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March 20, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

People v. Arcos CA4/1

California Court of Appeal

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: D084938

• Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

• Opinion

• Authorities (3)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (69.1K)

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Combined Opinion

Filed 3/20/26 P. v. Arcos CA4/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

THE PEOPLE, D084938

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super. Ct. No. INF1200051)

v.

ROLAND JIMENEZ ARCOS,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Riverside County,

David A. Gunn, Judge.* Affirmed.
James M. Crawford, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters and Charles C.
Ragland, Assistant Attorneys General, Arlene A. Sevidal, Michael D. Butera
and Andrew Mestman, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and
Respondent.

• Retired Judge of the Orange Superior Court assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution. In 2015, a jury convicted Roland Jimenez Arcos of first degree murder and street terrorism. Thereafter, the trial court sentenced Arcos to 52 years to life in state prison. In 2022, after changes to the state’s murder laws,

Arcos filed a petition for resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.6.1 In
2024, the trial court summarily denied the petition.
On appeal from that denial, Arcos argues the trial court erred by
concluding he was ineligible for relief as a matter of law at the prima facie
stage of the proceeding because the record of conviction did not conclusively
establish the jury found he harbored the requisite intent to kill. As we shall
explain, we reject Arcos’s argument and affirm the order denying his petition
for resentencing.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The following short summary of the facts is taken from our prior
nonpublished opinion affirming Arcos’s judgment, People v. Magallanes, et al.
(March 27, 2018, D072864) (Magallanes).
“On New Year’s Eve in 2011, Angela P. walked with some of her
children and their friends to a convenience store to purchase food. The group
included Angela P., her two minor sons and daughter, and Angela P.’s
daughter’s boyfriend Marcello Moscozo. As they walked, they came upon a
white Cadillac driven by a Hispanic female. Angela P. heard a male in the
car, Johnathan Villafan, shout ‘Brownstown,’ which was the name of a local
criminal street gang of which Johnathan Villafan was a member. Angela P.
also heard someone from the car say another derogatory term relating to a
rival gang. She told everyone to stay quiet and to keep walking. Johnathan
Villafan ran to the home of a fellow gang member, Raymond Gallardo, who

1 Subsequent undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.

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then went to the convenience store and told one of Angela P.’s sons that
Gallardo’s friends were going to shoot them.
“Angela P. and the others started walking home when they were
approached by a truck driven by Erik Godina, who was then a Brownstown
gang member. In the truck with Godina were Magallanes, Arcos and Jesse
Villafan, also Brownstown gang members. One of the passengers, who
Angela P. later identified as Magallanes, threatened Angela P. with a gun
after invoking the name Brownstown but then reentered the truck, which
left. After Angela P.’s group ran and scattered throughout a trailer park,
Godina and the other gang members returned in the truck. Magallanes
exited and began shooting at Angela P. and the others. Finally, Moscozo
pushed Angela P. aside and ran toward Magallanes. Moscozo’s body was
later found near a fence in the trailer park; he died from multiple gunshots to
his head, neck and back.
“Godina, who had entered into a plea agreement in exchange for his
testimony, testified that after the shooting, Magallanes admitted he ran after
an individual in the trailer park and shot him in the back and head several
times.” (Magallanes, supra, D072864.)
On August 24, 2015, the Riverside County District Attorney filed an
amended information charging Arcos and Magallanes with murder (§ 187,
subd. (a); count 1), attempted murder (§§ 664, 187; counts 2–5); and street
terrorism (§ 186.22, subd. (a); count 6). As to count 1, the information alleged
Arcos and Magallanes were principals, and at least one principal personally
and intentionally discharged a firearm that proximately caused great bodily
injury and death (§ 12022.53, subd. (d)). As to counts 2 through 5, the
information alleged Arcos personally and intentionally discharged a firearm
(§ 12022.53, subds. (c), (e)); and as to counts 1 through 5, the information also

