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  Dillon v Connolly [No.2] (Approved) [2026] IEHC 201 (27 March 2026)

URL: https://www.bailii.org/ie/cases/IEHC/2026/2026IEHC201.html
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THE HIGH COURT

[2026] IEHC 201

[H. Sp. 2024/24]

IN THE MATTER OF THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE ESTATE OF MATTHEW STEPHEN CONNOLLY, LATE OF "BEL AIR" WESTMINSTER ROAD, FOXROCK, COUNTY DUBLIN, DECEASED

AND IN THE MATTER OF THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE ESTATE OF ELIZABETH CONNOLLY, LATE OF "BEL AIR" WESTMINSTER ROAD, FOXROCK, COUNTY DUBLIN, DECEASED

AND IN THE MATTER OF AN APPLICATION MADE BY DAVID DILLON AS THE EXECUTOR OF THE DECEASED PURSUANT TO ORDER 3 OF THE RULES OF THE SUPERIOR COURTS

BETWEEN/

DAVID DILLON

Applicant

AND

---

MATTHEW JAMES CONNOLLY

Respondent

---

?JUDGMENT (No. 2) of Ms. Justice Siobh?n Stack delivered 27 March, 2026.

Introduction

1. This is an application by the applicant **** and sole proving executor in the estates of Matthew Stephen Connolly and Elizabeth Connolly, deceased, both late of Bel Air, Westminster Road, Foxrock, County Dublin, for the costs of the application brought by him for the approval of the estate accounts in both estates which was the subject of an earlier judgment ([2025] IEHC 424) ("the principal judgment"). The applicant seeks an Order directing that his costs would be paid out of the estates of the deceased and, further, for an Order that they be paid out of the respondent's share in the estate of Matthew Connolly, deceased. This is contested by the respondent who submits that the applicant should be fixed with the costs of the application and that no costs should be paid out of the estate.

2. In the principal judgment, I set out the nine objections which the respondent raised to the draft accounts. In essence, the respondent raised successful objections only on three grounds. The first two of these related to the late Mrs. Connolly's rings and a small plot of land in Glengarriff known as "The Dell", which the respondent said formed part of Mr. Connolly's estate. The third successful objection related to the fees charged by Reddy Charlton LLP in respect of the time spent in dealing with a complaint made by the respondent to the Legal Services Regulatory Authority which was found to be inadmissible.

3. As regards the late Mrs. Connolly's rings, it is important to note that the applicant says that he initially understood that all of the beneficiaries, including the respondent, had previously agreed that Mrs. Connolly's rings should be given to her daughters, Carol and Ann, in accordance with the custom and practice which is routinely followed by families of a deceased woman, that is, that her jewellery would be given to her nearest female relations and divided by agreement among them. As a result of that understanding on the part of the applicant, it appears that he had not been informed of the existence of the particular rings in question - though the respondent questions this on the basis that the applicant is married to Carol. However, the applicant seems to have believed that there was an agreement between all of the beneficiaries that these would not form part of the residue and he put a Note to that effect in the accounts circulated in July, 2023, and which are the subject of this application. The respondent seems to acknowledge that there was such an agreement but that the strict letter of the law required that the agreement would not be honoured and that the rings would form part of the estate of Matthew Connolly, deceased.

4. While there appears to be no direct authority on the matter so far as the administration of estates is concerned, it is well settled as an aspect of the law of trusts that all of the beneficiaries, having achieved their majority and being fully capable, are entitled to make a joint decision as to the application of trust property: the Rule in Saunders v. Vautier (1841) 1 Cr. & Ph. 240, discussed in Keane J., Equity and the Law of Trusts in Ireland, 3 rd ed., (Bloomsbury, Dublin, 2017), at para. 10.89. **** As a matter of first principle, a similar rule must apply to the administration of estates so as to limit the duties of legal personal representatives in situations where there is unanimous agreement between the residuary legatees that certain assets falling into the residue should be distributed in specie.

5. It is entirely commonplace for families to agree that certain assets which would otherwise fall to be distributed as part of the residue or under an intestacy would be handed over to particular family members. Very often, these assets would be of very limited monetary value and the informal distribution of jewellery is perhaps a classic example of family members agreeing among themselves to distribute the personal effects of a deceased. In most estates, jewellery is of very small or perhaps even negligible value, but could have very significant sentimental value. In the absence of a specific bequest in a will, an agreement of this kind among beneficiaries poses no difficulty for a legal personal representative, although it is the legal personal representative who would be entitled to settle any disputes as to how particular pieces should be distributed.

