Gary Montgomery v. Aramark of Tennessee LLC - Prisoner Civil Rights

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Gary Montgomery v. Aramark of Tennessee, LLC, Shawn Phillips, Stacey Oaks, Frank Strada, Officer Duncan, and John Doe

District Court, E.D. Tennessee

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: 3:25-cv-00537

• Precedential Status: Unknown Status

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Trial Court Document

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
AT KNOXVILLE

GARY MONTGOMERY, )
) Case No. 3:25-cv-537
Plaintiff, )
) Judge Travis R. McDonough
v. )
) Magistrate Judge Debra C. Poplin
ARAMARK OF TENNESSEE, LLC, )
SHAWN PHILLIPS, STACEY OAKS, )
FRANK STRADA, OFFICER DUNCAN, )
and JOHN DOE, )
)
Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

Plaintiff Gary Montgomery, a prisoner in the custody of the Tennessee Department of
Correction (“TDOC”) currently incarcerated at the Morgan County Correctional Complex
(“MCCX”), filed a motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis (Doc. 1); a civil rights
complaint under Tennessee law, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and 42 U.S.C. § 1985 (Doc. 2); a motion for
leave to file an amended complaint (Doc. 5); and a proposed amended complaint (Doc. 5-1). For
the reasons set forth below, the Court will GRANT Plaintiff’s motions, DISMISS Plaintiff’s
federal claims for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, DECLINE
jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s State-law claims, and DISMISS Plaintiff’s State-law claims without
prejudice.
I. MOTIONS
A. To Proceed In Forma Pauperis
Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), a prisoner bringing a civil action may
apply for permission to file suit without prepaying the filing fee. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). A
review of Plaintiff’s motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis (Doc. 1) demonstrates that he
lacks sufficient financial resources to pay the filing fee in a lump sum. Accordingly, pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 1915, this motion (id.) will be GRANTED.
Plaintiff will be ASSESSED the civil filing fee of $350.00. The custodian of Plaintiff’s
inmate trust account will be DIRECTED to submit to the Clerk, U.S. District Court, 800 Market

Street, Suite 130, Knoxville, Tennessee, as an initial partial payment, whichever is the greater of:
(a) twenty percent (20%) of the average monthly deposits to Plaintiff’s inmate trust account; or
(b) twenty percent (20%) of the average monthly balance in his inmate trust account for the six-
month period preceding the filing of the complaint. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1)(A), (B). Thereafter,
the custodian of Plaintiff’s inmate trust account is directed to submit twenty percent (20%) of
Plaintiff’s preceding monthly income (or income credited to Plaintiff’s trust account for the
preceding month), but only when such monthly income exceeds ten dollars ($10.00), until the
full filing fee of three hundred fifty dollars ($350.00) as authorized under 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a)
has been paid to the Clerk. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2).
The Clerk will be DIRECTED to send a copy of this Order to the Court’s financial

deputy and the custodian of inmate trust accounts at Plaintiff’s current facility to ensure
compliance with payment of the filing fee.
B. Motion to Amend
Under Rule 15(a)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a party may amend its
pleading once as a matter of course within twenty-one days of service. See Fed. R. Civ. P.
15(a)(1)(A). Plaintiff’s motion to amend (Doc. 5), filed within twenty-one days of his initial
complaint, will therefore be GRANTED as a matter of course. Thus, Plaintiff’s amended
complaint (Doc. 5-1) will serve as the operative pleading in this cause. See In re Refrigerant
Compressors Antitrust Litig., 731 F.3d 586, 589 (6th Cir. 2013) (“An amended complaint
supersedes an earlier complaint for all purposes.”) (citation omitted).
II. SCREENING OF AMENDED COMPLAINT
A. Screening Standard
Under the PLRA, district courts must screen prisoner complaints and sua sponte dismiss

any claims that are “frivolous, malicious, or fail[] to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted,” or “seek[] monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28
U.S.C. § 1915A(b); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); Benson v. O’Brian, 179 F.3d 1014 (6th
Cir. 1999). The dismissal standard articulated by the Supreme Court in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556
U.S. 662 (2009) and Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) “governs dismissals
for failure to state a claim under [28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A] because the relevant
statutory language tracks the language in Rule 12(b)(6)” of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470–71 (6th Cir. 2010) (citations omitted). Thus, to survive an
initial review under the PLRA, a complaint “must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as
true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570).

