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• Know your Kanoon - Doc Gen Hub - Counter Argument - Case Predict AI - Talk with IK Doc -... Upgrade to Premium [Cites 19, Cited by 0 ] ### Karnataka High Court

Nayajulla vs State By Hunsur Rural P S on 2 March, 2026

Author: M.Nagaprasanna

Bench: M.Nagaprasanna

-1-
NC: 2026:KHC:12729
CRL.P No. 1823 of 2026

                   HC-KAR

                       IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU

                            DATED THIS THE 2ND DAY OF MARCH, 2026

                                             BEFORE

                         THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE M.NAGAPRASANNA

                             CRIMINAL PETITION NO. 1823 OF 2026

                  BETWEEN:

                  NAYAJULLA
                  S/O ISMAIL KHAN
                  AGED ABOUT 37 YEARS,
                  AADHAR NO. 863101080181
                  R/AT, GOWDIKERE VILLAGE,
                  HUNSUR TALUK,
                  MYSORE DIST. - 571105
                                                                   ...PETITIONER

                  (BY SRI. MOHAMMED TAHIR, ADVOCATE)

                  AND:

                  1.    STATE BY HUNSUR RURAL P S
                        REPRESENTED BY STATE PUBLIC PROSECUTOR

Digitally signed by ADVOCATE GENERAL OFFICE
GEETHAKUMARI
PARLATTAYA S HIGH COURT COMPLEX
Location: High BANGALORE -560001
Court of
Karnataka
2. IMRAN SHARIFH CPC 467
AGED ABOUT 30 YEARS
POLICE OFFICER
HUNASURU RURAL POLICE STATION
HUNSUR TOWN,
MYSORE DIST. - 571105
...RESPONDENTS
(BY SRI.B.N.JAGADEESHA, ADDL.SPP)
-2-
NC: 2026:KHC:12729
CRL.P No. 1823 of 2026

HC-KAR

 THIS CRL.P is FILED U/S.482(FILED U/S.528 BNSS) CR.P.C

PRAYING TO SET ASIDE THE FRAMING OF CHARGE DATED
18.11.2025 PASSED BY THE PCJ AND JMFC HUNSUR AT ANNEXURE E
REGISTERED AS C.C.NO.376/2025 AND ALSO TO SET ASIDE THE
CHARGE SHEET DATED 31.01.2025 REGISTERED AS
C.C.NO.376/2025 AT ANNEXURE C FILED BY THE RESPONDENT
POLICE UNDER SEC.196(1) BNS 2023 IN CONNECTIONS OF CRIME
NO.309/2024 REGISTERED BY HUNUSUR RURAL P.S., SAME IS
PENDING BEFORE THE HONBLE PCJ AND JMFC AT HUNSUR,
WHEREIN ARRAYED PETITIONERS ARE ARRIVED AS ACCUSED NO.1.

 THIS PETITION IS COMING ON FOR ADMISSION, THIS DAY,

ORDER WAS MADE THEREIN AS UNDER:

CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE M.NAGAPRASANNA

                       ORAL ORDER Heard     the    learned    counsel    Sri.   Mohammed      Tahir,

appearing for the petitioner, Sri. B.N. Jagadeesha, learned

Addl. SPP appearing for respondents and have perused the

material on record.

1. The petitioner is before this Court, seeking the

following prayer:

"Wherefore, in view of above grounds and circumstances
the Petitioner humbly prays to this Hon'ble court pleased
to Set aside the Framing of Charges dated 18/11/2025
passed by the PCJ & JMFC., HUNSUR at Annexure-E -3- NC: 2026:KHC:12729 CRL.P No. 1823 of 2026 HC-KAR

registered as CC No. 376/2025 and also to set aside the
Charge sheet dated 31/01/2025 registered as CC no.
376/2025 at ANNEXURE-C filed by the Respondent police
under section 196(1)BNS, 2023 in connection of crime no
309/2024 registered by Hunusur Rural PS, same is
Pending before the Hon'ble PCJ and JMFC AT Hunsur,
wherein arrayed Petitioner are arrived as Accused no. 1 in
the interest of Justice and equity."
3. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioner would

submit that the issue in the lis stands covered by the judgment

rendered by this Court in Crl.P.No.5478/2024 disposed on

27.11.2024, wherein it has held as follows:

"7. The afore-narrated facts are not in dispute.
The issue lies in a narrow compass as to whether the
complaint so registered would amount to ingredients of
Section 505 or 153(A) of the IPC. Therefore, it becomes
necessary to notice the complaint. The complaint reads
as follows:

Date: 19/04/2024
To:

SHO
Malleshwaram Police Station
Bengaluru.

From:

FST Leader, Ward - 77
Arjun Ahirwar (Mob: 7415534609)
164, Gandhinagar.

Subject: FIR for statements on official BJP Twitter
handle Karnataka announcing to creating
divisions and hatred based on religion,
communities/language reg.
-4-
NC: 2026:KHC:12729 CRL.P No. 1823 of 2026 HC-KAR

Today, dated: 19/04/2024 working W-77 in 2nd shift ಾಜ ದ
@ INC Karnataka ದ ಾ' ೈ' ಾ ಕ ಾ ರ ಂದ ಾ ಾ ಾ ೆ ಾ .
ೈ ೕ ಾ ಎಂದ ೆ ಬ ದ! ಗ#ಂದ ಹ%ೆ
¯ï &'ಾ()ೆ ಒಪ,-ೆ ಇದ/ ೆ ಬಬ ರ ೊ%ೆ
ಒ ೆಯ2 ಪರ 3ಂತ ೆ ಾರು ಹ 6 ೊ%ೆ
ಾ 7 ೊಟ9 ೆ ಮ ಾಂಧ ಂದ <)ಾ= ಮು)ಾ= ಥ#ತ
ಕನ@ಡ ಾತBಾCದ ೆ ನD Eೕ%ೆFೕ ಹ%ೆ ಯತ@.

            ಚುBಾವIೆ       ಸಮಯದ        &'ಾ       ಮ ಾಂಧ       ಬ ದ! ಗಳನು@     @

siddaramaiah ºÁUÀÆ D ¢£ÀUÀ¼À PÉÆvÁé¯ï ²óµÀå @ S.K.Shivakumar
ಅವರು M )ೆ Mಟು9 <ಂದೂಗಳBೆ@ೕ Nಾ)ೆ O ಾC ೆದ ಸುP-ಾ/ ೆ.

ಕBಾ ಟಕವನು@ ಮ ಾಂಧರ ಗಲRೆಯ ೋಟವBಾ@S ಾC6 @ Rahul
Gandhi ಅವರು -ೆTೕಷದ ಅಂಗC. ಈ ನ Bಾಂಕ: 19/04/2020 ರಂದು
ಮ-ಾ ಹ@ 12-31 ಸಮಯದ ಈ Eೕ ನಂ ೆ Tweet ಾCರು ಾ ೆ.

Talibani Congress # Congress Fails Karnataka.

These statements issued by the BJP Karnataka amounts to
offence under Section 153A, 505 IPC as they are statements
creating or prompting enmity, hatred or ill-will between
classes.

This is a violation of MCC Guidelines issued by
Elections of India as contained Page 29 in Manual of the MCC
March 2019 Document 21 Edition 1 and Similar othe
instructions.

Don't (ii) No Appeal on the basis of caste/communal
feelings of the electors

(iii) No acting which my aggavato existing differences
or create mutual hatred or cause tension between different
castes/communities/religion/linguistic groups, shall be
attempted.
Kindly immediately register the FIR against Shri
B.Y.Vijayendra, the President of the BJP and others as the
statements have been made on the official twitter handle of
the BJP and amount to creating division among people and
communities based on eligion and actions are prejudicial to
maintenance of peace and harmony. The same are also
offences under Section . . . .of the RP Act 1951.

Please register case and investigate the offence.

Sd/-

FST Leader.

-5- NC: 2026:KHC:12729 CRL.P No. 1823 of 2026 HC-KAR

                                                          ಸ</-

125 RP Act ೕ ಾ ಪ ಕರಣ -ಾಖ 6ರು ೆ.

Whether the kind of a complaint or the post on X
(twitter) account would amount to the ingredients of Section 505 or 153(A) need not detain this Court for long
or delve deep into the matter. The Apex Court on time
to time has considered this very issue and held as
follows:

1. In the case of PATRICIA MUKHIM (supra)
   

   has held as follows:

2. The learned counsel for the respondent State
   argued that the appellant is a renowned journalist and
   is expected to be more responsible when making public
   comments. The learned counsel for the State submitted
   that the comment of the appellant has the tendency of
   provoking communal disharmony. He submitted that
   the High Court was right in dismissing the application
   filed under Section 482CrPC and requested this Court to
   not interfere as the investigation is in progress.

3. "It is of utmost importance to keep all speech
   free in order for the truth to emerge and have a civil
   society."--Thomas Jefferson. Freedom of speech and
   expression guaranteed by Article 19(1)(a) of the
   Constitution is a very valuable fundamental right.
   However, the right is not absolute. Reasonable
   restrictions can be placed on the right of free speech
   and expression in the interest of sovereignty and
   integrity of India, security of the State, friendly
   relations with foreign States, public order, decency or
   morality or in relation to contempt of Court, defamation
   or incitement to an offence. Speech crime is punishable
   under Section 153-AIPC. Promotion of enmity between
   different groups on grounds of religion, race, place of
   birth, residence, language, etc. and doing acts
   prejudicial to maintenance of harmony is punishable
   with imprisonment which may extend to three years or
   with fine or with both under Section 153-A. As we are
   called upon to decide whether a prima facie case is
   made out against the appellant for committing offences
   under Sections 153-A and 505(1)(c), it is relevant to
   reproduce the provisions which are as follows:

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NC: 2026:KHC:12729 CRL.P No. 1823 of 2026 HC-KAR

"153-A. Promoting enmity between
different groups on grounds of religion, race,
place of birth, residence, language, etc., and
doing acts prejudicial to maintenance of
harmony.--(1) Whoever--

(a) by words, either spoken or written, or by
signs or by visible representations or otherwise,
promotes or attempts to promote, on grounds of
religion, race, place of birth, residence, language,
caste or community or any other ground
whatsoever, disharmony or feelings of enmity,
hatred or ill-will between different religious, racial,
language or regional groups or castes or
communities, or

(b) commits any act which is prejudicial to the
maintenance of harmony between different
religious, racial, language or regional groups or
castes or communities, and which disturbs or is
likely to disturb the public tranquility, or

(c) organises any exercise, movement, drill or
other similar activity intending that the participants
in such activity shall use or be trained to use
criminal force or violence or knowing it to be likely
that the participants in such activity will use or be
trained to use criminal force or violence, or
participates in such activity intending to use or be
trained to use criminal force or violence or knowing
it to be likely that the participants in such activity
will use or be trained to use criminal force or
violence, against any religious, racial, language or
regional group or caste or community and such
activity, for any reason whatsoever causes or is
likely to cause fear or alarm or a feeling of
insecurity amongst members of such religious,
racial, language or regional group or caste or
community,
shall be punished with imprisonment which may
extend to three years, or with fine, or with both.
Offence committed in place of worship,
etc.--(2) Whoever commits an offence specified in
sub-section (1) in any place of worship or in any
assembly engaged in the performance of religious
worship or religious ceremonies, shall be punished
with imprisonment which may extend to five years
and shall also be liable to fine.

---

1. Statements conducing to public mischief.--(1) Whoever makes, publishes or circulates any statement, rumour or report--

*** -7- NC: 2026:KHC:12729 CRL.P No. 1823 of 2026 HC-KAR

(c) with intent to incite, or which is likely to
incite, any class or community of persons to commit
any offence against any other class or community,
shall be punished with imprisonment which may
extend to three years, or with fine, or with both."

1. Only where the written or spoken words have
   the tendency of creating public disorder or disturbance
   of law and order or affecting public tranquility, the law
   needs to step in to prevent such an activity. The
   intention to cause disorder or incite people to violence
   is the sine qua non of the offence under Section 153- A IPC and the prosecution has to prove the existence of
   mens rea in order to succeed. [Balwant Singh v. State
   of Punjab, (1995) 3 SCC 214 : 1995 SCC (Cri) 432]

2. The gist of the offence under Section 153- A IPC is the intention to promote feelings of enmity or
   hatred between different classes of people. The
   intention has to be judged primarily by the language of
   the piece of writing and the circumstances in which it
   was written and published. The matter complained of
   within the ambit of Section 153-A must be read as a
   whole. One cannot rely on strongly worded and isolated
   passages for proving the charge nor indeed can one
   take a sentence here and a sentence there and connect
   them by a meticulous process of inferential reasoning
   [Manzar Sayeed Khan v. State of Maharashtra, (2007)
   5 SCC 1 : (2007) 2 SCC (Cri) 417] .

3. In Bilal Ahmed Kaloo v. State of A.P. [Bilal
   Ahmed Kaloo v. State of A.P., (1997) 7 SCC 431 : 1997
   SCC (Cri) 1094] , this Court analysed the ingredients of Sections 153-A and 505(2) IPC. It was held that Section
   153-A covers a case where a person by "words, either
   spoken or written, or by signs or by visible
   representations", promotes or attempts to promote
   feeling of enmity, hatred or ill will. Under Section
   505(2) promotion of such feeling should have been
   done by making a publication or circulating any
   statement or report containing rumour or alarming
   news. Mens rea was held to be a necessary ingredient
   for the offence under Sections 153-A and 505(2). The
   common factor of both the sections being promotion of
   feelings of enmity, hatred or ill will between different
   religious or racial or linguistics or religious groups or
   castes or communities, it is necessary that at least two
   such groups or communities should be involved. It was
   further held in [Bilal Ahmed Kaloo Bilal Ahmed
   Kaloo v. State of A.P., (1997) 7 SCC 431 : 1997 SCC
   (Cri) 1094] that merely inciting the feelings of one -8- NC: 2026:KHC:12729 CRL.P No. 1823 of 2026 HC-KAR

    community or group without any reference to any other
    community or group cannot attract any of the two
    sections. The Court went on to highlight the distinction
    between the two offences, holding that publication of
    words or representation is sine qua non under Section
   

4. It is also relevant to refer to the judgment of this
   Court in [Ramesh v. Union of India Ramesh v. Union of
   India, (1988) 1 SCC 668 : 1988 SCC (Cri) 266] in which
   it was held that words used in the alleged criminal
   speech should be judged from the standards of
   reasonable, strong-minded, firm and courageous men,
   and not those of weak and vacillating minds, nor of
   those who scent danger in every hostile point of view.
   The standard of an ordinary reasonable man or as they
   say in English law "the man on the top of a Clapham
   omnibus" should be applied.

5. This Court in Pravasi Bhalai
   Sangathan v. Union of India [Pravasi Bhalai
   Sangathan v. Union of India, (2014) 11 SCC 477 :

(2014) 3 SCC (Cri) 400] had referred to the Canadian
Supreme Court decision in [Saskatchewan (Human
Rights Commission) v. William Whatcott Saskatchewan
(Human Rights Commission) v. William Whatcott, 2013
SCC OnLine Can SC 6 : (2013) 1 SCR 467] . In that
judgment, the Canadian Supreme Court set out what it
considered to be a workable approach in interpreting
"hatred" as is used in legislative provisions prohibiting
hate speech. The first test was for the Courts to apply
the hate speech prohibition objectively and in so doing,
ask whether a reasonable person, aware of the context
and circumstances, would view the expression as
exposing the protected group to hatred. The second
test was to restrict interpretation of the legislative term
"hatred" to those extreme manifestations of the
emotion described by the words "detestation" and
"vilification". This would filter out and protect speech
which might be repugnant and offensive, but does not
incite the level of abhorrence, delegitimisation and
rejection that risks causing discrimination or injury. The
third test was for the Courts to focus their analysis on
the effect of the expression at issue, namely, whether it
is likely to expose the targeted person or group to
hatred by others. Mere repugnancy of the ideas
expressed is insufficient to constitute the crime
attracting penalty.
13. In the instant case, applying the principles laid down by this Court as mentioned above, the
question that arises for our consideration is whether the
Facebook post dated 4-7-2020 was intentionally made -9- NC: 2026:KHC:12729 CRL.P No. 1823 of 2026 HC-KAR

     for promoting class/community hatred and has the
     tendency to provoke enmity between two communities.
     A close scrutiny of the Facebook post would indicate
     that the agony of the appellant was directed against the
     apathy shown by the Chief Minister of Meghalaya, the
     Director General of Police and the Dorbar Shnong of the
     area in not taking any action against the culprits who
     attacked the non-tribals youngsters. The appellant
     referred to the attacks on non-tribals in 1979. At the
     most, the Facebook post can be understood to highlight
     the discrimination against non-tribals in the State of
     Meghalaya. However, the appellant made it clear that
     criminal elements have no community and immediate
     action has to be taken against persons who had
     indulged in the brutal attack on non-tribal youngsters
     playing basketball. The Facebook post read in its
     entirety pleads for equality of non-tribals in the State of
     Meghalaya. In our understanding, there was no
     intention on the part of the appellant to promote
     class/community hatred. As there is no attempt made
     by the appellant to incite people belonging to a
     community to indulge in any violence, the basic
     ingredients of the offence under [Sections 153-A](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/345634/) and [505(1)(c)](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1565692/) have not been made out. Where allegations
     made in the FIR or the complaint, even if they are
     taken on their face value and accepted in their entirety
     do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a
     case against the accused, the FIR is liable to be
     quashed [[State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1033637/), 1992 Supp
     (1) SCC 335 : 1992 SCC (Cri) 426] .

1. India is a plural and multicultural society.
   The promise of liberty, enunciated in the Preamble,
   manifests itself in various provisions which outline each
   citizen's rights; they include the right to free speech, to
   travel freely and settle (subject to such reasonable
   restrictions that may be validly enacted) throughout the
   length and breadth of India. At times, when in the
   legitimate exercise of such a right, individuals travel,
   settle down or carry on a vocation in a place where they
   find conditions conducive, there may be resentments,
   especially if such citizens prosper, leading to hostility or
   possibly violence. In such instances, if the victims voice
   their discontent, and speak out, especially if the State
   authorities turn a blind eye, or drag their feet, such
   voicing of discontent is really a cry for anguish, for
   justice denied -- or delayed. This is exactly what
   appears to have happened in this case.

2. The attack upon six non-locals, carried out
   by masked individuals, is not denied by the State; its

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       reporting too is not denied. The State in fact issued a
       press release. There appears to be no headway in the
       investigations. The complaint made by the Dorbar
       Shnong, Lawsohtun that the statement of the appellant
       would incite communal tension and might instigate a
       communal conflict in the entire State is only a figment
       of imagination. The fervent plea made by the appellant
       for protection of non-tribals living in the State of
       Meghalaya and for their equality cannot, by any stretch
       of imagination, be categorised as hate speech. It was a
       call for justice -- for action according to law, which
       every citizen has a right to expect and articulate.
       Disapprobation of governmental inaction cannot be
       branded as an attempt to promote hatred between
       different communities. Free speech of the citizens of
       this country cannot be stifled by implicating them in
       criminal cases, unless such speech has the tendency to
       affect public order. The sequitur of above analysis of
       the Facebook post made by the appellant is that no
       case is made out against the appellant for an offence
       under [Sections 153-A](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/345634/) and [505(1)(c)](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1565692/) IPC."

1. In the case of JAVED AHAMAD HAJAM (supra) has held as follows:

"16. As regards the picture containing "Chand"
and below that the words "14th August-Happy
Independence Day Pakistan", we are of the view that it
will not attract clause (a) of sub-section (1) of Section
153-AIPC. Every citizen has the right to extend good
wishes to the citizens of the other countries on their
respective Independence Days. If a citizen of India
extends good wishes to the citizens of Pakistan on 14th
August, which is their Independence Day, there is
nothing wrong with it. It is a gesture of goodwill. In
such a case, it cannot be said that such acts will tend to
create disharmony or feelings of enmity, hatred or ill
will between different religious groups. Motives cannot
be attributed to the appellant only because he belongs
to a particular religion.

1. Now, the time has come to enlighten and educate our police machinery on the concept of freedom of speech and expression guaranteed by Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution and the extent of reasonable restraint on their free speech and expression. They must be sensitised about the democratic values enshrined in our Constitution.

• 11 -

NC: 2026:KHC:12729 CRL.P No. 1823 of 2026 HC-KAR

1. For the same reasons, clause (b) of sub-
   section (1) of Section 153-AIPC will not be attracted as
   what is depicted on the WhatsApp status of the
   appellant cannot be said to be prejudicial to the
   maintenance of harmony among various groups as
   stated therein. Thus, continuation of the prosecution of
   the appellant for the offence punishable under Section
   153-AIPC will be a gross abuse of the process of law."

2. In the case of SHIV PRASAD SEMWAL
   

   (supra) has held as follows:

1. Apparently, the post was aimed at
   frustrating the proposed foundation stone laying
   ceremony on the land, of which the complainant claims
   to be the true owner. The post also imputes that the
   person who was planning the foundation stone
   ceremony was an enemy of mountains and had no
   concern with the well-being of the mountains.

