Jane Doe v. James Dzurenda - Transgender Juvenile Solitary Confinement Constitutional Claims

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April 22, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

Jane Doe v. James Dzurenda, et al.

District Court, D. Connecticut

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: 3:16-cv-01934

• Precedential Status: Unknown Status

• Opinion

• Authorities (41)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (1.6K)

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Trial Court Document

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT

JANE DOE,
Plaintiff
V. Case No. 3:16-CV-1934
JAMES DZURENDA, ET AL.,
Defendants

RULING AND ORDER
Plaintiff Jane Doe brings this action under 42
U.S.C. § 1983 for money damages against the State of
Connecticut, the Department of Children and Families
("DCF"), the Department of Correction ("DOC") and DOC and
DCF officials in their individual and official capacities
for alleged violations of her rights under federal law
while confined as a juvenile in state facilities.1 The
complaint alleges that in 2014, plaintiff, then a
sixteen-year-old transgender girl with mental
impairments, was held in solitary confinement in a high
security facility for boys and an adult prison for women
in violation of her rights under the Fourteenth and
Eighth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution, the Juvenile

1 The individual defendants are former DOC Commissioners James
Dzurenda and Scott Semple, former DCF Commissioner Joette Katz,
and William Rosenbeck, former Superintendent of
the Connecticut Juvenile Training School for Boys.
Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act (“JJDPA”), 42
U.S.C. § 5601 et. seq., the Prison Rape Elimination Act
(“PREA”), 42 U.S.C. § 15601, et. seq., Title II of the
Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. §
12132, and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 29
U.S.C. § 701, et. seq.2
The defendants have moved pursuant to Fed. R. Civ.
P. 12(b)(6) to dismiss the action in its entirety. The
main issues are whether the claims for damages against
the individual defendants sufficiently allege violations
of requirements of substantive due process that apply in
the context presented here; whether quasi-judicial
absolute immunity bars the claims because defendants were
carrying out court orders; whether qualified immunity
bars the claims because the applicable law was not
clearly established; whether the JJDPA and PREA create

2 There are ten counts in all. Counts one and two allege that
all four officials violated plaintiff's rights under the
Fourteenth Amendment’s due process clause by confining her in
isolation for extended periods, placing her at a facility for
boys and an adult prison for women, and threatening to transfer
her to an adult prison for men. Counts three and four allege
that the officials were deliberately indifferent to excessive
risks to plaintiff’s health and safety in violation of the
Eighth Amendment. Counts five and six allege JJDPA claims
against Katz, Dzurenda, and Semple in their individual
capacities related to plaintiff’s incarceration at a prison for
adult women. Count seven alleges PREA violations against Katz
and Rosenbeck in their individual capacities related to
plaintiff’s detention at a facility for boys. Count eight
alleges deprivation of liberty interests grounded in the JJDPA
and PREA in violation of due process. Counts nine and ten
allege violations of the ADA and Rehabilitation Act.
individually enforceable rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983;
and whether plaintiff's gender dysphoria constitutes a
cognizable disability under the ADA notwithstanding the
statute's exclusion of "gender identity disorders not
resulting from physical impairments." 42 U.S.C. §
12211 (b)(1).
For reasons explained below, the motion is denied
as to the ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims but granted
as to the other claims. The Fourteenth Amendment claims
for damages against the DCF and DOC officials in their
individual capacities sufficiently allege violations of
substantive due process but are dismissed based on
qualified immunity. The Eighth Amendment claims are
dismissed because its prohibition of cruel and unusual
punishments does not directly apply to juveniles confined
pursuant to a delinquency adjudication and commitment
order. The JJDPA claims and the PREA claim are dismissed
because neither statute creates rights that are privately
enforceable through § 1983.3

3 Plaintiff filed this action after she was released from DCF
custody and thus no longer subject to the requirement of the Prison
Litigation Reform Act that she exhaust administrative remedies.
42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). See Greig v. Goord, 169 F.3d 165, 167 (2d
Cir. 1999) (“[L]itigants. . . who file prison condition actions
after release from confinement are no longer ‘prisoners’ for
purposes of § 1997e(a) and, therefore, need not satisfy the
exhaustion requirements of [the] provision.”). Plaintiff
previously filed two actions without exhausting administrative
remedies: the first, Doe v. Connecticut Department of Corrections,
14-cv-469 (filed April 9, 2014), sought a temporary restraining
order preventing her transfer from DCF custody to DOC custody; the
I. Background
The following facts are drawn from the allegations
in the complaint, which are accepted as true, and from
statements of fact in published decisions of state courts
in closely related litigation. See In re Doe, No.
F04JV32912660A, 2014 WL 2600505 *1 (Conn. Super. Ct. May
6, 2014), rev’d, In re Angel R., 157 Conn. App. 826 (2015).
Plaintiff is transgender – biologically male,
identifying as female. She became involved with DCF at
age five due to neglect. Throughout her childhood, she
suffered severe and repeated physical, sexual, and
emotional abuse, some of which occurred in DCF

second, Doe v. Dzurenda, 15-cv-498 (filed April 6, 2015), sought
damages for the same violations of federal rights alleged here.
Both actions were voluntarily dismissed. Plaintiff moved to
dismiss the second action without prejudice after she filed this
action arguing that it would serve to moot issues relating to the
exhaustion requirement. In support she cited cases permitting
litigants who filed lawsuits as prisoners to refile their suits
after release like any other non-prisoner litigant. See Harris v.
City of New York, 607 F.3d 18, 24 (2d Cir. 2010)(plaintiff whose
suit is dismissed under the PLRA’s three-strikes provision but has
been released can refile and seek in forma pauperis status like
any non-prisoner); Dilworth v. Goldberg, No. CIV. 2224 RJH GWG, 2011 WL 3501869, at*15 (S.D.N.Y. July 28, 2011)(declining to
dismiss for non-exhaustion claims refiled after release), report
and recommendation adopted, 2011 WL 4526555 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 30,
2011). The motion was granted over defendants’ objection. In
support of the present motion to dismiss, defendants again assert
that the action is barred by plaintiff’s failure to exhaust. I
agree with plaintiff that her failure to exhaust administrative
remedies in connection with the prior actions does not warrant
dismissal here.
placements. At all relevant times, she suffered from
depression, post-traumatic stress disorder, anxiety,
developmental trauma disorder, and gender dysphoria,
which substantially limited activities of eating,
sleeping, learning, concentrating, thinking,
communicating and interacting with others. Before the
events at issue, DCF recognized plaintiff as a
transgender girl and provided her with hormone therapy
and other transition-related services.
Between the ages of nine and sixteen, while in DCF
placements, plaintiff “exhibited a history of assaultive
behavior.” In re Doe, 2014 WL 2600505, at *1.4 “There
were eleven occasions in which police were called to
either a facility or a program regarding an incident with
[her].” Id.5 Plaintiff exhibited assaultive behavior
toward staff members and peers, including females. Id. On November 21, 2013, plaintiff was adjudicated
delinquent following her plea of guilty to assault on an
officer in violation of Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-167c. She
was committed to DCF custody for up to eighteen months
pursuant to Conn. Gen. Stat. § 46b-140.

4 The facts drawn from In re Doe are taken from findings of fact
in the Court’s opinion dated May 6, 2014. The findings were
made by a preponderance of the evidence following an evidentiary
hearing spanning six days in which plaintiff was represented by
counsel.
5 These incidents occurred at ages nine, ten, eleven, twelve,
fourteen, and sixteen. Id.
Pursuant to this delinquency conviction and order
of commitment, DCF initially placed plaintiff at
Meadowridge Academy in Massachusetts, a therapeutic
boarding school that provides specialized trauma-
informed treatment services. In re Doe, 2014 WL 2600505,
at *2. Plaintiff was placed in the girl's dormitory. Id. During her two-month placement at Meadowridge, she
“committed multiple assaults, first pulling the hair and
spitting on one staff member, kicking another, and
attacking another student, pulling her hair and
scratching and punching her.” Id. Then, on January 28,
2014, she attacked a female staff member and was
discharged from Meadowridge. Id. At a subsequent hearing on the issue of plaintiff’s
dangerousness, the Superior Court credited the testimony
of the victim of the assault and found as follows:
The assault occurred after the Respondent was
agitated and the assaulted staff member and another
staff member were trying to calm her down. The
Respondent made threats that she would punch or cut
the two staff members. The other staff member
grabbed the Respondent. She pulled an arm free,
which the assaulted staff member tried to hold
down. The Respondent then ripped at her hair and
bit her, leaving puncture wounds. All three fell
to the ground, after which the Respondent, wearing
army boots, kicked the assaulted staff member in
the head, arm, face, and ear. The assaulted staff
member believes she was kicked six times. She
estimated that the Respondent weighed approximately
180 pounds and stood five feet eight inches,
compared to her own 135 pounds and five feet five
inches. Id. (citations of hearing transcript omitted).