Courts should liberally construe pro se pleadings filed in civil rights cases and hold them
to a less stringent standard than lawyer-drafted pleadings. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520
(1972). Even so, allegations that give rise to a mere possibility that a plaintiff might later
establish undisclosed facts supporting recovery are not well-pled and do not state a plausible
claim. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 570. Further, formulaic and conclusory recitations of the
elements of a claim which are not supported by specific facts are insufficient to state a plausible
claim for relief. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 681.
B. Plaintiff’s Allegations
Plaintiff, who is “elderly and vulnerable[,]” was transferred from Bledsoe County
Correctional Complex to the MCCX approximately one year ago. (Doc. 5-1 p. 1, 3). “His
diabetes diagnosis and medical orders followed” him to the MCCX. (Id. at 3). Aramark,
TDOC’s food service provider, refused to follow Plaintiff’s “medical order for a diabetic meal

until [P]laintiff was [on] their internal diabetic meal distribution list.” (Id.) That process took
approximately five weeks. (Id.)
On March 16, 2025, Plaintiff attempted to enter the chow hall, but Officer Duncan denied
him “the opportunity to eat[,]” even though “[t]he door to the chow hall was still open and
residents were inside sitting and eating.” (Id.) Plaintiff explained that he was diabetic and
needed food, but Officer Duncan stated, “I don’t care.” (Id.) So, Plaintiff went without food and
reported the incident to his unit officer. (Id.) Plaintiff asserts “[t]his is deliberate indifference.”
(Id.)
In August 2025, Plaintiff left the MCCX “for a couple days to attend a court hearing.”
(Id. at 3.) When Plaintiff returned to the MCCX, Aramark refused to serve him a diabetic meal
pursuant to a “new rule that if you miss six (6) meals you are automatically dropped from
diabetic special meals, regardless of medical orders.” (Id.) Nurse Toya and Nurse Practitioner

Kline “made numerous calls to Aramark,” but it still took three weeks for Plaintiff to begin to
receive diabetic meals again. (Id.)
Believing the above-recited conduct to violate his rights under Tennessee law and 42
U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985, Plaintiff filed the instant action against Aramark of Tennessee, LLC
(“Aramark”) and Defendants John Doe, the chief medical supervisor of the TDOC; Frank Strada,
the commissioner of the TDOC; Stacey Oaks, the assistant warden over safety and security at
the MCCX; Officer Duncan, the duty officer on the yard on March 16, 2025; and Shawn Phillips,
a warden at the MCCX. (Id. at 2, 3.) Plaintiff seeks a variety of injunctive, declaratory, and
monetary relief (Id. at 3–4.)
C. Analysis
1. Section 1983 Claims
The crux of Plaintiff’s complaint is that Plaintiff was allegedly denied medically

prescribed care. (See generally, Doc. 5-1.) The Eighth Amendment, applicable to the States
through the Fourteenth Amendment, provides that “[e]xcessive bail shall not be required, nor
excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.” U.S. Const. amend. VIII;
see also Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 666–67 (1962). This provision requires the
government “to provide medical care for those whom it is punishing by incarceration.” Estelle v.
Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103 (1976). However, the United States Constitution does not guarantee a
prisoner “unqualified access to healthcare.” Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 9 (1992).
Instead, the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment proscribes
acts or omissions that produce an “unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.” Wilson v. Seiter,
501 U.S. 294, 297 (1991).

