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March 20, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

People v. Taft

California Court of Appeal

• Citations: None known

• Docket Number: B339775

• Opinion

• Authorities (4)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (91.6K)

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Combined Opinion

Filed 3/20/26
CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SEVEN

THE PEOPLE, B339775

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. MA083821)
v.

BILLY ARTHUR TAFT, JR.,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Emily J. Cole and Michelle deCasas, Judges.
Affirmed as modified.
Robert L.S. Angres, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Idan Ivri and Lauren N. Guber, Deputy
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

---

After the trial court terminated Billy Taft’s felony
probation and imposed a previously suspended four-year state
prison sentence, Taft appealed from the judgment, raising one
issue: whether he is entitled to two additional days of
presentence custody credit. While this appeal was pending, Taft
notified the trial court that the custody credit had been
miscalculated. Although the court agreed two more days of credit
were owed to Taft, it determined it lacked jurisdiction to correct
the credit award. However, Penal Code section 1237.11 conferred
jurisdiction on the trial court to correct the error. We modify the
judgment to correct the award of credit and otherwise affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. Taft’s Offenses
At around midnight on August 22, 2022, Taft arrived at the
home of Sindy I.,2 with whom he had a sexual relationship for
many years.3 Taft was intoxicated and immediately became
verbally aggressive and threatened Sindy. After Sindy asked
Taft to leave, Taft headbutted and punched her in the face,
causing bruising and a laceration that required stitches.
Sindy contacted the Los Angeles County Sheriff’s
Department, and deputies went to Taft’s mother’s house and

1 Statutory references are to the Penal Code unless
otherwise designated.
2 We refer to the victim by her first name and last initial to
protect her privacy interests. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule
8.90(b)(4).)
3 The facts are derived from the preliminary hearing
transcript.

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observed Taft driving a car into the driveway. Taft refused to
exit the car despite the deputies’ commands, and he struck the
forehead of a deputy who attempted to remove him from the car
and injured another deputy during the ensuing struggle. Both
deputies observed that Taft appeared intoxicated and smelled
like alcohol. The deputies had to forcibly extract Taft from his
car and were unable to administer a field sobriety test.

B. Taft Receives a Suspended Prison Sentence and Is Placed
on Probation
Taft was charged by information with two counts of
resisting an executive officer (Pen. Code, § 69), corporal injury on
a cohabitant or girlfriend (id., § 273.5, subd. (a)), driving under
the influence of alcohol (Veh. Code, § 23152, subd. (a)), and
criminal threats (Pen. Code, § 422, subd. (a)). The information
also alleged four prior strike convictions (Pen. Code, §§ 667,
subds. (b)-(j), 1170.12). In addition, the information alleged
multiple factors in aggravation (Cal. Rules of Court, rule
4.421(a)(1) & (b)(1)-(3)).
Taft pleaded no contest to a misdemeanor count of resisting
an executive officer (§ 69) and a felony count of injuring a
cohabitant or girlfriend (§ 273.5, subd. (a)). He also admitted the
aggravating factor that his prior convictions were of increasing
seriousness (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.421(b)(2)).
On January 3, 2023, pursuant to the plea agreement, the
court sentenced Taft to 269 days in county jail (with credit for
time served) on the misdemeanor count of resisting an executive
officer. For the section 273.5 charge, the trial court imposed a
four-year prison sentence (the upper term, based on Taft’s
admission of the aggravating factor) but suspended its execution

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and placed Taft on four years of probation. The court awarded
Taft a total of 269 days of presentence custody credit, consisting
of 135 days of confinement credit and 134 days of conduct credit.
Among the terms of probation imposed by the court were the
requirement to “obey all laws” and to “abstain from the [use of]
alcoholic beverages.”

C. Taft Violates the Terms of His Probation, and the Trial
Court Imposes the Previously Suspended Prison Sentence
On January 17, 2024, the court summarily revoked Taft’s
probation following his arrest on a new charge of driving under
the influence. Although Taft was initially released on his own
recognizance on the condition he submit to electronic alcohol
monitoring, he was remanded to custody on March 7, 2024, after
numerous reports of noncompliance with that condition.
On May 8, 2024, following a formal probation violation
hearing, the trial court (Judge Emily Cole) found Taft in violation
of the terms of probation that he obey all laws and abstain from
alcohol. The court terminated probation and imposed the four-
year prison sentence that had previously been suspended. The
court awarded Taft 398 total days of presentence custody credit,
calculated by adding to the 269 days of previously awarded credit
an additional 65 days of confinement credit and 64 days of
conduct credit.

D. Taft Appeals and Notifies the Trial Court of an Error in
Calculating His Custody Credit
On May 29, 2024, Taft timely filed a notice of appeal.
(§ 1237, subd. (b).) In a letter filed on September 9, 2025, Taft’s
appellate counsel notified the trial court that in reviewing the

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record for purposes of Taft’s appeal, counsel determined that the
court had miscalculated Taft’s presentence credit.
Counsel noted that when the court originally imposed but
suspended the execution of the prison sentence, it awarded Taft
269 days of presentence custody credit, namely 135 days of
confinement credit and 134 days of conduct credit. When the
court terminated probation and imposed the previously
suspended sentence, the court acknowledged the prior award of
269 days and added to it the 65 days of confinement credit plus
64 days of conduct credit that Taft had earned when he was in
custody after his arrest in January 2024 and then after he was
remanded in March 2024 pending the probation violation
hearing. Counsel submitted that the court should have instead
“add[ed] up the total amount of confinement time, i.e.[,] 135 days
of presentence confinement earned prior to the grant of probation
plus 65 days of presentence confinement earned thereafter for a
total confinement period of 200 days. Mr. Taft was then entitled
to matching conduct credit, which in this case was also 200.
Thus, instead of 398 days of presentence custody credit, Mr. Taft
was entitled to . . . a total award of 400 days.” Counsel requested
that the court amend the minute order and the abstract of
judgment to reflect the proper number of days of credit.
Supervising Judge Michelle deCasas issued a “Response to
Defendant Correspondence re Erroneous Credit Award” on
September 30, 2025. The court stated, “The Court concedes that
Judge Cole’s calculations of the total credit were erroneous.
Nonetheless, the court lacks fundamental jurisdiction to correct
judicial errors, including those governed by mathematical rules
(such as calculating credits). People v. Singleton (2025)
113 Cal.App.5th 783, 792.”

5
DISCUSSION

Taft contends, and the Attorney General concedes, that
when the trial court terminated Taft’s probation and imposed the
prison sentence, the court miscalculated his presentence custody
credit. When Taft’s counsel notified the trial court about the
error while the case was pending appeal, the trial court failed to
correct the error as permitted under section 1237.1, mistakenly
concluding it lacked jurisdiction to do so. As the Attorney
General concedes, because Taft exhausted his remedies in the
trial court under section 1237.1 by requesting that the court
correct the error in calculating the custody credit, Taft’s appeal is
well-taken, and we now modify the judgment to correct the error.

A. Taft’s Presentence Custody Credit Was Miscalculated
When Judge Cole calculated the award of presentence
custody credit at the time she imposed Taft’s prison sentence, she
added to the prior custody credit award of 269 days the additional
65 days of confinement credit plus conduct credit in the amount
of 64 days. This yielded a total of 398 days. This mode of
calculating the credit was incorrect.
Subject to exceptions that are not applicable here,
presentence custody credit is calculated according to section
4019. (§ 2900.5; People v. Jones (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 819, 822.)
In addition to receiving credit for the actual days spent in
confinement prior to being sentenced, defendants earn “conduct
credit at a rate of two days for every two days in presentence
custody under section 4019.” (People v. Chilelli (2014)
225 Cal.App.4th 581, 591; see § 4019, subd. (f) [“if all days are
earned under this section, a term of four days will be deemed to
have been served for every two days spent in actual custody”];

6
People v. Whitaker (2015) 238 Cal.App.4th 1354, 1358.) “A
defendant who serves an odd number of days is not entitled to an
additional single day of conduct credit for his or her final day of
actual custody.” (Whitaker, at p. 1358; see id. at p. 1362 [holding
“trial court properly applied the two-for-two formula in
calculating that Whitaker was entitled to 326 days of conduct
credit for his 327 days served”].)
“[A] defendant is entitled to have time spent in
noncontinuous custody aggregated for the purpose of calculating
[conduct] credits pursuant to section 4019.” (People v. Culp
(2002) 100 Cal.App.4th 1278, 1283.) Thus, the trial court should
have added up the total amount of Taft’s confinement time, 135
days earned prior to the grant of probation plus 65 days earned
thereafter, for a total confinement period of 200 days. Taft was
then entitled to matching conduct credit of 200 days. As both
parties agree, instead of 398 days of presentence custody credit,
Taft was entitled to 400 total days of credit.

B. The Trial Court Retained Jurisdiction After the Notice of
Appeal Was Filed To Correct the Calculation of the Credit
After reviewing the letter from Taft’s appellate counsel, the
trial court (Judge deCasas) concluded Taft was correct that his
credit had been miscalculated by Judge Cole but that the trial
court lacked jurisdiction to correct the error. However, section
1237.1 conferred such jurisdiction on the trial court.
Section 1237.1 provides that “[t]he trial court retains
jurisdiction after a notice of appeal has been filed to correct any
error in the calculation of presentence custody credits upon the
defendant’s request for correction” in a motion or informally in
writing. (§ 1237.1; see Jones, supra, 88 Cal.App.5th at p. 821.)

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Contrary to the trial court’s conclusion, in People v. Singleton
(2025) 113 Cal.App.5th 783 (Singleton), we did not hold that trial
courts lack jurisdiction to correct errors in calculating custody
credit in the present circumstances.
In Singleton, we addressed the following question: “When a
superior court receives a letter from a case records manager in
the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation
(CDCR) informing the court that the abstract of judgment for a
defendant ‘may be in error,’ does the court have jurisdiction to
correct the sentence where the judgment is long since final?”
(Singleton, supra, 113 Cal.App.5th at p. 787.) We answered in
the negative, holding that “the courts in these circumstances lack
fundamental jurisdiction to vacate or modify the sentence,” and
that the court can modify the sentence only if the court has
jurisdiction under section 1172.14 or another authorizing statute,
or if a writ of habeas corpus has been filed. (Singleton, at p. 787.)

4 For defendants convicted of a felony offense and ordered to
serve their sentence in state prison or in county jail, section
1172.1, subdivision (a)(1), confers jurisdiction on the trial court to
recall and resentence defendants (1) within 120 days of the date
of commitment; (2) at any time if the applicable sentencing laws
at the time of original sentencing are subsequently changed by
new statutory authority or case law; or (3) at any time upon the
recommendation of the Secretary of the CDCR or the Board of
Parole Hearings, the county correctional administrator in the
case of a defendant incarcerated in county jail, the district
attorney of the county in which the defendant was sentenced, or
the Attorney General if the Department of Justice originally
prosecuted the case. (§ 1172.1, subd. (a)(1).) The jurisdictional
problem in Singleton was that the CDCR Secretary did not
recommend resentencing; rather, a CDCR correctional case

8
The trial court cited language in Singleton noting that
improperly calculating credit constitutes judicial error, as
opposed to clerical error. (Singleton, supra, 113 Cal.App.5th at
p. 792.) In Singleton we noted the longstanding rule that while a
court has inherent power to correct clerical errors, it “does not
have inherent jurisdiction to correct judicial errors.” (Ibid.) We
rejected the notion that any time a sentence is unauthorized, the
court has inherent jurisdiction to correct it, and we agreed with
the holding of People v. King (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 629, at pages
641-642, that “ ‘the unauthorized sentence doctrine does not itself
create jurisdiction for a trial court to rule on an incarcerated
defendant’s motion to correct an alleged illegal sentence . . . after
the execution of the sentence has begun.’ ” (Singleton, at p. 793.)
Rather, a court only has jurisdiction to modify a sentence where
such jurisdiction has been conferred, whether by “section 1172.1
or another authorizing statute, or by the filing of a petition for a
writ of habeas corpus.” (Singleton, at p. 787, italics added; see
People v. Loper (2015) 60 Cal.4th 1155, 1159 [“[t]he right to
appeal is statutory only”].)
Section 1237.1 is such an authorizing statute. It gives trial
courts the authority to correct miscalculations of custody credit
when the mistake is brought to the court’s attention “after a

records manager merely requested in a letter that the court
determine whether a correction to the sentence was required.
(Singleton, supra, 113 Cal.App.5th at p. 791.) Thus, the trial
court did not have jurisdiction under section 1172.1 to modify the
sentence; nor did any other statute authorize the court to modify
the long-final sentence at that juncture.

