Jump To

Top Caption Combined Opinion The text of this document was obtained by analyzing a scanned document and may have typos.

Support FLP

CourtListener is a project of Free
Law Project, a federally-recognized 501(c)(3) non-profit. Members help support our work and get special access to features.

Please become a member today.

Join Free.law Now

March 23, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

United States v. Daniel Wert

Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: 24-10127
• Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

• Nature of Suit: NEW

• Opinion

• Authorities (17)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (40.1K)

• PDF

Combined Opinion

USCA11 Case: 24-10127 Document: 41-1 Date Filed: 03/23/2026 Page: 1 of 13

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Eleventh Circuit

---

No. 24-10127
Non-Argument Calendar

---

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus

DANIEL WERT,
Defendant-Appellant.

---

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
D.C. Docket No. 6:97-cr-00001-CEM-DCI-13

---

Before JORDAN, ABUDU, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Daniel Wert, who is proceeding pro se, is a federal prisoner
serving a life sentence for conspiracy to possess with intent to dis-
tribute marijuana and cocaine. He appeals the district court’s denial
USCA11 Case: 24-10127 Document: 41-1 Date Filed: 03/23/2026 Page: 2 of 13

2 Opinion of the Court 24-10127

of his motion for compassionate release and requests a new sen-
tencing hearing. Following review of the record and the parties’
briefs, we affirm.
I
In the early 1990s, Mr. Wert became a part of a large inter-
state cocaine and marijuana trafficking organization. The leader of
the organization paid Mr. Wert and two co-conspirators $10,000
each to kill Eloy Benevides over a disputed marijuana transaction.
In October of 1993, Mr. Wert shot and killed Mr. Benevides; he and
the two co-conspirators then buried Mr. Benevides’ body in Volu-
sia County, Florida. After the murder, Mr. Wert stopped delivering
drugs for the organization. On October 13, 1993, authorities ar-
rested Mr. Wert for possession of ten pounds of marijuana and pos-
session of a firearm.
In April of 1997, Mr. Wert proceeded to a 14-day jury trial.
The jury convicted Mr. Wert of a single count of conspiracy to pos-
sess with intent to distribute marijuana and cocaine in violation of
21 U.S.C. § 846. Mr. Wert had a criminal history category of IV and
a total offense level of 43, resulting in a then-mandatory guideline
sentence of life imprisonment. In July of 1997, the district court im-
posed a sentence of life imprisonment.
In September of 2021, Mr. Wert, proceeding pro se, moved
for compassionate release pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582. He later
supplemented his motion asking, in the alternative, for a sentence
reduction. The district court denied his motion. Mr. Wert ap-
USCA11 Case: 24-10127 Document: 41-1 Date Filed: 03/23/2026 Page: 3 of 13

24-10127 Opinion of the Court 3

pealed, and we remanded because the court’s explanation was “in-
sufficient for meaningful appellate review.” United States v. Wert,
No. 22-11965, 2023 WL 5745487, at *3 (11th Cir. Sept. 6, 2023). Mr.
Wert filed two motions for “spoliation” while he awaited the dis-
trict court’s compassionate release decision on remand. See D.E.
615; D.E. 620. Simply put, he asked the court to presume that his
original sentencing transcript—which is now unavailable—re-
vealed favorable mitigating evidence to support his claims for com-
passionate release or a sentence reduction.
The district court denied Mr. Wert’s motion for compas-
sionate release. Mr. Wert again appealed. The court denied his first
motion for spoliation before Mr. Wert filed his notice of appeal and
denied the second motion for spoliation after he filed his notice of
appeal.
II
Mr. Wert contends the district court erred in denying his
motion for compassionate release. First, he argues that the court
abused its discretion by failing to adequately consider the 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553 (a) factors. Second, he contends that the district court’s de-
nial of compassionate release violates the Ex Post Facto Clause and
the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Third, he
asserts that the court should have conducted a new sentencing
USCA11 Case: 24-10127 Document: 41-1 Date Filed: 03/23/2026 Page: 4 of 13

4 Opinion of the Court 24-10127

hearing and could not have properly weighed the § 3553(a) factors
because his original 1997 sentencing transcript is unavailable.1
A
“We review de novo whether a defendant is eligible for a sen-
tence reduction under 18 U.S.C. § 3582 (c)(1)(A).” United States v.
Giron, 15 F.4th 1343, 1345 (11th Cir. 2021) (citing United States v.
Bryant, 996 F.3d 1243, 1251 (11th Cir. 2021)). “After eligibility is es-
tablished, we review a district court’s denial of a prisoner’s
§ 3582(c)(1)(A) motion for abuse of discretion.” Id. (citing United
States v. Harris, 989 F.3d 908, 911 (11th Cir. 2021)). “A district court
abuses its discretion if it applies an incorrect legal standard, follows
improper procedures in making the determination, or makes find-
ings of fact that are clearly erroneous.” Harris, 989 F.3d at 911 (in-
ternal quotation marks and citation omitted).

