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March 24, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

Commonwealth v. Jessica Terkelsen.

Massachusetts Appeals Court

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: 25-P-0494

• Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

• Opinion

• Authorities (4)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (0)

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Combined Opinion

NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule
23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28,
as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties
and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's
decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire
court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case.
A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25,
2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted
above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260
n.4 (2008).

COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

APPEALS COURT

25-P-494

COMMONWEALTH

vs.

JESSICA TERKELSEN.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0

The defendant, Jessica Terkelsen, appeals from her

convictions, following a jury trial in the District Court, of

breaking and entering a building in the nighttime with the

intent to commit a misdemeanor, in violation of G. L. c. 266,

§ 16A, and of larceny under $1,200, in violation of G. L.

c. 266, § 30 (1). The defendant argues that the trial judge

erred in accepting her attorney's waiver of her right to be

present at sidebar during individual juror voir dire, rather

than obtaining a personal waiver directly from the defendant.

We affirm.

Background. In the early morning hours on August 2, 2019,

Montague Police responded to the home of Orlando Wildman-Hanlon
for a reported disturbance. Wildman-Hanlon lived there with his

parents, his sister, and a dog, Lilly. Wildman-Hanlon and the

defendant had previously been in a relationship in which they

shared possession of Lilly. After their breakup, Wildman-Hanlon

moved back into his parents' home. The parties agreed Wildman-

Hanlon would retain possession of Lilly until the defendant

found suitable living arrangements for the dog. When the

defendant moved in with her parents, she asked Wildman-Hanlon

for the dog back, and he refused.

At around 4:30 A.M. on the day of the incident, the

defendant and two accomplices broke into the Wildman-Hanlon home

while the occupants were asleep. Wildman-Hanlon awoke and heard

banging at his bedroom door. He opened it and saw the

defendant. The defendant then took and fled with Lilly. After

the defendant and her accomplices left the home, there was

damage to a window screen and to Wildman-Hanlon's doorframe.

The police obtained a criminal complaint and arrested the

defendant.

The defendant elected a jury trial, which occurred on June

14, 2022. In the midst of jury selection, the judge asked

defense counsel whether he waived the defendant's presence at

sidebar for individual juror voir dire. Defense counsel stated

that he had spoken to the defendant about that issue and he

waived her presence for individual juror voir dire. The jury

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convicted the defendant of breaking and entering in the

nighttime with the intent to commit a misdemeanor and of larceny

under $1,200. The defendant timely appealed.

Discussion. The defendant claims that her counsel's waiver

of her right to participate in individual juror voir dire was

invalid because the judge was required to obtain a personal

waiver directly from her. We disagree.

"[A] defendant is entitled to be present at all critical

stages of a criminal proceeding," including voir dire of an

individual juror, "if an appropriate request for [her] presence

is made" (citation omitted). Commonwealth v. Owens, 414 Mass.

595, 602 (1993). But defense counsel has the authority to waive

a defendant's presence on her behalf. See Commonwealth v.

Myers, 82 Mass. App. Ct. 172, 181 (2012) ("only a limited number

of rights are [waivable by] the defendant alone, including

whether to plead guilty, to waive the right to trial by jury, to

testify in one's behalf, to take an appeal, or to waive the

right to counsel" [quotation and citation omitted]).

The defendant did not request to be present at sidebar

during the individual juror voir dire. Moreover, her counsel

did not object to her absence and the judge did not exclude her.

For this reason alone, the issue need not be considered on

appeal. See Commonwealth v. Perry, 432 Mass. 214, 238 (2000).

But here, the judge specifically asked defense counsel if he was

3
waiving the defendant's presence for individual voir dire.

Defense counsel responded that he had discussed the issue with

the defendant and they were "waiving her presence."1

Accordingly, defense counsel validly waived the defendant's

right to be present. See Myers, 82 Mass. App. Ct. at 181.

Judgments affirmed.

By the Court (Rubin, Henry, &
Wood, JJ.2),

Clerk

Entered: March 24, 2026.

1 When defense counsel waived the defendant's presence at
sidebar, seven jurors had been seated and the defense had struck
two jurors for cause without objection.

2 The panelists are listed in order of seniority.

4