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March 18, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

Nancy C. Fennell v. James M. Fennell

Court of Appeals of South Carolina

• Citations: None known

• Docket Number: 2024-000555

• Opinion

• Authorities (11)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (0)

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Syllabus

James M. Fennell (Father) appeals the family court's order (1) finding him in willful contempt for violating his final divorce decree (the Divorce Decree) with Nancy C. Fennell (Mother); (2) requiring him to pay college tuition and expenses for Katelyn Fennell (Daughter); and (3) requiring him to pay Mother's attorney's fees. On appeal, Father argues the family court erred because the clause addressing Daughter's college tuition and related expenses was ambiguous, there was no meeting of the minds, and his actions were not willful; thus, he was not required to reimburse Mother for past college tuition and expenses, contribute equally to Daughter's future college tuition and expenses, and pay Mother's attorney's fees. We affirm.

Combined Opinion

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

Nancy C. Fennell, Respondent,

v.

James M. Fennell, Appellant.

Appellate Case No. 2024-000555

Appeal From Richland County
Michelle M. Hurley, Family Court Judge

Opinion No. 6141
Submitted March 2, 2026 – Filed March 18, 2026

AFFIRMED

James M. Fennell, of Columbia, pro se.

Nancy C. Fennell, of Irmo, pro se.

PER CURIAM: James M. Fennell (Father) appeals the family court's order (1)
finding him in willful contempt for violating his final divorce decree (the Divorce
Decree) with Nancy C. Fennell (Mother); (2) requiring him to pay college tuition
and expenses for Katelyn Fennell (Daughter); and (3) requiring him to pay
Mother's attorney's fees. On appeal, Father argues the family court erred because
the clause addressing Daughter's college tuition and related expenses was
ambiguous, there was no meeting of the minds, and his actions were not willful;
thus, he was not required to reimburse Mother for past college tuition and
expenses, contribute equally to Daughter's future college tuition and expenses, and
pay Mother's attorney's fees. We affirm.
Mother and Father married on April 5, 1997, had three children together, including
Daughter, and divorced on May 11, 2010. The family court approved and
incorporated the marital settlement agreement (the Agreement) into the parties'
Divorce Decree. The Agreement's "College Expenses" provision stated "[b]oth
parties agree[d] to contribute equally to the tuition and other expenses necessary
for the Children to pursue a college education." On November 9, 2023, Mother
filed a petition for a rule to show cause alleging Father was in willful contempt of
the Divorce Decree because he refused to pay his equal share of Daughter's tuition
and necessary related expenses. Father answered, denying that his failure to pay
his equal share was willful, deliberate, or in violation of the Divorce Decree. After
a hearing, the family court found Father had willfully violated the Divorce Decree
and ordered Father to pay $5,481.00 for one semester, with the failure to do so
resulting in 120 days' incarceration, which would be purged upon payment; and
$5,485.67 for a second semester, with the failure to do so resulting in thirty days'
incarceration, which would be purged upon payment. Further, the family court
found Mother was entitled to attorney's fees because she had to file the action to
force Father to comply with the Divorce Decree.

We hold the family court did not err in finding Father willfully violated the
Divorce Decree and ordering Father to pay Daughter's college tuition and
expenses. 1 See Simmons v. Simmons, 392 S.C. 412, 414, 709 S.E.2d 666, 667
(2011) ("In appeals from the family court, [an appellate c]ourt reviews factual and
legal issues de novo."); Lewis v. Lewis, 392 S.C. 381, 384-85, 709 S.E.2d 650, 651
(2011) (explaining the appellate court has the authority to find the facts in
accordance with its own view of the preponderance of the evidence in appeals from
the family court); Stoney v. Stoney, 422 S.C. 593, 595, 813 S.E.2d 486, 487 (2018)
("[D]e novo review allows an appellate court to make its own findings of fact;
however, this standard does not abrogate two long-standing principles still

1
We address the first and second issues on appeal together. Regarding his second
issue on appeal, Father argues the family court erred in failing to find the doctrine
of impossibility excused his performance and that Mother's "unclean hands" barred
relief. We find these arguments are not preserved for appellate review. See State
v. Dunbar, 356 S.C. 138, 142, 587 S.E.2d 691, 693 (2003) ("In order for an issue
to be preserved for appellate review, it must have been raised to and ruled upon by
the [family court]."). To the extent Father argues the family court erred in finding
Mother and Daughter had no duty to mitigate the costs associated with attending
college, our holding that the Divorce Decree was clear and unambiguous as to
Father's responsibility to contribute equally toward Daughter's college tuition and
expenses resolves this argument.
recognized by our courts during the de novo review process: (1) a trial [court] is in
a superior position to assess witness credibility, and (2) an appellant has the burden
of showing the appellate court that the preponderance of the evidence is against the
finding of the trial [court]."). 2 Here, the "College Expenses" provision in the
Divorce Decree stated "[b]oth parties agree[d] to contribute equally to the tuition
and other expenses for the Children to pursue a college education," which clearly
and unambiguously required Father to pay 50% towards Daughter's college tuition
and other expenses. See Gibson v. Epting, 426 S.C 346, 351, 827 S.E.2d 178, 181
(Ct. App. 2019) ("Ambiguity of a contract is a question of law, which [an appellate
court] review[s] de novo."); Nicholson v. Nicholson, 378 S.C. 523, 532, 663 S.E.2d
74, 79 (Ct. App. 2008) ("In South Carolina, the construction of a separation
agreement is a matter of contract law." (quoting Davis v. Davis, 372 S.C. 64, 75,
641 S.E.2d 446, 451 (Ct. App. 2006))); id. ("The court's only function with an
agreement that is clear and capable of legal construction is to interpret its lawful
meaning and the intention of the parties as found within the agreement and to give
them effect."); id. ("In the enforcement of an agreement, the court does not have
the authority to modify terms that are clear and unambiguous on their face."
(quoting Messer v. Messer, 359 S.C. 614, 621, 598 S.E.2d 310, 314 (Ct. App.
2004))). Father willfully violated the Divorce Decree when he refused to pay his

