Riordan v Judicial Council - Judicial Review

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  Riordan v Complaints Review Committee of the Judicial Council (Approved) [2026] IEHC 193 (27 March 2026)

URL: https://www.bailii.org/ie/cases/IEHC/2026/2026IEHC193.html
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[2026] IEHC 193 | | |
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THE HIGH COURT

JUDICIAL REVIEW

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[2026] IEHC 193

Record No. 2025 279 JR

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BETWEEN

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DENIS RIORDAN

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APPLICANT

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AND

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COMPLAINTS REVIEW COMMITTEE OF THE JUDICIAL COUNCIL

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RESPONDENT

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JUDGMENT of Ms. Justice Siobh?n Phelan delivered on the 27 th day of March, 2026

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INTRODUCTION

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1. This matter comes before me on an opposed application for leave to proceed by way of judicial review to challenge three determinations of the Complaints Review Committee (hereinafter "CRC") of the Judicial Council.? The impugned determinations upheld earlier decisions of the Registrar of the Judicial Conduct Committee that the Applicant's Complaints against three Supreme Court judges sitting as a panel of that court in respect of his application for leave to appeal against a decision of the Court of Appeal were inadmissible.??

2. On this application, the Applicant argues that the CRC's determinations that his Complaints were inadmissible as against each of the three judges of the Supreme Court in refusing him leave to appeal are unlawful, unconstitutional, procedurally unfair and invalid.? The issue for me to determine on this application is whether the Applicant has an arguable case that the CRC acted unlawfully or irrationally in finding his complaint inadmissible and whether he was denied fair procedures in the complaints process on any of the grounds he advances.? Importantly, I am not concerned with his Complaints regarding the Supreme Court proceedings.? This intended challenge is clearly confined to the sustainability as a matter of law of the inadmissibility determinations of the CRC.

3. The Applicant appeared before me without legal representation.? The Respondent was represented by solicitor and counsel.

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BACKGROUND

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4. The Applicant brings these judicial review proceedings arising from the handling and ultimate rejection of three Complaints he made to the Judicial Council under Part 5 of the Judicial Council Act, 2019 (hereinafter "the 2019 Act") in connection with the consideration and refusal of the Applicant's application for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court in Riordan v. Irish Financial Services Appeals Tribunal, an application made under Article 34.5.3? of the Constitution.

Riordan v. Irish Financial Services Appeal Tribunal

5. In these proceedings by way of judicial review, the Applicant challenged the ?5,000 appeal fee required by the Irish Financial Services Appeals Tribunal (IFSAT) when he sought to appeal a compensation determination made under the Anglo-Irish Bank Corporation Act, 2009.? In his proceedings he argued, inter alia, that no valid legislation authorised IFSAT to charge the ?5,000 fee and the IFSAT acted ultra vires in demanding it.? In consequence, he claimed that his appeal to IFSAT was wrongly struck out for non‑payment and IFSAT failed to give sufficient reasons explaining the legal basis for the fee.

6. The High Court (Heslin J.) rejected all his claims in a publicly available written judgment (Riordan v. Irish Financial Services Appeals Tribunal [2022] IEHC 488) finding that the appeal fee was authorised under the Central Bank Act, 1942, Part VIIA, and by the 2008 IFSAT Rules, which set the fee at ?5,000.? The High Court concluded that the statutory definitions in Part VIIA apply throughout the Part, IFSAT was legally empowered to create rules imposing fees and the 2008 Rules were validly made and remained operative.? The High Court found, therefore, that IFSAT acted within its powers in requiring the Applicant to pay the appeal fee.? It also held that IFSAT gave adequate reasons and the clearly identified the statutory basis for the fee.? As the fee was validly imposed and the Applicant refused to pay it, the High Court found that IFSAT was entitled to strike out his appeal and the decision to do so was lawful, rational and compliant with fair procedures and all relief was refused.

7. The Applicant appealed to the Court of Appeal against the decision of the High Court.? The Court of Appeal delivered two publicly available judgments in October 2023 and January 2024 ([2023] IECA 236 (substantive appeal, 6 th of October, 2023) [2024] IECA 3 (costs ruling, 12 th of January, 2024).? In its decision on the substantive appeal, the Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal holding that the Assessor's determination was an " appealable decision" within the meaning of the Central Bank Act, 1942, and therefore fell within the jurisdiction of IFSAT and the 2008 IFSAT Rules, including the requirement to pay the ?5,000 appeal fee, were valid, applicable, and correctly interpreted by the High Court.? Accordingly, the Court of Appeal rejected the Applicant's argument that the determination was not an " appealable decision " for statutory purposes.? The Court of Appeal affirmed the decision of the High Court that IFSAT was lawfully entitled to require the ?5,000 fee before proceeding with the appeal.? As a result, when the Applicant declined to pay the fee, it was found that IFSAT was entitled to strike out his appeal.? In its cost ruling, the Court of Appeal found that IFSAT was entitled to its costs of both the High Court and the Court of Appeal.

8. An application for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court in turn giving rise to the Complaints at the heart of these proceedings followed from the decision of the Court of Appeal on a full appeal against the decision of the High Court.? In seeking leave of the Supreme Court to appeal, the Applicant contended that his case raised points of law of general public importance, including statutory interpretation errors, unlawful application of IFSAT Rules, lack of a proper legal basis for an " appealable decision " and issues with constitutional and procedural fairness.? He argued in the alternative that the interests of justice required the Supreme Court to correct serious alleged errors by the lower courts, a significant miscarriage of justice and violations of constitutional, EU and ECHR rights.

Supreme Court Determination

9. In its publicly available written determination issued on the 1 st of May, 2024, the Supreme Court found that the application for leave to appeal did not meet the constitutional test for leave (pursuant to Article 34.5.3?) ([2024] IESCDET 49).?

10. Applying the first limb of the test, it was found that the Applicant's intended appeal did not raise any point of law of general public importance, noting that the issues identified " appear to have no application beyond the Applicant."? The Supreme Court noted that the Applicant's Notice of Appeal " contains a detailed traverse of the reasoning of the Court of Appeal," but determined that this did not transform his points into issues of general public importance.? In arriving at the conclusion that the threshold for leave was not met, the Determination referred to the substance of the Applicant's claim in the proceedings and summarised the Court of Appeal finding that " Rule 5(1) of the Tribunal Rules provided for payment of an appeal fee of ?5,000 " noting the Court of Appeal's rejection of the Applicant's argument that no appeal fee was applicable.? The Supreme Court accepted the approach taken by the High Court and Court of Appeal was arrived at on the application of " well‑established principles of statutory interpretation."?

11. As for the second limb of the test it was also concluded that " The interests of justice do not warrant the grant of leave either."? This conclusion was informed by the fact that lower courts had already applied what the Supreme Court described as established methods of statutory interpretation.? The Supreme Court stated as follows (at para. 12):

"The interests of justice do not warrant the grant of leave either. The Applicant has had two opportunities to make his case. The High Court and Court of Appeal both comprehensively engaged with his arguments and found them to be without merit. The interests of justice would not be served by permitting a further appeal to this Court from the Court of Appeal."

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12. It was concluded that no arguable unfairness arose in the previous hearings and the Determination explicitly stated that:

"There is nothing in the papers to substantiate the assertion that the Applicant did not get a fair hearing in either the High Court or the Court of Appeal."

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13. The Determination incorrectly states that the Director opposed the application.? There was no involvement by a " Director " in the proceedings.? This is an obvious error which has no apparent bearing on the Determination arrived at.?

14. Separately, the Determination recorded the position of the Tribunal in opposing the application for leave to appeal as follows (at para. 9 of the Determination):

"The Tribunal opposes the application for leave.? It points out that the case is peculiar to the Applicant and no-one else stands to be affected by it. The Applicant had made his case to the High Court and to the Court of Appeal and both courts had "unambiguously" rejected his interpretation of the relevant provisions of the 1942 Act, the 2009 Act and the Tribunal Rules. According to the Tribunal, the decisions of the High Court and Court of Appeal involved the application of settled rules of statutory interpretation and there was nothing warranting a further appeal."

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15. As apparent from the terms of its Determination, the Supreme Court refused leave to appeal because neither requirement of Article 34.5.3? of the Constitution was satisfied as there was neither a point of law of general public importance nor did the interests of justice require the grant of leave.

Complaint under 2019 Act

16. On the 24 th of September, 2024, the Applicant submitted three Complaints alleging judicial misconduct by each of the three judges who considered and refused his application for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court in Riordan v. Irish Financial Services Appeals Tribunal.?

17. The Complaint in each case is advanced under headings which include " Integrity and Deception ", " Violation or Article 34.1 of the Constitution with regard to secret court hearing ", " Finality of Panel determination ", " Independence ", " Denial of a right to fair procedures," " Denial of rights under the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, Denial of Rights under the European Convention on Human Rights ", " Negligent Misrepresentation " and " Miscarriage of Justice " and the Complaint Form as signed by the Applicant dated the 23 rd of September, 2024, is 134 paragraphs long.?

18. In each case it is alleged that the judges engaged in judicial misconduct during the leave to appeal process, including that a panel of three judges met " in secret conclave " in chambers on the 29 th of April, 2024 and again on the 26 th of June, 2024 (reflected in listings appearing in the Legal Diary), that no record of proceedings on those days was kept and that the Applicant was denied the opportunity to be heard or present submissions. ?The Applicant asserted that such panel meetings were not authorised by the Constitution, by statute, or by court rules and did not constitute sittings of " the Supreme Court established by law."? In his Complaints, the Applicant claimed, inter alia, that the way his leave application was processed violated the Constitution, his procedural rights and EU/ECHR guarantees.?

19. In broad summary outline, the Applicant alleges that the judges falsely characterised a private panel meeting in chambers as a sitting of the " Supreme Court established by law. "? He relies on the constitutional requirement that justice be administered in public and further contends that a " Panel determination " is not a " decision of the Supreme Court " within Article 34.5.6 and therefore the judges engaged in improper conduct by describing their determination as " final and conclusive." ?

20. The Applicant also claims that the three-judge panel of the Supreme Court misrepresented the law by setting out the findings in the Court of Appeal to the effect that the 2008 IFSAT Rules required a ?5,000 appeal fee, arguing instead that: the Rules were ultra vires, they referred to the abolished Regulatory Authority, and his case involved no " appealable decision " under the Central Bank Act, 1942.? He asserts that multiple statements in the judges' determination were " blatantly untrue," including that his Complaints were not particularised, that the Director opposed his application and that the issues did not give rise to points of law of general public importance.? It is his case that " untrue " statements of this kind constitute judicial misconduct.

21. It bears note that in the terms of his Complaints, the Applicant referred to the wording of Article 34.5.3? of the Constitution which vests the Supreme Court with appellate jurisdiction from the Court of Appeal " subject to such regulations as may be prescribed by law ", and the provisions of the Court of Appeal Act, 2014 amended s. 7 of the Courts (Supplemental Provisions) Act, 1961 (s.7(10)-(11)) which expressly authorises the Supreme Court to determine leave applications " otherwise than with an oral hearing."? He also referred to Order 58 of the Rules of the Superior Courts, which governs the procedural rules for Supreme Court appeals and which, together with Supreme Court Practice Direction No. 19, provides that applications for leave to appeal are considered on the papers, the Court determines these applications in panels, not necessarily as a full Court and that the Court may sit in divisions as organised by the Chief Justice.? Notwithstanding his reference to these provisions in his Complaints under the 2019 Act, the Applicant contends that a panel meeting of three judges sitting in chambers " in secret " is not authorised by law.

22. In essence, the Applicant's Complaints under the 2019 Act were thus largely constructed on the assertion that the Supreme Court leave procedure used in his case was constitutionally invalid and in consequence the conduct of the three-judge panel amounted to misconduct, deception and abuse of power.

Registrar's Inadmissibility Determination

23. In accordance with the 2019 Act, the Registrar of the Judicial Conduct Committee notified each judge of the Complaint and proceeded to assess admissibility under s.53 of the 2019 Act.

24. By written determination dated the 3 rd of October, 2024, the Registrar decided that each Complaint was inadmissible.? In his consideration of the matters complained of, the Registrar noted that a substantial part of each Complaint involved argument in relation to the constitutional role of a Supreme Court Judge, and the legality of the judge's action having regard to that role based on the Applicant's own views of what constitutes the judge's role. The Complaints were also described as founded in the Applicant's understanding of the application of the Constitution and the various legislative provisions relevant to his Supreme Court leave application.?The Registrar pointed out:

" There is much less focus on the judge's conduct, being what he did or did not do. Those actions are that, by his actions or inactions, the judge did not act in accordance with law."

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The Registrar added:

" I would observe that the judge's role as described and what is complained of appears to be standard conduct for any Supreme Court Judge dealing with such a leave application, and therefore by the complainant's own account, the judge's role as a panel member is unremarkable and his conduct is as expected in that context."

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He continued:

"Briefly, the complainant alleges that the judge ought to have known and consequently ought to have decided himself that he was carrying out a role which was not lawful. By embarking on a process which the judge should have known was unlawful, charges of "stated misbehaviour" by the judge are alleged.

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It is undoubtedly the position that this complaint is not in reality a complaint in relation to a judge's conduct, but a complaint about the legal provisions under which the judge lawfully acted, and with which the complainant is dissatisfied. The belief that there could be any misconduct by a judge acting in accordance with the Constitution, legislation, rules of court and Practice Directions because a complainant has formed a view that the various provisions are unlawful is misguided."

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25. The Registrar then addressed the admissibility criteria under s. 53(2) and (3) of the 2019 Act.? He was satisfied that the Applicant was a person directly affected by the conduct complained of and therefore entitled to bring a complaint under the 2019 Act.? It was also found that the Applicant had complied with the procedures specified under s. 52 of the 2019 Act and the Complaints were in the correct form.? He then considered, however, whether the conducted alleged constituted " judicial misconduct " as defined under s. 2 of the 2019 Act.? Having set out the definition, the Registrar then stated:

"In considering the entirety of this complaint, the allegation is that the judge is guilty of judicial misconduct by reason of him acting otherwise than in accordance with law. The position here however is that it is the complainant's own interpretation of those laws upon which he relies upon, and which ground his complaint.

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I do not share the complainant's interpretation of those provisions. It is also at odds with the established procedure in the Supreme Court in relation to all cases seeking leave where an oral hearing is not directed.? In addition, regardless of my view, those legal provisions enjoy the presumption of being lawful.? It seems that they are interpreted by the complainant as set out by him in order to achieve a certain purpose, being to undermine the decisions of a properly constituted panel and the process by which it reached its decisions through a judicial complaint.? As stated, it is clear that in reality the issue the complainant has is with the legal provisions themselves, rather than the conduct of a judge carrying out his judicial function in accordance with those lawful provisions.? Whether or not there is a remedy by some other avenue, there is no remedy within the judicial complaints function to address such concerns.

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As described by the complainant himself, I can only conclude that the judge's conduct as complained of was in accordance with the law as it stands and the procedure in the Supreme Court and cannot be of any concern. The complainant in effect seeks to complain about the judge for adhering to the law in circumstances where, it is alleged, he ought to have somehow concluded that he was acting ** unlawfully because, according to the complainant, the basis for his authority to deal with the application is unlawful. This is a circular argument based on the complainant's misinterpretation of the legal provisions grounding the empanelment of Supreme Court Judges dealing with an application for leave and the process which follows. There is no basis for any finding of misconduct in such circumstances. "

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26. The Registrar noted that for a complaint to constitute judicial misconduct b oth (a) a departure from acknowledged standards of judicial conduct and (b) conduct which brings the administration of justice into disrepute must be present.? Identifying the relevant principles in the 2019 Act and in the guidelines as independence, integrity, impartiality, propriety, equality, competence and diligence, the Registrar next addressed the two categories constituting judicial misconduct under the 2019 Act in turn.? Noting that the judge in each case acted in accordance with law and established procedures, the Registrar found there to be no substantiated conduct which could possibly constitute a breach of any guideline or judicial standard.? He further found there to be no conduct disclosed other than the conduct of a judge acting in accordance with law in a manner which is expected of a Judge of the Supreme Court.? He concluded that the matters alleged could not, even if substantiated, bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

27. As neither of the two criteria necessary to establish judicial misconduct were present in the Complaints, he concluded:

"the conduct is therefore not judicial misconduct and consequently the complaint is not admissible having regard to section 53 (2) (b) of the Act."

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28. Separately, the Registrar considered whether the Complaints were also " frivolous and vexatious " within the meaning of s. 53(2)(d), noting that the term " frivolous " as judicially interpreted simply means that a complaint cannot succeed.? In this regard, he referred to s. 93 of the 2019 Act which provides t hat nothing in the Act shall be construed as operating to interfere with (a) the performance by the courts of their functions, or (b) The exercise by a judge of his or her judicial functions.? As the Complaints asked the Judicial Conduct Committee to interfere with or re-examine the decisions of a judge carrying out such a judicial function, the Registrar considered that admitting the Complaints was also precluded on an application of s. 93.? The Registrar noted that the Committee cannot declare the law under which t he judge acted to be unlawful in order to find the judge guilty of misconduct but is confined to consideration of the judge's conduct (as opposed to the underlying law).? The Registrar observed:

"This complaint shows a significant misunderstanding of the scope of the committee's powers, and accordingly has no prospect of success."

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29. In an exercise of completeness, the Registrar also considered the admissibility of the Complaints under s.53(3) of the 2019 Act concluding that s.53 (3)(b), which provides that conduct relating solely to " the merits of a decision in proceedings before the judge concerned is not admissible," applied in this case to render the Complaints inadmissible.? In this regard he found:

"e very single allegation of misconduct, however described or labelled, relates solely to the making of a decision by the judge in these proceedings.? Whether, as alleged, deciding to constitute part of an unlawful panel, making erroneous decisions or making decisions without legal authority, the entire complaint relates to the merits of the decisions made.

30. It was noted that the Complaints were also out of time (as it was not made within three months of the alleged conduct) insofar as conducted alleged on the 29 th of April, 2024, was concerned but that an application for an extension of time could be made were the Complaints otherwise admissible.? The Complaints in respect of conduct on the 26 th of June, 2024, were noted to be in time.

31. In summary, therefore, for reasons elaborated upon in some detail in his written determination and summarised above, the Registrar found the Complaints inadmissible on the basis that the matters complained of related solely to decisions or conduct occurring within judicial proceedings based only on the Applicant's interpretation of the law which he contended the judges must know to be wrong and constituted a complaint in respect of the merits of the decision of the members of the Supreme Court panel. ?In summation, the Registrar concluded that the Complaints were not admissible because they did not disclose conduct which could, if substantiated, constitute judicial misconduct as required by s. 53(2)(b), were frivolous and vexatious within the meaning of s. 53(2)(d) and were excluded by s.53(3)(b).

32. The Applicant was notified that he could seek a review of these determinations by the CRC pursuant to s. 56 of the 2019.? The Applicant duly requested such reviews on the 30 th of October, 2024.