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alleged the crimes were committed for the benefit of, at the direction of, and
in association with a criminal street gang (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)(C).
After deliberations, the jury found Arcos guilty of first degree murder
and street terrorism and found true the firearm and street terrorism
enhancements alleged as to count 1. On February 5, 2016, the trial court
sentenced Arcos to 52 years to life in state prison. The sentence was
comprised of two consecutive 25-year-to-life terms for count 1 and the firearm
enhancement, plus a two-year term for count 6.
On April 18, 2022, Arcos filed a petition for resentencing under former
section 1170.95, now section 1172.6. (Stats. 2022, ch. 58, § 10.) The People
did not file a written opposition to the petition, but at the prima facie hearing
on August 9, 2024, opposed the motion and asked the court to take judicial
notice of the jury instructions provided during the underlying murder trial.
At the hearing, the trial court granted the request for judicial notice and
denied the petition. Arcos filed a timely notice of appeal from the denial
order.
DISCUSSION
I
“The Legislature enacted Senate Bill [No.] 1437 ‘to more equitably
sentence offenders in accordance with their involvement in homicides.’
(Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 1(b).) The Legislature recognized, ‘It is a bedrock
principle of the law and of equity that a person should be punished for his or
her actions according to his or her own level of individual culpability.’ (Id.,
§ 1(d).) With this purpose in mind, Senate Bill [No.] 1437 ‘amend[ed] the
felony murder rule and the natural and probable consequences doctrine, as it
relates to murder, to ensure that murder liability is not imposed on a person
who is not the actual killer, did not act with the intent to kill, or was not a

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major participant in the underlying felony who acted with reckless
indifference to human life.’ (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 1(f).) Outside of the
felony-murder rule, ‘a conviction for murder requires that a person act with
malice aforethought. A person’s culpability for murder must be premised
upon that person’s own actions and subjective mens rea.’ (Id., § 1(g).)”
(People v. Curiel (2023) 15 Cal.5th 433, 448 (Curiel).)
“Senate Bill [No.] 1437 altered the substantive law of murder in two
areas. First, with certain exceptions, it narrowed the application of the
felony-murder rule by adding section 189, subdivision (e) to the Penal Code.
(Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 3.) Under that provision, ‘A participant in the
perpetration or attempted perpetration of a [specified felony] in which a
death occurs is liable for murder only if one of the following is proven: ¶ The person was the actual killer. ¶ The person was not the actual
killer, but, with the intent to kill, aided, abetted, counseled, commanded,
induced, solicited, requested, or assisted the actual killer in the commission
of murder in the first degree. ¶ The person was a major participant in
the underlying felony and acted with reckless indifference to human life, as
described in subdivision (d) of Section 190.2.’ (§ 189, subd. (e).)” (Curiel,
supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 448.)
“Second, Senate Bill [No.] 1437 imposed a new requirement that, except
in cases of felony murder, ‘a principal in a crime shall act with malice
aforethought’ to be convicted of murder. (§ 188, subd. (a)(3).) ‘Malice shall
not be imputed to a person based solely on his or her participation in a crime.’
(Ibid.) One effect of this requirement was to eliminate liability for murder as
an aider and abettor under the natural and probable consequences doctrine.
([People v.] Gentile [(2020)] 10 Cal.5th [830,] 846.) ‘[U]nder the natural and
probable consequences doctrine, an accomplice is guilty not only of the offense

