Agents, 492 F.3d 1158, 1163 (10th Cir. 2007). The court “will not supply additional factual allegations to round out a plaintiff’s
complaint or construct a legal theory on a plaintiff’s behalf.” Whitney v. New Mexico, 113 F.3d
1170, 1173-74 (10th Cir. 1997) (citation omitted).

The Tenth Circuit has pointed out that the Supreme Court’s decisions in Twombly and
Erickson gave rise to a new standard of review for § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) dismissals. See Kay v.
Bemis, 500 F.3d 1214, 1218 (10th Cir. 2007) (citations omitted); see also Smith v. United States, 561 F.3d 1090, 1098 (10th Cir. 2009). As a result, courts “look to the specific allegations in the
complaint to determine whether they plausibly support a legal claim for relief.” Kay, 500 F.3d at
1218 (citation omitted). Under this new standard, “a plaintiff must ‘nudge his claims across the
line from conceivable to plausible.’” Smith, 561 F.3d at 1098 (citation omitted). “Plausible” in
this context does not mean “likely to be true,” but rather refers “to the scope of the allegations in
a complaint: if they are so general that they encompass a wide swath of conduct, much of it
innocent,” then the plaintiff has not “nudged [his] claims across the line from conceivable to
plausible.” Robbins v. Oklahoma, 519 F.3d 1242, 1247 (10th Cir. 2008) (citing Twombly, 127 S.
Ct. at 1974).
III. DISCUSSION
1. Improper Defendant

Plaintiff does not name a proper defendant. The only defendant he names, the Hutchinson
Police Department, is subject to dismissal, as “‘police departments . . . are not suable entities under
§ 1983, because they lack legal identities apart from the municipality.’” Young v. City of
Albuquerque, 77 F. Supp. 3d 1154, 1186 (D. N.M. 2014) (quoting Ketchum v. Albuquerque Police
Dep’t, 958 F.2d 381, 1992 WL 51481, at *2 (10th Cir. March 12, 1992). This Court has held that
municipal police departments are subunits of city government and not legal entities subject to suit.
Roberts v. Unknown Wichita Police Officers, 2019 WL 1790050, at *2 (D. Kan. April 24, 2019)
(citing Schwab v. Kansas, 2017 WL 2831508, at *13 (D. Kan. June 30, 2017) (dismissing Riley
County Police Department); Neighbors v. Lawrence Police Dep’t, 2016 WL 3685355, at *6 (D.

Kan. July 12, 2016); Ward v. Lenexa, Kansas Police Dep’t, 2014 WL 1775612, at *4 (D. Kan.
May 5, 2014)); see also See Martinez v. Winner, 771 F.2d 424, 444 (10th Cir. 1985) (“City of
Denver Police Department” not “separate suable entity”).
2. Younger Abstention
To the extent Plaintiff’s claims relate to his state criminal proceedings in Reno County,
Kansas, the Court would be prohibited from hearing Plaintiff’s claims under Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 45 (1971). “The Younger doctrine requires a federal court to abstain from hearing a
case where . . . (1) state judicial proceedings are ongoing; (2) [that] implicate an important state
interest; and (3) the state proceedings offer an adequate opportunity to litigate federal
constitutional issues.” Buck v. Myers, 244 F. App’x 193, 197 (10th Cir. 2007) (unpublished) (citing
Winnebago Tribe of Neb. v. Stovall, 341 F.3d 1202, 1204 (10th Cir. 2003); see also Middlesex Cty.
Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass’n, 457 U.S. 423, 432 (1982)). “Once these three conditions
are met, Younger abstention is non-discretionary and, absent extraordinary circumstances, a
district court is required to abstain.” Buck, 244 F. App’x at 197 (citing Crown Point I, LLC v.

Intermountain Rural Elec. Ass’n, 319 F.3d 1211, 1215 (10th Cir. 2003)).
Online records show that Plaintiff’s criminal proceedings are pending. See State v. Jones,
Case No. RN-2024-CR-000672 (District Court of Reno County, Kansas). Plaintiff is charged with
Aggravated Battery on a Law Enforcement Officer; two counts of Fleeing or Attempting to Elude;
Interference with a Law Enforcement Officer; Failure to Stop at Accident; and Criminal Damage
to Property. Trial has not yet occurred, with the last docket entry being an order for mediation
entered on February 6, 2026. Id. Because it appears that Plaintiff’s state court criminal proceedings are pending, the first
and second conditions for Younger abstention would be met; Kansas undoubtedly has an important