9
notice of appeal has been filed.”5 (§ 1237.1.) Thus, the trial court
had jurisdiction to correct the miscalculated presentence custody
credit. (See People v. Millsap (2025) 114 Cal.App.5th 368, 376
[section 1237.1 “vest[s] jurisdiction in trial courts to correct
custody credits . . . pending appeal”]; People v. Boyd (2024)
103 Cal.App.5th 56, 70 [custody credit “miscalculation claims
may either be presented to the trial court at sentencing or, during
a direct appeal, to the trial court or reviewing court, depending
on the circumstances”].)6

5 Section 1237.1 is one of the exceptions to the general rule
that “ ‘an appeal from an order [or judgment] in a criminal case
removes the subject matter of that order [or judgment] from the
jurisdiction of the trial court.’ ” (People v. Jenkins (2019)
40 Cal.App.5th 30, 37.) Another such exception is for the
correction of “any error in the imposition or calculation of fines,
penalty assessments, surcharges, fees, or costs.” (§ 1237.2; see
Jenkins, at p. 37.) The trial court “retains jurisdiction after a
notice of appeal has been filed” to correct errors in imposing or
calculating fines and fees, and, as with errors in the calculation of
presentence credits, where such errors are the sole issue on
appeal, the defendant must have requested the trial court correct
the errors or the appeal must be dismissed. (§ 1237.2; see People
v. Torres (2020) 44 Cal.App.5th 1081, 1085.)
6 In People v. Boyd, supra, 103 Cal.App.5th at page 70, the
court appeared to conclude that under section 1237.1, a trial
court does not retain jurisdiction to correct an error in the
calculation of presentence custody credit after the remittitur has
issued following an appeal, but rather only has authority to
correct calculations errors before and during the pendency of the
appeal. Because of the posture of our case, we need not address
whether section 1237.1 bestows a trial court with jurisdiction to
correct such errors after an appeal has concluded. However, we

10
C. We Have Appellate Jurisdiction To Modify the Judgment To
Correct the Amount of Credit Awarded to Taft
In addition to conferring jurisdiction on trial courts to
correct the calculation of credit after sentencing, section 1237.1
provides that a defendant may appeal the judgment of conviction
on the ground of such a calculation error if the defendant raised
the error at the time of sentencing, or if he or she moved for
correction of the error (in writing) after sentencing. (§ 1237.1
[“No appeal shall be taken by the defendant from a judgment of
conviction on the ground of an error in the calculation of
presentence custody credits, unless the defendant first presents
the claim in the trial court at the time of sentencing, or if the
error is not discovered until after sentencing, the defendant first
makes a motion for correction of the record in the trial court,
which may be made informally in writing.”].) Taft’s appellate
counsel requested in his letter of September 9, 2025 that the trial
court correct the record to reflect the proper amount of custody
credit, and the court denied his request. Thus, we have
jurisdiction under section 1237.1 to hear Taft’s appeal on the

note that the language of section 1237.1 is ambiguous in this
respect, as it states that “[t]he trial court retains jurisdiction
after a notice of appeal has been filed” to correct such errors.
(Italics added.) In the analogous context of a request to correct
errors in the imposition or calculation of fines or fees under
section 1237.2 (see fn. 5, ante), another division of this court
interpreted the identical language in that provision and
concluded that the jurisdiction bestowed on the trial court by
section 1237.2 “does not extend beyond the pendency of a
defendant’s direct appeal.” (People v. Torres, supra,
44 Cal.App.5th at p. 1088.)

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issue of the calculation of credit. In light of the conceded error in
calculating the credit, we order the judgment of conviction to be
modified to reflect Taft is entitled to 400 days of presentence
custody credit (200 confinement and 200 conduct).

DISPOSITION

The judgment is modified to reflect Taft is entitled to 400
days of presentence custody credit (200 confinement and 200
conduct). On issuance of the remittitur, the superior court is
directed to prepare and transmit a modified abstract of judgment
to the parties and the CDCR.

STONE, J.
We concur:

SEGAL, Acting P. J.

GIZA, J.*


Judge of the Los Angeles County Superior Court, assigned
by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the
California Constitution.

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