On January 31, 2014, following plaintiff’s discharge
from Meadowridge, DCF placed her at the Connecticut
Juvenile Training School ("CJTS"), a high security
facility for boys in DCF custody.6 Plaintiff obtained an
injunction requiring DCF to house her apart from the
general population at CJTS.7 She was placed in a housing
unit that included small rooms for sleeping and a large
room containing a table, chairs and television. She
remained there for nine weeks. Throughout this time, she
was restricted to the housing unit and was not permitted
to go outdoors. At all times when she was in the housing
unit, two DCF employees were present in the unit with
her. Initially, she was the only child in the unit. Later,
an injured boy was placed in the unit. Other than
interactions with this boy, plaintiff had no contact with
any other child. With the exception of occasional
professional visits, her contact with adults was limited
to employees of DCF.8

6 CJTS closed in 2018.
7 See In re Doe, 2014 WL 2600505, at *2 ("[Plaintiff’s] attorney
filed and was granted a temporary injunction preventing CJTS from
housing her with the general population of the school based on her
statement that she was scared to enter the general population of
the school.").
8 Defendants provide the following description of plaintiff’s
placement at CJTS:
While at CJTS, [plaintiff] was initially kept in an eighteen-bed
unit by herself with two full-time staff around the clock.
A few days after placing plaintiff at CJTS, DCF
filed a motion in Superior Court pursuant to Conn. Gen.
Stat. § 17a-12 to transfer her to the John R. Manson
Youth Institution (“Manson”), a high security facility
operated by DOC for males under 21, many with pending
adult charges or serving adult sentences. Section 17a-
12 had been used only once in the previous fourteen years,
for an individual who was not living under the care and
custody of DCF’s guardianship.
“In order to make a transfer decision [pursuant to
§ 17a-12], a fact finder must consider whether such a
transfer is in a child's best interest, whether a child
is dangerous to himself, herself or others, whether DCF
cannot safely retain the child's custody, and whether DOC
offers a suitable environment for such a juvenile.” In
re Angel R., 157 Conn. App. at 850 (citing In re Steven
M., 264 Conn. 747, 756–57 (2003)). Plaintiff opposed the

Staff tried to provide her with educational and recreational
activities on a one-to-one basis. She initially refused to
participate in any of the individualized programming, but later
began to participate in the individualized programming provided.
The CJTS staff member in charge of [plaintiff’s] compliance with
the behavioral level system implemented at CJTS stated that
[she] was “on level,” but also stated that she did not have to
meet any requirements to stay on level because she did not
participate in the programs that were offered in the general
population units. CJTS eventually moved one male student who
was recovering from a broken jaw into the unit with her. They
[were] on opposite ends of the unit, which is structured as a
semicircle lined with individual rooms for each resident. A
common area separate[d] [plaintiff] and the male resident and
two staff members [were] present at all times.
transfer on the grounds that DOC would confine her to a
cell for twenty-three hours a day, deny her appropriate
programing, and place her with males. As an alternative,
she asked to be placed at the recently opened Pueblo
Unit, a locked DCF facility for girls adjacent to CJTS.
In re Doe, 2014 WL 2600505, at *5. While the litigation
was pending, plaintiff remained at CJTS.
On April 8, 2014, following a six-day evidentiary
hearing, the Superior Court (Kaplan, J.) granted DCF’s
motion to transfer plaintiff to DOC custody. The Court
found by a preponderance of the evidence that plaintiff
was “clearly too dangerous to be held at CJTS or any
facility run by DCF.” Id. at *5. It was also “clear”
that continuing to house plaintiff “in solitude or near
solitude” was “not in [her] best interest.” Id. at
*10. Plaintiff’s request to be transferred to the
Pueblo Unit was denied. The Court stated that “housing
plaintiff at the DCF girl's facility would be just as
difficult as housing her at CJTS in view of her history
of assaulting female staff and other female residents,
which made her equally dangerous in [a] women's
juvenile facility.” Id. Because plaintiff is
transgender, she was ordered transferred to York
Correctional Institution, a high security adult women's
prison operated by DOC.9

9 The Court provided the following reasons for transferring
plaintiff to York instead of Manson:
In support of its finding that plaintiff was too
dangerous to be held at a DCF facility, the Court
relied on the testimony of defendant Rosenbeck, the
Director of CJTS, who described plaintiff as “the most
dangerous resident they have had at CJTS.” Id. at *4.
At the hearing, Rosenbeck testified regarding “specific
behaviors that made [plaintiff] especially dangerous
and difficult to secure: an inability to de-escalate,
targeting of female staff, and smearing of feces. Id.
at 1. He stated that the incidents became steadily
more aggressive and intense as [plaintiff] increased in
size and strength,” and that “he had not seen the same
level of behavior in any other juveniles at the
training school.” Id. He further stated that “CJTS
staff are often assaulted, but that this is in the

The Respondent was previously classified as female by DCF, the
Court Support Services Division, and the Massachusetts
placement. She attends the GUIPPE Program at Connecticut
Children's Medical Center, which deals with issues faced by
transgendered youth. Given this prior classification, the court
is inclined to send her initially to the women's DOC facility in
Niantic [i.e. York] for assessment. The decision as to whether a
transgender girl should be treated as male or female requires a
complex assessment. There is insufficient evidence that DCF
performed an evaluation before reversing its policy of treating
the Respondent as female. The court recognizes that
determination of her long-term placement will be best left to
DOC's expertise. It also recognizes that DCF maintains the
ability to recall the Respondent from DOC custody at any time.
Once the Respondent is transferred to [York], DOC may perform
whatever evaluations it deems necessary in keeping with state
and federal law to determine where the Respondent should be
housed.
In re Doe, 2014 WL 2600505, at *10.
course of an intervention, when they are trying to
break up a fight between residents. [Plaintiff] in
contrast, specifically target[ed] staff members.” Id. “When asked whether placement in DOC was in plaintiff’s
best interest given her trauma history, Rosenbeck
stated that plaintiff needed to be transferred to DOC
due to her dangerousness, even though that would not
necessarily be best for anyone who had experienced
trauma.” Id. at *5.
The transfer order directed that plaintiff "be held
in isolation [at York] for no more than 72 hours," and
that she be “examined, evaluated and classified under the
appropriate State and Federal statues, guidelines, rules
and procedures.” Id. at *11. The order provided that,
"[f]ollowing the classification process, the
Commissioner of Correction shall make his own placement
determination." Id. The order noted that DCF's
Commissioner retained statutory authority under Conn.
Gen. Stat. § 17a-13 to remove plaintiff from DOC custody
at any time. Id.
Plaintiff appealed the transfer order on the ground
that § 17a-12, as applied to her, violated due process
because, among other reasons, it permitted the court to
order her transferred to DOC without requiring DCF to
prove its allegations by proof beyond a reasonable doubt.
The Connecticut Appellate Court ultimately reversed the
order. In re Angel R., 157 Conn. App. at 862. The Court
recognized that a child in DCF custody due to a
delinquency adjudication retains a liberty interest in
avoiding transfer to an institution operated by DOC
because DOC does not operate under the child-protective
mandates applicable to DCF;10 and the child-protective
features of DCF’s operations are “notably absent” from
DOC’s charter.11 In view of this disparity, a juvenile’s
liberty interest in avoiding transfer to DOC custody
requires DCF to prove facts justifying a transfer by
clear and convincing evidence. Id. at 853–54. Because
DCF was not held to a clear and convincing standard
regarding plaintiff’s level of dangerousness or its
inability to safely maintain her in its care, plaintiff
was denied due process. Id. at 858, 862.

