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March 23, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

Commonwealth v. Jerome Leatherwood.

Massachusetts Appeals Court

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: 24-P-1254

• Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

• Opinion

• Authorities (6)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (0)

• PDF

Combined Opinion

NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule
23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28,
as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties
and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's
decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire
court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case.
A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25,
2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted
above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260
n.4 (2008).

COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

APPEALS COURT

24-P-1254

COMMONWEALTH

vs.

JEROME LEATHERWOOD.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0

The defendant, Jerome Leatherwood, appeals from his

convictions of two counts of indecent assault and battery on a

child under fourteen, arguing that the judge improperly

determined that he was competent to stand trial. He also

appeals from a different judge's denial of his postconviction

motion for costs for an expert speech language pathologist to

support a motion for a new trial. We affirm.

Background. We summarize the facts and procedural history

of this case, reserving certain facts for later discussion. The

defendant was indicted in 2015 on multiple charges of aggravated

rape of a child and indecent assault and battery on a child
under fourteen.1 His competency to stand trial was called into

question at his arraignment in late 2015, and he was committed

to Bridgewater State Hospital (Bridgewater) for observation and

evaluation. In early 2016, he was transferred to the Worcester

Recovery Center and Hospital, where he remained civilly

committed for over two years, before returning to Bridgewater

until his trial commenced in 2022.2

In 2017, the defendant moved to dismiss the indictments on

the ground that he was incompetent to stand trial. After an

updated competency evaluation and a multiday evidentiary hearing

in 2018, a judge (first judge) found that the defendant was

competent to stand trial and denied the motion. In reaching her

conclusion, the first judge relied on a report authored by Dr.

Jeffrey Burl, who opined that the defendant was competent. In

2019, the defendant moved for reconsideration of that

determination, and, after another evidentiary hearing, the first

1 The defendant was originally indicted on three counts of
aggravated rape of a child, subsequent offense, five counts of
indecent assault and battery on a child under age fourteen, and
one count of resisting arrest. The Commonwealth later entered
nolle prosequis on several of the charges. The defendant was
ultimately tried for two counts of aggravated rape of a child
and three counts of indecent assault and battery on a child
under age fourteen.

2 The defendant was briefly held in custody at the Nashua
Street jail for two short periods in 2018 and 2019, lasting
approximately three and twenty-one days respectively, before
being recommitted to Bridgewater.

2
judge denied the motion, finding no changed circumstances

warranting reconsideration.

In 2022, just before trial, a different judge (second

judge) presided over another evidentiary hearing on the

defendant's competency, at which Dr. Sara Laniado testified.

Although Dr. Laniado was unable to conclusively opine whether

the defendant was competent, she opined that the defendant's

abilities "should be intact." The second judge ultimately found

the defendant competent, and the case proceeded to a jury trial.

On the two counts of rape of a child, the jury found the

defendant guilty of the lesser included offense of indecent

assault and battery on a child under age fourteen. On the three

counts of indecent assault and battery on a child under age

fourteen, the jury found the defendant not guilty.

After trial, the defendant moved for funds for a speech

language pathology expert pursuant to Mass. R. Crim. P.

30 (c) (5), as appearing in 435 Mass. 1501 (2001). He argued in

part that such an expert would opine on the effect of his

language deficits on prior evaluations of his competency. A

judge (third judge) denied the motion, concluding that the

defendant had not shown that such an opinion would support a

meritorious motion for new trial.

3
Discussion. 1. Competency. Where competency has been

called into question, the Commonwealth has the burden to prove

by a preponderance of the evidence that a defendant is competent

to stand trial. Commonwealth v. Lyons, 426 Mass. 466, 469

(1998). "Competency to stand trial requires that the defendant

have [1] sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer

with a reasonable degree of rational understanding and . . . [2]

a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings

against him" (quotation and citation omitted). Id. at 468-469.

We review a judge's determination of a defendant's

competency for abuse of discretion. Commonwealth v. Beatty, 492

Mass. 118, 125 (2023). In doing so, we give substantial

deference to the judge's findings of fact. Lyons, 426 Mass. at

469. Crucially, "[w]hile it may be useful for a judge to hear

opinions from medical experts, the determination is ultimately a

legal, not a medical, judgment." Commonwealth v. Jones, 479

Mass. 1, 14 (2018).

Here, the second judge, in finding the defendant competent

immediately before trial, credited Dr. Laniado's testimony and

report, which, while not affirmatively opining that the

defendant was competent, included Dr. Laniado's opinions that

the defendant was exaggerating his symptoms for secondary gain

and that there was "a richness of data to suggest that [the

4
defendant's] abilities are intact." The second judge also

reviewed all of the evidence from the 2018 and 2019 hearings.3

Finally, and importantly, the second judge considered her own

observations of the defendant in the court room, including his

ability to generally conduct himself appropriately and his

apparent close relationship with his attorney. Considering all

of this evidence, the second judge did not abuse her discretion

in finding the defendant competent to stand trial.