6. That seems to have been the course initially taken here as it was at one point agreed by the four siblings that Mrs. Connolly's jewellery would be distributed among her female relatives. The three rings discussed in the principal judgment seem to have been discussed at that informal meeting. Subject to any obligation to make a return to Revenue, the beneficiaries were entitled to proceed in this way.

7. The only reason that the rings were ultimately determined to form part of the estate is that the respondent, having apparently initially agreed to the distribution of jewellery, seems to have resiled from this and insisted on what he saw as the strict letter of the law, requiring formal distribution by the applicant as part of the estate with the value of the rings forming part of Carol and Ann's respective shares in the residue.

8. Similarly, so far as "The Dell" is concerned, the respondent had initially agreed - and had indeed at one point sought to insist - that his late father had intended to gift "The Dell" to Ronan and that it should not be treated as part of the residue. "The Dell" had been held by the two deceased as joint tenants and a voluntary Deed of Transfer of "The Dell" in favour of Ronan had already been executed by the late Mr. Connolly. However, Mrs. Connolly had not executed it before she died. It seems, therefore, that the only reason that "The Dell" remained in the estate was that the gift to Ronan had not been perfected by Mrs. Connolly prior to her death. It was therefore not surprising that the family seems to have agreed initially that "The Dell" should not be regarded as an asset in the estate, and that the applicant should perfect the gift to Ronan.

9. The respondent, however, subsequently resiled from his position in relation to "The Dell" and insisted that it should be accounted for as part of the estate. While it was asserted by the respondent initially that the market value of "The Dell" was ?20,000, it is now agreed that it is in fact only worth ?10,000.

10. None of the other six objections made by the respondent to the draft estate accounts were found to have any substance.

Whether the applicant's costs should be paid out of the estate

**

11. At the outset, I will say that I agree that the applicant is entitled to his costs out of the estate of Matthew Connolly, deceased. It is quite evident from the affidavits filed in the substantive application that the respondent would have sued the applicant had he attempted to distribute the cash amounts in the residue of the late Mr. Connolly's estate as he proposed to do. The applicant was, therefore, entitled to the protection of the Court by seeking its approval of the accounts. In O'Connor v. Markey [2006] IEHC 219, [2007] 2 IR 194 at p. 199, Herbert J. approved the decision of Kekewich J. in In re Buckton; Buckton v. Buckton [1907] 2 Ch 406 at p. 414, where he stated:

"I act on the principle that trustees are entitled to the fullest possible protection which the court can give them."

12. Given the complete breakdown in the relationship between the applicant and the respondent, it would have been highly unwise of the applicant to purport to distribute the cash assets in the residue without court approval. In the circumstances, the application was not only appropriate but was necessary. Indeed, the respondent refused to sign a Confirmation and Indemnity, which in itself indicated that he was objecting to the accounts. The remaining three beneficiaries signed the Confirmation and Indemnity on 19 November, 2023, 24 November, 2023 and 17 December, 2023 respectively, in which they, inter alia, confirmed that the amount for distribution as disclosed in the circulated accounts represented the full amount to which they were entitled as residuary legatees and devisees. These Confirmation and Indemnities were signed by the other three beneficiaries on the basis of draft accounts dated 30 June, 2023, which included Notes dealing with the late Mrs. Connolly's rings and the situation with "The Dell". There was no concealment.

13. In relation to those two issues, it must be recalled that, while the evidence has not been fully clarified by either side, there seems to have been general agreement for a time as between the beneficiaries that the rings would be distributed by informal agreement between the beneficiaries, and that the applicant was not advised by the beneficiaries that the rings were an asset in the estate. As the applicant was dependent on information received from the beneficiaries, who are the adult children of both deceased, as to what was in the estate, it is my view that he did not act unreasonably in relying on that information. Similarly, the affidavit evidence is clearly to the effect that it was agreed by all of the beneficiaries that it was intended that Ronan would receive "The Dell" as a gift during the lifetime of his parents, and that this should be given effect to by the applicant as legal personal representative. As a result, the applicant was initially informed by the beneficiaries that this did not form part of the estate.