10 Under Conn. Gen. Stat. § 46b–121h, the goals of the juvenile
justice system are to: “(1) Hold juveniles accountable for their
unlawful behavior; (2) Provide secure and therapeutic
confinement to those juveniles who present a danger to the
community; (3) Adequately protect the community and juveniles;
(4) Provide programs and services that are community-based and
are provided in close proximity to the juvenile's community; (5)
Retain and support juveniles within their homes whenever
possible and appropriate; (6) Base probation treatment planning
upon individual case management plans; and (7) Include the
juvenile's family in the case management plan . . . .”
11DOC's mission statement reads:
“The [DOC] shall strive to be a global leader in progressive
correctional practices and partnered re-entry initiatives to
support responsive evidence-based practices aligned to law-
abiding and accountable behaviors. Safety and security shall be
a priority component of this responsibility, coinciding with an
unwavering respect for the human dignity of staff, victims,
citizens and offenders.” DOC Administrative Directive 1.1.
Following issuance of the transfer order on April
8, plaintiff was immediately transferred from CJTS to
York, where she remained until June 24, a period of
approximately 11 weeks. Throughout her stay at York,
plaintiff’s placement was indefinite and she was given
no specific guidelines for what she needed to do to be
moved out of the prison.
During her first five weeks at York, plaintiff was
held in a locked cell in the mental health unit for
approximately 21 to 22 hours per day. She had one hour
of solitary recreation each day, and received limited
educational services in another cell in the mental health
unit. While in her cell, plaintiff was watched at all
times by a correctional officer, including when she
showered and used the toilet.
On May 13, plaintiff was moved to a self-contained
housing unit at York consisting of three rooms and a
bathroom. Plaintiff slept in one of the rooms and was
observed by correctional officers through a window in the
door of the room. The bathroom door also had a window.
At all times, at least two officers were inside the unit
with her. She was able to walk outside the unit into a
small outdoor space.12

12 Defendants provide a less stark description of the housing unit.
They state that “DOC built a single occupancy apartment for
plaintiff, complete with a small kitchenette, and a television,
with sliding doors to an outdoor patio and garden area.”
Plaintiff spent approximately 23 hours a day in the
unit or immediately outside it. She left the unit for
recreation in the prison gym for one hour per day, and
for occasional professional visits. She was subjected to
strip searches in connection with these visits, which
caused her severe distress given her trauma history and
gender dysphoria.
Plaintiff received limited educational services in
the housing unit each weekday. DCF said she could be
transported to CJTS to attend school there, and DOC said
she could attend school with adult inmates at York.
Plaintiff declined to place herself in either environment
because she feared she would be ridiculed, harassed and
physically assaulted.13

13 Regarding services plaintiff received at York, defendants
state: “DOC provided a medical and mental health intake
screening and assessment. This resulted in an individualized
treatment plan developed by psychiatrists with age and gender
appropriate experience and training. DOC's mental health staff
also provided numerous individual sessions with [plaintiff],
including sessions with a psychiatrist and a psychologist and
the regular provision of art therapy.” They add that
plaintiff’s “mental health [was] noted to be stable throughout
her placement at York,” and that, although “she generally
cooperated with mental health assessments,” she “remained
relatively unengaged with treatment, claiming to both DOC and
DCF staff that she [did] not have any need for therapy.”
Defendants state that DOC “continued to support the plaintiff's
transgender status” and provided her with “a continuity of care”
that included “regular transportation to the GUPPE Program at
the Connecticut Children's Medical Center, visits and phone
calls with the True Colors organization, and with an individual
transgender mentor, whose visits at York CI were facilitated by
both DCF and DOC.”
Approximately six weeks later, on June 24, DCF
Commissioner Katz removed plaintiff from York and placed
her at the Pueblo Unit. At Pueblo, plaintiff was
positively engaged in individual and group therapy and
in school work. On July 12, plaintiff was involved in a
fight with three other Pueblo residents. All four were
restrained and DCF records describe all four as hitting
each other and staff. Within hours of the fight, DCF
returned plaintiff to CJTS. The others were not removed
from Pueblo. Due to additional delinquency proceedings
relating to the events at Pueblo, plaintiff was
subsequently committed to DCF custody until April 2016.
On returning to CJTS, plaintiff was placed in the
same housing unit where she resided before going to York.
She was required to be in her room from 8:30 p.m. to 7:30
a.m. While in the day room, she was observed by two CJTS
staff members who remained with her at all times. Other
CJTS staff members came to this room to meet with her.
Her only human contact, other than occasional
professional visits, was with CJTS staff. Plaintiff
declined to be housed with the male population because
she feared she would be harassed, humiliated, and
assaulted.
From July 12 until August 15, plaintiff was not
permitted to go outdoors. Subsequently, she went out for
one hour of recreation a day. At times, she declined
offers to go outside when boys were present.
Plaintiff was required to wear the same uniform as
the boys and was not permitted to use make-up or wear a
wig. Prior to October 2014, when she was allowed to use
hair extensions, she could not express herself physically
as a girl. It is psychologically damaging and harmful for
a transgender female to be placed in a male facility and
to be unable to express herself as female.
Other than unauthorized contact with peers on
September 16, plaintiff’s first interaction with peers
came on December 23, 2014. Until shortly before December
23, she was not informed when she would next interact
with peers.
At both CJTS and York, plaintiff experienced
increasing levels of stress, frustration, anxiety,
loneliness, depression and trauma. Her mental and
emotional distress was exacerbated by her history of
severe abuse and trauma. She was not provided with
intensive individual psychotherapy and had no opportunity
to participate in group therapy with peers.14

14 Defendants provide the following statement regarding what
occurred after plaintiff returned to CJTS:
DCF continued to arrange for ongoing medical, educational,
substance abuse, and mental health treatment services. Included
during times of the plaintiff's placements at CJTS were the
following: school, offered daily (including math,
English/literature, science, civics); art- and music-based
therapy (total of three times weekly); individual counseling (to
include counseling directed to past trauma and mental health
needs and counseling for substance abuse); physical exercise
(daily, including time outside for large muscle activity).
II. Legal Standard
To withstand a motion to dismiss under Rule
12(b)(6), "a complaint must contain sufficient factual
matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief
that is plausible on its face.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556
U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). This standard is met if the
factual allegations plausibly satisfy the elements of a
cognizable legal claim. Conclusory allegations and legal
conclusions are not entitled to the assumption of truth.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678–79.
III. Discussion
A. Constitutional Claims (Counts One through Four)

DCF also continued to facilitate transgender-specific treatment
through CCMC, for endocrinology and hormone therapy. Regarding
related services, DCF arranged for a transgender "life coach" –
an adult transgendered person who specializes in providing
assistance to others. It also coordinated with the True Colors
program, and the plaintiff in fact engaged with activities
through that program. Significantly, DCF also coordinated with
The Institute of Living (IOL), in Hartford, to add the plaintiff
to a special transgender youth service program. On the first
date that the plaintiff was brought to IOL for an orientation to
the program, however, she ran from DCF staff, was on escape
status, only found later elsewhere in the Hartford community.
The plaintiff ultimately was convicted for this escape (Conn.
Gen. Stat. § 53a-171). In 2015, DCF arranged for the plaintiff
to reside at a therapeutic group home, the Alison Gill Lodge in
Manchester. While there, the plaintiff left the facility (on
"AWOL" a number of times and engaged in substance abuse. After
about ten weeks of attempting to maintain this placement for the
plaintiff, she was again returned to CJTS. In October 2015, the
plaintiff was returned to her mother's home, with offers from
DCF for both continuing child protection-based and juvenile-
justice based services. The plaintiff has not been in State
custody since then.
The Complaint States a Claim for Relief Based on
Prolonged Isolation In Violation of Substantive Due
Process

The gravamen of the damages claims against the
individual defendants is that they caused plaintiff harm
by “confining [her] in isolation for extended and
indefinite periods.” The complaint alleges that
plaintiff’s confinement at CJTS and York approximated
solitary confinement and caused her to suffer physical
pain and mental and emotional anguish. In addition, it
denied her opportunity for healthy development of
relationships with peers and adult role models and
deprived her of access to needed services.
Defendants deny that plaintiff was held in
conditions approximating solitary confinement and
contend that their actions were at all times consistent
with individualized treatment plans that complied with
accepted standards. In addition, they contend that they
are entitled to quasi-judicial absolute immunity -
because plaintiff was confined in conformity with court
orders - and qualified immunity - because plaintiff is
applying novel legal theories to highly unusual facts.
Qualified immunity protects state officials against
damages claims under § 1983 if the federal right they
allegedly violated was not clearly established at the
time. It is therefore necessary to determine what
federal right may have been violated by plaintiff’s
prolonged isolation, as alleged in the complaint, and
whether it was so clearly defined by controlling
authority in 2014 as to defeat qualified immunity.
Plaintiff contends that her isolation at CJTS and
York violated requirements of substantive due process
under the Fourteenth Amendment.15 She relies on Youngberg
v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307 (1982), where the Court recognized
that individuals held by the state in non-criminal
confinement are “entitled to more considerate treatment
and conditions of confinement than criminals whose
conditions of confinement are designed to punish.” Id.
at 322.16 In addition, she contends that her isolation
violated the cruel and unusual punishments clause of the
Eighth Amendment.
Defendants do not dispute that as a child held by
the state in non-criminal confinement, plaintiff was
protected by the substantive due process right recognized
in Youngberg. Nor do they dispute that plaintiff was
protected by the Eighth Amendment’s ban on cruel and

15 The Fourteenth Amendment’s due process clause has a
substantive component that bars certain state actions
“‘regardless of the fairness of the procedures used to implement
them.’” County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 840 (1998)
(quoting Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 331 (1986)).
16 In Youngberg, an adult with profound intellectual and
developmental disabilities who had been institutionalized
claimed a right to safe conditions, freedom from bodily
restraints, and minimally adequate “habilitation,” defined as
training and development of needed skills. The Court sustained
his claim in substantially all respects.
unusual punishments. They contend instead that plaintiff
was not deprived of these protections.
No Supreme Court or Second Circuit case considers
whether Youngberg protects minors held in non-criminal
confinement. Soon after Youngberg was decided, however,
the Second Circuit extended its protections to “’anyone
in a state institution’ regardless of how they came to
be institutionalized.” J.M. v. Sessions, 162 F.4th 364,369
(2d Cir. 2025)(quoting Soc’y for Good Will to Retarded
Children, Inc. v. Cuomo, 737 F.2d 1239, 1246 (2d Cir.
1984). Other circuits have recognized that Youngberg
applies to juveniles held by the state in non-criminal
confinement. See Gary H. v. Hegstrom, 831 F.2d 1430,
1431-32 (9th Cir. 1987); Hewett v. Jarrard, 786 F.2d
1080, 1084-85 (11th Cir. 1986); Santana v. Collazo, 714
F.2d 1172, 1179–81 (1st Cir. 1983); Milonas v. Williams, 691 F.2d 931, 942 (10th Cir. 1982). And district courts
uniformly agree that Youngberg applies in this context.
With regard to the Eighth Amendment, there is a
similar lack of controlling authority. However, in
Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651 (1977), the Supreme
Court determined that the Eighth Amendment protection
against cruel and unusual punishments applies only to
prisoners confined pursuant to a criminal conviction. Id. at 671–72 and n. 40. On this basis, the Second
Circuit has held that a pretrial detainee's claims of
unconstitutional conditions of confinement are governed
by the due process clause rather than the cruel and
unusual punishments clause. See Darnell v. Pineiro, 849
F.3d 17, 29 (2d Cir. 2017). Under Darnell, “to establish
a claim for deliberate indifference to conditions of
confinement under the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, [a] pretrial detainee must prove
that the defendant-official acted intentionally to impose
the alleged condition, or recklessly failed to act with
reasonable care to mitigate the risk that the condition
posed to the pretrial detainee[,] even though the
defendant-official knew, or should have known, that the
condition posed an excessive risk to health or safety.
In other words, the ‘subjective prong’ (or ‘mens rea
prong’) of a deliberate indifference claim is defined
objectively.” Id. at 35.17

17 Darnell relied on the holding in Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 576
U.S. 389, 396-97 (2015), that excessive force claims brought
under the Fourteenth Amendment do not require the same
subjective intent standard as excessive force claims brought
under the Eighth Amendment. Prior to Kingsley, the same
standard of subjective deliberate indifference – equivalent to
recklessness under criminal law - applied to both types of
claims. Kingsley relied on the holding in Bell v. Wolfish, 441
U.S. 520, 541-43 (1979), that a pretrial detainee can prevail on
a due process claim “by providing only objective evidence that
the challenged governmental action is not rationally related to
a legitimate governmental objective or that it is excessive in
relation to that purpose.” Kingsley, 576 U.S. at 398. The
opinions in Kingsley and Darnell were issued after the events at
issue here.
A pretrial detainee and a juvenile confined pursuant
to a commitment order based on conduct that would be a
crime if committed by an adult are not similarly situated
in all material respects. But in neither context has the
individual been convicted of a crime rendering him
subject to punishment. See Bell, 441 U.S. at 535 n. 16.
Accordingly, I conclude that the Eighth Amendment does
not directly apply in this case. See Jackson v. Johnson, 118 F. Supp. 2d 278, 287 (N.D.N.Y. 2000), aff'd in part,
dismissed in part, 13 F. App'x 51 (2d Cir. 2001)(applying
Fourteenth Amendment rather than Eighth Amendment to
claims arising from use of potentially dangerous
restraint technique in juvenile detention center).18
Under Youngberg, an individual held by the state in
non-criminal confinement is entitled to “conditions of
reasonable care and safety,” and “reasonably
nonrestrictive confinement conditions.” 457 U.S. at 324.
A state may restrain residents of an institution “when
and to the extent professional judgment deems this
necessary” to “assure” “reasonable safety for all

18 On the appeal in Jackson, the Second Circuit considered
whether denial of a motion for summary judgment based on
qualified immunity was appealable. The Court stated that
whether the defendant’s response to the potential dangers of the
restraint technique “was reasonable or constituted deliberate
indifference to [his] constitutional rights is a question for a
jury to determine.” 13 F. App'x at 54. This framing suggests
that an objective deliberate indifference standard should be
applied to claims by juveniles seeking damages for harm caused
by dangerous conditions of confinement.
residents and personnel within the institution.” Id. at
324. Unlike in the criminal context, punishment as
retribution is not a legitimate objective.19
Youngberg provides that a defendant’s conduct may
violate due process if it "substantially depart[s] from
accepted professional judgment, practice, or standards."
Id. at 323. In Santana, the First Circuit applied this
test to a claim for prospective relief with regard to the
use of prolonged isolation in a juvenile detention
facility. In deciding what federal right may have been
violated in the present case, I am guided by the First
Circuit’s decision.20

19 A Fourteenth Amendment standard that prohibits punishment of
juveniles held in non-criminal confinement is further supported
by the rehabilitative objectives of juvenile justice. See Pena
v. New York State Division for Youth, 419 F. Supp. 203, 206 (S.D.N.Y. 1976); see generally, Restatement of the Law -
Children and the Law § 12.21 cmt. a (Tentative Draft No. 6
2024)(“Youths in correctional facilities have a more robust
liberty interest under the Fourteenth Amendment than do adult
prisoners, whose interest is minimal. Although both justice
systems aim to hold offenders accountable for their offenses,
the juvenile justice system gives far greater weight to the goal
of rehabilitation and reintegration of young offenders into
society as a key purpose of confinement and withdrawal of
individual liberty.”).

20 Santana was a class action challenging conditions of
confinement in two juvenile detention facilities in Puerto Rico.
See 793 F.3d at 41-42. There were two appeals. Id. at 42. On
the first appeal, the Court resolved some issues and remanded
for further proceedings on the issue “whether isolation as
imposed on juveniles at [one of the facilities] satisfie[d]
constitutional standards.” Id. On the appeal following the
remand, the Court engaged in the analysis followed here.
In Santana, the Court stated that it was necessary
to consider the nature and duration of the restrictions
on the liberty of the juveniles placed in isolation,
whether there was a reasonable relationship between the
isolation and the interests in safety, security and
rehabilitation, and whether the isolation accorded with
the considered judgment of a qualified professional as
to what was necessary to serve these interests. 793 F.2d
at 44–48. The Court stated that “If the need for extended
isolation, can be significantly reduced or eliminated by
other equally effective but less confining methods
requiring relatively minimal additional effort, it is
unreasonable not to use them.” Id. at 45. (emphasis in
original).21
The Court was unwilling to assume that the interests
in protecting juveniles from harm, discouraging offending
behavior and preventing escapes justified confining
juveniles in isolation for as long as twenty days.
Testimony by the plaintiffs' experts suggested that
extended isolation for the most serious offenders within
a juvenile facility might be reasonable, particularly if
no other options are available. Id. at 47. But the
plaintiffs’ experts and national standards favored only
the briefest commitments to isolation and courts had with

21 The Court considered it “unlikely that, under Youngberg,
‘reasonableness’ in this context means that corrections
officials are bound to employ the ‘least restrictive”
alternative.’” Id.
near unanimity limited isolation of juveniles to twenty-
four hours, with only rare exceptions allowed. Id. 45-
46 and n.7 (citing cases).22 To show that prolonged
isolation was reasonably related to justifiable
institutional objectives, the defendants would have to
show that “whatever legitimate needs are served by
extended isolation are unlikely to be achieved by resort
to other less burdensome practices such as shorter
periods of isolation and/or a system of incentives and
deterrents based on the granting and deprivation of
privileges.” Id. at 46. The case was remanded to enable
the district court to “thoroughly explore defendants'
professed need to use prolonged isolation, including the
practicability of less restrictive alternatives.” Id.
at 48.
Plaintiff submits that defendants substantially
departed from accepted practice by isolating her at CJTS,
then at York, then again at CJTS. In support she cites
R.G. v. Koller, 415 F. Supp. 2d 1129 (D. Haw. 2006),
where Youngberg was applied to claims of a “gay female,”
a “boy who was perceived to be gay,” and a “transgender
girl” who challenged the conditions of their confinement
in a secure juvenile correctional facility. Id. at 1133.
The facility used isolation as a means of protecting the

