Groller v. Flores - Custody Modification Appeal
Summary
The Superior Court of Pennsylvania issued a non-precedential decision in Groller v. Flores, affirming a trial court's order modifying a child custody schedule. The appeal concerned the modification of physical custody for a ten-year-old child, with the court upholding the trial court's decision to maintain an equal shared physical custody schedule.
What changed
The Superior Court of Pennsylvania, in a non-precedential decision (Docket No. 1875 EDA 2025), affirmed a trial court's order modifying the physical custody schedule for a child. The appellant, Mother Jessica Flores, appealed the trial court's decision to modify the custody arrangement from a 2-2-3 schedule to a week-on/week-off schedule, declining to award primary physical custody and maintaining equal shared physical custody. The appellate court found no abuse of discretion by the trial court in weighing the evidence.
This decision primarily impacts the parties involved in the specific custody dispute. For legal professionals and courts, it serves as an example of how custody modification appeals are handled and the factors considered. There are no immediate compliance actions required for regulated entities outside of the parties directly involved in this case. The ruling affirms the trial court's discretion in custody matters.
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by Nichols](https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/10810569/groller-c-v-flores-j/#o1)
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March 18, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note
Groller, C. v. Flores, J.
Superior Court of Pennsylvania
- Citations: None known
- Docket Number: 1875 EDA 2025
- Precedential Status: Non-Precedential
Judges: Nichols
Lead Opinion
by Nichols
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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37
CARSON GROLLER : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
JESSICA FLORES N/K/A JESSICA :
FREED :
: No. 1875 EDA 2025
Appellant :
Appeal from the Order Entered July 7, 2025
In the Court of Common Pleas of Lehigh County Civil Division at No(s):
2015-FC-1680
BEFORE: STABILE, J., NICHOLS, J., and SULLIVAN, J.
MEMORANDUM BY NICHOLS, J.: FILED MARCH 18, 2026
Appellant Jessica Flores n/k/a Jessica Freed (Mother) appeals from the
order modifying the physical custody schedule for B.G. (Child), Mother’s and
Appellee Carson Groller’s (Father) ten-year-old child. On appeal, Mother
claims that the trial court abused its discretion in weighing the evidence when
evaluating Mother’s proposed custody agreement. We affirm.
By way of background, the trial court summarized the underlying facts
of this case as follows:
The parties are the parents of [Child], born [in] 2015[,] . . . and
share legal custody [and previously] shared physical custody on a
2-2-3 schedule rotating weekly. Both parties [] filed modification
petitions seeking primary physical custody. The [trial] court held
a custody trial on March 12, 2025 and June 6, 2025[.]
[The prior] physical custodial arrangement was agreed to by the
parties in 2022, when [Child] was nearly seven years old. Prior
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to trial, the parties may have orally agreed to a week on/week off
custody schedule[] but[,] ultimately, because a complete
agreement could not be reached on all issues, a custody trial was
necessary.
Trial Ct. Mem., 7/7/25, at 1-2.
The trial court held hearings on March 12, 2025 and June 6, 2025.
Mother, Father, and Lehigh County Office of Children and Youth Services social
worker Martin Baddick, were among the witnesses who testified at the
hearings. See N.T., 3/12/25; N.T., 6/6/25. On July 7, 2025, the trial court
entered an order modifying the custody arrangement from a 2-2-3 rotating
basis to a week on/week off schedule, declining to award primary physical
custody to either parent and maintaining an equal shared physical custody
schedule. The trial court also issued a memorandum addressing the custody
factors set forth in the Custody Act at 23 Pa.C.S. § 5328(a). See Trial Ct.
Mem., 7/7/25. After Mother filed a timely notice of appeal and an untimely
Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)(2)(i) statement, the trial court issued a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)
opinion addressing Mother’s claims. 1
On appeal, Mother raises the following claims:
1 We note that in this children’s fast track matter Mother failed to file a
statement of errors with her pro se notice of appeal on July 17, 2025, as
required by Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)(2)(i). On July 25, 2025, however, Mother’s
counsel entered his appearance and filed a Rule 1925(a)(2)(i) statement.
While the late filing of Mother’s statement of errors is a procedural defect, it
“does not affect the validity of the appeal.” In re K.T.E.L., 983 a.2D 745,
474 (Pa. Super. 2009); see also Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)(2)(i).