Review by CRC

33. Under s.56 of the 2019 Act, the Registrar referred the Complaints together with all material in his possession to the CRC. The CRC met on the 4 th of December, 2024, considered the admissibility of each Complaint and concluded that all three were inadmissible. The CRC issued three written determinations on the 17 th of December, 2024, affirming the Registrar's conclusions, albeit on narrower grounds. ?

34. In a separate written decision on its review of the determination by the Registrar in each case, the CRC decision records in express terms that it considered the Complaint ab initio.? The Complaint was summarised with reference to the headings provided (set out at para. 16 ?above).? Sections 2 and 7(1)(b) of the 2019 Act defining " judicial misconduct " and referring to high standards of conduct among judges, having regard to the principles of judicial conduct requiring judges to uphold and exemplify judicial independence, impartiality, integrity, propriety (including the appearance of propriety), competence and diligence and to ensure equality of treatment to all persons before the courts are cited under the heading of " Relevant Statutory Provisions ".? Section 53 of the Act dealing with " admissibility- of complaints " is quoted as to its relevant parts and the right to review under s.56 (1) is set out.? The decision of the Registrar was summarised.

35. The CRC recorded that having considered the documentation furnished by the Complainant, it was clear that no " judicial misconduct " had been identified by the Complainant stating:

"The complaint relates to the decisions taken and procedures followed by the Judge in the course of hearing the Complainant's application for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court from a decision of the Court of Appeal. Article 34.5.3 provides: -

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"The Supreme Court shall, subject to such regulations as may be prescribed by law, have appellate jurisdiction from a decision of the Court of Appeal... "

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The Judge was following those regulations in considering the leave application. Further, the principles applied by the Supreme Court in determining whether to grant or refuse leave to appeal have been considered in a large number of determinations including, in particular, BS v Director of Public Prosecutions [2017] IESCDET 134.

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The complaint made by the Complainant also relates "the merits of a decision in proceedings before the Judge concerned.." (s. 53(3)(b))."

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36. In sum, the CRC found that the Complaints were inadmissible under s.53(3) of the 2019 Act because they related solely to the judges' conduct within established procedures and to the merits and outcomes of judicial decisions.? The names of the three members of the Committee composed of two judges and one lay person appear at the bottom of the decision in typescript.

37. Following the CRC decisions, the Applicant engaged in further correspondence with the Judicial Conduct Committee by letter dated the 6 th of February, 2025, disputing the processes followed, seeking transcripts, records and procedural clarifications and alleging that he had been denied fair procedures in the review process. ?The Judicial Conduct Committee responded by letter dated the 13 th of ?February, 2025, confirming that reviews are decided on the papers, that no oral hearing is contemplated at the admissibility stage and that determinations need not be signed by individual members, consistent with statutory requirements and case‑law.

PROCEEDINGS

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38. Dissatisfied with the CRC's determinations and the response to his correspondence, the Applicant initiated these judicial review proceedings by filing papers in the Central Office on the 3 rd of March, 2025. ?

39. In the case as pleaded, the Applicant argues that the Registrar wrongly found his Complaints inadmissible by treating them as attacks on judicial decisions rather than allegations of misconduct.? He makes a similar complaint as against the CRC to that made against the three judges of the panel of the Supreme Court by contending in these proceedings that the CRC's review was procedurally unfair, secretive and lacking transparency.? He complains that he was denied the opportunity to participate, make submissions and the right to correct errors.? He points to the fact that the determinations were unsigned and claims they were unsupported by evidence.? He maintains that the CRC misapplied the admissibility provisions in s.53 of the 2019 Act and contends that the CRC should have found his Complaints admissible and proceeded to a formal investigation.? In these proceedings he seeks orders quashing the inadmissibility determinations and requiring the Respondent to reconsider his Complaints in accordance with law.?

40. The application was grounded on affidavits sworn by the Applicant exhibiting relevant documents including:

i. The Application for Leave to Appeal to the Supreme Court;

ii. The Supreme Court determination dated 30/4/2025 and Order dated 26/7/2024;

iii. The Complaints submitted to the Judicial Conduct Committee re: each of the three judges;

iv. The Registrar's determination with reference to each complaint;

v. The CRC's Determination with reference to each case;

vi. The Supreme Court Determination in BS ?v- Director of Public Prosecutions [2017] IESCDET 134;

vii. Submissions submitted by the Applicant to the Supreme Court after receiving the Panel Determination.

41. By Order of the 7 th of April, 2025 (Simons J.) directed that the leave application proceed on notice to the Respondents directing the issue of a Notice of Motion returnable to the 20 th of May, 2025.?He amended the title to add the relevant judges as Notice Parties.? By further Order of the 20 th of May, 2025 (Simons J.) c orrected the title to the proceedings by removing the Notice Parties and allowed the Applicant to amend his Statement of Grounds.

42. Opposition to the leave application is grounded on several affidavits sworn by the Registrar to the Judicial Conduct Committee, who is also secretary to the Judicial Council (under s. 49(1) of the 2019 Act).?

43. In an affidavit sworn on the 12 th of June, 2025, the Registrar set out the complaint process and confirmed, from the contents of his file, that the complaint process was properly followed in these cases.? He exhibited the procedures specified pursuant to s. 52 of the 2019 Act and outlined the progress of a complaint once referred under the 2019 Act starting with his decision on admissibility.? He confirmed that under the procedures governing his consideration of the admissibility decision he may seek further information from the complainant or the judge or obtain the Digital Audio Recording (DAR) of a court hearing.? He further noted that if he determines a complaint admissible, then he refers it to the Judicial Conduct Committee for investigation.? He set out that where he determines the complaint inadmissible, he is obligated under s. 54(1) of the 2019 Act to notify the judge and the complainant in writing of the determination and the reasons for same and to inform the complainant of the entitlement to seek a review under s. 56 of the 2019 Act.

44. The Registrar also described the make up of the CRC, the members of which are drawn from and appointed by the Judicial Conduct Committee which is composed of two judges and one lay person noting that the membership may change from time to time.? He notes that where a review is sought, he is obliged under s. 56(2) to refer the complaint to the CRC and to notify both parties that this has been done.? In accordance with para. 8.2 of the Procedures, he is required to refer all material in his possession regarding the complaint to the CRC and not just the complaint itself.

45. The Registrar emphasised that he is barred from attending CRC meetings, protecting the independence of the review process.? He noted that the CRC have their own powers to request further information to assist in making its determination on admissibility (para. 8.3 of the Procedures) and that it may also obtain a DAR of a court hearing (para. 30.1 of the Procedures).? He explained the practice of the CRC of meeting to deal with a number of requests for review together with meetings occurring either in person or remotely with the members of the CRC attending alone.? The CRC then determines, in accordance with ss. 53(2) and (3) whether the complaint is admissible and notifies the Registrar in writing of its determination on admissibility and the reasons therefore (in accordance with s. 56(5)).? Where a complaint is determined to be inadmissible by the CRC, the Registrar notifies the complainant and the judge in accordance with s. 56(7) of the 2019 Act.? Where the complaint is found to be admissible, it is referred to the Judicial Conduct Committee.

46. He confirmed that all statutory steps were taken in that receipt of the Complaints was acknowledged, the judges were notified by letter dated the 26 th of September, 2024 (as required by s. 50(5) of the 2019 Act) and the admissibility criteria under s.53 were applied by him in deciding the Complaints inadmissible.? He confirmed that he was satisfied from his consideration of the Complaints that he did not require any further information from either the Applicant or the judges in order to make a decision on admissibility.? He confirmed issuing his determination on the 3 rd of October, 2024 and notifying the Applicant and the judges of his decisions that the Complaints were inadmissible.

47. He confirmed that between the 18 th?and the 24 th?of October, 2024, an email exchange took place between him and the Applicant regarding procedures and processes in relation to a review of a determination.? The Applicant was advised through this email exchange that there was nothing to prevent a person making submissions to the CRC and that a review is an ab initio consideration of a complaint and not a review of the Registrar's determination.? Despite this exchange, it was confirmed by the Registrar that no submissions were received from the Applicant for the purpose of the review.

48. The Registrar confirmed receipt of a request for review of his determination on the 30 th of October, 2024.? He confirmed sending the Complaints together with all material in his position to the CRC on the 28 th of November, 2024, in advance of a scheduled meeting on the 4 th of December, 2024. ?He listed the said material, all of which is exhibited in the proceedings.? He stated that it was necessary to include the determinations as, unless an initial determination is made, the CRC would have no jurisdiction to conduct a review of the Complaint.? The Registrar further explained that neither the Act nor the Procedures envisage an oral hearing for the review application of an admissibility determination but the Act expressly provides for the possibility of an oral hearing before a Panel of Inquiry in accordance with s. 69(3) and 83(3) of the 2019 Act.? While the CRC have a power to request further information, it did not choose to do so in respect of any of these Complaints.

49. The Registrar confirmed from the file that having considered the Complaints ab initio at its meeting on the 4 th of, December 2024, the CRC determined the Complaints to be inadmissible and sent their determinations to him on the 17 th of December, 2024.? In turn, he advised the Applicant and the judges of the determinations that same day.? He explained the delay between the meeting on the 4 th of December and the receipt of the determinations on the 17 th of December as being necessitated by a requirement to have the determinations typed up.? He further explained that the meeting on the 4 th of December, 2024, was a deliberation which did not take place in a court room and is not recorded.? Following the communication of the determinations, the Applicant engaged in further correspondence with the CRC in relation to their procedures and the consideration of his Complaints by letters dated the 6 th of February, 2024 and the CRC responded on the 13 th of February, 2024, dealing with his questions.