22 The Court cited U.S. Department of Justice standards limiting
confinement of juveniles to twenty-four hours, and American Bar
Association standards setting a maximum of eight hours of
isolation for safety reasons.
plaintiffs from harassment and abuse by other teenagers. Id. at 1148, 1154.23 Relying on expert testimony that
“long-term segregation or isolation of youth [held in
secure detention] is “well outside the range of accepted
professional practices,” id. at 1155, the Court
determined that “[c]onsistently placing [LGBT] juvenile
wards in isolation, not to impose discipline for
violating rules, but simply to separate [them] from their
abusers” was “at best, an excessive, and therefore
unconstitutional, response to legitimate safety needs of
the institution.” Id. at 1155-56.
Defendants respond that plaintiff was never held in
“solitary confinement,” defined as “the confinement of a

23 The Court summarized the facts relating to the isolation claim
of the transgender girl – referred to as “C.P.” – as follows:
[I]n response to C.P.’s complaints of harassment, defendants
first subjected her to social isolation by physically
segregating her from the other wards in the module and later by
sending her to a holding cell. When not locked down, C.P. was
instructed by [staff] not to have anything to do with any of the
male wards—she was not supposed to sit with or near them, speak
with them, look at them, or interact with them in any way. When
C.P. returned to [the facility] in August 2005, defendants held
her in solitary confinement for six days, again, allegedly for
her “protection.” She was isolated in a holding cell under video
surveillance for twenty-three hours a day, with nothing in her
cell other than her pillow and a blanket. She was allowed one
hour a day to leave the cell for recreation and showering. She
was not permitted letters, writing instruments, radio, or
television, nor was she allowed to interact with any other
wards. C.P. reported to medical staff that she was “going crazy”
in the holding cell. 415 F. Supp. 2d at 1148 (citations to hearing transcript
omitted).
prisoner alone in a cell for all, or nearly all, of the
day with minimal environmental stimulation and minimal
opportunity for social interaction.”24 They state that
plaintiff was “in almost constant contact” with
“caseworkers, social workers, psychologists, school
teachers, attorneys, advocates and others, all of whom
visited and interacted with [her] on a daily basis.” She
had “frequent visits by all types and varieties of child
care and mental health professionals” and was provided
with “gender appropriate services,” including visits to
the Connecticut Children's Medical Center “for continuity
of care” as a “transgender youth.”25

24 The quoted definition is taken from an article cited in
plaintiff’s briefing. See Stuart Grassian, Psychiatric Effects
of Solitary Confinement, 22 Wash. U. J.L. & Pol'y 325, 327
(2006). In a more recent article by another author that
addresses isolation of juveniles, “solitary confinement” is
similarly described as “the physical and social isolation of an
individual within a single cell for twenty-two and one-half to
twenty-four hours per day” where “[a]ny remaining time is
generally spent in a barren yard, or cage.” Deborah Paruch, The
Solitary Confinement of Juveniles: It Is A Cruel and Unusual
Punishment, 57 Idaho L. Rev. 689, 716–18 (2021). This article
notes that while there is no established definition of “solitary
confinement” used in correctional facilities, “three factors are
present in all solitary confinement schemes: social isolation,
reduced activity and environmental input, and loss of autonomy
and control over almost all aspects of daily life.” Id. 25 Defendants add that “at all relevant times plaintiff was treated
within the guidelines of individually tailored treatment plans
developed by child care professionals, with expertise in dealing
with plaintiff's issues.” But these plans are not part of the
record and neither the complaint or the decision in In re Doe
provides information concerning the contents of any treatment plan
at CJTS or York. Though it is reasonable to presume that treatment
Defendants further submit that the restrictive
conditions of plaintiff’s isolation were reasonably
necessary for her safety and the safety of others. With
regard to plaintiff’s safety, they emphasize that her own
concern about the risk of being harassed, abused and
assaulted at CJTS resulted in the issuance of the
injunction requiring that she be housed apart from the
general population. With regard to the safety of others,
they point to plaintiff’s history of violent assaults on
staff and other juveniles, including females, which the
Superior Court cited in ordering her transferred to York
on the ground that she was too dangerous to be housed at
any DCF facility.
Defendants’ arguments have force. The conditions
of plaintiff’s confinement, as alleged in the complaint,
differ markedly from the conditions that characterize
solitary confinement as defined above. Based on the
allegations of the complaint, it appears that plaintiff
may have been held in conditions approximating solitary
confinement during her first five weeks at York, where
she remained in a locked cell for 21 to 22 hours per day,
but not otherwise. The injunction requiring DCF to house
plaintiff separately at CJTS, and the order transferring

plans were in place, I cannot presume that the plans specifically
called for the nature and duration of the isolation alleged in the
complaint or did so in accordance with accepted standards.
her to DOC custody have obvious significance for the
reasonableness of her isolation. And plaintiff’s own
preference for avoiding interaction with boys at CJTS and
adult females at York, as alleged in the complaint, bears
on the reasonableness of her social isolation.
Nonetheless, it is plausible that the nature and
duration of the isolation alleged in the complaint
violated plaintiff’s right to reasonably nonrestrictive
conditions of confinement under Youngberg. Accepting the
complaint’s allegations as true, plaintiff was isolated
in a locked cell for 21 to 22 hours a day for five weeks
in the mental health unit at York. As the First Circuit
recognized in Santana, much shorter periods of isolation
can violate due process.
Moreover, the standard of objective deliberate
indifference adopted in Darnell for due process claims
by pretrial detainees could support a plaintiff’s verdict
here. Under this standard, deliberate indifference could
be found if a defendant unreasonably failed to reduce
plaintiff’s isolation even though the defendant knew, or
should have known, that it posed an excessive risk to her
health or safety. Darnell, 849 F.3d at 35. The complaint
alleges that defendants were aware of plaintiff’s serious
medical conditions, her trauma history, and the harms of
prolonged isolation on juveniles generally and on
traumatized transgender youth specifically, yet isolated
her for lengthy periods at CJTS, then York, and then
again at CJTS. Accepting these allegations as true, a
jury could find that defendants should have been aware
that the nature and duration of plaintiff’s isolation in
the mental health unit at York, and potentially even at
other times, created a substantial risk of serious harm
to her mental health. See V.W. by & through Williams v.
Conway, No. 9:16-CV-1150, 2017 WL 696808, at *19 (N.D.N.Y. Feb. 22, 2017) (enjoining defendants from
imposing disciplinary isolation on juveniles in view of
“broad consensus among the scientific and professional
community that juveniles are psychologically more
vulnerable than adults”).
A jury could also find that defendants failed to
take reasonable steps to abate this risk. Plaintiff’s
allegations suggest that she could have been placed in
significantly less confining conditions without
jeopardizing legitimate safety or security objectives.
She does not specifically allege what those conditions
would have entailed either at CJTS or York. Nonetheless,
it is plausible that defendants may have failed to take
reasonable steps to mitigate the negative effects of
plaintiff’s isolation. I therefore conclude that she has
sufficiently alleged a plausible claim for objective
deliberate indifference, the standard that now applies
to due process claims of institutionalized persons under
Darnell.26
The plausibility of plaintiff’s due process claim
is further supported by the JJDPA and PREA, which are
discussed below in connection with plaintiff’s claims
based on these statutes. Defendants do not dispute that
both statutes may help define the content of liberty
interests protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. And at
least one federal court has recognized that failure to
conform to PREA regulations may provide evidence of a
substantial departure from prevailing standards for
purposes of Youngberg. See Walsh v. N.J. Department of
Corrections, Civil Action No. 17-2442 (JBS-AMD), 2017 WL
3835666, at *3 n.5 (D.N.J. Aug. 31, 2017)(“If a prisoner
has a constitutional cause of action, such as for a
deliberate indifference to dangerous conditions of
confinement, the fact that a prison facility may have
failed to adopt and enforce the [PREA] national standards
may, or may not, be evidence of deliberate indifference
depending on the circumstances.”).
Absolute Quasi-Judicial Immunity Does Not Apply to
the Prolonged Isolation Alleged in the Complaint

