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March 27, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

Linda Hopkins Steele v. Eqt Corporation

Court of Appeals of Kentucky

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: 2019-CA-1268
• Precedential Status: Non-Precedential
• Judges: A. Jones

• Disposition: OPINION AFFIRMING

• Opinion

• Authorities (7)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (32.2K)

• PDF

Disposition

OPINION AFFIRMING

Combined Opinion

                        by [Allison Jones](https://www.courtlistener.com/person/7333/allison-jones/)

RENDERED: MARCH 27, 2026; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2019-CA-1268-MR

LINDA HOPKINS STEELE APPELLANT

APPEAL FROM FLOYD CIRCUIT COURT
v. HONORABLE JOHNNY RAY HARRIS, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 19-CI-00113

EQT CORPORATION; CORE
APPALACHIA PRODUCTION LLC;
DIVERSIFIED GAS & OIL PLC; EQT
PRODUCTION COMPANY; AND
TCFII CORE LLC APPELLEES

OPINION
AFFIRMING

---

BEFORE: A. JONES, KAREM, AND MOYNAHAN, JUDGES.

JONES, A., JUDGE: Linda Steele, pro se, appeals an order of the Floyd Circuit

Court dismissing her complaint against numerous corporations (collectively
referred to herein as “EQT”)1 that hold oil and gas leases on Steele’s real property.

After careful review, we affirm the circuit court.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On February 15, 2019, Steele, a Colorado resident, filed a pro se

complaint against EQT.2 She alleged EQT holds leases for gas and oil production

on her real property in Floyd County and she is entitled to a certain percentage of

royalties from said production. She claimed EQT failed to pay royalties as agreed,

failed to provide an accurate accounting, and deducted unauthorized amounts from

her royalties.3 Although she did not enumerate her claims with specificity, she

used the following terms throughout her complaint: breach of contract; unjust

enrichment; bad faith; and fraud.

EQT filed a motion to dismiss the complaint pursuant to CR4 12.02(f),

arguing: 1) Steele failed to plead fraud with particularity as mandated by CR 9.02;

2) the unjust enrichment claim was improper due to the existence of a contract; 3)

1
Appellees collectively referred to as EQT have been represented by the same counsel
throughout all proceedings, but filed separate, although largely identical, pleadings in the circuit
court. On appeal, one brief was filed on behalf of all appellees.
2
Steele also had claims against Chesapeake Corporation and Chesapeake Appalachia, LLC
(collectively “Chesapeake”). However, during the lengthy pendency of this appeal, Chesapeake
filed for bankruptcy. Steele’s claims against Chesapeake were resolved in the bankruptcy
proceedings and Chesapeake was dismissed as a party to this appeal on October 18, 2024.
3
In her complaint at paragraph 7, Steele acknowledges she has received payments from EQT,
but has not cashed any checks received since December 2005.
4
Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure.

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Steele did not specify a breach of any alleged contractual duty; 4) Steele failed to

cite any contractual provisions regarding calculation of royalties or deductions; and

5) the breach of contract claim for deductions is improper because EQT is allowed

to make deductions under Kentucky law.

The motion was called on May 3, 2019. At that time, the circuit court

informed EQT that Steele contacted the court because she could not attend a

hearing and asked for 10 days to file a response.5 Counsel did not oppose, and an

order was entered to that end. In her response, Steele raised additional

issues/potential claims, but did not seek to amend the original complaint. On June

17, 2019, the circuit court entered an order dismissing Steele’s complaint with

prejudice. The order did not detail any findings of fact or conclusions of law, and

stated only that Steele’s complaint was “dismissed for the reasons provided in the

respective motions and reply memoranda filed by EQT[.]” Steele filed a motion to

alter, amend, or vacate the order that will be discussed in more detail infra. On

July 22, 2019, the circuit court denied Steele’s motion.

This appeal followed.6

5
Steele also asserts the circuit court held a hearing on November 19, 2019, that she could not
attend. However, the record before us shows the circuit court only called the case, told counsel
for EQT that no one is permitted to appear by telephone, and that it would take the matter under
submission.

6
To explain the lengthy appellate proceedings, we note that Steele filed her first motion for an
extension of time to file her appellate brief on December 27, 2019, which was granted by this
Court via an order entered on January 14, 2020. Steele requested three additional extensions of

-3-
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Although EQT filed motions to dismiss pursuant to CR 12.02, we note

that the rule states, in relevant part:

[i]f, on a motion asserting the defense that the pleading
fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted,
matters outside the pleading are presented to and not
excluded by the court, the motion shall be treated as one
for summary judgment and disposed of as provided in
Rule 56, and all parties shall be given reasonable
opportunity to present all material made pertinent to such
a motion by Rule 56.

To that end, Chesapeake filed an affidavit, and Steele filed a print-out

from the website of the Secretary of State. She also asked the circuit court to take

judicial notice of her Father’s will and the various oil and gas leases as they appear

in the records of the Floyd County Clerk. However, the record before us indicates

she did not provide certified copies of those items, and it is unknown if the circuit

court considered them. Although the circuit court did not specify if it was granting

time, which were granted. Before Steele’s brief was filed, however, Chesapeake filed a notice of
bankruptcy with this Court on July 1, 2020. At that point, the appeal was held in abeyance. On
March 23, 2021, Chesapeake filed a motion to have the case returned to our active docket,
stating it had emerged from bankruptcy. Steele opposed the motion, and argued that her claims
against Chesapeake remained pending in the bankruptcy court. From March 2021, until October
2024, a series of orders were entered holding the appeal in abeyance until Steele’s claims against
Chesapeake were resolved in the bankruptcy proceedings. Chesapeake was dismissed from this
action on October 18, 2024. Steele then filed at least one additional motion seeking more time to
file her brief, which was opposed by EQT. This Court granted more time, and Steele’s brief was
filed by this Court on July 10, 2025.

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judgment on the pleadings or summary judgment, because the record does contain

matters outside of the pleadings, we treat it as a summary judgment.

When a circuit court grants a motion for summary judgment, the

standard of review for the appellate court is de novo because only legal issues are

involved. Hallahan v. The Courier-Journal, 138 S.W.3d 699, 705 (Ky. App.

2004). We must consider the evidence of record in the light most favorable to the

non-movant (i.e., Steele) and determine whether the circuit court correctly found

there was no genuine issues as to any material fact and that the moving party was

entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Scifres v. Kraft, 916 S.W.2d 779, 781 (Ky.

App. 1996).

III. ANALYSIS

We first turn to EQT’s assertion that Steele’s appeal is untimely and

should be dismissed.

CR 59.05 provides that, “[a] motion to alter or amend a judgment, or

to vacate a judgment and enter a new one, shall be served not later than 10 days

after entry of the final judgment.” (Emphasis added.) Filing the motion is not the

same as serving the motion. See Huddleston v. Murley, 757 S.W.2d 216 (Ky. App.

1988). A timely CR 59.05 motion converts a final judgment into an interlocutory

judgment until the motion is adjudicated. Johnson v. Smith, 885 S.W.2d 944, 947

(Ky. 1994). As was proper, Steele waited until after the circuit court resolved her

-5-
CR 59.05 motion to file her notice of appeal in this matter. The circuit court

denied Steele’s CR 59.05 motion on July 22, 2019, and Steele subsequently filed

her notice of appeal on August 21, 2019. However, if her CR 59.05 motion was

untimely as EQT asserts, her notice of appeal was also untimely.

EQT contested the timeliness of Steele’s CR 59.05 motion to the

circuit court. They asserted that, although Steele timely filed her motion to alter,

amend, or vacate on June 27, 2019, an email EQT included as an exhibit showed

Steele actually served the motion on June 28, 2019, or 11 days after entry of

judgment. EQT argued the circuit court therefore lacked jurisdiction to resolve

Steele’s CR 59.05 motion and, at best, could treat it as a CR 60.02 motion. The

circuit court denied Steele’s CR 59.05 motion in a perfunctory order that did not

address EQT’s argument regarding timeliness.

Now in this appeal, EQT reasserts its argument that Steele’s CR 59.05

motion was ineffectively served, and, accordingly, could not have converted the

circuit court’s June 17, 2019, final order into an interlocutory one, thereby making

Steele’s August 21, 2019 notice of appeal untimely. However, we disagree that

Steele’s appeal must be dismissed as untimely. Although there was conflicting

evidence as to whether the motion was timely served, the circuit court neglected to

make a finding in that regard. As explained in CR 52.04:

A final judgment shall not be reversed or remanded
because of the failure of the trial court to make a finding

-6-
of fact on an issue essential to the judgment unless such
failure is brought to the attention of the trial court by a
written request for a finding on that issue or by a motion
pursuant to Rule 52.02.

Whether Steele served her complaint within 10 days of the June 17,

2019, order is a question of fact. We are without a finding from the circuit court in

that regard and EQT did not seek additional findings from the circuit court

pursuant to CR 52.04. We are therefore without authority to assess the timeliness

of Steele’s service of her CR 59.05 motion.

Moving to the merits of Steele’s appeal, we do agree with EQT that

she has abandoned all legal arguments except breach of contract, but her arguments

are nonetheless extremely difficult to discern. Steele asks us to take judicial notice

of the leases apparently on file with the Floyd County Clerk, just as she asked the

circuit court. However, those leases are not in the record before us. An appellate

court cannot consider items that were not presented to the trial court. Oakley v.

Oakley, 391 S.W.3d 377, 380 (Ky. App. 2012). Moreover, it seems as though

Steele expected the circuit court and this Court to seek out said leases. Just as “it is

not the job of the appellate courts to scour the record in support of an appellant or

cross-appellant’s argument[,]” (see Dennis v. Fulkerson, 343 S.W.3d 633, 637 (Ky.

App. 2011) (citations omitted)), we certainly will not gather evidence not

-7-
contained in the record. Finally, in contravention of RAP7 32(E)(1)(b), Steele

attaches items in the appendix of her brief that are not included in the record below

that this Court cannot consider such as gas tax assessment documents.

Steele has also failed to cite any contractual provisions in support of

her position. In paragraph three of the argument section of her brief, she simply

asserts that EQT’s “own records” prove her argument (emphasis in original). It is

unclear to what records she is referring. We further agree with EQT that Steele

failed to state any claim whatsoever against Diversified Gas & Oil PLC, instead

stating in her complaint that she “can only assume that [Diversified] also intends to

harm and defraud [Steele] by stealing her oil and/or gas and refusing to pay for

it[.]” Steele also appears to present an argument on behalf of her sibling to this

Court, contending that “Steele did not make Ms. Hopkins Smith’s 1/9 life estate

disappear.” It is well-settled law in Kentucky that, not only can an appellant not

raise an argument for the first time on appeal (see Koteras v. Commonwealth, 589

S.W.3d 534, 540 (Ky. App. 2018)), but a person may not raise another person’s

legal rights. Lawson v. Office of Atty. Gen., 415 S.W.3d 59, 67 (Ky. 2013). In

sum, we discern no reason to reverse the circuit court based upon Steele’s

arguments on appeal.

7
Kentucky Rules of Appellate Procedure.

-8-
IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Floyd Circuit Court is

affirmed.

ALL CONCUR.

BRIEF FOR APPELLANT: BRIEF FOR APPELLEES:

Linda Hopkins Steele, pro se Candace B. Smith
Olathe, Colorado Lexington, Kentucky

J. Kevin West
Columbus, Ohio

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