Plivo India Pvt Ltd vs Mr Arvind Eshwarlal - Commercial Appeal

## Unlock Advanced Research with PRISM AI

Integrated with over 4 crore judgments and laws — designed for legal practitioners, researchers, students and institutions

• Know your Kanoon - Doc Gen Hub - Counter Argument - Case Predict AI - Talk with IK Doc -... Upgrade to Premium [Cites 14, Cited by 0 ] ### Karnataka High Court

Plivo India Pvt Ltd vs Mr Arvind Eshwarlal on 25 February, 2026

-1-
NC: 2026:KHC:11821-DB
COMAP No. 96 of 2026

         HC-KAR

             IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU

                  DATED THIS THE 25TH DAY OF FEBRUARY, 2026

                                  PRESENT
              THE HON'BLE MR. VIBHU BAKHRU, CHIEF JUSTICE
                                    AND
                   THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE C.M. POONACHA
                     COMMERCIAL APPEAL NO. 96 OF 2026
        BETWEEN:

        PLIVO INDIA PVT LTD
        (FORMERLY KNOWN AS PLIVO
        COMMUNICATIONS PVT. LTD.)
        7TH FLOOR, INDIQUBE ECO WORLD,
        CAMPUS 32, RMZ ECOWORLD,
        BHOGANAHALLI VILLAGE,
        VARTHUR HOBLI, BELLANDUR,
        BENGALURU
        REPRESENTED BY ITS AUTHORIZED
        REPRESENTATIVE,
        MR. KSHITIJ SHARMA

Digitally
signed by
NIRMALA ...APPELLANT
DEVI (BY SRI. PRADEEP NAYAK, ADVOCATE)
Location:
HIGH AND:
COURT OF
KARNATAKA
1. MR ARVIND ESHWARLAL
RESIDING AT 106,
RAHEJA MANSION,
13 MILTON STREET,
COOKE TOWN,
BENGALURU - 560005
-2-
NC: 2026:KHC:11821-DB
COMAP No. 96 of 2026

HC-KAR

1. SHRI. V. JAGANNATHAN,
   FORMER JUDGE,
   HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA,
   SOLE ARBITRATOR,
   ARBITRATION AND CONCILIATION CENTRE,
   BENGALURU (DOMESTIC AND
   INTERNATIONAL)
   KANIJA BHAVAN,
   RACE COURSE ROAD,
   BANGALORE-560001

                               ...RESPONDENTS
   

   (BY SRI.SHODHAN BABU A.M, ADVOCATE FOR C/R)

   THIS COMAP IS FILED UNDER SECTION 13(1-A) OF
   COMMERCIAL COURTS ACT, PRAYING TO SET ASIDE THE
   ORDER DATED 24.01.2026 PASSED BY THE LD LXXXIV
   ADDITIONAL CITY CIVIL AND SESSIONS JUDGE,
   COMMERCIAL COURT AT BENGALURU (CCH-85) PASSED IN
   COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION PETITION NO.57/2025
   PRODUCED AT ANNEXURE B.

   THIS APPEAL, COMING ON FOR ADMISSION, THIS DAY,
   JUDGMENT WAS DELIVERED THEREIN AS UNDER:

CORAM: HON'BLE MR. VIBHU BAKHRU, CHIEF JUSTICE
and
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE C.M. POONACHA

                  ORAL JUDGMENT (PER: HON'BLE MR. VIBHU BAKHRU, CHIEF JUSTICE)

1. The appellant has filed the present appeal under Section

13(1- A) of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015 read with [Section

37(1)(c)](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/106806293/) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 [A&C Act] -3- NC: 2026:KHC:11821-DB COMAP No. 96 of 2026 HC-KAR

impugning a judgment dated 24.01.2026 [impugned judgment]

passed by the learned LXXXIV Additional City Civil and Sessions

Judge, Bengaluru (CCH-85) [Commercial Court] in

Com.A.P.No.57/2025 captioned ['Plivo India Pvt.Ltd., v. Mr.Arvind

Eshwarlal & Another](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/98440450/) '. The appellant had filed the said petition to

set aside the arbitral award dated 24.12.2024 [impugned award]

passed by respondent No. 2 [Arbitral Tribunal].

1. It is stated that respondent No.1 had joined the appellant

company as an Associate Director on 27.11.2017 pursuant to the

letter of offer dated 16.10.2017. In terms of the said offer,

respondent No.1 was employed at an annual remuneration of

`78,96,400/-. Respondent No.1 had also signed a Non-Disclosure

and a Non-Compete Agreement [NDA] on joining the services of

the appellant on 27.11.2017.

1. The appellant claims that respondent No.1 had violated the

terms of the employment agreement as well as the NDA and the

same gave rise to disputes between the said parties. Since the

disputes were covered by an arbitration agreement, the appellant

issued a notice dated 27.10.2018 under Section 21 of the A&C Act.

-4- NC: 2026:KHC:11821-DB COMAP No. 96 of 2026 HC-KAR

The parties could not concur on the constitution of the Arbitral

Tribunal. Accordingly, the appellant filed a petition (Civil

Miscellaneous Petition No.171/2020) under Section 11 of the A&C

Act before this Court. The said petition was allowed by an order

dated 21.07.2022, and the Court appointed respondent No.2, a

former judge of this Court, as the sole arbitrator to adjudicate the

disputes that had arisen between the parties.

1. The appellant filed a statement of claims on 28.04.2023.

Respondent No.1 resisted the claim, inter alia, on the ground that it

was barred by limitation. The said contention was accepted by the

learned Arbitral Tribunal, and the appellant's claims were, inter alia,

rejected on that ground. We consider it apposite to reproduce the

relevant extract of the impugned award, which reflects the Arbitral

Tribunal's reasoning for accepting the said contention:

"44. From the memo filed by the claimant
counsel on 4.12.2024, the date of cause of
action is shown as 30.5.2018. The date of
invocation of Section 21 notice of arbitration is
27.10.2018. Both parties do not dispute the
aforesaid dates. If the limitation is calculated
from the notice of arbitration, then 3 years period
will expire on 26.10.2021. If the extension of
limitation on account of COVID 19 pandemic is
taken into consideration, the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Re
Cognizance for Extension of Limitation -
-5-
NC: 2026:KHC:11821-DB COMAP No. 96 of 2026 HC-KAR

(Miscellaneous Application 21 of 2022) will have
to be taken into account. It was held thus:

Restored its order dated March 8,
2021, April 27, 2021 and September
23, 2021. Further directed that the
period from March 15, 2020 till
February 28, 2022 shall stand
excluded for the purposes of limitation
as may be prescribed under any
general or special laws in respect of all
judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings.

Consequently, the balance period of
limitation remaining as on October 03,
2021, if any, shall become available
with effect from March 01, 2022.

Held that, in cases where the limitation
expiring during the period between
March 15, 2020 till February 28, 2022,
the actual balance period of limitation
remaining, all persons shall have a
limitation period of 90 days from March
01, 2022. Further, where the actual
balance period of limitation remaining,
with effect from March 01, 2022 is
greater than 90 days, that longer
period shall apply.

1. Applying the aforesaid extension of limitation laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, in the case on hand the picture that emerges is as under:

(1) Date of Invocation of Section 21,
Notice of Arbitration : 27.10.2018

(2) Date of expiry of limitation in
the normal course : 26.10.2021

(3) Since the period of limitation expires between
15.3.2020 and 28.2.2022, the claimant will have
the benefit of 90 more days from 01.03.2022.
-6- NC: 2026:KHC:11821-DB COMAP No. 96 of 2026 HC-KAR

        Therefore, the limitation will expire on
                                             :28.06.2022

        (4) The claim petition is field on : 28.04.2023

1. Thus, it is clear from the aforesaid
   calculation that the claim petition was filed after
   more than 10 months from the expiry of limitation
   period. Therefore, the question of 440 days
   being added to 28.2.2022 cannot arise by any
   stretch of imagination in the light of the extension
   period granted by the Hon'ble Supreme Court on
   account of COVIC 19. As per the decision, only
   90 days can be added after 28.2.2022. As such,
   the claim petition filed on 28.4.2023 is clearly
   barred by limitation."

2. Additionally, the Arbitral Tribunal also found that the disputes

raised in the claim petition were not specifically mentioned in the

notice issued under Section 21 of the A&C Act and therefore,

reasoned that the said disputes were beyond the period of

limitation. The relevant extract of the impugned award setting out

the reasoning of the Arbitral Tribunal in this regard is reproduced

as under:

"39. In so far as limitation ground is concerned,
the submission made is that the claims sought
before this Tribunal are made for the first time in
this arbitration proceedings and that they were
never the claims mentioned in the arbitration
notice dated 27.10.2018 issued under Section 21 of the AC Act by the claimant (Ex. P34).
Therefore, as the claims/relief now sought in the
claim petition being made for the first time, when
the claim petition is filed (on 28.4.2023), more -7- NC: 2026:KHC:11821-DB COMAP No. 96 of 2026 HC-KAR

than 3 years have elapsed from the date of
issuance of arbitration notice and the date of
filing of the claim petition and as such the claims
made are barred by time. In this connection,
learned counsel for the respondent relied on the
decision of Hon'ble Supreme Court in State of
Goa vs. Praveen Enterprises, (2012) 12 SCC

1. "
2. We find that none of the aforesaid reasons, on the basis of

which the appellant's claims were rejected, are sustainable. The

Arbitral Tribunal's conclusion that the appellant's claims were

barred by limitation is ex facie erroneous and vitiates the impugned

award on the ground of patent illegality. The assumption that the

period of limitation would commence from the date of the notice

and end on the date when the statement of claims is filed is without

any foundation in law.

1. In the present case, the disputes arose in connection with the

NDA executed on 27.11.2017. The notice invoking arbitration was

issued on 27.10.2018, which is well within the three-years from the

date of the agreement. Thus, in any event, the arbitral proceedings

commenced within the period of limitation.

-8- NC: 2026:KHC:11821-DB COMAP No. 96 of 2026 HC-KAR

1. The period of limitation in respect of any claims would

commence from the cause of action and the limitation would stop

running on the commencement of the arbitral proceedings.

1. Section 21 of the A&C Act, which provides for the

commencement of the arbitration proceedings reads as under:

"21. Commencement of arbitral
proceedings.--Unless otherwise agreed by the
parties, the arbitral proceedings in respect of a
particular dispute commence on the date on
which a request for that dispute to be referred to
arbitration is received by the respondent."
10. A plain reading of Section 21 of the A&C Act indicates that

the arbitral proceedings in respect of a particular dispute would

commence on the date when the request for that dispute to be

referred to arbitration is received.

1. We may refer to the following passages from the decision

in State of Goa v. Praveen Enterprises1. The Supreme Court

referred to Section 21 of the A&C Act and explained as under:

"15. Taking a cue from the said section, the
respondent submitted that arbitral proceedings
can commence only in regard to a dispute in
respect of which notice has been served by a 1 (2012) 12 SCC 581 -9- NC: 2026:KHC:11821-DB COMAP No. 96 of 2026 HC-KAR

claimant upon the other party, requesting such
dispute to be referred to arbitration; and
therefore, a counterclaim can be entertained by
the arbitrator only if it has been referred to him,
after a notice seeking arbitration in regard to
such counterclaim. On a careful consideration we
find no basis for such a contention.

1. The purpose of Section 21 is to specify, in the absence of a provision in the arbitration agreement in that behalf, as to when an arbitral proceeding in regard to a dispute commences. This becomes relevant for the purpose of Section 43 of the Act. Sub-section (1) of Section 43 provides that the Limitation Act, 1963 shall apply to arbitrations as it applies to proceedings in courts. Sub-section (2) of Section 43 provides that for the purposes of Section 43 and the Limitation Act, 1963, an arbitration shall be deemed to have commenced on the date referred to in Section 21 of the Act. Having regard to Section 43 of the Act, any claim made beyond the period of limitation prescribed by the Limitation Act, 1963 will be barred by limitation and the Arbitral Tribunal will have to reject such claims as barred by limitation.

1. Section 3 of the Limitation Act, 1963 provides for bar of limitation and is extracted below:

"3.Bar of limitation.--(1) Subject to the
provisions contained in Sections 4 to 24
(inclusive), every suit instituted, appeal
preferred, and application made after the
prescribed period shall be
dismissed although limitation has not
been set up as a defence.

(2) For the purposes of this Act,--

(a) a suit is instituted,--

(i) in an ordinary case, when the plaint is
presented to the proper officer;
- 10 -

NC: 2026:KHC:11821-DB COMAP No. 96 of 2026 HC-KAR

(ii) in the case of a pauper, when his
application for leave to sue as a pauper is
made; and

(iii) in the case of a claim against a
company which is being wound up by the
court, when the claimant first sends in his
claim to the official liquidator;

(b) any claim by way of a set-off or a
counterclaim, shall be treated as a
separate suit and shall be deemed to
have been instituted--

(i) in the case of a set-off, on the same
date as the suit in which the set-off is
pleaded;

(ii) in the case of a counterclaim, on the
date on which the counterclaim is made in
court;

(c) an application by notice of motion in a
High Court is made when the application
is presented to the proper officer of that
court." (emphasis supplied)

1. In regard to a claim which is sought to be enforced by filing a civil suit, the question whether the suit is within the period of limitation is decided with reference to the date of institution of the suit, that is, the date of presentation of a plaint. As the Limitation Act, 1963 is made applicable to arbitrations, there is a need to specify the date on which the arbitration is deemed to be instituted or commenced as that will decide whether the proceedings are barred by limitation or not. Section 3 of the Limitation Act, 1963 specifies the date of institution for suit, but does not specify the date of "institution" for arbitration proceedings. Section 21 of the Act

• 11 -

NC: 2026:KHC:11821-DB COMAP No. 96 of 2026 HC-KAR

     supplies the omission. But for [Section 21](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1772105/) there
     would be considerable confusion as to what
     would be the date of "institution" in regard to the
     arbitration proceedings. It will be possible for the
     respondent in an arbitration to argue that the
     limitation has to be calculated as on the date on
     which statement of claim was filed, or the date on
     which the arbitrator entered upon the reference,
     or the date on which the arbitrator was appointed
     by the court, or the date on which the application
     was filed under [Section 11](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/438099/) of the Act. In view of [Section 21](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1772105/) of the Act providing that the arbitration
     proceedings shall be deemed to commence on
     the date on which "a request for that dispute to
     be referred to arbitration is received by the
     respondent" the said confusion is cleared.
     Therefore, the purpose of [Section 21](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1772105/) of the Act is
     to determine the date of commencement of the
     arbitration proceedings, relevant mainly for
     deciding whether the claims of the claimant are
     barred by limitation or not.

1. There can be claims by a claimant even without a notice seeking reference. Let us take an example where a notice is issued by a claimant raising disputes regarding Claims A and B and seeking reference thereof to arbitration. On appointment of the arbitrator, the claimant files a claim statement in regard to the said Claims A and B. Subsequently if the claimant amends the claim statement by adding Claim C [which is permitted under Section 23(3) of the Act] the additional Claim C would not be preceded by a notice seeking arbitration. The date of amendment by which Claim C was introduced, will become the relevant date for determining the limitation in regard to the said Claim C, whereas the date on which the notice seeking arbitration was served on the other party, will be the relevant date for deciding the limitation in regard to Claims A and B. Be that as it may."

• 12 -

NC: 2026:KHC:11821-DB COMAP No. 96 of 2026 HC-KAR

1. The commencement of arbitral proceedings is akin to

instituting a suit. The period of limitation for any cause of action

stops on commencement of arbitral proceedings, as it does on

institution of the suit. Thus, the appellant's claims were not barred

by limitation.

1. In the event that there was any delay on the part of the

appellant to file a statement of claims, the arbitral proceedings

were required to be terminated. Since there is no dispute that the

statement of claims had been filed during the course of the arbitral

proceedings, that could not be the ground for rejecting them as

barred by limitation. The calculation of the period of time from the

date of issuance of the notice under Section 21 of the A&C Act and

the date of filing of the statement of claims for determining whether

the claims are barred by limitation is clearly erroneous.

1. The Arbitral Tribunal's conclusion that the disputes raised by

the appellant in its statement of claims were not covered by the

notice issued under Section 21 of the A&C Act, is also erroneous.

A plain reading of the notice issued under Section 21 of the A&C

Act indicates that the appellant had referred to clause 12 of the

• 13 -

NC: 2026:KHC:11821-DB COMAP No. 96 of 2026 HC-KAR

NDA and had alleged that respondent No.1 had breached the NDA.

The appellant alleged that respondent No.1 had reproduced and

copied the confidential information belonging to the appellant. It

was unequivocally alleged that respondent No.1 had willfully and

dishonestly taken the confidential information belonging to the

appellant and had refused to return the same.

1. The statement of claims filed also indicates that the claims

are founded on the allegation of breach of the NDA.

1. The contention that the breach of each claim of dispute must

be specifically set out in the notice issued under Section 21 of the

A&C Act is erroneous. Section 21 merely supplies the statutory

provision for the commencement of arbitral proceedings, absent

any agreement between the parties regarding the same. It does not

control the issues or the claims that can be raised under Section 23 of the A&C Act. We consider it apposite to refer to the following

passages from the decision of the Supreme Court in ASF

Buildtech (P) Ltd. Vs Shapoorji Pallonji & Co.2, which clearly 2 (2025) 9 SCC 76

• 14 -

NC: 2026:KHC:11821-DB COMAP No. 96 of 2026 HC-KAR

explain the difference in the scope of Sections 21 and 23 of the

A&C Act.:

1. Section 23 sub-section (1) places an obligation upon the claimant to state the facts supporting his "claim", the points at issue and the relief or remedy sought by way of its statement of claim, before the Arbitral Tribunal. Notably, the legislature, in the first part of the said sub- section, has deliberately and consciously used the term "claim" as opposed to "particular dispute" employed in Section 21 of the 1996 Act. Although, it could be said that the term "particular dispute" under Section 21 connotes a larger umbrella within which the term "claim" under Section 23 would be subsumed, thereby suggesting that there is no scope to deviate from what was sought to be referred by the notice of invocation, we do not think so. We say so because, the requirement for providing the points at issue and the relief or remedy sought that exists in sub-section (1) of Section 23 of the 1996 Act is patently absent in Section 21 of the 1996 Act, which clearly shows that the scope and object of these two provisions are at variance to each other. Further, this sub-section does not stipulate either explicitly or implicitly, that such "claim" must be the same or in tandem with the "particular dispute" in respect of which the notice of invocation was issued under Section 21 of the 1996 Act. This distinction in terminology is neither incidental nor redundant; rather, it reflects a conscious legislative design to demarcate the procedural objective of Section 21 from the substantive function served by Section 23. Unlike Section 23, Section 21 does not require any articulation of the relief sought or the framing of issues -- its sole purpose is to indicate when arbitration is deemed to have commenced, for the limited purpose of computing the limitation period.

• 15 -

NC: 2026:KHC:11821-DB COMAP No. 96 of 2026 HC-KAR

     xxxxxx

1. The marginal note appended to Section 21 of the 1996 Act makes it abundantly clear that the notice to be issued thereunder is for the purpose of "commencement of arbitration proceedings". The substantive provision further makes it clear that the date on which a request/notice of invocation for referring a dispute is received by the respondent, would the date on which the arbitral proceedings in respect of a particular dispute commences. The words "particular dispute" assume significance in the interpretation of this provision and its underlying object. It indicates that the provision is concerned only with determining when arbitration is deemed to have commenced for the specific dispute mentioned in the notice. The language in which the said provision is couched is neither prohibitive or exhaustive insofar as reference of any other disputes which although not specified in the notice of invocation yet, nonetheless falls within the scope of the arbitration agreement. The term "particular dispute", does not mean all disputes, nor does it confine the jurisdiction of the Arbitral Tribunal which is said to be one emanating from the "arbitration agreement" to only those disputes mentioned in the notice of invocation, as it would tantamount to reading a restriction into the jurisdiction of the Arbitral Tribunal to the bounds of the notice of invocation instead of the arbitration agreement. Thus, there is no inhibition under Section 21 of the 1996 Act for raising any other dispute or claim which is covered under the arbitration agreement in the absence of any such notice. Section 21 is procedural rather than jurisdictional -- it does not serve to create or validate the arbitration agreement itself, nor is it a precondition for the existence of the Tribunal's jurisdiction, but merely operates as a statutory mechanism to ascertain the date of initiation for reckoning limitation.

xxxxxx

• 16 -

NC: 2026:KHC:11821-DB COMAP No. 96 of 2026 HC-KAR

1. Similarly, sub-section (2) of Section 23,
   which enables the respondent to make a
   counterclaim or plead set-off, does not envisage
   any requirement that such counterclaim or set-off
   must be in respect of or correspond to the
   "particular dispute" in terms of Section 21 of the
   1996 Act, thus, suggesting the legislature's
   intention to give a wide import to the term "claim"
   and by extension "counterclaim". In order to
   further obviate any confusion in respect of what
   claims can be raised, Section 23 sub-section (3)
   goes one step ahead and stipulates that, unless
   agreed otherwise by the parties, any party may
   amend or supplement its "claim" during the
   course of the arbitral proceedings, and further,
   that such amendment or supplement may be
   rejected only if the Arbitral Tribunal considers it
   inappropriate for one and only one reason, that
   being, the delay in making or seeking such
   amendment or supplement. What can be
   discerned from the above is that there is no
   restriction whatsoever, in the plain words of Section 23 of the 1996 Act, which would be
   indicative of an inhibition in raising those claims
   or counterclaims, etc. that have no bearing with
   the notice of invocation under Section 21 of the
   1996 Act.

2. The language used in Section 23 of the
   1996 Act makes no reference whatsoever, either
   explicitly to the provision of Section 21 or the
   particular words used thereunder, that would be
   suggestive of any correlation between the two
   provisions. On the contrary, the singular ground
   that has been mentioned in Section 23 sub-
   section (3) upon which an amendment or
   supplement of claim may be rejected by the
   Arbitral Tribunal i.e. if it is deemed inappropriate
   due to delay, is a positive indicium that no
   restriction can be read into the scope of claims
   that may be raised in the statement of claim or
   counterclaim beyond what was stipulated in the
   notice of invocation under Section 21 of the 1996

• 17 -

NC: 2026:KHC:11821-DB COMAP No. 96 of 2026 HC-KAR

        Act. Any limitation or restriction on the scope of a
        statement of claim or a counterclaim as the case
        may be, has to be understood not from the
        provision of [Section 21](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1772105/) but only from the explicit
        language used in [Section 23](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/11639/) of the 1996 Act.

1. Any restriction on the nature or content of
   claims, counterclaims, or set-offs in arbitration
   must be sourced solely from the express
   language of Section 23 and not from Section 21.
   Section(s) 21 and 23 of the 1996 Act although
   overlap in some aspects with each other in terms
   of the claims that would ordinarily be referred to
   the Tribunal more often than not tend to coincide,
   yet they are by no means tethered together in
   such a manner that neither of them can survive
   without one another. The latter serves only a
   procedural function and does not condition or
   limit the Tribunal's jurisdiction to adjudicate
   claims that may not have been specifically
   invoked at the threshold stage. To read such a
   limitation into the statutory scheme would run
   contrary to both the text and the object of the Act.

2. The learned counsel for respondent No. 1 had referred to the

decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Praveen Enterprises (supra) and contended that the period of limitation is to be

reckoned from the date when the statement of claims was filed. We

find no merit in the said contention. The reliance placed on [the said

decision](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/267861/) is misplaced. The decision in Praveen Enterprises (supra) is not an authority for the proposition that claims must be

set out in detail in the notice issued under Section 21 of the A&C

Act, failing which the claimant is precluded from raising the same,

• 18 -

NC: 2026:KHC:11821-DB COMAP No. 96 of 2026 HC-KAR

notwithstanding that the same are covered under the arbitration

agreement.

1. Having stated the above, we may note that the aforesaid

question does not arise in the given facts of the present case. In

the facts of the present case, the appellant had sought reference of

the disputes arising out of the breach of the NDA. The statement of

claims filed does not set out any dispute, which is not founded on

the breach of the NDA.

1. In view of the above, the impugned order and the impugned

award are set aside. The parties are at liberty to take steps for

adjudication of the disputes by arbitration afresh.

1. The appeal is allowed in the aforesaid terms.

2. All pending applications are also disposed of.

Sd/-

(VIBHU BAKHRU)
CHIEF JUSTICE

                                         Sd/-

(C.M. POONACHA)
JUDGE
ND / List No.: 2 Sl No.: 24