26 In this regard, it is plausible that defendants could have done
more without compromising safety and security to reduce the
total amount of time plaintiff was required to spend in
isolation, to provide her with longer respite periods from
isolation, to reduce or eliminate restrictions on her ability to
exercise or spend time outdoors, and to provide services and
programs tailored to her particular needs as a traumatized
transgender youth.
Defendants move to dismiss the damages claims
against the DCF and DOC officials in their individual
capacities on the ground that they are entitled to
absolute quasi-judicial immunity. They state that the
DCF defendants were operating under a court injunction
to keep plaintiff separate from the general population
at CJTS and the DOC defendants were obliged by the
transfer order to incarcerate her at York. Plaintiff
responds that quasi-judicial immunity does not apply to
the discretionary administrative decisions made by the
defendants to keep plaintiff in isolation at both
facilities. I agree.
Whether an official has quasi-judicial absolute
immunity depends on the nature of the official’s
activities and the relationship of the activities to the
judicial process. See Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409,
430 (1976) (prosecutor has absolute immunity for
activities intimately associated with judicial phase of
criminal process). Judges themselves have absolute
immunity for decisions they make as adjudicators, but not
for decisions they make as administrators. Forrester v.
White, 484 U.S 219, 227 (1988)(we must “draw the line
between truly judicial acts, for which immunity is
appropriate, and acts that simply happen to have been
done by judges.”). An official may be entitled to quasi-
judicial immunity for acts performed as an agent of a
court in connection with a case but only to the extent
the acts are done with the authorization or approval of
the court. See Gross v. Rell, 695 F.3d 211, 216-17 (2d
Cir. 2012)(conservator immune from suit only to the
extent she acted with authorization or approval of
Probate Court).
The injunction requiring plaintiff to be housed
separately from the general population at CJTS is not in
the record. While it is reasonable to presume that the
DCF defendants were complying with the terms of the
injunction in isolating plaintiff from male peers, I
cannot presume that the injunction required them to keep
her in the restrictive conditions alleged in the
complaint throughout the time she was at CJTS pending the
outcome of the transfer litigation.
The order authorizing plaintiff’s confinement at
York expressly prohibited holding her in isolation for
longer than 72 hours and required that she be classified
by the DOC defendants in accordance with applicable
statutes and regulations. The 72-hour limit was
consistent with the Court’s finding that continuing to
confine plaintiff in seclusion or near total seclusion
was clearly not in her best interest. Viewed in the
context provided by this finding, the Court seems to have
expected DOC officials to make a classification decision
during the 72-hour period that would enable plaintiff to
spend less time in seclusion or near total seclusion.
Accepting plaintiff’s allegations as true, she was
nonetheless held in seclusion or near total seclusion in
the mental health unit for five weeks.
Qualified Immunity Applies to the Prolonged
Isolation Claim

Defendants also move to dismiss these claims on the
basis of qualified immunity. Plaintiff responds that
whether qualified immunity applies cannot be resolved on
the basis of the present record. Though it is rarely
possible to resolve issues of qualified immunity on a
motion to dismiss, I conclude that the allegations of the
complaint and the decision in In re Doe provide a
sufficient basis for determining that qualified immunity
applies.
The Supreme Court recently reversed a decision of
the Second Circuit denying qualified immunity. Zorn v.
Linton, 607 U.S. ___, 146 S. Ct. 926 (March 23,
2026)(per curiam). In doing so, the Court restated the
controlling principles:
Government officials enjoy qualified immunity
from suit under § 1983 unless their conduct
violates clearly established law. Rivas-Villegas v.
Cortesluna, 595 U.S. 1, 5 (2021) (per curiam). “A
right is clearly established when it is
‘sufficiently clear that every reasonable official
would have understood that what he is doing
violates that right.’” Ibid. A right is not
clearly established if existing precedent does not
place the constitutional question “‘beyond
debate.’” Ibid. To find that a right is clearly established,
courts generally “need to identify a case where an
officer acting under similar circumstances ... was
held to have violated” the Constitution. Escondido
v. Emmons, 586 U.S. 38, 43 (2019) (per curiam)
(internal quotation marks omitted). The relevant
precedent must define the right with a “high degree
of specificity,” so that “every reasonable official
would interpret it to establish the particular rule
the plaintiff seeks to apply.” District of Columbia
v. Wesby, 583 U.S. 48, 63 (2018) (internal
quotation marks omitted). Principles stated
generally, such as that “an officer may not use
unreasonable and excessive force,” do not suffice.
Kisela v. Hughes, 584 U.S. 100, 105 (2018) (per
curiam). In short, officers receive qualified
immunity unless they could have “read” the relevant
precedent beforehand and “know[ n]” that it
proscribed their specific conduct. City and County
of San Francisco v. Sheehan, 575 U.S. 600, 616, 135
S.Ct. 1765, 191 L.Ed.2d 856 (2015).

Zorn v. Linton, 146 S. Ct. at 930.
The Second Circuit “contravened these principles”
because the Circuit case law on which it relied did not
“clearly establish that Zorn’s specific conduct
violated the Fourth Amendment.” Id. “The Second
Circuit concluded otherwise by reading [its precedent]
to establish the general principle ‘that the gratuitous
use of pain compliance techniques – such as a rear-
wristlock – on a protestor who is passively resisting
arrest constitutes excessive force.’ But that
principle . . . lacks the ‘high degree of specificity’
needed to make it ‘clear’ to officers which actions
violate the law.” Id. at 931 (citing Wesby, 583 U.S.at
63). In particular, “[i]t does not ‘obviously resolve’
whether using a rear wristlock to move a noncompliant
protester after repeated warnings violates the Fourth
Amendment, as it fails to specify which circumstances
make the use of force ‘gratuitous.’” Id. “Because the
Second Circuit failed to identify a case where an
officer taking similar actions in similar circumstances
‘was held to have violated’ the Constitution, Emmons, 586 U.S., at 43 (internal quotation marks omitted),
Zorn was entitled to qualified immunity.” Id. In 2014, no Supreme Court or Second Circuit case,
nor any consensus of circuit authority, provided clear
guidance to assist the defendants in addressing the
issues of safety, security and rehabilitation presented
by plaintiff’s specific circumstances.27 Competent
officials would know that in the Second Circuit,
substantive due process entitled all institutionalized
persons to reasonably non-restrictive conditions of
confinement. See Soc’y for Good Will to Retarded
Children, 737 F.2d at 1246. But that general principle
lacked the high degree of specificity to make it clear

27 On the first appeal in Santana, the First Circuit observed
that “[t]he Supreme Court ha[d] not addressed the use of
isolation in a juvenile detention center.” Santana v. Collazo, 714 F.3d 1172, 1179 (1st Cir. 1983). To this day, the practice
has yet to be addressed by the Supreme Court or the Second
Circuit.
that the restrictive conditions in which plaintiff was
held were unreasonably excessive and thus unlawful.
Specifically, given the state of the law in this
Circuit, it would not have been clear to every
reasonable official in the position of the defendants
that confining a transgender girl in plaintiff’s
position in the conditions and for the periods of time
alleged in the complaint in the interests of safety,
security and rehabilitation was prohibited by the
Fourteenth Amendment. Further factual development would
not enable plaintiff to show that the law was so
clearly established as to defeat qualified immunity.
With regard to plaintiff’s initial confinement at
CJTS, plaintiff identifies no case clearly establishing
that confining a child with her history and
characteristics in the housing unit apart from her male
peers violated substantive due process. Accepting the
complaint’s allegations as true, moreover, it is apparent
that plaintiff’s confinement at CJTS was not obviously
unlawful. After plaintiff’s unquestionably serious
assault on the staff member at Meadowridge, DCF placed
her at CJTS and immediately sought judicial authorization
to transfer her to DOC custody. The unprecedented nature
of the transfer motion underscores the uniqueness of the
situation DCF officials faced at the time. Plaintiff
obtained an injunction requiring DCF to house her
separately because she was “scared to enter the general
population.” In re Doe, 2014 WL 2600505, at *2. No
controlling authority made it clear that confining her
in the housing unit apart from the general population
would be so unreasonably restrictive as to violate
substantive due process.
Plaintiff opposed DCF’s transfer motion and
requested placement at the new Pueblo Unit for girls. If
the objectives of safety, security and rehabilitation
could be equally met by placing plaintiff in
significantly less confining conditions with female peers
at Pueblo, keeping her at CJTS could violate due process.
But it would not have been clear to every reasonable
official that failing to place plaintiff at Pueblo
pending the outcome of the transfer litigation would
violate due process. Indeed, the Superior Court
determined that plaintiff was clearly too dangerous at
that time to be housed in any DCF facility, including,
specifically, the Pueblo Unit.
Similarly, no controlling authority made it clear
that confining plaintiff at York in the conditions and
for the periods of time alleged in the complaint would
violate her right to substantive due process.28 The