1 Mr. Wert also avers that his original appellate counsel’s failure to request the

sentencing transcripts constituted ineffective assistance of counsel, but he did
not raise this issue below. We generally do not consider ineffective assistance
claims without an evidentiary record below, and 18 U.S.C. § 3582 is not the
proper means to raise such a claim. See United States v. Abreu, 840 F. App’x 457,
462 (11th Cir. 2020). Accord United States v. Escajeda, 58 F.4th 184, 188 (5th Cir.
2023) (“Because [the ineffective assistance] claims would have been cognizable
under [28 U.S.C.] § 2255, they are not cognizable under § 3582(c).”); United
States v. Bass, No. 21-1703, 2022 WL 16752876, at *1 (6th Cir. June 3, 2022)
(stating that “a compassionate-release motion is not the proper vehicle for rais-
ing claims regarding ineffective assistance of counsel”).
USCA11 Case: 24-10127 Document: 41-1 Date Filed: 03/23/2026 Page: 5 of 13

24-10127 Opinion of the Court 5

B
A district court may grant compassionate release if (1) an ex-
traordinary and compelling reason exists; (2) a sentencing reduc-
tion would be consistent with U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13; and (3) the
§ 3553(a) factors weigh in favor of compassionate release. See 18
U.S.C. § 3582 (c)(1)(A)(i); United States v. Tinker, 14 F.4th 1234,
1237–38 (11th Cir. 2021). The court may conduct the compassion-
ate release analysis in any order. See Tinker, 14 F.4th at 1237. When
it determines that one of these three requirements is not met, the
court need not examine the others. See id. at 1238. Here, the court
focused its analysis on the § 3553(a) factors. For the reasons we ex-
plain below, we discern no abuse of discretion and affirm.2
1
First, the district court did not abuse its discretion in balanc-
ing the § 3553(a) factors to determine that neither compassionate
release nor a sentence reduction was warranted. The court ana-
lyzed the nature and circumstances of the offense, explaining that
Mr. Wert belonged to a prolific drug distribution organization and
killed someone while affiliated with that enterprise. The court also
considered Mr. Wert’s history and characteristics, doubting that

2 To the extent that Mr. Wert has attempted to develop the record before this

Court by providing an updated health history and rehabilitation record in his
briefing, much of that information is not part of the actual record on appeal
because it was not presented to the district court before it denied his motion.
Therefore, we do not consider it for the first time on appeal. See United States
v. Trader, 981 F.3d 961, 969 (11th Cir. 2020); Fed. R. App. P. 10(a).
USCA11 Case: 24-10127 Document: 41-1 Date Filed: 03/23/2026 Page: 6 of 13

6 Opinion of the Court 24-10127

Mr. Wert was remorseful. Nor did the court believe that Mr. Wert
has been rehabilitated. Instead, the court explained that it could not
disregard decades of denial of responsibility and disciplinary prob-
lems in favor of focusing on the last two years when Mr. Wert has
avoided trouble. 3
The district court then assessed the need for the sentence to
reflect the seriousness of the offense, explaining that it is hard to
imagine someone more dangerous than a person who killed a
stranger for money. The court also factored in the need to protect
the public, explaining that if Mr. Wert already took a life in ex-
change for money, he may be inclined to do so the next time he
needs funds. After weighing the § 3553(a) factors, the court deter-
mined that Mr. Wert’s life sentence was justified and that release
was not appropriate.
On appeal, Mr. Wert maintains that the district court failed
to consider his rehabilitation, his lack of danger to the community,
and the disproportionate nature of his sentence under the current
law. But courts do not need to specifically address each of the
§ 3553(a) factors or every piece of mitigating evidence. See United
States v. Taylor, 997 F.3d 1348, 1354 (11th Cir. 2021) (citation omit-
ted). Rather, the court must acknowledge that it considered the
§ 3553(a) factors and the parties’ arguments. See id. at 1354–55.
Here, the district court did exactly that. See D.E. 617 at 12 (“Having
fully considered all the circumstances in light of the § 3553 factors,

3 Mr. Wert now asserts that he “has consistently maintained his innocence re-

garding the murder allegation.” Reply Br. for Appellant at 7.
USCA11 Case: 24-10127 Document: 41-1 Date Filed: 03/23/2026 Page: 7 of 13

24-10127 Opinion of the Court 7

the Court must conclude that Defendant has not satisfied his bur-
den.”).
Although Mr. Wert quarrels with how the district court
weighed the § 3553(a) factors, the weight to be accorded to those
factors is left to the sound discretion of the court, not to Mr. Wert.
See Tinker, 14 F.4th at 1237. And when the court finds that one of
the compassionate release requirements is not met, it need not ex-
amine the others, as the absence of one condition forecloses relief.
See id. at 1238; 18 U.S.C. § 3582 (c)(1)(A).
2
Mr. Wert also argues that the denial of his compassionate
release violated the Ex Post Facto Clause and the Sixth Amend-
ment because the district court should have considered changes in
the law since his 1997 sentencing. Below, he asserted that if the
2021 sentencing laws were applied, his guidelines would be any-
where between 262 months and 405 months. On appeal, Mr. Wert
argues that, under today’s sentencing framework, he would not re-
ceive a life sentence because the court, not the jury, engaged in fact-
finding to factor the murder into his sentence. And, he argues, he
would no longer qualify for a mandatory minimum sentence.
A district court may consider non-retroactive changes to the
law when deciding a motion for compassionate release. See
U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(c). Specifically, the Sentencing Commission pro-
vided in the 2023 amendment to its Policy Statement, as follows:
“[I]f a defendant otherwise establishes that extraordinary and com-
pelling reasons warrant a sentence reduction under this policy
USCA11 Case: 24-10127 Document: 41-1 Date Filed: 03/23/2026 Page: 8 of 13

8 Opinion of the Court 24-10127

statement, a change in the law (including an amendment to the
Guidelines Manual that has not been made retroactive) may be
considered for purposes of determining the extent of any such re-
duction.” Id.
The permissive language in this policy statement demon-
strates that the district court was permitted—but not required—to
address the disparity between the 1997 mandatory guideline sen-
tence and Mr. Wert’s calculation of the 2021 advisory guideline
range. See id. We have said many times that a district court “need
not articulate the applicability of each [§ 3553(a)] factor, but the rec-
ord must show that the pertinent factors were taken into account.”
United States v. Johnson, 877 F.3d 993, 997 (11th Cir. 2017) (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted). Therefore, a court does not
abuse its discretion when other factors outweigh the change in law.
Additionally, the court did not engage in “judicial factfinding,” as
Mr. Wert calls it, by fully considering the record evidence of his
offense in its § 3553(a) analysis. The court did not err by failing to
explicitly address the changes in the law.
3
Mr. Wert argues that the district court could not properly
consider the § 3553(a) factors because his original sentencing tran-
script is unavailable. He contends that the failure to consider the
USCA11 Case: 24-10127 Document: 41-1 Date Filed: 03/23/2026 Page: 9 of 13

24-10127 Opinion of the Court 9

original sentencing transcript constitutes a due process violation
and warrants a new sentencing hearing.4
Although a district court may consider its balancing of the
§ 3553(a) factors at the original sentencing, we have never held that
it must rely on the original sentencing court’s statements in deter-
mining whether a sentence reduction is appropriate. See generally
Chavez-Meza v. United States, 585 U.S. 109, 118–20 (2018). And a
court does not abuse its discretion in denying compassionate re-
lease so long as “the record as a whole satisfies us that the judge
considered the parties’ arguments and had a reasoned basis for ex-
ercising his own legal decisionmaking authority.” Id. at 119 (altera-
tions adopted, internal quotation marks omitted, and citation omit-
ted).
Mr. Wert cites Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956), to support
his contention that meaningful review requires an absolutely com-
plete record. But he is incorrect that he is entitled to reversal. A
criminal defendant must be afforded a “record of sufficient com-
pleteness” to permit proper consideration of his claims. See Draper
v. Washington, 372 U.S. 487, 499 (1963) (citations omitted). Yet Mr.
Wert is not entitled to a hearing on a motion for compassionate
release, and this rule does not change because his original sentenc-
ing transcript is unavailable. See United States v. Caraballo-Martinez,

4 We address this issue only insofar as the district court addressed it in the

order denying compassionate release. As we will explain, Mr. Wert did not
challenge the court’s ruling on “spoliation” related to the sentencing tran-
scripts.
USCA11 Case: 24-10127 Document: 41-1 Date Filed: 03/23/2026 Page: 10 of 13

10 Opinion of the Court 24-10127

866 F.3d 1233, 1249 (11th Cir. 2017) (citing United States v. Phillips,
597 F.3d 1190, 1198 n.18 (11th Cir. 2010)).
In Mr. Wert’s case, the district court reviewed his lengthy
presentence investigation report. We are satisfied that the district
court thoroughly considered his arguments and determined that
compassionate release was unwarranted. Accordingly, we affirm
the district court’s denial of compassionate release.
III
Finally, the government contends that we lack jurisdiction
to consider Mr. Wert’s challenges to the district court’s denial of
his motions for spoliation. While spoliation is not a concept of
criminal law, we use Mr. Wert’s label as a shorthand for his mo-
tions asking the district court to presume that his original 1997 sen-
tencing transcripts revealed favorable information. See United States
v. Lanzon, 639 F.3d 1293, 1302 (11th Cir. 2011) (stating that “we
have not recognized the spoliation doctrine in the criminal con-
text”). But, based on our review, Mr. Wert has not attempted to
appeal the denial of his spoliation motions.
Some context on the timing of the filings is helpful to under-
stand why the government raises this point. After Mr. Wert filed
his motion for compassionate release, he filed two motions for spo-
liation and miscellaneous relief. Mr. Wert signed the first motion
USCA11 Case: 24-10127 Document: 41-1 Date Filed: 03/23/2026 Page: 11 of 13

24-10127 Opinion of the Court 11

for spoliation on November 10, 2023, and the second motion on
December 16, 2023. 5
On December 20, 2023, the district court denied Mr. Wert’s
motion for compassionate release. The court did not address Mr.
Wert’s spoliation arguments in this order and noted that it did not
need to rely on the missing sentencing transcripts. On December
29, 2023, three days after receiving Mr. Wert’s second motion for
spoliation, the court denied his initial one.
On January 4, 2024, Mr. Wert filed his notice of appeal, ex-
plaining that on January 3, 2024, he received the December 20,
2023, order denying his motion for compassionate release, which
he wished to appeal. On July 25, 2024, the court denied Mr. Wert’s
second motion for spoliation. The issue is, therefore, whether the
January 4, 2024, notice of appeal encompasses the December 29,
2023, order denying Mr. Wert’s first motion for spoliation. We
think it does not.
“[A]n appellate court has jurisdiction to review only those
judgments, orders or portions thereof which are specified in an ap-
pellant’s notice of appeal.” Weatherly v. Ala. State Univ., 728 F.3d
1263, 1271 (11th Cir. 2013) (quoting Osterneck v. E.T. Barwick Indus.,
Inc., 825 F.2d 1521, 1528 (11th Cir.1987)). See also Fed. R. App. P.
3(c)(1)(B). And though “we generally construe a notice of appeal

5 The docket reflects the motions as filed on November 15, 2023, and Decem-

ber 26, 2023. But “a pro se prisoner’s court filing is deemed filed on the date it
is delivered to prison authorities for mailing.” Jeffries v. United States, 748 F.3d
1310, 1314 (11th Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
USCA11 Case: 24-10127 Document: 41-1 Date Filed: 03/23/2026 Page: 12 of 13

12 Opinion of the Court 24-10127

liberally, we will not expand it to include judgments and orders not
specified unless the overriding intent to appeal these orders is read-
ily apparent on the face of the notice.” Weatherly, 728 F.3d at 1271
(quoting Osterneck, 825 F.2d at 1528). The notice of appeal is clear
that Mr. Wert seeks to appeal the denial of his motion for compas-
sionate release. Because Mr. Wert’s notice of appeal does not
demonstrate or suggest any intent to appeal the orders denying the
spoliation motions, we do not review those orders.
Indeed, Mr. Wert does not mention the spoliation issue in
his opening brief. Nor does Mr. Wert ever identify the orders deny-
ing his motions for spoliation as the ones being appealed. Only after
the government raised the spoliation issue did Mr. Wert address
the matter in his reply brief in a perfunctory manner without any
controlling authority or case law. And we generally do not consider
arguments advanced for the first time in an appellant’s reply brief.
See Sapuppo v. Allstate Floridian Ins. Co., 739 F.3d 678, 682–83 (11th
Cir. 2014) (citations omitted). We decline to do so now.
In sum, Mr. Wert did not identify the spoliation orders as
the orders he sought to appeal. Mr. Wert timely and properly iden-
tified the court’s order denying his motion for compassionate re-
lease in his notice of appeal. Thus, our review ends where our ju-
risdiction does—with the order that was properly identified and ap-
pealed.
USCA11 Case: 24-10127 Document: 41-1 Date Filed: 03/23/2026 Page: 13 of 13

24-10127 Opinion of the Court 13

IV
We affirm the district court’s denial of Mr. Wert’s compas-
sionate release motion.
AFFIRMED.