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March 23, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

United States v. Cristino Mendoza Torres

Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: 25-12990
• Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

• Nature of Suit: NEW

• Opinion

• Authorities (5)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (35.6K)

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Combined Opinion

USCA11 Case: 25-12990 Document: 27-1 Date Filed: 03/23/2026 Page: 1 of 7

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Eleventh Circuit

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No. 25-12990
Non-Argument Calendar

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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus

CRISTINO MENDOZA TORRES,
Defendant-Appellant.

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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Alabama
D.C. Docket No. 2:25-cr-00186-LCB-NAD-1

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Before JILL PRYOR, BRANCH, and GRANT, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Cristino Mendoza Torres brings this appeal challenging his
18-month sentence. Because the district court failed to explain its
USCA11 Case: 25-12990 Document: 27-1 Date Filed: 03/23/2026 Page: 2 of 7

2 Opinion of the Court 25-12990

decision to impose an upward variance, we vacate and remand for
resentencing.
I.
In March 2025, Mendoza Torres was pulled over on
suspicion of drunk driving. Inside the car, police found a Ruger
9mm pistol. Mendoza Torres was arrested and charged with
driving under the influence.
Soon after, Mendoza Torres, a Mexican citizen, was taken
into the custody of U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement
(“ICE”). An ICE officer found Mendoza Torres in possession of a
fraudulent social security card and lawful permanent resident card.
He was charged with and pleaded guilty to one count of possession
of immigration documents procured by fraud in violation of
18 U.S.C. § 1546 (a).
Mendoza Torres’s sentencing hearing was brief. It lasted just
over ten minutes; the hearing transcript filled less than ten pages.
At the hearing, little was in dispute. The government and Mendoza
Torres’s counsel agreed that his offense level was four and his
criminal history category was I, which yielded a Sentencing
Guidelines range of zero to six months’ imprisonment. The
government requested a sentence of six months, at the top of the
range, noting that Mendoza Torres had already been in custody for
“approximately five months.” Doc. 33 at 6. 1 His counsel had no
objection to the government’s request, “given how long he ha[d]

1 “Doc.” numbers refer to the district court’s docket entries.
USCA11 Case: 25-12990 Document: 27-1 Date Filed: 03/23/2026 Page: 3 of 7

25-12990 Opinion of the Court 3

been in custody.” Id. His counsel explained to the district court that
Mendoza Torres obtained the fraudulent documents because he
was told that he needed them to work, he had no “prior
interactions with Customs and Border Patrol or ICE” until this
case, and this case would result in “his first and only removal.” Id.
at 5–6. The government did not address these facts or any other
facts about Mendoza Torres or his conduct.
After his counsel’s brief comments, the court imposed a
sentence of 18 months. The court said that it had “considered the
guidelines computation” and “taken them under advisement.” Id.
at 8. It then recited that the sentence was
sufficient but not greater than necessary to comply
with the statutory purposes of sentencing and that
it’s reasonable considering the following sentencing
factors found at 18 U.S.C. Section 3553 (a): “[t]he
nature and circumstances of the offense and the
history and characteristics of the defendant,” “to
reflect the seriousness of the offense,” “promote
respect for the law,” “provide just punishment for the
offense,” and “to afford adequate deterrence to
criminal conduct.”

Id. (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3553 (a)). Beyond this statement quoting
verbatim several of the § 3553(a) factors, 2 the court offered no

2 Under § 3553(a), a district court is required to impose a sentence that is

“sufficient, but not greater than necessary, to comply with the purposes” of
the statute. 18 U.S.C. § 3553 (a). These purposes include the need to: reflect the
seriousness of the offense; promote respect for the law; provide just
USCA11 Case: 25-12990 Document: 27-1 Date Filed: 03/23/2026 Page: 4 of 7

4 Opinion of the Court 25-12990

explanation for its decision to impose a sentence three times longer
than the top of the applicable guidelines range. The court said
nothing to explain how the factors applied in this case. It did not
say what information it had considered. It did not acknowledge
that the sentence involved an upward variance.
Mendoza Torres objected to the sentence. The court
overruled his objection.
After the sentencing hearing, the district court completed a
written statement-of-reasons form. On the form, the court
indicated that it had imposed an upward variance and relied on the
§ 3553(a) factors mentioned during the sentencing hearing. It did
not further explain its sentencing decision.
This is Mendoza Torres’s appeal.
II.
We review the reasonableness of a defendant’s sentence for
abuse of discretion. United States v. Henry, 1 F.4th 1315, 1319 (11th
Cir. 2021).