28 See Ian M. Kysel, Banishing Solitary: Litigating an End to the
Solitary Confinement of Children in Jails and Prisons, 40 N.Y.U.
Rev. L. & Soc. Change 675, 675–76 (2016)(observing that as of 2016
there was “no case law applying the federal constitution to the
solitary confinement of children in adult jails and prisons”);
see also Kim Brooks Tandy, Do No Harm: The Enhanced Application of
Legal and Professional Standards in Protecting Youth from the Harm
conditions of plaintiff’s five-week confinement in the
mental health unit, as alleged in the complaint, may be
fairly described as approximating solitary confinement,
and therefore warrant significant concern under
Youngberg. But plaintiff did not want social interaction
with adult inmates; the transfer order permitting her
incarceration at York necessarily contemplated that she
would have little access to other children; and she
declined to be transported to CJTS to participate in
educational programs with the residents there because she
feared being victimized by them. No controlling authority
put defendants on notice that in these circumstances
isolating plaintiff in the mental health unit as alleged
in the complaint would surely violate substantive due
process.
The conditions of plaintiff’s subsequent six-week
confinement at York, although sufficiently restrictive
to warrant concern under Youngberg, were materially less
restrictive in terms of the elements that define solitary
confinement: she lived in a three-room housing unit with

of Isolation in Youth Correctional Facilities, 34 Child. Legal
Rts. J. 143, 158 (2014)(“Importantly, the Supreme Court has not
specifically addressed what standard governs the use of isolation
for juveniles adjudicated delinquent.”); Paul Holland & Wallace J.
Mlyniec, Whatever Happened to the Right to Treatment?: The Modern
Quest for A Historical Promise, 68 Temp. L. Rev. 1791 (1995)(discussing the need for community-based solutions to the
treatment needs of juveniles in confinement in light of the
uncertain protection provided by Youngberg and other cases).
access to outdoor space; was in constant contact with
staff in the unit; could watch television when she
wished; and received educational services. The law did
not clearly establish that confining this child in these
conditions for six weeks would violate substantive due
process.
Plaintiff’s subsequent confinement in the housing
unit at CJTS differs from her previous confinement in the
same unit because it was more prolonged, lasting more
than four months. Under Youngberg, if plaintiff’s social
isolation could be significantly reduced during this
period without compromising the interests in safety,
security and rehabilitation, defendants were required to
make the attempt. The obvious alternative would be to
place plaintiff at the Pueblo Unit where she could
interact with age-appropriate female peers. However,
plaintiff had just been removed from Pueblo for
legitimate reasons. Perhaps substantive due process
required defendants to give Pueblo another try at some
point. But no controlling authority put the matter
beyond debate.
Qualified immunity doctrine has been roundly
criticized for being overly protective of state officials
at the expense of deserving plaintiffs in that it serves
to immunize from damages liability all but those who are
incompetent or knowingly violate the law. Yet the
principles reiterated again by the Supreme Court in Zorn
are controlling and must be faithfully applied. I
conclude that these principles shield all four of the
individual defendants from damages liability on
plaintiff’s constitutional claims.
B. JJDPA Claims (Counts Five and Six)
Plaintiff alleges that the defendants violated the
JJDPA's prohibition on confining juveniles in adult jails
and lockups. See 34 U.S.C. § 11133 (a)(13)(to receive
federal grants, a state must not detain or confine a
juvenile in a jail or lockup for adults except under
narrow exceptions). Plaintiff argues that this provision
was violated when she was held at York as a juvenile who
had not been charged with or convicted of a crime in
adult court. Defendants contend that the JJDPA claims
must be dismissed because the statute does not create
rights privately enforceable through § 1983. Though the
issue is not free from doubt, recent Supreme Court
decisions support defendants’ position.
Legal Framework
Section 1983 authorizes private suits against state
actors who violate rights “secured by the Constitution
and laws [of the United States]." Federal statutes do
not create § 1983-enforceable rights as a matter of
course. A statute creates privately enforceable rights
only if it "unambiguously confer[s] individual rights
upon a class of beneficiaries" through language that is
"rights-creating," "individual-centric," and has "an
unmistakable focus on the benefited class." Health &
Hosp. Corp. of Marion Cnty. v. Talevski, 599 U.S. 166,
183–86 (2023). This is "a demanding bar cleared only in
the atypical case." Medina v. Planned Parenthood S. Atl., 606 U.S. 357, 375 (2025)(internal quotes omitted).
Spending-power statutes, which provide for termination
of funds as the primary remedy for noncompliance, face
heightened scrutiny under this framework. See Gonzaga
University v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 280 (2002).
Talevski and Medina clarify the degree of textual
specificity required to meet the standard applied in
those cases. In Talevski, two provisions of the Federal
Nursing Home Reform Act satisfied the standard: one
explicitly guaranteed each resident "the right to be free
from" physical or chemical restraints; the other provided
that facilities "must not transfer or discharge" a
resident absent specified preconditions. Both provisions
used "clear rights-creating language" with "an
unmistakable focus on the benefited class." Talevski,
599 U.S. at 185–86. In Medina, by contrast, a Medicaid
provision requiring states to ensure that eligible
individuals "may obtain" assistance from any qualified
provider failed to meet the Tavelski standard. The
provision “addresse[d] a State's obligations to the
federal government, not the rights of any particular
person." Medina, 606 U.S. at 379.
Application to the JJDPA
The JJDPA provision at issue here mandates that a
state plan receiving formula grants "shall . . . provide
that no juvenile will be detained or confined in any jail
or lockup for adults." 34 U.S.C. § 11133 (a)(13). This
is a funding condition — it specifies what a state's plan
must contain in order to qualify for federal grants —
rather than a direct conferral of rights on juveniles
confined by the state.
Plaintiff relies primarily on Briggs v. Bremby, 792
F.3d 239 (2d Cir. 2015), where the Court of Appeals held
that time limits in the Food Stamp Act are privately
enforceable under § 1983. Briggs applied the framework
of Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U.S. 329 (1997), which
tests the private enforceabilty of a statute based on
whether it uses mandatory language, identifies a defined
class of beneficiaries, and establishes a specific
prohibition. The provision of the JJDPA at issue here
uses mandatory language, focuses on individual juveniles
rather than speaking solely in the abstract language of
state obligations, and establishes a specific
prohibition. On this basis, one Circuit Court of Appeals
held in 1994 that the JJDPA's adult lockup provision is
enforceable under § 1983. See Horn by Parks v. Madison
County Fiscal Court, 22 F.3d 653, 658 (6th Cir. 1994).29

29 Horn has not been followed by any other Circuit.
The controlling authority here, however, is not
Briggs alone but Talevski and Medina, which postdate
Briggs and establish a higher threshold than Blessing.
Under Talevski and Medina, the critical question is not
whether mandatory language benefits a defined class, but
whether the statute "clearly and unambiguously" confers
individual rights. Medina, 606 U.S. at 376. Measured
against the FNHRA provisions that satisfied this standard
in Talevski — which spoke explicitly of individual
"rights" and directly prohibited what facilities "must
not" do to individual residents — the JJDPA provision
falls short. It specifies what a state plan "shall
provide," embedding the prohibition within a conditions-
of-funding requirement rather than conferring rights on
individual juveniles in the direct, unmistakable manner
Talevski requires. Moreover, the JJDPA, which funds
state juvenile justice programs rather than providing
direct individual benefits, is if anything a weaker
candidate for privately enforceable rights than the
Medicaid provision at issue in Medina.
C. PREA Claim (Count Seven)
Plaintiff alleges that the defendants violated
Department of Justice regulations implementing the PREA.
See 28 C.F.R. § 115.342. The regulations provide that
residents of juvenile facilities may be isolated “only
as a last resort when less restrictive measures are
inadequate,” require documentation of the basis for
isolation and reasons why no alternative exists, and
mandate a thirty-day review of each resident in
isolation. Id. The complaint alleges that plaintiff
was not placed in isolation as a last resort, no thirty-
day reviews were conducted, and no documentation was
provided. The defendants argue that this statute does
not create rights enforceable through § 1983. I agree.
Congress enacted the PREA in 2003 because a “high
incidence of prison rape” was “undermin[ing] the
effectiveness and efficiency of United States Government
expenditures through grant programs.” 42 U.S.C. §
15601 (14). Congress sought to “make the prevention of
prison rape a top priority in each prison system”;
establish national standards for prison rape prevention
and punishment; “protect the Eighth Amendment rights of
Federal, State, and local prisoners”; and “increase the
efficiency and effectiveness of Federal expenditures
through grant programs . . . .” 42 U.S.C. § 15602 (2)–
(3), (7)–(8).
Congress mandated that DOJ promulgate national
standards governing the detection, prevention, reduction
and punishment of prison rape. 34 U.S.C. § 30307. DOJ
promulgated regulations in 2012. 28 C.F.R. §§ 115 et
seq. States are not required to adopt them but a majority
have done so, including Connecticut.30