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Did the trial court err by misapplying the burden of proof to
[Mother]?Did the trial court abuse its discretion by denying [Mother’s]
petition for modification of custody?Did the trial court abuse its discretion by reaching conclusions
of law based on factual findings unsupported by the evidence
of record?
Mother’s Brief at 6 (some formatting altered).
We address Mother’s claims together. The crux of Mother’s arguments
is that the trial court’s rejection of her proposed custody modification was
against the weight of the evidence. Id. at 17-18, 25 (citations omitted).
Mother argues that the trial court erred in focusing on whether she had proven
her specific allegations and, in doing so, failed to adequately apply the custody
factors from the Child Custody Act to determine Child’s best interests. Id. at
17-22. Mother also argues that the trial court’s conclusions are unreasonable
in light of its factual findings. Id. at 26. Mother contends that the trial court
erred in finding that “neither party had met their burden of proof” and that
the trial court weighed Child’s preference too heavily in that it “ultimately
overrode all of the custody factors.” Id. at 35 (citation omitted).
Our standard of review for custody modification orders is as follows:
[i]n reviewing a custody order, our scope is of the broadest type
and our standard is abuse of discretion. We must accept findings
of the trial court that are supported by competent evidence of
record, as our role does not include making independent factual
determinations. In addition, with regard to issues of credibility
and weight of the evidence, we must defer to the presiding trial
judge who viewed and assessed the witnesses first-hand.
However, we are not bound by the trial court’s deductions or
inferences from its factual findings. Ultimately, the test is whether
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the trial court's conclusions are unreasonable as shown by the
evidence of record. We may reject the conclusions of the trial
court only if they involve an error of law[] or are unreasonable in
light of the sustainable findings of the trial court.
E.R. v. J.N.B., 129 A.3d 521, 527 (Pa. Super. 2015) (citation omitted); see
also R.L. v. M.A., 209 A.3d 391, 395 (Pa. Super. 2019) (explaining that “a
trial court abuses its discretion if, in reaching a conclusion, it overrides or
misapplies the law, or the record shows that the trial court’s judgment was
either manifestly unreasonable or the product of partiality, prejudice, bias or
ill will” (citation omitted and some formatting altered)). We apply a deferential
standard of review to claims of abuse of discretion, as it is not this Court’s role
to “re-find facts, re-weigh evidence, and re-assess credibility.” Wilson v.
Smyers, 284 A.3d 509, 520 (Pa. Super. 2022) (citation omitted). On appeal,
“[t]he parties cannot dictate the amount of weight the trial court places on
evidence” and “[a]ppellate interference is unwarranted if the trial court’s
consideration of the best interest of the child was careful and thorough.”
R.M.G., Jr. v. F.M.G., 986 A.2d 1234, 1237 (Pa. Super. 2009) (citation
omitted).
The paramount concern in any custody case decided under the Child
Custody Act is the best interests of the child. See 23 Pa.C.S. §§ 5328(a),
5338(a). “The best-interests standard, decided on a case-by-case basis,
considers all factors which legitimately have an effect upon the child’s
physical, intellectual, moral, and spiritual well-being.” Taylor, 302 A.3d at
207 (citation omitted and some formatting altered). Section 5328(a) sets
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forth the best interest factors that a trial court must consider in awarding
custody. See E.R., 129 A.3d at 527.
Section 5328(a) of the Act provides as follows:
§ 5328. Factors to consider when awarding custody
(a) Factors.—In ordering any form of custody, the court shall
determine the best interest of the child by considering all relevant
factors, giving substantial weighted consideration to those factors
specified under paragraphs (1), (2), (2.1) and (2.2) which affect
the safety of the child, including the following:
(1) Which party is more likely to ensure the safety of the child.
(2) The present and past abuse committed by a party or
member of the party's household, which may include past or
current protection from abuse or sexual violence protection
orders where there has been a finding of abuse.
(2.1) The information set forth in section 5329.1(a) (relating
to consideration of child abuse and involvement with protective
services).
(2.2) Violent or assaultive behavior committed by a party.
(2.3) Which party is more likely to encourage and permit
frequent and continuing contact between the child and another
party if contact is consistent with the safety needs of the child.
(3) The parental duties performed by each party on behalf of
the child.
(4) The need for stability and continuity in the child’s
education, family life and community life, except if changes are
necessary to protect the safety of the child or a party.
(5) The availability of extended family.
(6) The child’s sibling relationships.
(7) The well-reasoned preference of the child, based on the
child’s developmental stage, maturity and judgment.
(8) The attempts of a party to turn the child against the other
party, except in cases of abuse where reasonable safety
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measures are necessary to protect the safety of the child. A
party's reasonable concerns for the safety of the child and the
party's reasonable efforts to protect the child shall not be
considered attempts to turn the child against the other party.
A child's deficient or negative relationship with a party shall not
be presumed to be caused by the other party.
(9) Which party is more likely to maintain a loving, stable,
consistent and nurturing relationship with the child adequate
for the child’s emotional needs.
(10) Which party is more likely to attend to the daily physical,
emotional, developmental, educational and special needs of the
child.
(11) The proximity of the residences of the parties.
(12) Each party’s availability to care for the child or ability to
make appropriate child-care arrangements.
(13) The level of conflict between the parties and the
willingness and ability of the parties to cooperate with one
another. A party’s effort to protect a child from abuse by
another party is not evidence of unwillingness or inability to
cooperate with that party.
(14) The history of drug or alcohol abuse of a party or member
of a party’s household.
(15) The mental and physical condition of a party or member
of a party’s household.
(16) Any other relevant factor.
(a.2) Determination.--No single factor under subsection (a)
shall by itself be determinative in the awarding of custody. The
court shall examine the totality of the circumstances, giving
weighted consideration to the factors that affect the safety of the
child, when issuing a custody order that is in the best interest of
the child.
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23 Pa.C.S. § 5328(a), (a.1).2
“[W]hen explaining its conclusions as to the section 5328(a) factors, the
trial court necessarily resolve[s] conflicts in testimony and [makes] credibility
determination[s].” M.J.M. v. M.L.G., 63 A.3d 331, 336 n.6 (Pa. Super. 2013).
In considering the factors set forth in Section 5328(a), “there is no required
amount of detail for the trial court’s explanation; all that is required is that
the enumerated factors are considered and that the custody decision is based
on those considerations.” Taylor v. Smith, 302 A.3d 203, 208 (Pa. Super.
2023) (citing, inter alia, M.J.M., 63 A.3d at 336 (citations omitted)).
Here, the trial court stated that it “weighed the custody factors” and
“considered whether [Mother’s] evidence established [that her] proposed
custody modification was in the best interest of [Child].” Trial Ct. Op.,
8/11/25, at 2 (citing Trial Ct. Mem., 7/7/25). The trial court addressed each
custody factor set forth in the Act, finding all but one factor to be neutral
between the parties, or inapplicable. See Trial Ct. Mem., 7/7/25, at 2-6.
2 These were the custody factors in effect at the time of hearing and when the
trial court made its decision. Effective August 29, 2025, our Legislature
amended Section 5328(a). See 23 Pa.C.S. § 5328 (amended June 30, 2025,
P.L. 18, No. 11, § 1, effective in 60 days). In the event of amendments to
the Child Custody Act, for “evidentiary proceedings [that] commence[] on or
after the effective date of the Act, the provisions of the Act apply even if the
request or petition for relief was filed prior to the effective date.” C.R.F. v.
S.E.F., 45 A.3d 441, 445 (Pa. Super. 2012); see also 23 Pa.C.S. § 5328(a).
Therefore, “it is the date of the commencement of the hearing that determines
whether the [amended] Act applies, not the date the petition or complaint was
filed.” C.R.F., 45 A.3d at 445.
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Specifically, the trial court explained:
[B]oth parties provide appropriate structure and home
environment for [Child]. The essence of the dispute concerns
Mother’s frustration with Father’s lack of communication and her
belief that Father improperly ceded parental responsibilities to
other persons and/or may not [have] properly supervise[d Child].
Mother’s concerns with supervision were not supported by . . .
evidence [the trial] court finds credible. [Child] is capable of
making short walks to the bus stop with his friends from school
without needing adult supervision. He certainly can ride his bike,
and is capable of operating an ATV with appropriate safety gear
and supervision. During his periods of custodial time, Father is
allowed to arrange activities for [Child] like summer camp, as long
as it does not interfere with Mother’s periods of shared custody.
Mother has described Father as being a very involved parent until
his most recent, and now ended, relationship with his former
partner. The [trial] court agrees with Mother that a third-party
parental figure in Father’s home may create parenting challenges
for her, but Mother bears the responsibility of initiating the difficult
conversation with Father directly if she feels this is an issue and
that person’s parental role can be defined to the benefit of [Child].
The [trial] court has no doubt that Mother’s concerns with Father’s
former girlfriend or Father’s alleged lack of communication or
supervision are based upon a sincere desire to protect [Child], but
the evidence at trial does not establish that Mother’s allegations
are, in fact, true. [The trial] court otherwise finds such evidence
by Mother to be incredible and unpersuasive. [Child] reportedly
had a very positive connection with Father’s former girlfriend, and
was genuinely sad when the relationship ended.
While it is commendable that Mother prefers to stay at home to
be available for [Child], Father should not be penalized for needing
[the] assistance of other family members when he is working or
otherwise engaged in activities. There is no evidence that these
alternative caregivers are in any way harmful, and it appears
[Child] enjoys his time with these individuals. While in Father’s
care, [Child] participates in outdoor activities like swimming, and
attends summer camp. The parties certainly are encouraged to
be flexible and reasonable in accommodating a request to modify
or change the custodial schedule, but in an agreement cannot be
reached, the aggrieved parent should not inform [Child] about the
conflict. [Child] is attending weekly counseling due to certain
emotional issues. Placing him in the middle of ongoing parental
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conflict does not demonstrate good and effective co-parenting.
Moreover, this parental behavior is immature and does not
promote [Child’s] emotional well-being.
Id. at 7-8 (some formatting altered).
Ultimately, the trial court concluded that Mother’s evidence was not
credible and explained that, in large part because the parties live
approximately one mile from one another and in the same school district, a
shared custodial arrangement on a week on/week off schedule best served
the interests of Child, “rather than the rotating 2-2-3 basis, which [was]
inconvenient and more confusing for Child.” Trial Ct. Op., 8/11/25, at 2 (some
formatting altered).
Following our review of the record, we find no abuse of discretion by the
trial court. See E.R., 129 A.3d at 527; see also R.L., 209 A.3d at 395. In
her brief, Mother attempts to dictate the amount of weight the trial court
should have placed on the evidence and asks that we apply her preferred
credibility determinations in place of those made by the trial court. See
R.M.G., Jr. v. F.M.G., 986 A.2d at 1237 (citation omitted); see also M.J.M.,
63 A.3d at 336 n.6. However, because there is no indication that the trial
court’s findings were “manifestly unreasonable or the product of partiality,
prejudice, bias or ill will,” we discern no abuse of discretion by the trial court. 3
3 To the extent that Mother argues that there was no basis in the record for
the trial court to find that Mother had a validated GPS referral, we agree that
Mr. Braddick’s testimony established that, after an investigation, the GPS
referral for Mother was deemed invalid. Mother’s Brief at 45; see also R.R.
(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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R.L. v. M.A., 209 A.3d at 395; see also E.R., 129 A.3d at 527; M.J.M., 63
A.3d at 336 n.6; Wilson, 284 A.3d at 520.
Finding no merit to Mother’s claims, we affirm the order below.
Order affirmed. Jurisdiction relinquished.
Date: 3/18/2026
142a-48a (we may cite to the parties’ reproduced records for the parties’
convenience). Nonetheless, because the trial court relied on other facts
supported in the record for its conclusion that custody should be modified to
serve Child’s best interests and, further, because the trial court expressly
found Mother’s “evidence to change custody to be incredible,” we conclude
that this fact-finding error does not rise to an abuse of discretion. Trial Ct.
Op., 8/11/25, at 2; see also R.L., 209 A.3d at 395. Further, the custody
order – which maintained the parties’ shared physical custody arrangement
and reduced the frequency of Child’s transitions between households – is not
“unreasonable in light of the sustainable findings of the trial court.” E.R., 129
A.3d at 527 (holding that an appellate court may reject a trial court’s
conclusions “only if they are . . .unreasonable in light of the sustainable
findings of the trial court”).
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