punishment; deter criminal conduct; protect the public from the defendant’s
future criminal conduct; and effectively provide the defendant with
educational or vocational training, medical care, or other correctional
treatment. Id. § 3553(a)(2). The court must also consider the nature and
circumstances of the offense, the history and characteristics of the defendant,
the kinds of sentences available, the applicable guidelines range, the pertinent
policy statements of the Sentencing Commission, the need to avoid
unwarranted sentencing disparities, and the need to provide restitution to
victims. Id. § 3553(a)(1), (3)–(7).
USCA11 Case: 25-12990 Document: 27-1 Date Filed: 03/23/2026 Page: 5 of 7

25-12990 Opinion of the Court 5

III.
Mendoza Torres argues that his sentence is procedurally
unreasonable because the district court failed to adequately explain
its decision to impose an upward variance.
“A defendant challenging his sentence bears the burden of
establishing that it is unreasonable.” United States v. Sarras, 575 F.3d
1191, 1219 (11th Cir. 2009). A sentence is procedurally
unreasonable if the district court commits a “significant procedural
error” such as failing to calculate or improperly calculating a
defendant’s guidelines range, treating the Sentencing Guidelines as
mandatory, failing to consider the § 3553(a) sentencing factors,
selecting a sentence based on clearly erroneous facts, or failing to
adequately explain the chosen sentence. United States v. Trailer,
827 F.3d 933, 936 (11th Cir. 2016).
We focus here on whether the district court committed a
procedural error by failing to adequately explain the sentence.
“Criminal defendants in federal court have the right to know the
reason for their sentence so they can understand the process and
challenge their sentence on appeal.” United States v. Steiger, 99 F.4th
1316, 1321 (11th Cir. 2024) (en banc). Federal law requires a district
court to “state in open court the reasons for its imposition of the
particular sentence.” 18 U.S.C. § 3553 (c).
Further, when the court imposes a sentence outside the
guidelines range, it must state at sentencing “the specific reason for
the imposition of a sentence different from” the guidelines range.
Id. § 3553(c)(2). It must state its reasons “with specificity” in a
USCA11 Case: 25-12990 Document: 27-1 Date Filed: 03/23/2026 Page: 6 of 7

6 Opinion of the Court 25-12990

written statement-of-reasons form as well. Id. And when a district
court imposes a sentence with a “major” variance from the
guidelines range, it must provide a “more significant justification.”
Steiger, 99 F.4th at 1322.
Here, having imposed a sentence that was three times
longer than the top end of the applicable guidelines range, the
district court had to comply with § 3553(c)(2). Yet it failed to
identify “the specific reason” why it varied significantly from the
guidelines range. 18 U.S.C. § 3553 (c)(2). The court merely recited
some of the § 3553(a) factors. It said nothing that would explain
how the factors applied to Mendoza Torres.
It is true that, when reviewing a district court’s decision to
impose an upward variance, we “may consider the record from the
entire sentencing hearing and need not rely upon the district
court’s summary statement made at the closing of the sentencing
hearing” to glean the court’s reasons for imposing a variance.
United States v. Suarez, 939 F.2d 929, 934 (11th Cir. 1991). Often,
where the parties argued to the court about how the § 3553(a)
factors applied to the facts of the case, we can understand from the
court’s reference to § 3553(a) factors the specific reasons why it
imposed an upward variance. But the record in this case allows us
to draw no such inference because, at sentencing, the parties
agreed that an appropriate sentence was six months, which was at
the top of the guidelines range. Given this agreement, there were
no arguments about the § 3553(a) factors. The only facts
mentioned at the sentencing hearing record were those offered by
USCA11 Case: 25-12990 Document: 27-1 Date Filed: 03/23/2026 Page: 7 of 7

25-12990 Opinion of the Court 7

Mendoza Torres: that he obtained the fake social security and
permanent resident cards because he was told he needed them to
work and that he had not previously been apprehended by
immigration authorities or removed. We cannot infer from this
record the basis for the district court’s decision to vary upward.
We conclude that the district court failed to adequately
explain its basis for imposing an upward variance.3 We therefore
vacate and remand for resentencing.
VACATED and REMANDED.

3 Mendoza Torres also argues on appeal that his 18-month sentence is
substantively unreasonable. Because we conclude that the district court
committed a procedural error in failing to adequately explain its decision to
impose a variance and Mendoza Torres is entitled to a resentencing, we do
not address whether the sentence was substantively reasonable.