30 Connecticut adopted the regulations in 2012. See Conn. Gen.
Stat. § 18 -81cc.
The PREA was adopted pursuant to Congress’s
Fourteenth Amendment enforcement power as well as its
spending power, see 42 U.S.C. § 15601, which strengthens
the case for private enforceability. And the regulations
speak with the specificity and individual focus required
by Tavelski: the provision that isolation may be used
“only as a last resort” addresses the treatment of
individual residents; the thirty-day review requirement
confers on each individual a specific procedural
entitlement; and the documentation requirement creates
an obligation directly tied to the circumstances of each
individual.
Nonetheless, a regulation may be privately enforced
only if it “invoke[s] a private right of action that
Congress through statutory text created,” and a right of
action “can extend no further than” the personal right
conferred by the plain language of the statute.
Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 291 (2001). In
other words, a regulation cannot confer privately
enforceable rights beyond those conferred by the statute
itself. See Taylor v. Housing Authority of New Haven, 267 F.R.D. 36, 42 (D. Conn. 2010), aff’d sub nom. Taylor
ex rel. Wazyluk v. Hous. Auth. of the City of New Haven, 645 F.3d 152, 154 (2d Cir. 2011)(explicitly adopting
Judge Arterton’s analysis of the private enforceability
of agency regulations under Sandoval).
The Second Circuit has not considered whether the
PREA creates privately enforceable rights. But other
judges of this court have consistently held that the PREA
does not create rights that are independently enforceable
through a private suit. See, e.g., Jones v. Beckert, No.
23-cv-1603 (VDO), 2024 WL 308480, *4 (D. Conn. Jan. 26,
2024); McClendon v. Maldonado, No. 3:16-cv-02136 (SRU), 2017 WL 3821792, at *3 (D. Conn. Aug. 31, 2017); White
v. Doe, No. 3:16-cv-01874 (JAM), 2017 WL 2562845, *5 (D.
Conn. June 13, 2017); Green v. Martin, 224 F.Supp.3d 154,
171 (D. Conn. 2016)(Haight, J.). Other district courts
are in agreement. See Walsh v. N.J. Dep't of Corr., No.
CV 17-2442 (JBS-AMD), 2017 WL 3835666, at *3 (D.N.J. Aug.
31, 2017).31
D. ADA and Rehabilitation Act (Counts Nine and Ten)
Juveniles confined in state facilities are protected
against discrimination on the basis of disabilities by
Title II of the ADA and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation
Act. The complaint alleges that defendants violated
plaintiff’s rights under both Title II and section 504.
Defendants contend that plaintiff’s allegations fail to

31 In count eight, plaintiff claims that defendants violated the
Fourteenth Amendment by depriving her of a liberty interest
grounded in the JJDPA and PREA regulations. This claim overlaps
with the substantive due process claims in counts one and two.
As discussed above, those counts state a plausible claim for
relief based in part on the JJDPA and PREA but are dismissed
based on qualified immunity. Count eight is dismissed on this
basis as well.
satisfy the elements of a cognizable claim under either
statute. I disagree.
Disability
The ADA and Rehabilitation Act define "disability"
as "a physical or mental impairment that substantially
limits one or more major life activities." 42 U.S.C. §
12102 (1)(A); see Roberts v. Royal Atl. Corp., 542 F.3d
363, 370 (2d Cir. 2008) (definition is identical under
both statutes). The 2008 ADA Amendments Act ("ADAAA")
mandates that the definition "be construed in favor of
broad coverage" and that the "substantially limits"
standard "not be a demanding standard." 42 U.S.C. §
12102 (4)(A)-(B). Major life activities include "the
operation of a major bodily function, including . . .
neurological, brain, endocrine, and reproductive
functions." 42 U.S.C. § 12102 (2)(B).32
Defendants argue that plaintiff has failed to
adequately allege a qualifying disability, and
specifically that gender dysphoria is excluded from the
ADA as a "gender identity disorder not resulting from
physical impairments." 42 U.S.C. § 12211 (b)(1).
However, the complaint plausibly alleges ADA disability
coverage on three independent grounds.

32 The ADAAA directs that the disability determination "should
not demand extensive analysis" and that the primary focus of ADA
cases should be whether discrimination occurred, not the
threshold disability question. 42 U.S.C. § 12102 (4)(B).
First, the complaint alleges that plaintiff suffers
from depression, PTSD, anxiety and developmental trauma
disorder. DOJ's implementing regulations identify major
depression and PTSD as conditions that will "virtually
always" substantially limit major life activities. 28
C.F.R. § 35.108 (d)(2)(iii)(K).
Second, the ADA’s exclusion of “gender identity
disorders” does not encompass “gender dysphoria.” In the
only circuit decision to consider the issue, the Fourth
Circuit held that the two are categorically distinct.
Williams v. Kincaid, 45 F.4th 759 (4th Cir. 2022). The
Court grounded its decision in a comparison of the text
of the edition of the American Psychiatric Association’s
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders
(DSM) in effect at the time the ADA was enacted - DSM-3
- and the current edition – DSM-5. At the time of the
ADA’s enactment in 1990, the diagnosis of "gender
identity disorder" in DSM-3 addressed transgender
identity itself; “gender dysphoria,” as currently defined
in DSM-5, addresses the clinically significant distress
experienced by some transgender people. The Court
concluded that “the ADA excludes from its protection
anything falling within the plain meaning of ‘gender
identity disorders,’ as that term was understood ‘at the
time of its enactment,’ Bostock [v. Clayton County, 140
S.Ct. [1731] at 1738. But nothing in the ADA, then or
now, compels the conclusion that gender dysphoria
constitutes a ‘gender identity disorder’ excluded from
ADA protection.” Id. at 769. A petition for en banc
review in Kincaid narrowly lost by a vote of 8 to 6, and
the Supreme Court denied certiorari with a notable
dissent. See 143 S. Ct. 2414 (June 30, 2023) (Alito, J.,
with Thomas, J., dissenting). However, the Fourth
Circuit's decision is consistent with the ADAAA's mandate
that the definition of “disability” be construed broadly.
Third, even if gender dysphoria were considered a
"gender identity disorder," the complaint plausibly
alleges that plaintiff’s condition results from physical
impairments. The complaint alleges a physical basis for
gender dysphoria, invokes a growing body of medical
research identifying physiological and genetic
contributors to the condition, and alleges that plaintiff
has received hormone therapy as part of her medically
supervised treatment. These allegations are sufficient
to raise a plausible inference that her gender dysphoria
results from a physical impairment. See Kincaid, 45
F.4th at 770–72.
Animus
Defendants argue that to state a claim for relief
plaintiff must allege discriminatory animus based on
disability, citing Garcia v. S.U.N.Y. Health Sciences
Ctr., 280 F.3d 98 (2d Cir. 2001). In Garcia, the Second
Circuit recognized that Congress, in enacting Title II,
intended to abrogate a state’s Eleventh Amendment
immunity against suits for money damages and that this
abrogation is valid insofar as it is based on Congress’s
power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to
enforce by appropriate legislation the constitutional
guarantee that no state shall deprive any person of due
process or equal protection. Id. at 108. The Court held
that Title II validly abrogates a state’s sovereign
immunity for claims seeking damages for violations of the
statute motivated by discriminatory animus on the ground
that government action of this nature is proscribed by
the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 111. Garcia's
discriminatory animus requirement does not apply when —
as here — the Title II claim is based on conduct that
violates the substantive component of the Fourteenth
Amendment’s due process clause. See Bolmer v. Oliveira, 594 F.3d 134, 137 (2d Cir. 2010)(Garcia is inapplicable
when Congress's abrogation is supported by its
enforcement of the substantive due process right not to
be involuntarily committed absent a danger to self or
others). Because plaintiff sufficiently alleges a
violation of her Fourteenth Amendment right to
substantive due process under Youngberg, the ADA and
Rehabilitation Act claims do not require an additional
allegation of discriminatory animus.
Merits
The complaint alleges that DCF excluded plaintiff
from participation in educational and rehabilitative
programs, denied her the integrated setting to which she
was entitled, failed to make reasonable modifications,
and discriminated against her based on her disabilities
by placing her in a boys' facility, denying her gender
expression, and isolating her from an appropriate peer
group. Accepted as true and construed most favorably to
plaintiff, these allegations are sufficient to support
an ADA claim. See 28 C.F.R. § 35.130 (d)(public entity
shall administer services and programs in “the most
integrated setting appropriate to the needs of qualified
individuals with disabilities”).
E. Sovereign Immunity
Defendants argue that the claims for money damages
against the State and DCF are barred by the Eleventh
Amendment. See Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58 (1989). This argument is well-taken as to
the § 1983 claims. As just discussed, however, Title II
validly abrogates sovereign immunity for conduct that
violates the Fourteenth Amendment, so the ADA damages
claims against the State and DCF may proceed. As to the
Rehabilitation Act, the State has waived sovereign
immunity by accepting federal financial assistance. See
42 U.S.C. § 2000d-7.
IV. Conclusion
Accordingly, the motion to dismiss is hereby granted
as to counts one through eight and denied as to counts
nine and ten.
A telephone conference will be scheduled to take
place within 30 days. Counsel are requested to confer in
advance of the conference with regard to steps that
should be taken to resolve the remaining claims,
including whether a settlement conference would be
helpful.
So ordered this 22nd day of April 2026.

_/s/ _RNC________________
Robert N. Chatigny
United States District Judge