2
Since Stoney, this court has reviewed contempt actions under both the abuse of
discretion and the de novo standard of review. See Campione v. Best, 435 S.C.
451, 458, 458 n.1, 868 S.E.2d 378, 381, 381 n.1 (Ct. App. 2021) (stating the abuse
of discretion standard applies to contempt orders and acknowledging that Stoney
could mean the standard should be de novo, but determining the resolution in that
case would be the same under either standard of review); Desilet v. Desilet, Op.
No. 2024-UP-029 (S.C. Ct. App. filed Jan. 24, 2024) (reviewing an order of
contempt de novo and recognizing that the standard of review for contempt orders
may be abuse of discretion, but determining the resolution of that case would be
the same under either standard); Taylor v. Taylor, 434 S.C. 307, 318, 863 S.E.2d
335, 341 (Ct. App. 2021) (reviewing the family court's contempt order de novo);
Clark v. Clark, 446 S.C. 90, 98, 917 S.E.2d 917, 921 (Ct. App. 2025) ("A finding
of contempt is within the discretion of the trial court and will not be disturbed on
appeal unless it is without evidentiary support." (quoting Burns v. Burns, 323 S.C.
45, 48, 448 S.E.2d 571, 572-73 (Ct. App. 1994))), cert. denied (Dec. 16, 2025). In
Stoney, our supreme court reversed this court's application of the abuse of
discretion standard in a family court action regarding numerous issues, including a
contempt issue, and remanded for this court to apply the de novo standard of
review. We read Stoney as requiring a de novo standard of review for contempt
actions in family court.
equal contribution towards Daughter's college tuition and other necessary expenses
as required in the Agreement.

Finally, we hold the family court did not err in awarding Mother compensatory
attorney's fees totaling $3,205.27. Mother was forced to file a petition for a rule to
show cause to get Father to comply with the Divorce Decree, the family court
determined Father willfully violated the Divorce Decree, and under the
compensatory contempt theory Mother may recover the costs she incurred in
forcing the non-complying party, here Father, to obey the Divorce Decree. See
Fossett v. Fossett, 440 S.C. 576, 587, 891 S.E.2d 515, 521 (Ct. App. 2023) ("An
appellate court reviews 'a family court's award of attorney's fees de novo.'"
(quoting Stone v. Thompson, 428 S.C. 79, 92, 833 S.E.2d 266, 272 (2019)));
Bristol v. Lipnevicius, 444 S.C. 373, 390, 906 S.E.2d 618, 628 (Ct. App. 2024)
("Courts, by exercising their contempt power, can award attorney's fees under a
compensatory contempt theory." (quoting Miller v. Miller, 375 S.C. 443, 463, 652
S.E.2d 754, 764 (Ct. App. 2007))); id. ("Compensatory contempt seeks to
reimburse the party for the costs it incurs in forcing the non-complying party to
obey the court's orders." (quoting Miller, 375 S.C. at 463, 652 S.E.2d at 764)); id.
at 390-91, 906 S.E.2d at 628 ("In a civil contempt proceeding, a contemnor may be
required to reimburse a complainant for the costs he incurred in enforcing the
court's prior order, including reasonable attorney's fees." (quoting Miller, 375 S.C.
at 463, 652 S.E.2d at 764)); id. at 391, 906 S.E.2d at 628 ("Courts u[se]
compensatory contempt to restore the plaintiff as nearly as possible to his original
position. Therefore[,] it is remedial." (first alteration in original) (quoting Curlee
v. Howle, 277 S.C. 377, 386, 287 S.E.2d 915, 919 (1982))); id. ("[T]he
compensatory award should be limited to the complainant's actual loss. Included
in the actual loss are the costs in defending and enforcing the court's order,
including litigation costs and attorney's fees." (alteration in original) (quoting
Curlee, 277 S.C. at 387, 287 S.E.2d at 920)).

AFFIRMED.3

THOMAS, MCDONALD, and TURNER, JJ., concur.

3
We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.