50. As for the substance of the Applicant's Complaints, the Registrar addressed them in turn pointing out that the impartiality of the CRC is ensured by provisions of the 2019 Act (referencing ss. 6 and 55 of the 2019 Act). ? He confirmed that t he Applicant was afforded all due fair procedures in accordance with constitutional fair procedures, the 2019 Act, the Procedures and the European Convention on Human Rights.?

51. In relation to the Complaints that the CRC should not have been furnished with a copy of the Registrar's determination, the Registrar pointed out that the CRC would have no jurisdiction to determine a review application unless there had been a determination at first instance. He noted that the review determinations also made clear that they considered the Applicant's Complaints ab initio.? He also referred to the fact that the review determinations set out different reasoning to the determinations at first instance.??He pointed out that there is no requirement as a matter of law for the deliberations of the CRC to be recorded.? He observed that no discernible basis had been identified by the Applicant for Complaints of institutional bias or a failure to properly construe and apply the provisions of the 2019 Act.

52. From the Registrar's Affidavit, it is clear that the application for leave is opposed on the basis that the Complaints were correctly found inadmissible, the determinations were properly reasoned, there is not requirement for oral hearings before the CRC at admissibility review stage, there is no requirement for audio recording of the CRC deliberations or detailed transcripts nor is there a requirement for signed determinations (citing Nowak v. Judicial Council [2024] IECA 216).? In consequence, it is contended on behalf of the Respondent that the Applicant has no arguable ground for judicial review and the Court is asked to refuse leave in the present proceedings.

53. A further affidavit was sworn by the Registrar and filed on the 16 th of July, 2025.? He confirmed that he was swearing the affidavit for the purpose of bringing to the attention of the Applicant and the Court a matter arising in respect of the constitution of the CRC. ?Although described as " not relevant " to any issue in the judicial review proceedings, he confirmed that he was raising the issue for the primary reason that, apart from the normal duty of candour to the Court, the Judicial Council has a particular obligation to maintain the trust of both the judiciary and the general public in the Judicial Council and in the operations of the conduct complaints system.? He confirmed that o n the 2 nd of May, 2024, he had received a letter from the Minister for Justice informing him that, in accordance with s. 26(2) of the 2019 Act, the Minister for Justice had decided to re-appoint five individuals as lay members of the Judicial Council Sentencing Guidelines and Information Committee for a second four-year term. ?Further, in accordance with s. 46(3) of the 2019 Act, the letter stated that the Minister had decided to re-appoint three individuals as lay members of the Judicial Conduct Committee for a second term.?

54. The said letter was exhibited and while redactions have been applied to the names of the relevant lay members, the Registrar confirmed that one of the relevant individuals in the context of s.46(3) of the 2019 Act and the Judicial Conduct Committee served as the lay member of the CRC that determined, on the 4 th of December, 2024, that the Applicant's Complaints were inadmissible.?

55. It is confirmed on affidavit that the lay persons identified for re-appointment in the letter of the 2 nd of May, 2024, were separately advised on behalf of the Minister that they were reappointed as lay members and that, as their first term of office was due to end on the 20 th of July, 2024, their second term would run until the 20 th of July, 2028.?

56. Subsequently, on the 28 th of May, 2025 (after these proceedings were instituted by filing papers in the Central Office and the leave application opened to the Court), the Registrar was informed by the Department of Justice that, when the lay members' four-year terms of office expired in July, 2024, there was no formal Government decision to re-appoint them. ?He was informed that this was an administrative error.?

57. The Department of Justice later informed the Registrar that, in a decision taken on the 10 th of June, 2025, the Government agreed that the reappointments which were communicated by ministerial letter on the 2 nd of May, 2024 were deemed to have taken effect from the 21 st of July, 2024.? Accordingly, it had been confirmed to the Registrar by the Department of Justice that all members were validly appointed at the date of swearing of his affidavit.

58. In the meantime, the Applicant filed a replying affidavit to the substantive affidavit opposing the grant of leave in these proceedings on the 11 th of July, 2025.? He objected that the Registrar had no authority to swear an affidavit on behalf of the CRC and was not " a witness to the proceedings before the respondent at its meeting to consider the applicant's complaints " and contended that the members of the CRC should have sworn affidavits. ?He accused the Registrar of setting out to deceive by swearing an affidavit as he had no knowledge as to:

" what was discussed, what was the cognitive analysis carried out by each member of the respondent on the applicant's complaints or what was the decision making process and reasoning by which each member of the respondent arrived at their determinations on each of the applicant's complaints at the respondents purported meeting to consider the applicant's complaints."

**

59. The Applicant objected again to the fact that the Registrar's admissibility determination had been provided to the CRC.? He contended that he did not put in submissions because he was not asked for them.? He reiterated that no provision of the 2019 Act precludes an oral hearing, maintaining that he was entitled to a public hearing, even at admissibility stage " to ensure transparency and to avoid corruption that can occur when such hearings ae held in secret conclave."? He objected that the date of the CRC determination should have been given as the date of the typed-up document and not the date the determination was made and that the typed-up version ought to have been verified and approved and signed by each member of the CRC.? He accused members of the CRC of choosing to " turn a blind eye " to the requirements of s. 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights Act, 2003 by neglecting to maintain records of their proceedings to allow for review of their decisions if subjected to judicial review.? He further accused the members of acting as witness, judge and jury in determining the admissibility as there was no one else present and that in consequence they were not impartial in making their determinations.

60. In a further replying affidavit filed on the 29 th of July, 2025, the Registrar pointed out that the members of the CRC cannot be required to give evidence as to what took place in the deliberations of the CRC as this would be contrary to the public interest.? In this Affidavit, he proceeded to reply in respect of the allegations repeated by the Applicant in sequence.

61. There was a final exchange of affidavits with an affidavit sworn by the Applicant on the 15 th of September, 2025 and by the Registrar on the 29 th of September, 2025.? At no point, however, did the Applicant respond to the Affidavit of the Registrar in July, 2025, disclosing an issue in relation to the constitution of the CRC which determined the review of the Applicant's Complaints.? He did not seek to amend his Statement of Grounds to include a challenge to the decision of the CRC on this basis nor to join the Minister for Justice as a party to the proceedings.?

62. There was no application to amend the Statement of Grounds presented in this case, notwithstanding ample opportunity to make such an application following delivery of the Registrar's Affidavit in July, 2025.? Despite this, the Applicant appeared to intimate in his written submissions filed in advance of the leave hearing on the 13 th of February, 2026, that he intended to make such an application in the future.? At paragraph 21 of the said submissions, the Applicant identified that the circumstances concerning the reappointment of the lay member was not " currently an issue in the proceedings."?

63. Even w hen presenting his application for leave in argument before me on the 5 th of March, 2026, the Applicant did not make an application for leave to amend nor outline the legal grounds of challenge he might seek to rely upon in making such an application.? Furthermore, he did not address issues of delay in bringing an application for leave to amend.? Delay is clearly a relevant factor where the Applicant had been made aware of the difficulty in July, 2025, the more so where a contemplated amendment might result in the reconstitution of proceedings by the joinder of an additional party. ?Despite the passage of almost eight months to the date of the hearing before me in March, 2026, and notwithstanding the intimation made in written submissions filed in February, 2026, the Applicant has not taken steps to apply to amend his pleadings.?

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LEGISLATIVE FRAMEWORK

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64. The central purpose of the 2019 Act is to promote and maintain high standards of judicial conduct and thereby safeguard public confidence in the administration of justice, by establishing the Judicial Council and a statutory framework for receiving, screening, reviewing, investigating and, where appropriate, sanctioning complaints of judicial misconduct.? Judicial misconduct is defined under s. 2 of the 2019 Act as:

"conduct (whether an act or omission) by a judge, whether in the execution of his or her office or otherwise, and whether generally or on a particular occasion, that ?

(i) constitutes a departure from acknowledged standards of judicial conduct, having regard to the principles of judicial conduct referred to in the 2019 Act, and

(ii) brings the administration of justice into disrepute."

65. The Act achieves its purpose by:

(i) creating institutional architecture in the form of the Judicial Council, Judicial Conduct Committee (JCC) and Complaints Review Committee (CRC);

(ii) defining admissibility criteria for complaints (s. 53), review rights (s. 56), and notification duties (ss. 50(5), s. 54);

(iii) empowering formal investigations via Panels of Inquiry with equivalent powers to the High Court and the possibility of reprimands, recommendations, and, in grave cases, referral to the Minister for Justice for the purposes of Article 35.4 of the Constitution; and

(iv) preserving fair procedures, independence, and confidentiality throughout.?

66. Section 44 of the 2019 Act governs how laypersons are appointed to the Judicial Conduct Committee.? Section 44(5) provides that t he Government shall appoint 5 persons to be members of the Judicial Conduct Committee from among such persons as are recommended by the Public Appointments Service in accordance with s.45 for appointment as such lay members.? Section 44(3) prescribes that the Public Appointments Service shall, when making recommendations for appointment, have regard to the desirability that the lay members of the Judicial Conduct Committee will, among them, possess knowledge of, and experience in, as many as possible of prescribed matters including the maintenance of standards in professions regulated by a statutory or other body; dealing with complaints made against members of such professions; mediation or other mechanisms for alternative dispute resolution the administration of justice and the management and provision of services to members of the public.?

67. Accordingly, l aypersons who sit on the Judicial Conduct Committee are selected through a public, independent process and then formally appointed as part of the Committee under the 2019 Act by Government decision. ?The 2019 Act therefore deliberately requires a public, independent selection mechanism to guarantee transparency, independence from the judiciary, accountability and public confidence in judicial oversight.