5
he or she directly aided or abetted (i.e., the target offense), but also of any
other offense committed by the direct perpetrator that was the “natural and
probable consequence” of the crime the accomplice aided and abetted (i.e., the
nontarget offense). [Citation.] A nontarget offense is the natural and
probable consequence of a target offense “if, judged objectively, the
[nontarget] offense was reasonably foreseeable.” [Citation.] The accomplice
need not actually foresee the nontarget offense. “Rather, liability ‘ “is
measured by whether a reasonable person in the defendant’s position would
have or should have known that the charged offense was a reasonably
foreseeable consequence of the act aided and abetted.” ’ ” ’ (Id. at pp. 843–
844.) Thus, under prior law, a defendant who aided and abetted an intended
assault could be liable for murder, if the murder was the natural and
probable consequence of the intended assault. (Id. at p. 844.) The defendant
need not have intended the murder or even subjectively appreciated the
natural and probable consequences of the intended crime. (Id. at pp. 843–
844.) Senate Bill [No.] 1437 ended this form of liability for murder.” (Curiel,
supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 449.)
“Senate Bill [No.] 1437 also enacted former section 1170.95, which
created a procedural mechanism ‘for those convicted of felony murder or
murder under the natural and probable consequences doctrine to seek relief’
where the two substantive changes described above affect a defendant’s
conviction.” (Curiel, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 449.) Two years later, by the
passage of Senate Bill No. 775 on October 5, 2021, the Legislature expanded
the scope of the law “to encompass, among other things, murder convictions
‘under the natural and probable consequences doctrine or other theory under
which malice is imputed to a person based solely on that person’s
participation in a crime.’ ” (People v. Langi (2022) 73 Cal.App.5th 972, 978

6
(Langi).) Senate Bill No. 775 also expanded the law to include those
convicted of attempted murder under a theory of liability abrogated by
Senate Bill [No.] 1437, codified “certain aspects of [the Supreme Court’s]
decision in [People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952 ], and clarif[ied] the
procedure and burden of proof at the evidentiary hearing stage of
proceedings. (Stats. 2021, ch. 551, § 1.)” (Curiel, at p. 449.) Senate Bill
No. 775 became effective on January 1, 2022. (Stats. 2021, ch. 551.) The
following year, the Legislature renumbered section 1170.95 to section 1172.6
without substantive change. (Stats. 2022, ch. 58, § 10.)
The resentencing “process begins with the filing of a petition containing
a declaration that all requirements for eligibility are met ([§ 1172.6],
subd. (b)(1)(A)).” (People v. Strong (2022) 13 Cal.5th 698, 708.) “When the
trial court receives a petition containing the necessary declaration and other
required information, the court must evaluate the petition ‘to determine
whether the petitioner has made a prima facie case for relief.’ (§ 1172.6,
subd. (c); [citation].) If the petition and record in the case establish
conclusively that the defendant is ineligible for relief, the trial court may
dismiss the petition. (See § 1172.6, subd. (c); [citation].)” (Strong, at p. 708.)
If the petitioner states a prima facie case for relief, the court must issue an
order to show cause and, in most cases, set an evidentiary hearing to
determine whether to vacate the conviction, recall the sentence, and
resentence the petitioner on any remaining counts. (§ 1172.6, subds. (c),
(d)(1).)
“In determining whether the petitioner has carried the burden of
making the requisite prima facie showing he falls within the provisions of
section 1172.6 and is entitled to relief, the superior court properly examines
the record of conviction, ‘allowing the court to distinguish petitions with

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potential merit from those that are clearly meritless.’ (Lewis, supra, 11
Cal.5th at p. 971.) However, ‘the prima facie inquiry under [section 1172.6,]
subdivision (c) is limited. … “ ‘[T]he court takes petitioner’s factual
allegations as true and makes a preliminary assessment regarding whether
the petitioner would be entitled to relief if his or her factual allegations were
proved. If so, the court must issue an order to show cause.’ ” ... “However, if
the record, including the court’s own documents, ‘contain[s] facts refuting the
allegations made in the petition,’ then ‘the court is justified in making a
credibility determination adverse to the petitioner.’ ” ’ ” (People v. Patton
(2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 649, 655–656, fn. omitted, review granted June 28,
2023, S279670.)
“We independently review a trial court’s determination on whether a
petitioner has made a prima facie showing.” (People v. Harden (2022) 81
Cal.App.5th 45, 52.)
II
Arcos asserts the trial court erred by concluding he did not make a
prima facie case for relief. Specifically, he contends the jury instructions in
his case left open the possibility that the jury convicted him of first degree
murder without finding he harbored the specific intent to kill, because the
aiding and abetting instruction did not “ ‘state that the aider and abetter
must himself have known that the act he aided was life-threatening, or that
he must himself have acted with indifference to human life.’ ” In support of
this assertion, Arcos relies on People v. Powell (2021) 63 Cal.App.5th 689
(Powell), Langi, supra, 73 Cal.App.5th 972, and People v. Maldonado (2023)
87 Cal.App.5th 1257 (Maldonado).
These cases, however, have critical differences from Arcos’s case.
Powell and Langi considered convictions for aiding and abetting an implied