2. The learned Standing Counsel for the State
   tried to draw much water from these lines alleging that
   this portion of the post tends to create a sense of
   enmity and disharmony amongst people of hill
   community and the people of plains. However, the
   interpretation sought to be given to these words is far-
   fetched and unconvincing. The lines referred to supra
   only refer to the complainant, imputing that his
   activities are prejudicial to the hills. These words have
   no connection whatsoever with a group or groups of
   people or communities. Hence, the foundational facts
   essential to constitute the offence under Section 153- A IPC are totally lacking from the allegations as set out
   in the FIR.

1. In Manzar Sayeed Khan v. State of
   Maharashtra [Manzar Sayeed Khan v. State of
   Maharashtra, (2007) 5 SCC 1 : (2007) 2 SCC (Cri) 417]
   , this Court held that for applying Section 153-AIPC, the
   presence of two or more groups or communities is
   essential, whereas in the present case, no such groups
   or communities were referred to in the news article.

2. The other substantive offence which has
   been applied by the investigating agency is Section
   504IPC. The said offence can be invoked when the
   insult of a person provokes him to break public peace or
   to commit any other offence. There is no such
   allegation in the FIR that owing to the alleged offensive

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     post attributable to the appellant, the complainant was
     provoked to such an extent that he could indulge in
     disturbing the public peace or commit any other
     offence. Hence, the FIR lacks the necessary ingredients
     of the said offence as well.

1. Since we have found that the foundational
   facts essential for constituting the substantive offences
   under Sections 153-A and 504IPC are not available
   from the admitted allegations of prosecution, the
   allegations qua the subsidiary offences under Sections
   34 and 120-BIPC would also be non est.

2. The complainant has also alleged in the FIR
   that the accused intended to blackmail him by
   publishing the news article in question. However, there
   is no allegation in the FIR that the accused tried to
   extract any wrongful gain or valuable security from the
   complainant on the basis of the mischievous/malicious
   post.

3. In [State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal State of
   Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335 : 1992
   SCC (Cri) 426] , this Court examined the principles
   governing the scope of exercise of powers by the High
   Court in a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution
   of India and under Section 482CrPC seeking quashing
   of criminal proceedings and held as follows : (SCC pp.
   378-79, para 102)

             "102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of
    the various relevant provisions of the Code under
    Chapter XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by
    this Court in a series of decisions relating to the
    exercise of the extraordinary power under [Article 226](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1712542/) or
    the inherent powers under [Section 482](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/903398/) of the Code
    which we have extracted and reproduced above, we
    give the following categories of cases by way of
    illustration wherein such power could be exercised
    either to prevent abuse of the process of any court or
    otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it may
    not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined
    and sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines or
    rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list of myriad
    kinds of cases wherein such power should be exercised.
   

(1) Where the allegations made in the first
information report or the complaint, even if they are
taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety
do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a
case against the accused.

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              (2) Where the allegations in the first information
       report and other materials, if any, accompanying the
       FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an
       investigation by police officers under [Section 156(1)](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/833310/) of
       the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within
       the purview of [Section 155(2)](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1062869/) of the Code.

(3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made
in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in
support of the same do not disclose the commission of
any offence and make out a case against the accused.

(4) Where, the allegations in the FIR do not
constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a
non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by
a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as
contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code.

(5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or
complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on
the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a
just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for
proceeding against the accused.

(6) Where there is an express legal bar
engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the
concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is
instituted) to the institution and continuance of the
proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision
in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious
redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party.

(7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly
attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is
maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for
wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to
spite him due to private and personal grudge."

The Apex Court considers identical posts on any of
the social media and holds that such posts would not
amount to generation of disharmony to any caste, race,
religion, they are at best criticism.

1. In that light, the petition deserves to succeed and I pass the following:

• 14 -

NC: 2026:KHC:12729 CRL.P No. 1823 of 2026 HC-KAR

ORDER

1.    Criminal petition is allowed.
   

2.    FIR registered in crime No.60/2024 against
   

   the petitioners at Malleshwaram Police
   Station, Malleshwaram Sub-Division,
   Bengaluru City stands quashed."

3.  In the light of the order passed by this Court
   

(supra) and for the reasons aforementioned, the following:

ORDER

(i) Criminal Petition is allowed;

(ii) The proceedings in C.C.No.376/2025

pending before the PCJ and JMFC, Hunsur,

stand quashed, qua the petitioner.
Sd/-

(M.NAGAPRASANNA)
JUDGE

AV
List No.: 2 Sl No.: 19