68. Section 49(1) of the Act provides that the Secretary to the Judicial Council shall be the Registrar to the Judicial Conduct Committee. The Registrar serves as the gatekeeper for complaint intake and initial screening and administering the scheme, initially by notifying the making of the complaint.? Specifically, s. 50(5) requires the Registrar to notify a judge of complaint a s soon as practicable after receiving it.? The Registrar is obliged to the name of the complainant and give particulars of the complaint.

69. Under s. 52, the Judicial Conduct Committee is required to specify procedures relating to the making and investigation of complaints, the investigation of judicial misconduct, and the making of determinations.

70. The admissibility of complaints falls to be determined in accordance with s.53 which provides:

"53. (1) On receiving a complaint, the Registrar shall determine whether or not the complaint is admissible.

(2) Subject to subsection (3), a complaint is admissible if?

(a) the complaint is made by a person authorised under section 50 to make a complaint,

(b) the conduct alleged could, if substantiated, constitute judicial misconduct by the judge concerned,

(c) the complaint is made within the period specified in subsection (1) or (2), as may be appropriate, of section 51, or any extension under section 51(3),

(d) the complaint is not frivolous or vexatious, and

(e) the complaint is made in compliance with procedures specified under section 52.

(3) A complaint that relates solely to?

(a) conduct by the judge in proceedings in respect of which a remedy has been or may be provided (i) in those proceedings, (ii) on appeal, (iii) by judicial review, or (iv) in any other proceedings, or

(b) the merits of a decision in proceedings before the judge, is not admissible."

**

71. In short, on an application of the s. 53 admissibility test, a complaint is admissible only if: (a) made by an authorised person; (b) the alleged conduct could constitute judicial misconduct; (c) made within time (generally three months, subject to possible extension in the procedures); (d) not frivolous or vexatious; and (e) compliant with the s. 52 procedures.? Furthermore, a complaint is excluded and is inadmissible under the 2019 Act if it relates solely to (i) conduct in proceedings for which a remedy exists (in those proceedings, on appeal, judicial review, or otherwise) or (ii) the merits of a decision. ?This ensures the scheme targets conduct rather than serving as a collateral appeal system.

72. The requirement to notify a finding of inadmissibility is provided for in s. 54(1) which requires that where the Registrar determines a complaint to be inadmissible, he or she shall notify the complainant and the judge concerned in writing of the determination, the reasons for it, and the complainant's entitlement to seek a review under section 56.

73. The CRC is established under s. 55.? It is a sub‑committee of the Judicial Conduct Committee that reviews determinations of inadmissibility at the complainant's request (s. 55; s. 56). ?It is composed of two judges and one lay member.? Section 55(2) explicitly states that the CRC shall comprise 3 members of whom one shall be a lay member of the Judicial Conduct Committee.? Section 55(3) provides that every person appointed to the CRC shall serve for a term of not less than one year and not more than 2 years from the date of his or her appointment but under s. 55(4) a member whose term expires is eligible for reappointment for a further term of not less than one year and not more than 2 years.? The CRC determines questions by majority vote (s. 55(10)) and regulates its own procedures (s. 55(11)).

74. Section 56 provides for a review of a Registrar's Determination by the CRC in the following terms:

"(1) A complainant may, within 30 days of receiving notification of a determination of inadmissibility, request a review of that determination.

(2) Where such a request is received, the Registrar shall refer the complaint to the Complaints Review Committee and notify the complainant and the judge concerned.

(3) The Complaints Review Committee shall determine whether the complaint is admissible having regard to section 53.

(5) The Committee shall notify the Registrar in writing of its determination and the reasons for the determination as soon as practicable.

(7) The Registrar shall notify the complainant and the judge concerned of the determination of the Complaints Review Committee."

**

75. Accordingly, under s. 56 a complainant may request review within 30 days. The Registrar then refers the complaint to the CRC, which decides whether the complaint is admissible having regard to s. 53. The CRC's written determination and reasons are provided to the Registrar, who then notifies the parties. The review stage is preliminary and does not entail a full evidential hearing except where the procedures so require; it focuses on admissibility, not proof of misconduct.

76. No provision is made for an oral hearing in ss. 53 or 56 but s. 69(3) provides for a power to convene an oral hearing before a Panel of Inquiry in connection with its investigation and s.83(3) enables the Judicial Conduct Committee to conduct an oral hearing in relation to a complaint where it considers it appropriate for assisting in making a decision or observing fair procedures.

77. In terms of its independence, the statutory scheme requires that the Judicial Council (and its committees) operate independently in performing functions under the Act. Section 6(2) provides that " the Judicial Council shall, subject to the provisions of this Act, be independent in the performance of its functions " and s. 55 provides for the establishment of the CRC as functionally separate from the Registrar of the Judicial Council.? The limited function of the CRC is " to review, in accordance with s. 56, the admissibility of complaints, or parts of complaints, that have been determined by the Registrar to be inadmissible ".?

78. The Registrar's role is separated from the CRC's deliberations and the Registrar does not attend CRC meetings.?The scheme of the 2019 Act builds in fairness through notice, reasoned decisions, time limits, review rights and where investigation proceeds, opportunities to be heard (including the possibility of oral hearings at inquiry or Judicial Conduct Committee determination stage).

TEST FOR LEAVE

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79. The threshold the Applicant must meet on an application for leave to proceed by way of judicial review is a low one.? As confirmed in O'Doherty v Minister for Health [2022] IESC 32, [2023] 2 I.R. 488 and McE v Chief Appeals Officer [2025] IEHC 114, even in the case of an opposed application on notice, the test is arguability, not likelihood of success.? A case must have some prospect of success, but nothing more.? In? O' Doherty ** v. ** Minister ** for ** Health , O'Donnell C.J., elaborated on the correct threshold at para. 39 of the judgment as follows:

"[... ] The threshold is ... , in essence, the same test which arises when proceedings are sought to be struck out on the grounds that they are bound to fail, or the test that is normally required in order to seek an interlocutory injunction. It must be a case that has a prospect of success (otherwise it would not be an arguable case) but does not require more than that. .... This test ... is solely one of arguability: it is emphatically not a test framed by reference to whether a case enjoys a reasonable prospect of success, still less a likelihood of success."

**

80. The Chief Justice also confirmed (at para. 40) that the same threshold test pertains irrespective of whether the application for leave is made ex parte or is made on notice to the respondent.

ANALYSIS AND DECISION

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Overview

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81. The 2019 Act provides a clear, multi‑stage process, from complaint receipt to potential inquiry, focused on conduct rather than merits of judicial decisions. It is designed to be efficient, fair and independent, while explicitly respecting the separation of powers.? Importantly, the 2019 Act cannot be used to challenge or re‑litigate judicial reasoning or legal conclusions.? The limits prescribed in the 2019 Act are important to protect judicial independence and prevent the complaints process from becoming a vehicle for collateral attacks on judicial outcomes.?

82. While these proceedings concern the decision of the CRC and not the underlying proceedings against the IFSAT and the ultimate decision of the Supreme Court to refuse leave to appeal to that Court, to contextualise the Applicant's Complaints as rejected by the CRC for the purpose of these proceedings, it is helpful to recall that Article 34.5.3? of the Constitution allows the Supreme Court's appellate procedures to be governed by law.? The Courts (Supplemental Provisions) Act, 1961 (s.7(4)) authorises determinations by three judges of the Supreme Court and s.7(10)?(11) (inserted by s.44 of the Court of Appeal Act, 2014) allows leave to appeal applications to be determined without oral hearing.?

83. Order 58 of the Rules of the Superior Courts (S.I. 583 of 2018), in accordance with s. 7(4) of the Courts (Supplemental Provisions) Act, 1961 allows for decisions by judges alone rather than full Court sittings and refers to " the applications for leave judge " and " the case-management judge ".? In addition, Supreme Court Practice Direction SC19 (authorised pursuant to s.7(7) of the Courts (Supplemental Provisions) Act, 1961 (as amended)) sets out an operational direction that leave applications are determined by a panel of at least three judges. It also specifies that applications are normally decided on the documents unless the Court otherwise orders. ? The Practice Direction provides for the publication of the application for leave to appeal, the respondent's notice and the Court's determination of the application.?

84. In accordance with the terms of the Practice Direction, when the Court has considered the documents filed it may then:

(i) direct that written submissions on the application for leave to appeal be filed;

(ii) refuse leave;

(iii) grant leave on all or specified grounds;

(iv) direct an oral hearing with or without the filing of written submissions;

(v) invite the parties to file written submissions as to the grant of leave on terms whether as to costs or otherwise.

85. By established convention and in reliance on the provisions referred to above the Supreme Court exercises its leave jurisdiction through three‑judge panels. ?This established practice is routine and is grounded in the Chief Justice's constitutional authority to organise the business of the Court and statutory authority under the Courts (Supplemental Provisions) Act, 1961 to regulate sittings. ?

86. When the Applicant's Complaints as against the three members of the Supreme Court are seen against this background, the basis for the rejection of his Complaints of judicial misconduct because the CRC was satisfied that the Complaints were based on conduct which was entirely in line with established practice in dealing with leave to appeal applications to the Supreme Court is readily understood.? While the Applicant dresses up the findings of the Supreme Court as lies or blatant untruths because that Court rejects his contention that a point of law arises, it is manifestly clear that what he complains of is the fact that his view of the law relating to the requirement to pay of a fee to the IFSAT is not shared by the Supreme Court who expressed itself satisfied that the question has been determined on the application of established principles following full hearings in the High Court and Court of Appeal.

Legal Grounds Pleaded

87. In written submissions on behalf of the Respondent, care has helpfully been taken to group the Applicant's concerns under six broad headings as follows: delay, bias, fair procedures, failure to give reasons, unreasonableness/irrationality and errors of law.? I propose to adopt these broad headings in deciding whether arguable grounds for leave to seek judicial review have been demonstrated.