The defendant's arguments to the contrary are not

persuasive. The defendant does not challenge any of the second

judge's factual findings. Rather, he argues that the ultimate

competency finding was contrary to the weight of the evidence,

because only one medical expert opined, several years before

trial, that he was competent, and because the judge's own

observations of him in court do not "overcome" the other

evidence. These arguments misunderstand the legal standards

3 In addition, the judge reviewed video footage of the
defendant's 2015 interview with police and audio recordings of
phone calls he made while detained. In these recordings, she
observed the defendant's ability to (1) recall information;
(2) engage with police about the allegations against him, the
credibility of the complainant, and the consequences of a
conviction; and (3) show his understanding of the court process
and the role of his lawyer. This 2015 evidence, while dated,
was consistent with the conclusion the judge reached based on
more recent evidence.

5
applied in a competency determination,4 and they amount to a

request to reweigh the evidence. We will not do so. See

Commonwealth v. Schoener, 491 Mass. 706, 719 (2023).

Finally, we note that, while the second judge of course

made her finding before trial, nothing in the trial record calls

that finding into question after the fact. The defendant

appears to have conducted himself appropriately throughout the

trial; he also testified coherently, and the jury appear to have

thoughtfully considered all of the evidence, returning guilty

verdicts on some, but not all of the charges.

1. Denial of funds for expert. Rule 30 (c) (5) of the

Rules of Criminal Procedure gives judges "discretion to allow

for the payment of costs associated with the preparation and

presentation of a new trial motion," including costs for

retaining an expert. Reporter's Notes to Mass. R. Crim. P.

30 (c) (5). "In making the decision to allow costs associated

4 For example, the defendant asserts that the judge's
"[s]uperficial observations offer little support for the judge's
non-expert findings supporting competency." This misstates both
the status of a competency determination as a legal question and
the weight which the judge may give to her own observations of
the defendant. See Jones, 479 Mass. at 14 (competency is
"ultimately a legal, not a medical, judgment"); Commonwealth v.
Scionti, 81 Mass. App. Ct. 266, 273 (2012) (judge "entitled to
place great weight" on observations of defendant). Similarly,
the defendant's argument that the judge could not base her
finding on a purportedly stale opinion from 2018 incorrectly
assumes that the judge may only find the defendant competent
when a medical expert has also so opined. See Jones, supra.

6
with a new trial motion, the judge should take into account the

likelihood that the expenditure will result in the defendant's

being able to present a meritorious ground for a new trial"

(citation omitted). Commonwealth v. Mitchell, 438 Mass. 535,

555, cert. denied, 539 U.S. 907 (2003). Here, the judge made

the appropriate inquiries and consequently did not abuse his

discretion. See Commonwealth v. Ortiz, 67 Mass. App. Ct. 349,

354 (2006).

The defendant's arguments on this issue are nearly verbatim

those which he made in his original motion for funds for an

expert speech language pathologist. He does not identify any

flaws in the third judge's reasons for denying the motion, let

alone show any abuse of discretion in that decision. See

Commonwealth v. Gonzalez, 103 Mass. App. Ct. 74, 81 n.4 (2023)

(inadequately argued claims need not be considered). The

defendant merely reiterates his argument that an expert speech

language pathologist would opine on how his difficulties with

speech and language comprehension might have affected his prior

competency evaluations. However, the role of the defendant's

learning disability and language-based difficulties has been

well considered throughout this case.5 Reviewing this record,

5 Multiple experts in the first competency hearing
considered the defendant's language disabilities in their
assessments. Likewise, Dr. Laniado factored the defendant's

7
the third judge did not abuse his discretion when concluding

that the defendant's motion did not present any issues not

already addressed in prior competency determinations, and

therefore that the expenditure was unlikely to result in a

meritorious motion for a new trial.

Judgments affirmed.

Order denying postconviction
motion for expert funds
affirmed.

By the Court (Vuono, Neyman &
Sacks, JJ.6),

Clerk

Entered: March 23, 2026.

cognitive deficits into her testing of the defendant, giving
nonverbal tests instead of verbal ones when possible, and
reading questions aloud rather than requiring the defendant to
read them himself. Even with these considerations in mind,
several experts opined that the defendant's competency was
likely unaffected by his disabilities or that he nonetheless
showed inconsistent effort on tests that were administered to
him, calling into question the genuineness of his other apparent
deficits. Also, both the first and second judges found that the
defendant had cognitive disabilities, which they factored into
their assessments of his competency.

6 The panelists are listed in order of seniority.

8