interest in enforcing its criminal laws through criminal proceedings in the state’s courts. In re
Troff, 488 F.3d 1237, 1240 (10th Cir. 2007) (“[S]tate control over criminal justice [is] a lynchpin
in the unique balance of interests” described as “Our Federalism.”) (citing Younger, 401 U.S. at
44). Likewise, the third condition would be met because Kansas courts provide Plaintiff with an
adequate forum to litigate his constitutional claims by way of pretrial proceedings, trial, and direct
appeal after conviction and sentence, as well as post-conviction remedies. See Capps v. Sullivan, 13 F.3d 350, 354 n.2 (10th Cir. 1993) (“[F]ederal courts should abstain from the exercise of . . .
jurisdiction if the issues raised . . . may be resolved either by trial on the merits in the state court
or by other [available] state procedures.”) (quotation omitted); see Robb v. Connolly, 111 U.S.
624, 637 (1984) (state courts have obligation ‘to guard, enforce, and protect every right granted or
secured by the constitution of the United States . . . .’”); Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 460–
61 (1974) (pendant state proceeding, in all but unusual cases, would provide federal plaintiff with
necessary vehicle for vindicating constitutional rights).
“[T]he Younger doctrine extends to federal claims for monetary relief when a judgment for

the plaintiff would have preclusive effects on a pending state-court proceeding.” D.L. v. Unified
Sch. Dist. No. 497, 392 F.3d 1223, 1228 (10th Cir. 2004). Plaintiff’s claims may be stayed pending
the resolution of the pending criminal case. See Garza v. Burnett, 672 F.3d 1217, 1220 (10th Cir.
2012) (citing Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 393 (2007)); Myers v. Garff, 876 F.2d 79, 81 (10th
Cir. 1989) (directing district court to stay claim for damages).
Younger applies “whenever the requested relief would interfere with the state court's ability
to conduct proceedings, regardless of whether the relief targets the conduct of a proceeding
directly.” Joseph A. ex rel. Corrine Wolfe v. Ingram, 275 F.3d 1253, 1272 (10th Cir. 2002)
(citations omitted). This principle has been interpreted to discourage addressing any claim which

could disrupt state proceedings, regardless of whether the claim specifically targets that
proceeding. See Simpson v. Rowan, 73 F.3d 134, 137 (7th Cir. 1995) (holding that Younger applied
to claims alleging misconduct during arrest and criminal investigation even though resolution of
those claims might not directly intervene in criminal prosecution, because federal judgment could
nevertheless substantially disrupt the state process); see also Boothe v. Sherman, 66 F. Supp. 3d
1069, 1074 (N.D. Ill. 2014) (Younger abstention applies to §1983 claim of excessive force upon
arrest where claimant is charged with resisting arrest and prosecution is ongoing).
Here, Plaintiff is charged with fleeing or attempting to elude a police officer and battery on
a police officer, and resisting or attempting to evade arrest is one of the factors to be considered in
an excessive force claim. See Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989) (holding that on an
excessive force claim, the Fourth Amendment's “proper application requires careful attention to
the facts and circumstances of each particular case, including ... whether [the suspect] is actively
resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest”). Because the question of whether Plaintiff is guilty
of attempting to elude or harm a LEO is “intertwined with the question of whether [Defendants]

used excessive force, Younger abstention is appropriate.” Boothe, 66 F. Supp. 3d at 1074.
Plaintiff should show good cause why the Court should not abstain from hearing his claims
regarding his state court proceedings in the District Court of Reno County, Kansas. Plaintiff
should indicate if he is seeking a stay pending resolution of those proceedings.
3. Habeas Nature of Claim
To the extent Plaintiff seeks release from custody, his federal claim must be presented in
habeas corpus. “[A] § 1983 action is a proper remedy for a state prisoner who is making a
constitutional challenge to the conditions of his prison life, but not to the fact or length of his
custody.” Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 499 (1973) (emphasis added). When the legality

of a confinement is challenged so that the remedy would be release or a speedier release, the case
must be filed as a habeas corpus proceeding rather than under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and the plaintiff
must comply with the exhaustion of state court remedies requirement. Heck v. Humphrey, 512
U.S. 477, 482 (1994); see also Montez v. McKinna, 208 F.3d 862, 866 (10th Cir. 2000) (exhaustion
of state court remedies is required by prisoner seeking habeas corpus relief); see 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254 (b)(1)(A) (requiring exhaustion of available state court remedies). “Before a federal court
may grant habeas relief to a state prisoner, the prisoner must exhaust his remedies in state court.
In other words, the state prisoner must give the state courts an opportunity to act on his claims
before he presents those claims to a federal court in a habeas petition.” O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 842 (1999); see Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 92 (2006); Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S.
509, 518–19 (1982). Therefore, any claim challenging his confinement under state charges is not
cognizable in a § 1983 action. Plaintiff should show cause why his Complaint should not be
dismissed as not properly brought in a § 1983 action.
IV. Response Required

Plaintiff is required to show good cause why Plaintiff’s Complaint should not be dismissed
for the reasons stated herein. Failure to respond by the Court’s deadline may result in dismissal
of this case without further notice.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Plaintiff is granted until May 11, 2026, in which
to show good cause, in writing, why Plaintiff’s Complaint should not be dismissed or stayed for
the reasons stated herein.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated April 10, 2026, in Kansas City, Kansas.
S/ John W. Lungstrum
JOHN W. LUNGSTRUM
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE