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March 27, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

Robert Walter Boss v. Anna Michelle Boss

Court of Appeals of Kentucky

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: 2025-CA-0933
• Precedential Status: Non-Precedential
• Judges: Caldwell

• Disposition: OPINION AND ORDER AFFIRMING AND DENYING MOTION TO STRIKE APPELLEE BRIEF

• Opinion

• Authorities (5)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (1.8K)

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Disposition

OPINION AND ORDER AFFIRMING AND DENYING MOTION TO STRIKE APPELLEE BRIEF

Combined Opinion

RENDERED: MARCH 27, 2026; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2025-CA-0933-ME

ROBERT WALTER BOSS APPELLANT

APPEAL FROM FRANKLIN FAMILY COURT
v. HONORABLE SQUIRE WILLIAMS, III, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 25-D-00068-002

ANNA MICHELLE BOSS APPELLEE

OPINION AND ORDER
AFFIRMING AND DENYING MOTION TO STRIKE APPELLEE BRIEF

---

BEFORE: ACREE, CALDWELL, AND CETRULO, JUDGES.

CALDWELL, JUDGE: Robert Walter Boss (“Robert”) appeals from a Domestic

Violence Order (“DVO”) granted for Anna Michelle Boss (“Anna”). We affirm

the DVO and deny Robert’s motion to strike Anna’s appellee brief.

FACTS

On April 18, 2025, Anna filed a petition for an order of protection in

the Franklin Family Court. The petition alleged that on April 17, 2024, Robert had
engaged in acts of domestic violence and abuse. It also alleged that on April 18,

2018, Robert shoved Anna “into a wall by her neck” and that Robert had been

“physical” with her numerous times in the past, including breaking her wrist

several years prior. The petition further stated Robert had masturbated in the room

he shared with the parties’ toddler son, that Anna planned on filing for divorce

from Robert soon, and that Anna feared Robert would continue to be physical with

her. (Petition for Order of Protection filed April 18, 2025—attached as Appendix

3 to Appellant red brief).1

The Franklin Family Court denied the first petition, stating the

petition failed to state an act or threat of domestic violence.

Several days later, in early May, Anna filed another petition for an

order of protection (“the second petition”). The second petition generally alleged

that on April 18, 2025, Robert had engaged in acts of domestic violence or abuse.

Further details were provided in a typewritten attachment. Anna alleged she told

Robert she did not want him to sleep in their son’s room anymore due to suspicions

that Robert had been masturbating in front of their son. (Anna indicated her

suspicions were based on her son’s mimicking masturbatory behavior.)

1
The first petition is not included in the record on appeal for this case, although Robert has
requested that this Court take judicial notice of the first petition. Anna did not object to the
request that this Court take judicial notice of the first petition in her appellee brief. Anna’s
appellee brief also discusses the contents of the first petition.

-2-
Anna further alleged Robert put their son to bed that night and would

not let her near the child. Anna alleged she tried to remain calm and not escalate

the situation but that when she heard Robert get up to go to the bathroom, she went

into the room to remove her son. Anna alleged trying to talk with Robert when he

returned and his putting his hand under her throat and pushing her into the hallway

where she fell against the wall and banged her head. Anna alleged she again tried

to retrieve her son but when she put her arm in the door, Robert slammed the door

on her arm and then barricaded himself in the room with a chair. Anna alleged she

eventually was able to get her son after Robert got out of the chair and went to

sleep.

The second petition further alleged Anna went to the police

department the next day, where an officer took her information and statement.

Indicating an officer filled in information on the first petition, the second petition

stated the first petition listed incorrect years—2024 and 2018—along with the

April 18th date.

The second petition also alleged that Robert had a history of

physically striking Anna after becoming angry and the petition acknowledged that

Anna had not reported those prior incidents. The petition further alleged that in

September 2023, Robert grabbed Anna’s arm during an argument and twisted it

before pushing her to the floor and breaking her arm. The second petition further

-3-
alleged Anna and the parties’ two minor children had recently left the family home

to live with her aunt and uncle due to her fear of Robert. The second petition also

included allegations of financial abuse, and that Anna had “been told on a regular

basis that he hates me and if he could kill me, he would.” (Record on Appeal,

(“R”), p. 6).

The family court granted Anna an Emergency Protective Order

(“EPO”). The case proceeded to an evidentiary hearing for the court to consider

whether to issue a DVO.

Anna, her aunt, and Robert testified at the DVO hearing held on May

14, 2025. Anna testified about the alleged pushing/door-slamming incident that

past April and Robert’s alleged history of prior abuse. Anna’s aunt testified to

trying to help Anna and the children and taking them into the aunt’s home, and to

Anna’s telling her on the telephone that Robert had threatened to kill Anna.

Robert denied Anna’s allegations of domestic violence and abuse.

However, he admitted to recently barricading himself in the room he shared with

his son. He also admitted to freezing the couple’s credit cards and accounts

because, according to him, Anna had been emptying out the accounts. He pointed

out that he and his son had separate beds in the bedroom they shared. He denied

that his son saw him masturbating, asserting the son was asleep when this

occurred.

-4-
Following the hearing, the court granted the DVO from which Robert

appeals. The judge orally stated that he found, by a preponderance of the evidence,

that acts of domestic violence had occurred and may occur again. The judge

indicated this finding was based on evidence of Robert’s pushing Anna and

slamming a door on her arm and of his threatening to kill her. The family court

judge orally stated that he put no weight on any evidence about a broken arm or

wrist in finding domestic violence occurred. The judge also orally stated that the

court would not be issuing any orders about the children in the DVO proceeding.

The judge explained that Robert and Anna also had a pending divorce case and that

issues about the children’s custody would be resolved in the divorce case.

The court checked a portion of the AOC2 DVO form stating the court

found, by a preponderance of the evidence, that an act or acts of domestic violence

occurred and may occur again. The DVO was also accompanied by the judge’s

handwritten calendar notes, which included the statement: “DV [domestic

violence] found and may occur again.” (R, p. 25). The family court also attached

to the DVO handwritten findings of fact, stating Robert had pushed Anna against a

wall with his hand on her neck and shut a door on her arm and Robert threatened to

kill Anna. (R, p. 29).

2
Administrative Office of the Courts.

-5-
The DVO restrained Robert from any further acts or threats of

domestic violence and from any unauthorized contact with Anna for three years.

Robert filed a motion to alter, amend, or vacate the DVO. After this motion was

denied, Robert filed a timely appeal from the DVO.

Further facts will be provided as needed in our analysis.

ANALYSIS

Standard of Review

Robert failed to include an explicit preservation statement at the

beginning of his argument indicating if and how the issues he raised on appeal

were also raised to the family court. See RAP3 32(A)(4). However, most of the

issues Robert raised on appeal were also raised to the family court based on our

review of the record. Thus, unless otherwise noted, we leniently review the issues

presented on appeal under otherwise applicable standards of review rather than

reviewing solely for palpable error or declining to review issues for lack of

preservation.4

3
Kentucky Rules of Appellate Procedure.
4
Failure to identify how an issue was preserved for review can result in an appellate court
reviewing the issue solely for palpable error resulting in manifest injustice or not even reaching
the issue at all if palpable error review is not requested. See Ford v. Commonwealth, 628 S.W.3d
147, 155 (Ky. 2021); J.P.T. v. Cabinet for Health and Family Services, 689 S.W.3d 149, 153
(Ky. App. 2024). See also Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure (“CR”) 61.02.

Also, the index to the appellant brief appendix does not state where the attached items are
located in the record. See RAP 32(E)(1)(d). Moreover, the item placed immediately after the

-6-
Generally, we review the decision to issue a DVO for abuse of

discretion and findings of fact for clear error:

We review the entry of a DVO for whether the trial
court’s finding of domestic violence was an abuse of
discretion. Our review of the trial court’s factual
findings is limited to whether they were clearly
erroneous. A trial court’s factual determination is not
clearly erroneous if it is supported by substantial
evidence, which is evidence of sufficient probative value
to induce conviction in the minds of reasonable people.

Johnston v. Johnston, 639 S.W.3d 428, 431 (Ky. App. 2021) (citations omitted).

We review the trial court’s resolution of purely legal issues such as

statutory interpretation de novo, meaning without deference. Pennie v. Mohamed,

720 S.W.3d 606, 614 (Ky. App. 2025). “We review the family court’s rulings on

the admissibility of evidence for abuse of discretion.” Id. at 617.

With these parameters in mind, we consider the parties’ arguments on

appeal. First, we consider Robert’s argument that the family court erred in

granting the DVO on the second petition after dismissing Anna’s first petition.

index to the appendix is not actually the order we are reviewing in this appeal (the DVO granted
May 14, 2025). See RAP 32(E)(1)(a). Instead, the first item in the appellant brief appendix is
the EPO granted by the family court on May 2, 2025.

Though we decline to impose sanctions, we urge counsel to carefully review the
Kentucky Rules of Appellate Procedure before filing appellate briefs in the future. Moreover,
we direct counsel’s attention to the helpful resources, including appellate briefing checklists and
a basic appellate handbook, available on our court website.
https://www.kycourts.gov/Courts/Court-of-Appeals (last visited Feb. 12, 2026).

-7-
No Reversible Error in Granting DVO After Dismissal of First Petition

Robert argues the family court’s findings were not supported by

substantial evidence because the court had previously denied Anna’s first petition,

which contained similar allegations to those in the second petition. He notes the

first petition was denied with the stated basis that it failed to allege acts or threats

of domestic violence.

Robert points out the first petition, like the second petition, alleged

that Robert had shoved Anna into a wall and injured her arm and that she feared

Robert would be physical with her when he found out she was filing for divorce.

Robert states he was the one who ended up filing for divorce—a few days before

Anna filed her second petition, which he suggests was filed in retaliation. He

suggests it was improper for the family court to grant the DVO on the second

petition after dismissing the first petition for failure to allege an act of domestic

violence.

Unlike Robert, Anna contends that the family court’s denial of her

first petition did not preclude it from considering her second petition. She asserts

-8-
the first petition was not dismissed with prejudice and that she was not precluded

from filing an amended petition.5

Despite Robert’s contentions to the contrary, we agree with Anna that

the dismissal of the first petition did not preclude the family court from considering

her second petition and from ultimately granting a DVO based on the record here.

KRS6 403.730(1)(a) provides:

The court shall review a petition for an order of
protection immediately upon its filing. If the review
indicates that domestic violence and abuse exists, the
court shall summons the parties to an evidentiary hearing
not more than fourteen (14) days in the future. If the
review indicates that such a basis does not exist, the court
may consider an amended petition or dismiss the petition
without prejudice.

While the family court’s dismissal of the first petition did not state

whether the dismissal was with or without prejudice, KRS 403.730(1)(a) clearly

provides that if the court’s review indicates no basis for finding domestic violence

and abuse exists, the dismissal of the petition is without prejudice. Also, KRS

403.730(1)(a) indicates the dismissal of a petition for an order of protection for

5
In his reply brief, Robert contends Anna could not file an amended petition but only a new one.
He also argues she made additional and/or more detailed allegations in the second petition which
had the effect of bolstering her claims.
6
Kentucky Revised Statutes.

-9-
failure to state an act of domestic violence does not preclude the court from later

considering another petition involving the same parties.

In sum, we discern no reversible error in the family court’s issuing the

DVO on the second petition despite its dismissing the first petition. Next, we

consider Robert’s argument that the family court rendered insufficient findings

because it did not make a finding that abuse was likely to occur again.

Family Court Made Required Findings that Domestic Violence Occurred
and May Occur Again

Robert points out the family court’s handwritten findings of fact,

contained at page 29 of the record, do not contain a finding that domestic violence

was likely to occur again. However, the family court’s docket notes (located on

page 25 of the record) contain a finding that domestic violence occurred and may

occur again—which is also consistent with a box checked on the AOC DVO form.

Despite Robert’s argument that the family court erred in granting a

DVO without finding that abuse was likely to occur again, courts are not required

to find that abuse is likely to occur again to issue DVOs. Instead, a court may

properly issue a DVO if it finds domestic violence or abuse has occurred and may

occur again.

KRS 403.740(1) states: “Following a hearing ordered under KRS

403.730, if a court finds by a preponderance of the evidence that domestic violence

-10-
and abuse has occurred and may again occur, the court may issue a domestic

violence order[.]” (Emphasis added.)

The family court made the statutorily required findings in writing. It

checked the box on the AOC DVO form stating that the court found, based upon a

preponderance of the evidence, that domestic violence or abuse had occurred and

may occur again. The court also attached to the DVO handwritten docket notes

stating it found “DV [(domestic violence) occurred] and may occur again” (R, p.

25) in addition to other findings of fact contained at page 29 of the record.

These were sufficient written findings to satisfy KRS 403.740(1). See

generally Williford v. Williford, 583 S.W.3d 424, 430 (Ky. App. 2019); Pettingill

v. Pettingill, 480 S.W.3d 920, 925 (Ky. 2015).

Having addressed arguments about whether the family court made

statutorily required findings, we now turn our attention to arguments about the

family court’s assessments of credibility and the weight of the evidence.

No Reversible Error in Family Court’s Assessment of Anna’s Competency,
Credibility, or the Weight of Her Testimony

Robert contends on appeal that the family court failed to properly

assess Anna’s credibility and gave undue weight to her testimony. He asserts

Anna appeared to be under the influence and confused at the DVO hearing and

-11-
gave vague and contradictory responses to questions.7 As Anna points out, Robert

seemingly suggests Anna was not competent to testify. Yet, the family court was

in the best position to observe her testimony and had the discretion to determine

whether she was competent. Pendleton v. Commonwealth, 83 S.W.3d 522, 525

(Ky. 2002).

Moreover, Robert did not express any concerns about her competency

during the hearing for the judge to keep in mind while observing her testimony.

Instead, Robert first asserted Anna was under the influence in his motion to alter,

amend, or vacate.

Given the lack of egregiously obvious signs of intoxication based on

our review of the hearing recording and the minimal requirements for finding a

witness competent, see KRE8 601(b), we discern no reversible error in the family

court’s not determining that Anna was incompetent to testify. Next, we address

arguments about the credibility and weight of her testimony.

Robert points to inconsistencies in Anna’s testimony, including

whether her wrist or her arm had been broken, on what dates various events

7
Robert did not raise any issues about Anna appearing to be confused or under the influence at
the DVO hearing, although he did raise these same arguments in his motion to alter, amend, or
vacate. Anna alluded to medical issues and to having recently had surgery in her testimony. She
also acknowledged that she was recovering from surgery in her response to the motion to alter,
amend, or vacate. However, she denied being on prescription medication or consuming any
alcohol or memory-impairing drugs for months before the DVO hearing.
8
Kentucky Rules of Evidence.

-12-
occurred, and where she was staying on certain dates. He also claims the family

court failed to properly consider evidence of Anna’s acting in a retaliatory

manner—i.e., her filing her second petition after he filed for divorce and her

admitting to having once stated she would not press charges against him if he let

her keep the children. So, he suggests the court over-estimated her credibility. He

further asserts the court failed to give sufficient weight to her admissions that she

had not previously reported her allegations to the Cabinet for Health and Family

Services (“the Cabinet”) or to police before seeking an order of protection.

Robert also points out Anna did not present documentary evidence or

call treating medical professionals to testify at the DVO hearing. Anna points out

that it is often difficult to come forward with medical evidence given how quickly

domestic violence cases are heard. She also emphasizes the non-heightened

standard of preponderance of the evidence.

Whether or not Anna’s testimony was entirely consistent on every

detail, or whether it was supported by medical evidence or prior reports to

government authorities, or whether or not it might be construed to suggest a

retaliatory motive, is not ultimately determinative. In this case, the family court

simply found that Robert engaged in domestic violence by pushing Anna and

slamming a door on her arm.

-13-
As Robert notes, the court made no specific finding of financial abuse.

Moreover, the judge made clear in oral remarks that the court was not basing its

finding of domestic violence on any testimony or other evidence about Anna’s

having broken her arm or wrist. Also, the court’s written findings do not

specifically mention any particular medical injury to Anna’s arm or wrist. Thus,

any inconsistencies in Anna’s testimony about the details of financial transactions

or whether she had broken her arm or wrist were immaterial since the family court

did not base its finding of domestic violence on financial abuse or on any fracture

of Anna’s arm or wrist.

In finding domestic violence based specifically on Robert’s pushing

Anna against the wall with his hand on her neck and slamming a door on her arm,9

the family court obviously found Anna’s testimony about this specific incident

more credible than Robert’s denial of the specific pushing or door-slamming

acts—despite any inconsistencies in Anna’s testimony. Such assessments of

credibility from the family court must be viewed with significant deference by this

court. See, e.g., CR 52.01. Moore v. Asente, 110 S.W.3d 336, 354 (Ky. 2003).

Moreover, as both parties acknowledge, the family court as factfinder had the

prerogative to find one party’s testimony more credible than the other and the court

9
Apparently, the court also based its finding of domestic violence partly on Anna’s aunt’s
testimony about her hearing Anna say Robert threatened to kill Anna—which we shall address
separately later.

-14-
could believe all or part of the testimony of either party witness. See, e.g., Bissell

v. Baumgardner, 236 S.W.3d 24, 29–30 (Ky. App. 2007).

In declining to make findings of domestic violence based on a broken

wrist or broken arm and in not specifically finding financial abuse, the family court

perhaps indicated that it did not put great weight on Anna’s testimony about these

specific matters. Or perhaps it did not view her testimony on these matters to be as

credible as her testimony about the specific pushing, door-slamming incident. On

the other hand, the court also evidently did not place great weight on Anna’s

admission to not previously reporting domestic violence allegations to the Cabinet

or police—which it also did not discuss in its written findings.

Again, the family court had the prerogative to believe Anna’s

testimony in whole or in part and we must defer to its assessments of credibility

and the weight of the evidence. See, e.g., CR 52.01. Moreover, we conclude the

family court’s finding of domestic violence based on the recent pushing, door-

slamming incident is supported by substantial evidence and not clearly erroneous.

In sum, there is no reversible error in the family court’s assessment of

Anna’s competency, credibility, or the weight to be placed on her testimony. Next,

we address Robert’s argument that his admissions on certain matters do not

support the finding of domestic violence.

-15-
No Reversible Error Concerning Robert’s Admissions in Trial Testimony

Robert argues that admissions in his trial testimony do not support the

family court’s findings of domestic violence. The family court’s written findings

do not explicitly discuss Robert’s admissions on these matters, so its finding of

domestic violence does not appear to depend on these admissions. And in any

event, we discern no reversible error regarding the family court’s consideration of

such admissions in issuing the DVO.

Robert acknowledges in his initial appellant brief that he admitted to

certain actions in his trial testimony, but he contends these admissions do not

support issuing the DVO. For example, he admitted to freezing the couple’s

accounts on one occasion due to Anna’s over-spending (according to him). But as

Robert points out, the family court made no specific finding of financial abuse.

Robert also suggests that allegations of financial abuse in the petition were not

substantiated. But since the family court made no finding of financial abuse and

did not specifically address the parties’ testimony about financial matters in its

written findings, any error in the family court’s consideration of his admission

about freezing accounts does not appear to affect Robert’s substantial rights and is

harmless. CR 61.01.

Similarly, Robert contends his admission that he blocked Anna’s

access to the bedroom he shared with his son does not support the family court’s

-16-
finding of domestic violence (which was largely based on Robert’s having pushed

Anna into the wall and slammed a door on her arm). Robert also points to conflicts

in Anna’s testimony about whether their son was asleep on the night in question.

He also emphasizes his testimony that he did not sleep in the same bed as his son

and his denial of the child’s being aware of Robert’s masturbating.

The family court made no express mention of Robert’s admitting to

barricading himself in its written findings. Moreover, the family court made no

finding of the child’s having witnessed anything inappropriate or otherwise being

harmed or subjected to any type of abuse in the DVO proceeding. Instead, the

court simply made findings of domestic violence directed at Anna and the DVO

does not list the parties’ son as a protected party. Thus, we discern no reversible

error in the family court’s consideration of Robert’s admissions about blocking

Anna’s access to the bedroom he shared with his son, of evidence of sleeping

arrangements in this room, and of Robert’s denial that his son saw him masturbate.

None of these matters were mentioned in written findings.

We find no reversible error in the family court’s assessments of the

weight and credibility of both parties’ testimony. While the family court’s specific

findings may not indicate that it entirely believed either party, its finding of

domestic violence consisting of Robert’s pushing Anna and slamming a door on

her arm is supported by substantial evidence and is not clearly erroneous.

-17-
Moreover, the court did not abuse its discretion in issuing the DVO based on its

finding about this pushing/door-slamming incident, which fits the statutory

definition of domestic violence. See KRS 403.720(2)(a) (defining domestic

violence and abuse as including physical injury, assault, or infliction of fear of

imminent physical injury between family members). Next, we address Robert’s

assertion that the family court erred in relying on hearsay testimony from Anna’s

aunt.

Any Error in Reliance on Any Hearsay Testimony from Anna’s Aunt is
Harmless

Robert contends the DVO must be reversed because the family court

improperly based its finding of domestic violence on hearsay testimony from

Anna’s aunt. In addition to making findings about Robert’s having pushed Anna

and slammed a door on her arm, the family court also specifically found that

Robert threatened to kill Anna.

Anna made a sworn statement in her second petition alleging she had

been told that Robert would kill her if he could. But Anna did not specifically

testify at the DVO hearing to Robert’s threatening to kill her.10 However, Anna’s

aunt testified to Anna’s telling her that Robert had threatened to kill Anna.

10
Anna was not asked to adopt the sworn statements in her petition as part of her testimony.
Despite not testifying at the DVO hearing to Robert’s threatening to kill her, Anna did testify at
that time to being afraid of Robert, to Robert’s threatening to kill himself, and to Robert’s having
anger issues and many guns in his possession.

-18-
The parties disagree about whether Anna’s aunt’s testimony about

Anna’s telling her of Robert’s threatening to kill Anna was admissible. They also

disagree about whether the issue regarding this testimony’s admissibility was

properly preserved. Anna points out that Robert did not immediately object after

Anna’s aunt’s testimony that Anna told the aunt Robert threatened to kill Anna.

Robert points out the testimony in question quickly followed his counsel’s request

that Anna’s aunt testify only to matters within her direct knowledge, after which

the judge said he was overruling the objection. Robert also points to a later portion

of the aunt’s testimony where she began to say she knew something was hearsay

right before Anna’s attorney stopped her and said not to testify to hearsay.

Regardless of whether the issue was properly preserved or whether the

statement in question was inadmissible hearsay, any error in the family court’s

reliance on the testimony in question was harmless. See CR 61.01; KRE 103(a).

As previously discussed, the family court issued factual findings

supported by substantial evidence and did not abuse its discretion in finding

domestic violence consisting of Robert’s having pushed Anna into a wall with his

hand on her neck and having slammed a door on her arm. Moreover, this finding

of the pushing and door-slamming incident was, by itself, sufficient to support the

court’s finding that domestic violence had occurred. Also, ample testimony—

besides Anna’s aunt’s testimony about what Anna told her and besides evidence

-19-
about the alleged wrist or arm fracture and financial occurrences which the family

court declined to make findings about—supported the finding that domestic

violence may occur again. For example, Anna’s testimony about Robert’s history

of being “physical” with her and her testimony about their recent conflicts is

substantial evidence supporting a finding that domestic violence may occur again.

In sum, we conclude the family court’s admission of and apparent

reliance on Anna’s aunt’s testimony about Anna’s saying Robert threatened to kill

Anna was, at most, harmless error. Next, we address Robert’s claims of procedural

deficiencies including those related to the family court’s holding the DVO hearing

by Zoom.

No Reversible Error in Holding DVO Hearing by Zoom

Robert points out the DVO hearing was held by Zoom due to then-

existing flooding in the Franklin County Courthouse. He alleges there were delays

and technical glitches resulting in the parties’ sometimes talking over each other

and his attorney’s having trouble understanding some of the testimony and the

judge’s oral statements about the court’s ruling. He also claims the family court

should have perceived that Anna was under the influence during the hearing. He

further asserts that there were times when Anna’s aunt was apparently looking at

Anna and Anna would shake her head yes or no during her aunt’s testimony.

-20-
Robert does not point to any objection about proceeding by Zoom or

request to repeat anything due to technical difficulties during the hearing.

However, he claimed in his motion to alter, amend, or vacate that Anna appeared

impaired during the hearing and that the Zoom link was unstable making it hard for

his attorney to understand what was being said and, in his view, resulting in his

being denied a fair hearing.

Anna points out, however, that other than Robert’s attorney’s

expressing difficulty in trying to share her screen, no issues about technical

glitches or difficulty understanding testimony or the court’s rulings were raised to

the family court during the DVO hearing. She asserts Robert’s attorney appeared

to be taking notes and nodding along during the hearing, giving the impression that

she was not having difficulty following the hearing.

Anna further points out that Zoom hearings have become routine in

recent years following the COVID-19 pandemic and that judges have become used

to observing witnesses by Zoom. She emphasizes the lack of contemporaneous

objection or request for a continuance, asserts Robert previously participated in

hearings by Zoom due to his being out of state, and argues the Zoom hearing did

not result in bias against or any other harm toward Robert.

Even if we assume Robert preserved issues about the Zoom hearing

through his motion to alter, amend, or vacate, we discern no reversible error.

-21-
Other than Robert’s attorney’s noting some difficulty with sharing her screen and

opting to share information through Robert’s testimony instead, no technical

problems with the Zoom hearing were brought to the family court’s attention

during the hearing. Moreover, the motion to alter, amend, or vacate did not

specifically identify the testimony or judge’s oral statements that Robert’s attorney

did not hear or understand, nor did the motion explain how this resulted in

prejudice to Robert. Also, there is no indication that the judge was unable to hear

and understand any of the testimony presented. Compare K.D.H. v. Cabinet for

Health and Family Services, 630 S.W.3d 729, 740–41 (Ky. App. 2021) (in

termination of parental rights proceeding, holding parent was denied a fair hearing

due to repeated, documented technical difficulties clearly affecting the judge’s

ability to hear and understand the parent’s testimony).

As for Robert’s attorney’s alleged inability to understand the judge’s

oral statements about rulings, the judge’s oral statements were not formally

incorporated into the DVO or written findings of fact and therefore had no

controlling effect. See Kindred Nursing Centers Ltd. Partnership v. Sloan, 329

S.W.3d 347, 349 (Ky. App. 2010) (stating courts speak only through written orders

and not through oral statements not incorporated into written orders). See also

Smith v. McCoy, 635 S.W.3d 811, 817 (Ky. 2021) (holding that formal

-22-
incorporation of court’s oral findings into a DVO utilizing the AOC DVO form

was sufficient to set forth statutorily required written findings).

Moreover, as we previously discussed, the family court’s written

findings did not reflect a reliance on many details in Anna’s testimony. Instead,

the family court made written findings of domestic violence based on the recent

pushing/door-slamming incident which Anna testified to and which Robert denied.

Furthermore, Robert timely filed his motion to alter, amend, or vacate by counsel

raising many of the issues he raises in this appeal and reflecting his counsel’s

understanding of the testimony presented and the family court’s rulings. So, we

conclude any error in conducting the hearing via Zoom was harmless. CR 61.01.

As for Anna’s aunt allegedly looking at Anna for feedback during the

aunt’s testimony, this matter was not brought to the family court’s attention

through an objection during the hearing or through the post-trial motion to alter,

amend, or vacate based on our review of the record. So, this issue was not

properly preserved. And even if we leniently review for palpable error despite the

lack of request for palpable error review, we discern no palpable error resulting in

manifest injustice. CR 61.02.

In sum, we discern no reversible error arising from the family court’s

conducting the hearing via Zoom. Next, we shall attempt to succinctly address

other procedural deficiencies asserted by Robert.

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Other Asserted Procedural Deficiencies Did Not Amount to Reversible Error

Robert asserts Anna sought protection for the parties’ two minor

children as well as herself. On the second petition, boxes were checked indicating

that Anna sought protection on behalf of the children as well as on her own behalf.

Since Anna sought protection on behalf of the children as well as

herself, Robert contends the family court erred in not appointing a Guardian ad

Litem (GAL) to represent the children in the DVO proceeding. He cites KRS

403.727(2), which provides in pertinent part: “If the court orders an evidentiary

hearing under KRS 403.730(1)(a), a guardian ad litem shall be appointed for any

unrepresented minor who is a respondent to the action or a petitioner who is an

alleged victim of domestic violence and abuse.” See also Hamilton v. Milbry, 676

S.W.3d 42, 46–47 (Ky. App. 2023).

As Anna points out, Robert did not provide a preservation statement

identifying if or how any issue about not appointing a GAL for the children was

raised to the family court and preserved for our review. Nor have we

independently come across any instance in the record of Robert’s arguing to the

family court that a GAL should have been appointed for the children. Nor has

Robert requested palpable error review. Thus, we may consider this issue

unpreserved, and we may review this issue solely for palpable error resulting in

manifest injustice or even decline to address this issue at all. See, e.g., CR 61.02;

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J.P.T., 689 S.W.3d at 153. Leniently reviewing for palpable error despite the lack

of request for such review, we conclude the failure to appoint a GAL for the

children did not amount to palpable error resulting in manifest injustice under the

facts here.

Even assuming arguendo that the GAL issue had been preserved, any

error in that regard was harmless to Robert11 since the family court did not restrain

Robert from having contact with the children in the DVO and it declined to issue

any orders concerning the children in the DVO proceeding, instead reserving child

custody issues to be resolved in the divorce case. See CR 61.01.

Similarly, other alleged procedural deficiencies do not entitle Robert

to relief on appeal.

Robert alleges his counsel did not receive a copy of the handwritten

findings of fact contained on page 29 of the record and she did not see this

document until she reviewed the certified record. Based on our review of the

clerk’s log, it appears that neither the handwritten calendar notes appearing on

page 25 nor the handwritten findings of fact appearing at page 29 of the record

were initially sent to the parties’ counsel. Instead, only the filled-out AOC DVO

11
Although not raised by the parties, some might view Robert’s standing to appeal from the
family court’s failure to appoint a GAL for the children as questionable since a GAL for the
children would represent the children, not Robert. We need not explore that issue further for
purposes of resolving this appeal, however.

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form itself was sent to the parties’ attorneys based on the clerk’s log. Certainly,

better practice would be for the court to clearly direct the clerk’s office to mail

copies of such informal written findings to the parties’ counsel (or to any

unrepresented parties) along with the filled-out AOC DVO form. Nonetheless, the

failure to send out the handwritten findings along with the DVO does not merit

disturbing the DVO because not affording appellate relief for this clerical mistake

is not inconsistent with substantial justice. See CR 61.01.

We are also aware that, as Robert points out, the family court

originally did not enter its order denying his motion to alter, amend, or vacate into

this case’s record12 before entering into the record a nunc pro tunc order denying

the motion to alter, amend, or vacate effective as of an earlier date. We do not

perceive how any error in this regard prejudiced Robert as the court corrected the

prior failure to enter the order into the DVO case record in a manner enabling

Robert to proceed with this appeal. As any error in this regard was harmless,

Robert is not entitled to relief on appeal. CR 61.01.

As for Robert’s pointing out that the DVO did not contain language

about it being final and appealable, any error in this regard was also harmless.

Robert’s appeal has not been dismissed as from a non-final and appealable order.

12
Apparently, the order denying the motion to alter, amend, or vacate the DVO was originally
entered into the divorce case record.

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Moreover, the family court adjudicated the rights of all parties (including Robert,

Anna, and the children) in the DVO proceeding by granting Anna an order of

protection against Robert and by declining to enter orders concerning the children

in the DVO proceeding since custody issues would be resolved in the divorce case.

As the family court’s order adjudicated all the rights of the parties in the DVO

proceeding, the DVO was final and appealable, and no CR 54.02 recitation was

necessary for Robert to appeal from the DVO. See generally CR 54.01; CR 54.02.

As for Robert’s complaint that the family court’s findings did not

identify a specific timeframe for when the abuse occurred, any error was harmless

under the facts here. While the findings of fact did not explicitly identify a date or

time, the family court clearly grounded its domestic violence finding on the recent

incident which Anna testified to concerning Robert’s pushing her and slamming a

door on her arm which she stated occurred on or about April 18, 2025, in both her

hearing testimony and the second petition.

Lastly, Robert also points to the family court’s reliance on alleged

hearsay testimony from Anna’s aunt and to the judge’s oral statement about not

understanding how an arm or wrist fracture occurred in Robert’s arguments about

procedural anomalies. We have already explained how any error regarding the

family court’s reliance on Anna’s aunt’s testimony was harmless and how the

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family court’s domestic violence finding did not depend on Anna’s testimony

about suffering an arm or wrist fracture.

Despite Robert’s claims of various procedural deficiencies in the

DVO proceeding, we find no reversible error. Having considered Robert’s

appellate brief arguments for appellate relief, we now turn our attention to his

motion to strike Anna’s appellee brief, which was passed to the merits.

We Deny the Motion to Strike Anna’s Appellee Brief

After Anna filed her appellee brief, Robert filed a motion to strike her

appellee brief (or in the alternative, to issue a show cause order) due to Anna’s

including items outside the record in the appendix to her brief. See RAP

32(E)(1)(c). The appendix to Anna’s brief includes a copy of a recent unpublished

opinion from this Court,13 as well as documents from other court proceedings. In

Anna’s appellee brief and in her response to Robert’s motion, Anna asked this

Court to take judicial notice of other court proceedings.

13
Although unpublished opinions are not binding authority, parties may cite such unpublished
opinions for our consideration provided certain conditions are met—including there being a lack
of published Kentucky appellate precedent on point and the citing party’s expressly noting that
the unpublished opinion is not binding. RAP 41(A). Anna’s citation to an unpublished opinion
is not accompanied by the required statement that this unpublished opinion is not binding. See
RAP 41(A)(4). We direct her counsel’s attention to the Kentucky Rules of Appellate Procedure
and appellate briefing resources on our court website, https://www.kycourts.gov/Courts/Court-
of-Appeals (last visited Feb. 12, 2026).

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We decline to take judicial notice of information or documents from

these other court proceedings—especially since doing so is not necessary to

resolve this appeal. We also decline to consider the unpublished opinion cited for

our consideration by Anna and attached to her appellee brief appendix. Without

considering the items in the appendix to Anna’s brief, we have nonetheless

determined that Robert is not entitled to relief on appeal. Thus, we DENY

Robert’s motion to strike Anna’s brief or to issue a show cause order as MOOT.

Further arguments in the briefs which we have not discussed herein

have been determined to lack merit or relevancy to our resolution of this appeal.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the DVO entered by the

Franklin Circuit Court. Furthermore, it is ORDERED that Robert’s motion to

strike Anna’s brief or for her to show cause is hereby DENIED as moot.

ALL CONCUR.

ENTERED: _03/27/2026_ _____________________________
JUDGE, COURT OF APPEALS

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BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT: BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:

Carrie Cotton Nicole S. Bearse
Frankfort, Kentucky Frankfort, Kentucky

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