14. In addition to the objection to the draft accounts dated 30 June, 2023, the respondent also maintained an objection in principle to the signing of a Confirmation and Indemnity. Mortimer and Sunnocks, Executors, Administrators and Probate, (22 nd ed., Sweet and Maxwell, London, 2023) state at p. 1239 that a personal representative is entitled to a receipt from beneficiaries on payment and that residuary legatees will normally do this by signing the accounts. The act of signing a document indicates approval or acceptance of it and I do not see that there could be any objection in principle to a requirement that a residuary legatee should give a Confirmation and Indemnity as a precondition of distribution, in order to protect the legal personal representative from action by a beneficiary who subsequently asserts that the figures are wrong. In this case, the respondent characterised the requirement at points in the correspondence as tantamount to coercion, which is misconceived. This mistaken approach also indicates that it was unlikely that the applicant could ever finalise the distribution to the residuary legatees without the protection of the court, by the making of this application.

15. The respondent's reaction to the draft accounts was not only to raise a series of objections, most of which have been found to be without any basis, but to allege fraud and deceit against the applicant and his wife. While the respondent has asserted in his first replying affidavit that he has always tried to be "temperate, professional [and] conciliatory", the documentary evidence is to the contrary. For example, in response to the circulation of the draft accounts in early July, 2023, the respondent sent an email to the applicant dated 14 July, 2023, in which he made scandalous allegations about his sister, Carol, questioned the applicant's intelligence, competence and integrity, and made various intemperate statements which are best described as insults and abuse. The affidavits filed in this application also contain invective and grossly intemperate statements and are replete with allegations of incompetence and fraud on the part of the applicant and his solicitors.

16. The email of 14 July, 2023, also raised a red herring in the form of a Leeds Building Society account as well as referring to a Nationwide UK account. No account numbers were given, even though this information would have made the applicant's task much simpler and even though it seems that the respondent already had that information. In any event, the applicant subsequently made inquiries of Leeds Building Society and was told they had no record of any account held with them by the late Mr. Connolly on the date of his death.

17. As is apparent from paras. 42-43 of the principal judgment, the late Mr. Connolly transferred the monies from a Nationwide UK account into the Leeds Building Society account on 7 December, 2015, and, on the same day, gave instructions for the transfer of the Leeds Building Society account into the sole name of an undisclosed third party. That was done three days later. It is now accepted that the deceased held no funds in Leeds Building Society on the date of his death, and therefore this account is irrelevant to the administration of the estate.

18. Furthermore, the applicant indicated through his solicitor that he would be prepared to mediate the dispute about the preparation of estate accounts and the distribution to the beneficiaries of their respective shares. The respondent objected to paying 50% of the mediator's costs - even though this is a normal part of mediation as the parties to the dispute must pay the mediator's fees. Indeed, the respondent appears to have wrongly believed that mediation would consist of a meeting with the applicant and the applicant's solicitors. In an email dated 27 May, 2024, the respondent replied to an offer to mediate on the basis that the parties would meet at the applicant's solicitors' offices and should bring witnesses to observe and take minutes. He suggested that this "might help in forensically examining each matter raised, [and] if so required, could be brought to the attention of the High Court should any party to the meeting act in an uncooperative [and]/or inappropriate manner". ?

19. This suggests that the respondent did not understand that mediation involves a third party mediator (who has to be paid) and that statements made within the mediation process are confidential and not disclosed in any subsequent court proceedings. This is to facilitate openness within the mediation process. In light of the dealings between the parties over the years as they emerge from the affidavit evidence, it is difficult to dispel the impression that the respondent approached the offer to mediate as an opportunity to scrutinise the information available to the applicant and his legal advisers with a view to making further criticism of them in subsequent court proceedings, rather than as an opportunity to settle the estate accounts to his satisfaction.

20. The applicant was within his rights to refuse to meet on the terms suggested by the respondent (and inaccurately referred to by the respondent as mediation) in circumstances where there had been a complete breakdown in the relationship between the respondent on the one hand and the applicant and his wife on the other.? However, the applicant did offer to participate in mediation, as that process is usually understood. The respondent refused to agree to the usual terms of mediation and this is a further factor indicating that the applicant should recover his costs from the appropriate estate.

Whether the applicant's costs should be paid from the respondent's share

21. In addition, I am satisfied that the applicant, as the sole proving executor of both estates, should be entitled to recover his costs from the respondent's share in the residue of Mr. Connolly's estate (the late Mr. Connolly being the residuary legatee under his wife's will).

22. As already stated, the respondent made a series of unfounded and scandalous allegations about the applicant and his wife, Carol, the respondent's sister. These are included in various emails which are in evidence but also in the affidavits filed for the purpose of these proceedings.

23. As indicated in the principal judgment, the making of unfounded claims of fraud is a matter which may be addressed by a court in considering costs. The affidavits filed by the respondent in this matter are replete with unsubstantiated and unfounded allegations of dishonesty on the part of the applicant. For example, it is suggested at para. 18 of the respondent's affidavits sworn 16 July, 2024 that the applicant had "no intention" of ever paying back the proposed contingency fund of ?120,000. This is repeated at para. 21 of the respondent's affidavit sworn 23 September, 2024, and at para. 14 of his affidavit of 6 November, 2024. There is no basis whatsoever for this accusation.

24. The applicant was similarly accused of deception at para. 21 of the respondent's affidavit of 16 July, 2024 because the account with Leeds Building Society was not included in the SA2. However, for the reasons already set out, the late Mr. Connolly held no funds in this account at the date of his death. This means that the account was properly excluded from the SA2 and, further, that it is not relevant to this application. It is also notable that the respondent seems to have been aware of the account but only informed the applicant of its existence on 14 July, 2023, some years after the applicant had extracted a Grant of Probate in Mr. Connolly's estate and only after the draft accounts had been circulated. It is not clear why the respondent did not raise this issue earlier. In any event, as the applicant was not aware of this account prior to 14 July, 2023, he cannot be accused of any fraud or deception in relation to it.

25. In Howley v. McClean [2025] IECA 77, the Court of Appeal (per O'Moore J.) stated (at para. 33):

"Far too frequently over the last number of years litigants, either acting by themselves or represented by lawyers, have resorted to the making of vitriolic but groundless allegations in defending or advancing their position. These allegations have been made against other litigants, against lawyers (whether solicitors or counsel) and against judges. Where possible, pertinent and proportionate steps should be taken to address and deter such activities. In this judgment I have set out some weapons in the armoury of the court which may be deployed where it is appropriate to do so."

26. One of the weapons in the armoury of the court which was identified by O'Moore J. (at para. 31) as being appropriate where groundless allegations of fraud are made in litigation is the making of a costs order which, by directing that costs would be paid at a higher level than party and party costs - such as legal practitioner and client basis. The applicant has not sought a higher level of costs but it would seem to follow that the making of groundless allegations of fraud in the course of an administration suit such as this can justify the making of an Order that the executor's costs would be recoverable from the share of the beneficiary making those allegations.

27. There is another reason why, in my view, the applicant's costs should be paid from the respondent's share in the estate of Matthew Connolly, deceased. In this case, the applicant has been largely successful in obtaining approval for the accounts as originally drafted. Not only has he succeeded on six of the nine issues raised by the respondent in relation to the administration of the estate, but the application has not materially altered the applicant's pre-litigation position as regards one of those issues, namely, "The Dell". While originally excluded from the proposed distribution, albeit the subject of a Note to the accounts indicating that Mr. Connolly had intended in his lifetime that it be transferred to Ronan, the applicant wrote to the respondent on 13 November, 2023, some months before the summons for the purpose of this application was issued, stating that he was agreeable to letting Ronan buy "The Dell" from the estate. That is essentially what is occurring now as the property has been valued and will form part of Ronan's share in his father's estate. The respondent's objections to the accounts, so far as they relate to "The Dell", have therefore not resulted in any significant change in the applicant's position as stated prior to the issue of the proceedings.

28. Another of the three issues requiring adjustment of the accounts relates to expenses incurred by the estate's solicitors as a result of the respondent's action in making a complaint against them to the LSRA even though he was not their client. While I have held that this is, in effect, a cost associated with the solicitors' practice, it must be recalled that the expense in question was nevertheless generated by the respondent's actions and that the complaint in question was dismissed by the LSRA as being frivolous and vexatious, the principal basis for this being that the respondent was not a client of Reddy Charlton LLP. The respondent's affidavits continue to contain commentary on and allegations against Reddy Charlton LLP and, in particular, the individual solicitor dealing with the administration of the estate, which do him little credit.

29. The value of the adjustments as a result of these proceedings constitutes a very small portion of the overblown sum of ?1,033,875.50 which the respondent initially claimed had been wrongfully withheld from the estates. The fees relating to the LSRA complaint amount to ?7,146.30, the rings in question were cumulatively valued at ?25,000, and "The Dell" has been valued at ?10,000. The outcome therefore of the application has been to alter the amounts available for distribution so as to increase the total amount by ?42,146.30, which in turn increases the share of each of the four siblings as residuary legatees of Matthew Connolly, deceased by ?10,536.58. The figure amounts to approximately 4% of the figure which the respondent incorrectly asserted in his affidavits had been withheld from the estates, and increases the value of what the respondent is due to receive as residuary legatee in his father's estate by less than 1%.

30. It is therefore clear that the applicant has been largely successful in dealing with the objections of the respondent, some of which - for example, the assertions that the applicant intended to retain ?240,000 rather than ?120,000 as a contingency fund and that the Leeds Building Society account should have been listed in the SA2 even though the balance had been transferred to a third party prior to death - are properly regarded as spurious. If one considers the matter from the point of view of the overall adjustment to the estate accounts - as opposed to the number of issues raised - the applicant has been almost entirely successful in obtaining approval for the accounts. To put it another way, the costs incurred by the estate in dealing with the objections raised by the respondent are completely disproportionate to the amounts credited to the estate accounts as a result of the respondent's objections. It is evident from the correspondence and the affidavits that there was no prospect of reaching an agreement with the respondent in relation to any of the nine issues raised by him. Cumulatively, these objections gave rise to a two-day hearing in this Court, followed by several for mention dates and a costs hearing. The result of this costly exercise is that the estate accounts have been adjusted to account for two matters on which the respondent resiled from his initial position that the assets in question should not form part of the residue, and a third matter which arose because of a frivolous and vexatious complaint made by him against the solicitors dealing with the administration of the estates.

31. Taken together with the uncooperative stance of the respondent, and with his propensity to make unfounded allegations of fraud, it follows that the application was necessitated by the respondent's conduct, consisting of his action in resiling from previously asserted positions, the making of an unfounded complaint against the applicant's solicitors, and the making of other objections which have been found to be without foundation.

32. The respondent did not incur legal costs as he represented himself. Litigants in person can be awarded their reasonable expenses, but, given that it was the respondent's conduct which necessitated the application, together with his tendency to make unfounded allegations of fraud and bad faith on the part of the applicant, I will not make any order that he should recover his expenses from the estate.

Conclusion

33. I will therefore direct that the applicant should be entitled to his costs out of the estate of Matthew Connolly, deceased, and further that costs should be paid from the respondent's share in that estate . As the greater part of Mrs. Connolly's estate passed into the residue of Mr. Connolly's estate, I will make no Order affecting her estate. I will make no order for the respondent's expenses and as he does not have legal representation, he has incurred no costs.

34. The matter is listed for mention on 17 April, 2026, and I will hear the parties on that date as to the precise Orders to be made to reflect this judgment.

35. I would also like to clarify that the purpose of requiring that the very small dividends payable to Mrs. Connolly's estate in respect of small shareholdings held by her at the date of her death would be handed over to the applicant was merely to ensure that the estate was dealt with in an orderly fashion. It seems that these cheques were still issuing in Mrs. Connolly's name after her death and that these were gathered in by the respondent (not the applicant, as inadvertently stated at para. 83 of the principal judgment). **** In any event, the reference to those cheques was made to clarify that, as the respondent never extracted a Grant of Probate in his father's estate and was not one of his mother's nominated executors, it seems inappropriate that he would purport to deal with the assets of either deceased. The respondent has disclosed on affidavit the estates' assets, in the form of dividend cheques and the like, which came into his possession and it is accepted that the applicant will deal with these minor shareholdings henceforth.

36. It appears from the respondent's affidavit sworn 6 August, 2025 in compliance with a direction of this court made on 30 July, 2025, that he holds or has held at some point sums amounting to over ?4,000 in the form of dividends paid to the estates, principally that of Mrs. Connolly. I should stress that, notwithstanding other criticisms made of the respondent in this judgment, there is no suggestion that the respondent has withheld funds or that he gathered in these assets for his own benefit. However, since the respondent did not extract a Grant in his father's estate and is not named as an executor in his mother's will, I thought it was appropriate that he would make known to the applicant all information that he has relating to either estate and that he would hand over all of the assets of either estate which might be in his possession.

37. Of course, I accept the representations subsequently made by the applicant that the cost of realising these shareholdings and even of cashing dividend cheques may outweigh the benefit of doing so, such that any attempt to gather them in might result only in expense. To the extent that that is so, the applicant is free to decide not to incur those costs. There is no obligation on a personal representative to incur unnecessary expense for the estate. I will hear the parties on the date when final orders are made as to whether the remittances disclosed by the respondent in his affidavit of 6 August, 2025, have already been or require now to be accounted for by the applicant.

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