8
malice murder, not premeditated first degree murder, while Maldonado
addressed aiding and abetting liability for first degree murder based on lying
in way, not premeditation. (See Powell, supra, 63 Cal.App.5th at pp. 710–718
[holding instructional error related to a conviction for aiding and abetting
second degree implied malice murder was harmless]; Langi, supra, 73
Cal.App.5th at p. 976 [reversing denial of section 1172.6 petition for
conviction for aiding and abetting implied malice murder where instructions
failed to foreclose conviction based on imputed malice]; and Maldonado,
supra, 87 Cal.App.5th at p. 1262 [reversing denial of section 1172.6 petition
where instructions did not foreclose imputation of malice because “ ‘[i]f the
act which the perpetrator intends to commit while lying in wait results in a
killing which satisfies the elements of murder, it is immaterial whether the
perpetrator intended to kill’ ”].) In each of these three cases, the Court of
Appeal concluded the jury instructions did not foreclose the possibility that
the defendant was convicted without the jury finding he harbored the
requisite intent to kill. Here, however, the jury instructions required the jury
to find Arcos himself harbored the specific intent to kill or to aid and abet a
killing.
Arcos’s jury received standard aiding and abetting instructions,
CALCRIM Nos. 400 and 401; homicide and murder instructions, CALCRIM
Nos. 500 and 520; and an instruction on first degree—willful, deliberate and
premeditated—murder, CALCRIM No. 521. Critically, at trial, the jury was
not instructed on the natural and probable consequences doctrine, felony
murder, or on any other theory of liability that would have allowed the jury
to impute malice to Arcos. The jury was instructed that murder requires
malice aforethought; the first degree murder at issue in this case required

9
premeditation; and, if the jury could not find premeditation to kill beyond a

reasonable doubt, it could not convict Arcos of first degree murder.2
Further, the jury was correctly instructed on aiding and abetting
liability, which required the jury to find Arcos guilty as an aider and abettor

2 CALCRIM No. 500 stated: “Homicide is the killing of one human being
by another. Murder and Manslaughter are types of homicide. The defendant
is charged with murder. Manslaughter is a lesser offense to murder.”

CALCRIM No. 520 stated: “The defendant is charged in Count 1 with
murder in violation of Penal Code section 187. [¶] To prove that the
defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that: [¶] 1. The
defendant committed an act that caused the death of another person; [¶]
AND [¶] 2. When the defendant acted, he had a state of mind called malice
aforethought. [¶] There are two kinds of malice aforethought, express malice
and implied malice. Proof of either is sufficient to establish the state of mind
required for murder. [¶] The defendant acted with express malice if he
unlawfully intended to kill. [¶] . . . [¶] If you decide that the defendant
committed murder, it is murder of the second degree, unless the People have
proved beyond a reasonable doubt that it is murder of the first degree as
defined in CALCRIM No. 521.”