An Eighth Amendment claim for the denial of adequate medical treatment is composed
of two parts: (1) an objective component, which requires a plaintiff to show a “sufficiently
serious” medical need; and (2) a subjective component, which requires the plaintiff to show the
defendants acted with “deliberate indifference” to that need. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825,
834, 842 (1994). Negligence is insufficient to establish liability; deliberate indifference requires
a mental state amounting to criminal recklessness. Santiago v. Ringle, 734 F.3d 585, 591 (6th
Cir. 2013) (citing Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834, 839–40). Therefore, to establish an official’s
liability, a prisoner must show that “the official knows of and disregards an excessive risk to
inmate health or safety; the official must both be aware of facts from which the inference could
be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.”
Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. And to set forth a viable constitutional claim for the denial of medical
care, a plaintiff must plausibly allege that his health suffered as a result of the alleged denial of
care. See Thaddeus–X v. Blatter, 175 F.3d 378, 401 (6th Cir. 1999).
Here, Plaintiff has not alleged any facts suggesting that his health was negatively

impacted by the temporary denial of a specialized diabetic meal on two separate occasions. He
does not allege that he was not provided food, he does not allege that he was unable to eat the
food that he was provided without compromising his health, and he does not allege that he
suffered any detriment to his health as a result of not being fed a diabetic meal tray on the
complained of occasions. Therefore, Plaintiff has failed to state a colorable Eighth Amendment
claim as to the temporary denial of a diabetic diet. See Cunningham v. Jones, 567 F.2d 653,
659–60 (6th Cir. 1977) (providing that where a prisoner’s diet is sufficient to sustain the
prisoner’s good health, no constitutional right has been violated); Richmond v. Settles, 450 F.
App’x 448, 456 (6th Cir. 2011) (affirming dismissal of claim based on inadequate nutrition
where the plaintiff failed to allege that his health suffered as a result of the alleged deprivation of

meals).
Similarly, Plaintiff has not alleged that his health suffered because Officer Duncan denied
him a meal on a singular occasion. Thus, this allegation is insufficient to state an Eighth
Amendment claim. See, e.g., Cunningham, 567 F.2d at 659–60.
Moreover, the Court notes that Plaintiff has sued Defendants Phillips, Strada, Oaks, and
Doe in both their individual and official capacities as employees of the TDOC. (See Doc. 5-1, at
2.) But the TDOC is an arm of the State of Tennessee, and thus, suit against Defendants in their
respective official capacities is suit against the State itself. See Hix v. Tenn. Dep’t of Corr., 196
F. App’x 350, 355 (6th Cir. 2006) (holding TDOC is equivalent of the “State”); Kentucky v.
Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 166 (1985) (holding “an official-capacity suit is, in all respects other than
name, to be treated as a suit against the entity”); Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658,
690 n.55 (1978) (“[O]fficial-capacity suits generally represent only another way of pleading an
action against an entity of which an officer is an agent.”). But Plaintiff may not maintain suit
against a State or its employees in their official capacities because “a State is not a person within

the meaning of § 1983.” Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 64 (1989). Thus, all
official-capacity claims against Defendants must be dismissed.
As to each Defendant’s respective individual liability, Plaintiff maintains that Defendants
Phillips, Strada, Oaks, and Doe are liable because of the duty of care they owe inmates due to
their particular positions of authority. (See Doc. 5-1, at 2.) But a plaintiff cannot maintain suit
against an individual defendant based solely on his or her position of authority, as there is no
respondeat superior liability in a § 1983 action. See, e.g., Monell, 436 U.S. at 691 (holding local
government “cannot be held liable under § 1983 on a respondeat superior theory”). Instead, to
state a claim against any Defendant individually, Plaintiff must adequately plead that each
Defendant, through his or her own actions, has violated the Constitution. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at

676; see also Frazier v. Michigan, 41 F. App’x 762, 764 (6th Cir. 2002) (providing that “a
complaint must allege that the defendants were personally involved in the alleged deprivation of
federal rights” to state a claim upon which relief may be granted). Plaintiff fails to plead any
facts suggesting that any individual Defendant was personally involved in the events giving rise
to this action.
And, to the extent Plaintiff purports to sue each of these Defendants under a theory of
supervisory liability, he must show “that the supervisor encouraged the specific incident of
misconduct or in some other way directly participated in it.” Bellamy v. Bradley, 729 F.2d 416,
421 (6th Cir. 1984) (citation omitted). Plaintiff’s complaint fails to state a colorable supervisory
liability claim, as it fails to allege that any individual Defendant violated any of Plaintiff’s
constitutional rights, or that he or she “directly participated” in or “encouraged” violations by the
jail or Aramark staff. Id.; see also Greene v. Barber, 310 F.3d 889, 899 (6th Cir. 2002)
(explaining that “[s]upervisory liability under § 1983 does not attach when it is premised on a
mere failure to act; it ‘must be based on active unconstitutional behavior’”) (quoting Bass v.