88. In relation to delay (Ground e. 7 of the Statement of Grounds), the Applicant alleges a delay between the CRC's meeting on the 4 th of December, 2024 and notification on the 17 th of December, 2024.? In truth, this was not an issue to which the Applicant attached much significance during the hearing before me, his principal concern being to satisfy me that his proceedings were commenced in time with reference to the date of notification, not the date of the decision.? I agree with the Respondent that the delay of 13 days complained of is not significant and is explained by delays in having multiple determinations typed up.? There are no legal consequences from the delay complained of and no arguable grounds for relief in judicial review proceedings by reason of delay have been demonstrated.

89. In terms of the Applicant's claims that the CRC members were biased because they saw the Registrar's inadmissibility determination or otherwise displayed bias or a lack of impartiality (Grounds e. 11, 19, 20, 22, 23, 24, 32 and 33 of the Statement of Grounds), even though the CRC review is ab initio, I am satisfied that the ground of challenge in this regard is not a tenable one, even on a prima facie basis.? The CRC is statutorily independent under ss.55 and 56 of the 2019 Act. ?Under s.56 of the 2019 Act and the Procedures adopted, the Registrar must send all material to the CRC.? Even if the initial determination were not captured by this, the law does not require a body sitting in appeal to be blind to the basis for the decision under appeal.? Routinely, appeals proceed on a de novo basis but in the full knowledge of the reasoning at first instance.? In this case, there is still less basis for any apprehension of bias or concern that the CRC failed to independently consider the Complaints afresh in view of the fact the CRC decisions showed different reasoning to the Registrar.? The law on objective bias has been set out in Bula Ltd v. Tara Mines Ltd (No. 6.) [2000] 4 I.R . 412; 2000 WJSC-SC 922, and in Kenny v. Trinity College Dublin [2008] 2 LR. 40; [2007] IESC 42.?

90. The test, set out at p. 441 of Bula is:

"It is well established that the test to be applied is objective, it is whether a reasonable person in the circumstances would have a reasonable apprehension that the applicants would not have a fair hearing from an impartial judge on the issues".

91. As the Respondent points out in written submissions, the reasonable observer test was maintained by the Supreme Court in the context of disqualification of judges in Kelly v. University College Dublin [2025] IESC 6.? The Applicant has identified no facts capable of grounding an arguable case that a reasonable observer would fear partiality (applying Bula, Kenny and Kelly v. UCD).

92. In relation to the various fair procedures issues he raises, specifically the grounds in relation to: (i) no oral hearing, (ii) no opportunity to make submissions, and (iii) broader constitutional/ECHR breaches (Grounds e. 12 to 18, 26, 27, 28, 29 and 54 of the Statement of Grounds), I am also satisfied that an arguable grounds threshold has not been reached.? Neither the 2019 Act nor the procedures adopted under it nor the requirements of constitutional justice nor the European Convention of Human Rights impose a requirement for oral hearings at admissibility review stage by a statutory complaints body.? In ZK v. Minister for Justice [2023] IECA 254, the Court of Appeal approved the factors in Galvin v. Chief Appeals Officer [1997] 3 IR 240; [1997] IEHC 218 in respect of when constitutional fair procedures require that an oral hearing be conducted. ?These factors were as follows:

i. the le gislation governing the impugned decision;

ii. whether an oral hearing was requested;

iii. the subject matter of the decision;

iv. the overall circumstances of the case; and

v. the nature of the inquiry

93. An admissibility decision of the CRC, confined to issues of law as regards whether the Applicant's Complaints came within the admissibility criteria of the 2019 Act, is not of the nature of an inquiry which requires an oral hearing as a matter of fairness.?There is no requirement at admissibility stage to determine contested facts or test evidence.? The process is a filtering one designed to ensure that only complaints which demonstrate conduct which is properly subject to investigation under the 2019 Act are admitted. ?Many complaints processes include similar admissibility stages.?

94. As already stated, neither the 2019 Act nor the Procedures envisage an oral hearing for the review application of an admissibility determination, although by contrast, the 2019 Act provides for the possibility of an oral hearing before a Panel of Inquiry (ss. 69(3) and s. 83(3) of the 2019 Act) where a complaint progresses beyond the admissibility stage having regard to the different nature of an inquiry at that stage.? Furthermore, the Applicant never requested an oral hearing and has not identified why an oral hearing was necessary in this case.? There is no issue such as an apparent conflict of fact incapable of resolution otherwise than through an oral hearing (e.g. Coleman v. Financial Services Ombudsman [2016] IEHC 169, at para. 24).

95. In relation to submissions, the Applicant was expressly told (via emails) that he could submit submissions, but he did not do so.? I am quite satisfied that the Applicant received all fair procedures required at the admissibility stage and has not identified a basis for contending otherwise in circumstances where he never sought to make submissions despite being expressly made aware of this possibility.

96. At the heart of the Applicant's challenge to the CRC inadmissibility determination (as it was previously in respect of the Panel of the Supreme Court sitting to determine an application for leave to appeal), is the fact that the deliberations occurred in private and the deliberations are not recorded (G rounds e. 21, 30 and 31 of the Statement of Grounds).? In my view, the grievance arising from the fact that no record/minutes of the CRC's deliberations exist is based on a misunderstanding of the process.? Judicial/quasi‑judicial deliberations are normally held in a private domain.? The Applicant points to no authority which requires minutes of such deliberations.? I am satisfied that the relevant record is the record of the decision itself.

97. It is true that the Applicant is entitled to know the reasons for the decision, but these should be provided through the formal written determinations of the CRC giving its decision and it would not be proper for the CRC to seek to expand on its reasoning by reference to matters discussed in private during its deliberations.? In this case, a reasoned determination in writing issued to the Applicant and it records the totality of the reasoning relied upon by the CRC in finding the Complaint inadmissible.? It has further been confirmed on affidavit from a review of the file and on the face of the decision itself that no undisclosed material was considered.? The only material before the CRC was the Applicant's own material as confirmed at para. 10 of each determination.?

98. In my view there is no tenable basis for the Applicant's contention that he is entitled to a record of deliberations heard in private.? As set out above, the Applicant is entitled to be advised of the reasons for the decision, but he is not entitled to the details of any discussions between decision-makers as part of their private, deliberative process.? No precedent or authority to the contrary was identified by the Applicant.? Similarly to the judgment of the Court of Appeal in Novak v. Judicial Council, the three members of the panel added their names to the impugned decisions, which must be taken as their express agreement with the content of the determinations.

99. Furthermore, I am quite satisfied that in the circumstances of this case, the reasons set out in the CR C determinations for the inadmissibility finding were adequate and the basis for the decision is intelligible. ? The Applicant has not engaged with the CRC determinations to identify in what way he maintains these express reasons are in any way lacking to convey their rationale.

100. Insofar as the Applicant claims the CRC's determinations were unreasonable (Grounds e. 22, 23, 34 and 35 of the Statement of Grounds) and acknowledging that the threshold for leave is low, I cannot ignore that the test of unreasonableness under O'Keeffe v. An Bord Plean?la [1992] 1 I.R 39; 1991 WJSC-SC 1137 ** means that irrationality is established only where the decision‑maker had no relevant material before them upon which to base the decision or the decision is otherwise perverse or unsustainable on the basis of the material before the decision-maker.?

101. In this case, the CRC concluded no judicial misconduct was identified and this was an obviously rational conclusion to arrive at given the statutory definition and the terms of the Complaints made.? In the circumstances, I see no basis for contending that the CRC's decision flew in the face of common sense or was perverse or was unsupported by the material before the CRC.? I am satisfied that there is no arguable irrationality demonstrated.

102. Fundamentally, the Applicant contends that the CRC failed to apply the 2019 Act correctly (Grounds e. 25, 36 to 53 of the Statement of Grounds), just as he contended that the Supreme Court failed to conduct proceedings in accordance with Article 34 of the Constitution or the provisions of law, and that his Complaints identified conduct amount to judicial misconduct even if the CRC consider that it does not.? In his approach to the decision of the CRC, the Applicant repeats a pattern whereby he is unwilling to accept any interpretation of the law different to his own and considers anyone who disagrees with him to behave in a mala fides fashion and to hold their contrary interpretation of the legal position dishonestly.? It may seem a trite observation but were every litigant to take the same approach, then there would be as many complaints under the 2019 Act as there are losing parties in court proceedings and a judge would be amenable to a complaint of judicial misconduct in every case for simply making a contested decision.

103. None of the other objections raised by the Applicant in his exchange of affidavits for the purpose of the leave application establish any other lawful basis for challenging the decision of the CRC.? Insofar as t he Applicant seems to raise an issue regarding the lack of affidavit evidence from the members of the CRC, no valid complaint is demonstrated.? As confirmed in JS v. MK [2024] IEHC 353 , it would be contrary to the independence of the CRC and the public interest to require the members of the CRC to swear affidavits in respect of their determinations, impugned in the present proceedings. ?The decision should stand or fall based on the reasoning disclosed on its face.

104. It should be clear from the very full history to these proceedings set out above, that this is not a case in which there is any genuine basis for a concern in relation to judicial misconduct.? Rather, as indeed the Applicant himself submitted, his case is built on the proposition that if a judge makes error which causes a person to lose a case, that error should be corrected.? Correcting judge's errors in relation to the law is what the appellate courts exist for and such errors may not properly be made amenable to the judicial misconduct jurisdiction under the 2019 Act.? Plainly, categorizing a decision as a lie or deception on the part of judges because a judge reaches a conclusion which is against the argument a litigant ?makes with the result that they lose a case does not turn the decision or the process in which the decision was reached into judicial misconduct within the meaning of the 2019 Act.?

105. Insofar as his proceedings against the IFSAT is concerned, the Applicant has availed of and exhausted his rights of access to the Court through a full hearing before the High Court and the Court of Appeal.? The panel of the Supreme Court who determined not to give leave to appeal to the Supreme Court did so on an application of the correct constitutional test and in accordance with the standard procedure of the Court as provided for by law and in established court practices.? The reasons for the determination are set out in writing and published in a fully transparent and accountable manner.? The fact that the Applicant does not agree with the basis for that determination, just as he did not agree with the decision of the High Court or the Court of Appeal, does not transform the basis for the ruling into a fraud or a deception or a matter of judicial conduct, in the manner he contends.?

106. Contrary to the Applicant's position as he articulated it before me, an admissible complaint of judicial misconduct must be based on some substantiated facts capable of supporting that complaint.? It is not enough to assert a lie or an untruth or deception, as he has done, without substantiating his Complaint in some real way with reference to judicial conduct.? It is patently not a judge engaging in " deception ", for example, for that judge to sit as a member of a panel of three Supreme Court judges to make a determination on behalf of the Supreme Court, although not the full Supreme Court, as the Applicant contends in his application for leave.?

107. Whatever the Applicant may protest in making complaint under the 2019 Act and in bringing these proceedings, the actions of each of the three judges in deciding on the Applicant's application for leave to appeal while sitting as a member of a three-member panel of the Supreme Court is manifestly not a departure from acceptable judicial conduct.? Instead, it is the established procedure applied in relation to leave to appeal applications.? The Applicant has exhausted his right to appeal and is not entitled to a further appeal to the Supreme Court.? Under Article 34.4.3 of the Constitution, the decision of the Court of Appeal is final unless the Supreme Court is satisfied that the conditions of Article 34.4.5 are met.? There is no appeal against a decision of the Supreme Court to refuse leave to appeal where it has concluded that those conditions are not met.? The judges sitting in respect of the Applicant's appeal dealt with his application in line with practices adopted in accordance with law and pursuant to established procedures.? There is simply no basis for contending that they engaged in judicial misconduct by so doing. ?

108. Furthermore, the fact that deliberation occurs in private clearly does not transgress the constitutional requirement to administer justice in public.? To argue otherwise ignores the fact that the decision reached following deliberation by the panel of the Court is made public, as occurred in this case, by the publication of the Supreme Court determination.? There is no secrecy attaching to the determination or the basis for it.

109. I am satisfied that the Applicant's allegations regarding the application of the 2019 Act in respect of his Complaint against the members of the Supreme Court panel relates entirely to the merits, procedures and decisions of the Supreme Court judges dealing with his leave‑to‑appeal application.? Under s.53(3), complaints concerning the merits of judicial decisions, are excluded and are inadmissible.? The definition of " judicial misconduct" under s. 2 of the 2019 Act requires both a departure from acknowledged judicial standards and damage to the administration of justice.? None of the Applicant's allegations, even if taken at their height, meet that threshold.? I do not, therefore, consider it to be arguable that the CRC incorrectly found no judicial misconduct on any of the grounds pleaded by the Applicant.?

110. In the circumstances where I can identify no arguable basis upon which to challenge the lawfulness of the decision of the CRC on the case as pleaded, the application for leave based on the Statement of Grounds as pleaded must fail.

Whether Late Amendment should be Permitted

111. Despite the disclosure on affidavit as long ago as July, 2025, that when the CRC determined the Applicant's review in December, 2024, unbeknownst to the CRC, the Judicial Conduct Committee or the layperson sitting to determine the review brought by the Applicant and contrary to assurances given in writing by the Department of Justice, the layperson's term of office had expired on the 20 th of July, 2024, without a formal Government decision to re-appoint him being made, the Applicant did not move an application to amend his Statement of Grounds to include a plea in this regard in presenting his application for leave before me.? He nonetheless suggests that he may wish to make such an application in the future.

112. The question which arises for me is whether the Applicant should be given leave to proceed by way of judicial review in these proceedings on foot of a claim he has not yet advanced, even though he was made aware of the issue as long ago as July, 2025, there being no other issue which reaches the threshold for leave. ?Counsel appearing before me on behalf of the CRC argued strongly that if the Applicant had wanted to amend his claim to raise an additional argument which is completely distinct from anything else he has raised in the case, then he ought to have done so properly and had ample opportunity to do so.? It was pointed out that this matter came before me as a leave application which had been case managed over a considerable period and assigned a one-day court hearing.? Counsel on behalf of the Respondent argued that the leave hearing was not a " dress rehearsal " and there is no rolling entitlement to raise other issues at a later stage.?

113. It was also pointed out on behalf of the Respondent that the issue arising was one which the Judicial Council would be unable to deal with itself because it is not a function of the Judicial Council to confirm appointments of laypersons to the Judicial Conduct Committee.? It was contended that whatever about the identity of the appropriate respondent or notice party in such proceedings which might require to be reconstituted if a new ground were permitted, at the very least other parties would be required to provide the requisite evidence in relation to the issue.? It was reiterated that as the point had not been raised, it was not a point validly in the case and there was therefore nothing to respond to.? The Respondent's position as outlined in oral argument was that the issue as to the sustainability of the CRC decision by reason of its constitution at the time of the decision, did not arise on the application I had to determine.

114. It is well established that u nder the system of judicial review, administrative decisions may only be challenged if the requirements of the Rules of Court are met. ?An applicant must make his application within the permitted time or persuade the court to make an order extending the time. ?The Applicant must advance grounds at the time of his application sufficient to persuade a judge that leave should be granted to seek judicial review of the decision. ?

115. On the other hand, it is also established that the Court has a jurisdiction to amend grounds and may, of its own motion, raise grounds when the interests of justice require that an order amending proceedings be made at any stage in the proceedings. ?Whether that power should be exercised is guided by the interests of justice and where the balance of justice weighs clearly in favour of granting the amendment, the Court may, on application to it or on its own motion, permit an amendment of a Statement of Grounds in proceedings by way of judicial review. ?

116. As there is no application before me, the issue for me is whether I should, of my own motion, permit an amendment of the Statement of Grounds in this case having regard to the interests of justice.?

117. There are only rare instances of a judge amending a Statement of Grounds at a late stage, without an application and on the judge's own motion in exercise of a jurisdiction to do so under the Rules of Court.? I had occasion to consider one example in my decision on a late application to amend a Statement of Grounds in N.Z. v. Minister for Justice [2023] IEHC 545.? In that case, I was referred to the decision in J.K. v. Minister for Justice and Equality [2011] IEHC 473 in support of a late application (on the date of hearing) on behalf of the Applicant to amend a Statement of Grounds.? In J.K. Hogan J. resumed the hearing of a case to raise an issue which had not been raised by the parties during the course of the first hearing and which came to his attention only in the course of preparing his judgment.?

118. As set out in his judgment in J.K., Hogan J. concluded that Order 84, Rule 20(4) of the Rules of the Superior Courts, which provides that the Court hearing an application for leave may allow the applicant's statement to be amended, whether by specifying different or additional grounds of relief or otherwise, on such terms, if any, as it thinks fit, enabled him to formulate a new ground of his own motion if it was appropriate to exercise that jurisdiction. In the circumstances of the case before him he was satisfied that it was appropriate to exercise the said discretion, even though a previous application had not been made on behalf of the Applicant.

119. Factors which influence whether it is appropriate, in the interests of justice, to amend a Statement of Grounds whether that be on an application on behalf of the Applicant or in exercise of the Court's own motion jurisdiction include in the first instance whether the proposed new ground is arguable.? While this is an issue upon which I have heard no legal argument insofar as the constitution of the CRC at the material time is concerned, it seems to me that it is at least arguable on a prima facie basis that the CRC was not properly constituted when it made its decision in December, 2024 and therefore the decision made in this case may be amenable to challenge as ultra vires.? It is also arguable that a Government decision to retrospectively validate re-appointment of the layperson from the 21 st of July, 2024, may not operate to save a decision already made in the Applicant's case in December, 2024, from invalidity when the CRC was not properly constituted at the time the decision was made. ?It seems to me, therefore, that a legal challenge in properly constituted proceedings brought in time on the basis of the constitution of the CRC and its authority to make a determination in December, 2024, could potentially meet the low arguability threshold applicable at leave stage.

120. In considering whether it is appropriate for me to exercise a jurisdiction of my own motion having regard to the interests of justice, it is also appropriate to consider the context and the nature of the underlying issues.? Both the public policy considerations which have prompted the enactment of provisions requiring the participation of a layperson appointed in accordance with statute in decisions of the CRC and the public policy considerations behind the adoption of rules governing the bringing of challenges by way of judicial review are relevant and may be in tension. I am particularly mindful in this case of the important function of the Judicial Conduct Committee in promoting and maintaining high standards of judicial conduct and in maintaining public confidence in the administration of justice.?

121. To my mind, the importance of preserving public confidence in the administration of justice weighs in favour of granting leave on foot of an amendment on my own motion even in the absence of an application on behalf of an applicant, if a failure to do so risks undermining public confidence in the administration of justice.? It also seems to me, however, that preserving public confidence in the administration of justice requires me to be judicious in exercising a power to amend pleadings of my own motion.? I should only do so if there is something in the case which means that justice will be on hazard unless I make the amendment.?

122. For the reasons fully rehearsed above, I am satisfied that the Complaints advanced by the Applicant before the CRC were fully considered and are not undermined by error of law or any unfairness in the decision-making process.? I do not see a basis for a concern regarding the decision arrived at in the complaints process which was joined in by a layperson possessing the qualities and attributes of a person suitable for appointment to the Judicial Conduct Committee or the CRC from the perspective of requiring participation from a layperson in the process to ensure that the CRC has the necessary independence to perform its role. A layperson previously appointed in accordance with the statutory process participated in the CRC meeting and joined in the decision.

123. Accordingly, to the extent that the raison d' ? tre of the appointment of a layperson under the 2019 Act is to guarantee transparency, independence from the judiciary, accountability and public confidence in judicial oversight, it seems to me that this purpose was served by the involvement in the decision of a layperson previously selected in accordance with the requirements of the 2019 Act.

124. Furthermore, this is not a case where a CRC determination was made in the knowledge of the members of the CRC that there was a concern as to its constitution. ?Most importantly, there is absolutely no basis for believing that a reconstituted CRC reconsidering the Applicant's Complaints in the event of remittal for fresh consideration could reach any different decision on the Complaints at the heart of these proceedings.?

125. While it is not my role in judicial review proceedings to step into the shoes of the decision-maker, it is nonetheless appropriate when considering the interests of justice in the context of a discretionary remedy, specifically whether to permit an amendment to proceedings of my own motion, that I should have regard to whether there was ever any actual merit to the complaint being made and, if not, whether any harm flows from an identified legal frailty in the process.? In view of the nature of the Complaints the Applicant agitates, I find it impossible to conceive of any real consequence for him flowing from the constitution of the CRC at the time of its determination in his Complaints.? I can identify no basis for believing that any other outcome was achievable from any constitution of the CRC.

126. Factors identified in the case law which influence the interests of justice assessment and which may properly guide me in deciding on this issue include whether the amendment which flows from the new issue changes the nature of the case.? Amendment applications may be refused where the proposed amendment would effectively give rise to a new cause of action (N? Eil? v Environmental Protection Agency [1997] IEHC 79).? Importantly, in this case the question as to whether I should permit an amendment of the proceedings arises in circumstances where the application as presented by the Applicant has been found to not meet the threshold for leave, such that without an amendment, the proceedings are at an end (unless a refusal of leave is overturned on appeal).? There is no doubt, therefore, that an amendment permitting a challenge having regard to the constitution of the CRC would constitute a new cause of action.? This is a factor which I consider must be weighed against the exercise of my discretionary power to amend the Statement of Grounds in the circumstances of this case.

127. Other factors relevant to the balance of justice exercise include the explanation for the failure to include the ground initially.? In Muresan v. Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform (Unreported, High Court, Finlay Geoghegan J., October 2003), Finlay Geoghegan J. considered the explanation offered for the delay in seeking the proposed amendments and found that a change of representation was not sufficient to justify the addition of new grounds.?

128. It is entirely understandable why legal grounds of challenge in relation to the constitution of the CRC were not pursued initially.? The Applicant, no more than the CRC, was unaware that the layperson had not been validly reappointed on the date of the admissibility review.? Given the candour of the CRC in disclosing the full facts regarding its constitution in July, 2025, however, the failure on the part of the Applicant to proceed in a timely manner to seek to amend his pleadings is incomprehensible.? While some latitude may be afforded by reason of his status as a lay litigant, the Applicant is clearly a lay litigant who is well versed in litigation.? Furthermore, it is clear from the terms of his written submissions that he was alive to the possibility of an application to amend his proceedings but elected not to bring that application.

129. In Keegan v. GSOC [2015] IESC 68, the Supreme Court reflected that the object of the system of rules governing the bringing of judicial review proceedings is to strike a fair balance between the certainty and security of administrative decisions and the rights of persons affected by them who wish to contest them.? Where an application is made to amend proceedings outside the time fixed under the Rules of Court, the Supreme Court reiterated that there is an obligation to justify the application and explain delay.?

130. No explanation has been offered by the Applicant for his failure to bring an application to amend in advance of the hearing of the leave application other than to suggest in argument before me that he expected that the Respondent might take some action themselves.? It was clear from the terms of the Registrar's affidavit sworn in July, 2025, that the Respondent took the position that the appointment of laypersons was not its function and that the issue identified was not relevant to these proceedings.? Thus, nothing was said to the Applicant which might have caused him to believe that the Respondent would take some action in this regard.

131. There is some significance also to the fact that as appointment of the layperson is a matter for the Government and not the Respondent, a challenge to the lawfulness of an order retrospectively validating that appointment and, in consequence, the constitution of the CRC, requires consideration of whether joinder of the Government as a party in these proceedings would be necessary should an amendment allowed.? If it were necessary to reconstitute proceedings, this in turn prompts consideration of whether reconstitution of the proceedings at this remove should be permitted having regard to the time periods mandated under Order 84, Rule 21 of the Rules of the Superior Court on the basis that the proceedings thus reconstituted are, in essence, new proceedings.

132. The test governing the grant of an extension of time requires the Applicant to satisfy me both that there is good and sufficient reason for an extension of time and that the circumstances which led to the failure to bring proceedings in time were outside his control or could not reasonably have been anticipated by the Applicant as required by Order 84, Rule 21(3)(b)(i) and (ii) of the Rules of the Superior Courts.? Addressing the rules on the extension of time in judicial review proceedings in Arthropharm (Europe) Ltd v. The Health Products Regulatory Authority [2022] IECA 109, the Court of Appeal (Murray J.) said as follows:

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"The effect of the rule is clearly to place an obligation on the party seeking an extension of time to identify on oath the reasons the application was not brought during the period fixed..."

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133. Most recently, the Court of Appeal held in Winters v. Legal Aid Board & Ors [2025] IECA 205 (Hyland J., at para. 19) that:

"...the jurisdiction to extend time in judicial review proceedings is now wholly delineated by statute i.e. Order 84, r. 21(3) to (7), and represent a complete code in respect of the extension of time, including the criteria by which applications are to be judged, the procedural manner in which an application is to be made, the relevance of the impact of an extension on third parties and other associated matters."

**

134. It bears repetition that the Applicant has not put anything on affidavit to explain why he has not sought to amend his pleadings in a timely manner and in advance of the hearing of the leave application and why he has not sought to comply with the Rules of the Superior Court in properly grounding an application for an extension of time in judicial review proceedings.

135. Applying the principles developed through the case-law, the fact that the infirmity resulting from the constitution of the CRC which has not yet been made the subject of a formal application to amend, could meet the test of being arguable is not enough to warrant the exercise of a discretion to amend the Statement of Grounds.? An important countervailing consideration is the fact that if an amendment were directed by me of my own motion it would result in a case which is otherwise at an end, because the existing grounds are so weak, proceeding in substantive fashion.? It must weigh negatively against the exercise of discretion that the identified issue constitutes an entirely new ground in law which might also properly require the proceedings to be reconstituted in circumstances where proceedings against the new party are long out of time.

136. A consideration of whether any purpose would be served by an amendment in a case which has been found to be otherwise untenable requires engagement with the merits of the Applicant's Complaints before the CRC.? Given the manifest lack of merit in the underlying Complaints, the fact that there was appropriate layperson involvement in the decision of the CRC and the fact that it is impossible to conceive of any different outcome in the event of remittal, drives me to conclude that permitting an amendment would serve more to undermine the administration of justice than to uphold it.? It would cause valuable court resources to be directed towards hearing and deciding this case which is without any real merit insofar as the challenge to the inadmissibility decision is concerned to the detriment of the timely administration of justice in other cases.

137. In circumstances which would result in a new claim being advanced, potentially against a non-party to existing proceedings outside the time allowed for proceedings by way of judicial review under the Rules of the Superior Court, it seems to me that there is also an onus on the Applicant not only to explain his delay for the purpose of a balancing of justice consideration but also to satisfy the Court that there is a basis for granting an extension of time within which to advance new grounds of challenge given that the amendment, if allowed, would result in an entirely different case being progressed involving a non-party to proceedings.? The Applicant has made no attempt to discharge an onus to explain his delay.?

138. I am satisfied on an application of the principles identified in the caselaw that the interests of justice are against me exercising a power to amend pleadings in a manner which would serve to resuscitate otherwise moribund proceedings.? It would not be an appropriate exercise of my jurisdiction to permit an amendment of the Statement of Grounds at this late stage in circumstances where the Applicant has been on notice of the facts upon which the legal grounds fall to be advanced since July, 2025, but has not yet formalised an application for leave to amend his Statement of Grounds nor explained his delay in doing so.

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CONCLUSION

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139. For the reasons set out above, I have decided that the Applicant has not established an entitlement to leave to proceed by way of judicial review on any ground.? Specifically, the Applicant has not established an arguable basis for contending that the CRC acted beyond its statutory powers or in a manner lacking in independence, fairness or rationality on the grounds pleaded.? There is no basis either for contending an unlawful departure from procedures or constitutional unfairness or breach of obligations imposed pursuant to s. 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights Act, 2003 on the grounds as pleaded and the Applicant has identified no relevant authority to support his contentions in this regard.?

140. In the absence of an application to amend his Statement of Grounds and in view of the fact that an amendment would entirely change the nature of the proceedings and would serve to resuscitate otherwise dead proceedings, without there being any basis to consider that a differently constituted CRC might reach a different decision and in circumstances where the Applicant has advanced nothing on affidavit which could ground an application for an order extending time, I do not consider it appropriate to make an order amending the Statement of Grounds of my own motion.?

141. I refuse this application for leave to proceed by way of judicial review.? I will hear the parties in respect of any consequential matters.? The matter will be listed for mention on notice to the parties following the expiry of fourteen days from the date of electronic delivery of this judgment for the purpose of finalising orders.

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