CALCRIM No. 521 stated: “The defendant is guilty of first degree
murder if the People have proved that he acted willfully, deliberately, and
with premeditation. The defendant acted willfully if he intended to kill. The
defendant acted deliberately if he carefully weighed the considerations for
and against his choice and, knowing the consequences, decided to kill. The
defendant acted with premeditation if he decided to kill before completing the
acts that caused death. [¶] … [¶] The People have the burden of proving
beyond a reasonable doubt that the killing was first degree murder rather
than a lesser crime. If the People have not met this burden, you must find
the defendant not guilty of first degree murder and the murder is second
degree murder.”

10
only if it concluded he personally harbored the requisite intent to kill.3 The
jury was told that, to convict Arcos as an aider and abettor, it had to find that
he knew of the direct perpetrator’s unlawful purpose to kill (because that was
the only target offense), and Arcos, with the intent to commit, encourage, or
facilitate the commission of the killing, aided, abetted, promoted, or
instigated the killing. Unlike Powell, Langi, and Maldonado, in Arcos’s case
there was no potential target offense aside from intentional murder. (See
Powell, supra, 63 Cal.App.5th at p. 714 [aiding and abetting instruction was
error because it failed to tell jury the aider and abetter must have intended to

3 CALCRIM No. 400 stated: “A person may be guilty of a crime in two
ways. One, -he or she may have directly committed the crime. I will call that
person the perpetrator. Two, he or she may have aided and abetted a
perpetrator, who directly committed the crime. [¶] A person is guilty of a
crime whether he or she committed it personally or aided and abetted the
perpetrator.”

CALCRIM No. 401 stated: “To prove that the defendant is guilty of a
crime based on aiding and abetting that crime, the People must prove that:
[¶] 1. The perpetrator committed the crime; [¶] 2. The defendant knew that
the perpetrator intended to commit the crime; [¶] 3. Before or during the
commission of the crime, the defendant intended to aid and abet the
perpetrator in committing the crime; [¶] AND [¶] 4. The defendant’s words or
conduct did in fact aid and abet the perpetrator’s commission of the crime.
[¶] Someone aids and abets a crime if he or she knows of the perpetrator’s
unlawful purpose and he or she specifically intends to, and does in fact, aid,
facilitate, promote, encourage, or instigate the perpetrator’s commission of
that crime. [¶] If all of these requirements are proved, the defendant does
not need to actually have been present when the crime was committed to be
guilty as an aider and abettor. [¶] If you conclude that defendant was
present at the scene of the crime or failed to prevent the crime, you may
consider that fact in determining whether the defendant was an aider and
abettor. However, the fact that a person is present at the scene of a crime or
fails to prevent the crime does not, by itself, make him or her an aider and
abettor.”

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aid murder, not just an act “the natural and probable consequences of which
are dangerous to human life”]; Langi, supra, 73 Cal.App.5th at p. 982 [“Since
the perpetrator’s purpose need not have been to kill the victim [rather only to
strike or injure him], the aider and abettor’s knowledge of that purpose
similarly need not have been knowledge that the perpetrator aimed to kill.”];
Maldonado, supra, 87 Cal.App.5th at p. 1262 [“Unlike first degree
premeditated murder, ‘nothing in section 189 requires the lying in wait to
have been done with the intent to kill.’ ”].)
Based on the instructions provided to Arcos’s jury, it convicted him of
first degree murder. The jury necessarily found Arcos personally harbored
intent to kill, either as the direct perpetrator or as a direct aider and abettor.
The instructions did not leave open the possibility of imputing malice to him
solely based on the state of mind of Magallanes. Because of this, Arcos is
ineligible for relief as a matter of law, and the trial court properly denied his
section 1172.6 petition. (See, e.g., People v. Daniel (2020) 57 Cal.App.5th 666,
677 [defendant ineligible for relief where the jury was not instructed on
felony murder or the natural and probable consequences doctrine and,
therefore, was not convicted on any theory involving the imputation of
malice].)
DISPOSITION
The order is affirmed.

MCCONNELL, P. J.

WE CONCUR:

DATO, J.

CASTILLO, J.

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