Robinson, 167 F.3d 1041, 1048 (6th Cir. 1999))). Accordingly, Plaintiff has not pled sufficient
facts to suggest that Defendants Phillips, Strada, Oaks, or Doe had any personal involvement in
the incidents giving rise to Plaintiff’s complaint, and all individual-capacity claims against these
Defendants will likewise be dismissed.
Plaintiff maintains that Officer Duncan’s behavior in denying him a meal on March 16,
2025, constitutes deliberate indifference. (See Doc. 5-1, at 2.) But Plaintiff has not presented
any facts that would suggest that Officer Duncan’s conduct posed an excessive risk to Plaintiff’s
health or safety, and the Court has already determined that Plaintiff’s allegations against Officer
Duncan fail to state a plausible constitutional claim. Thus, Plaintiff’s claim that Officer Duncan

acted with deliberate indifference is impermissibly conclusory, and Plaintiff’s individual-liability
claim against Officer Duncan will be dismissed. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 681 (noting conclusory
allegations are not entitled to presumption of truth).
Plaintiff also purports to sue Aramark in its individual capacity, “but an entity . . . does
not have an individual capacity.” Hodges v. Strada, No. 3:23-CV-00952, 2025 WL 2471150, at
*4 n.5 (M.D. Tenn. Aug. 27, 2025). Rather, a claim against Aramark may proceed only upon a
plausible allegation that Plaintiff suffered a particular injury as a result of a policy or custom of
the entity. See id.; see also Garner v. Memphis Police Dep’t, 8 F.3d 358, 364 (6th Cir. 1993)
(citation omitted); Braswell v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 419 F. App’x 622, 627 (6th Cir. 2011)
(holding plaintiff must allege “a policy or well-settled custom of the company was the ‘moving
force’ behind the alleged deprivation” of his rights). However, as the Court found above,
Plaintiff has not identified any particular injury as a result of Aramark’s alleged actions.
Accordingly, Plaintiff has failed to state a colorable Eighth Amendment claim under
§ 1983 against any of the named Defendants, and his § 1983 claims will be dismissed.

1. 42 U.S.C. § 1985 Plaintiff maintains that he is entitled to relief in this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1985 (see Doc. 5-1, at 1), which allows the recovery of damages against “two or more persons” who “conspire” to prevent an officer from discharging his duties, deter or intimidate a witness, or deprive another person of civil rights or privileges. 42 U.S.C. § 1985. However, Plaintiff has not alleged any facts that would support a conspiracy claim. Accordingly, any intended § 1985 claim will be dismissed.
2. State-Law Claims Plaintiff alleges State-law claims for the “tort of the deprivation of food[,]” negligence,

and negligence per se. (See Doc. 5-1, at 4.) Because the Court is dismissing Plaintiff’s federal
claims, the Court will exercise its discretion and decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction
over the remaining State-law claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3); United Mine Workers of Am.
v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726–727 (1966) (“[I]f the federal claims are dismissed before
trial, . . . the state claims should be dismissed as well.”).
III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above:
1. Plaintiff’s motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis (Doc. 1) is GRANTED;

1. Plaintiff is ASSESSED the civil filing fee of $350.00;

   1. The custodian of Plaintiff’s inmate trust account is DIRECTED to submit the filing fee to the Clerk in the manner set forth above;
   2. The Clerk is DIRECTED to mail a copy of this Memorandum and Order to the custodian of inmate accounts at the institution where Plaintiff is now confined and to the Court’s financial deputy;
   3. Plaintiff’s motion to amend his complaint (Doc. 5) is GRANTED;
   4. Plaintiff’s federal claims are DISMISSED for failure to state a claim;
   5. The Court DECLINES to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s State-law claims, and those claims are DISMISSED without prejudice; and
   6. The Court CERTIFIES that any appeal from this action would not be taken in good faith and would be totally frivolous. See Rule 24 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure.

SO ORDERED.
/s/ Travis R. McDonough
TRAVIS R. MCDONOUGH
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE