DFPS Gender Transition Investigation Injunctions Vacated as Moot

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by Blacklock](https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/10847658/greg-abbott-in-his-official-capacity-as-governor-of-the-state-of-texas/#o2)

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April 24, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

Greg Abbott, in His Official Capacity as Governor of the State of Texas; Stephanie Muth, in Her Official Capacity as Commissioner of the Department of Family and Protective Services; And the Texas Department of Family and Protective Services v. Jane Doe, Individually and as Parent and Next Friend of Mary Doe, a Minor; John Doe, Individually and as Parent and Next Friend of Mary Doe, a Minor; And Dr. Megan Mooney

Texas Supreme Court

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: 24-0385
• Judges: Blacklock

• Disposition: Pursuant to Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 59.1, after granting the petitions for review and without hearing oral argument, the Court reverses the court of appeals' judgments and vacates the trial court's orders.

• Opinion

• Authorities (8)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (20.6K)

• PDF

Disposition

Pursuant to Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 59.1, after granting the petitions for review and without hearing oral argument, the Court reverses the court of appeals' judgments and vacates the trial court's orders.

Unanimous Opinion

Supreme Court of Texas
══════════
No. 24-0384
══════════

Stephanie Muth, in her official capacity as Commissioner of the
Texas Department of Family and Protective Services, and the
Texas Department of Family and Protective Services,
Petitioners,

v.

Mirabel Voe, individually and as parent and next friend of
Antonio Voe, a minor; Wanda Roe, individually and as parent and
next friend of Tommy Roe, a minor; PFLAG, Inc.; and Adam
Briggle and Amber Briggle, individually and as parents and next
friends of M.B., a minor,
Respondents

~ and ~

══════════
No. 24-0385
══════════

Greg Abbott, in his official capacity as Governor of the State of
Texas; Stephanie Muth, in her official capacity as Commissioner
of the Department of Family and Protective Services; and the
Texas Department of Family and Protective Services,
Petitioners,

v.
Jane Doe, individually and as parent and next friend of Mary
Doe, a minor; John Doe, individually and as parent and next
friend of Mary Doe, a minor; and Dr. Megan Mooney,
Respondents

═══════════════════════════════════════
On Petitions for Review from the
Court of Appeals for the Third District of Texas
═══════════════════════════════════════

PER CURIAM

CHIEF JUSTICE BLACKLOCK filed a concurring opinion.

Justice Sullivan did not participate in the decision.

In these consolidated appeals, the Department of Family and
Protective Services and its commissioner appeal three temporary-
injunction orders prohibiting DFPS from investigating reports of minors
using puberty blockers and hormone therapy for the purpose of gender
transitioning. While the appeals have been pending, DFPS
permanently closed its investigations, and most of the children reached
the age of majority. For these and other reasons explained below, we
conclude plaintiffs’ claims for injunctive relief present no live justiciable
controversy. Accordingly, we vacate the temporary-injunction orders
and dismiss the interlocutory appeals.
I
In February 2022, the Governor sent a letter to DFPS
Commissioner Jaime Masters noting that the Attorney General had
recently issued an opinion (KP-0401) concluding that it is “against the
law to subject Texas children to a wide variety of elective procedures for

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gender transitioning.” The letter “direct[ed]” DFPS “to conduct a prompt
and thorough investigation of any reported instances of these abusive
procedures” in Texas. The same day, DFPS declared in a press release:
“In accordance with Governor Abbott’s directive today to Commissioner
Masters, we will follow Texas law as explained in Attorney General
opinion KP-0401.”1
A week later, the parents of a then-16-year-old child diagnosed
with gender dysphoria (Mary Doe) and a psychologist who treats such
children sued the Governor, the DFPS Commissioner, and DFPS in
Travis County (the Doe suit). A few months after that, three additional
families—the Voes, the Roes, and the Briggles—plus PFLAG, Inc., an
advocacy organization, brought a similar suit in Travis County against
the same three defendants (the Voe suit). All plaintiffs sought a
declaration that DFPS’s February 2022 statement was void because it
was ultra vires, unconstitutional, and violated the Administrative
Procedure Act, which requires notice and comment before the enactment
of a new rule. Plaintiffs also sought injunctive relief prohibiting the new
rule’s enforcement.
The trial court ultimately issued three separate orders
temporarily enjoining DFPS and its commissioner from taking actions
against plaintiffs based on the Governor’s letter, DFPS’s statement, and
the Attorney General’s opinion and from investigating reports based

1 As we observed in a related proceeding, although DFPS’s statement

suggests that it may have considered itself bound by the Governor’s letter and
the Attorney General’s opinion, “neither the Governor nor the Attorney
General has statutory authority to directly control DFPS’s investigatory
decisions.” In re Abbott, 645 S.W.3d 276, 281 (Tex. 2022).

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solely on allegations that a minor child received medical treatment for
gender transitioning. Defendants appealed.2
The court of appeals partially vacated the injunction against the
Governor in the Doe suit but otherwise affirmed. See Abbott v. Doe, 691
S.W.3d 55, 93 (Tex. App.—Austin 2024); Muth v. Voe, 691 S.W.3d 93,
138 (Tex. App.—Austin 2024).3 Defendants petitioned for review.4
II
As we recently reaffirmed, “mootness is a constitutional
limitation on judicial authority.” Tex. Dep’t of Fam. & Protective Servs.
v. Grassroots Leadership, Inc., 717 S.W.3d 854, 866 (Tex. 2025). “When
a case ‘becomes moot, and the issues no longer justiciable,’ the case
‘should be dismissed.’” Id. at 873 (quoting Sterling v. Ferguson, 53
S.W.2d 753, 760 (Tex. 1932)). “Any ruling on the merits of a moot issue
constitutes an advisory opinion, which we lack jurisdiction to issue.” In
re J.J.R.S., 627 S.W.3d 211, 225 (Tex. 2021).

2 Although defendants’ appeals automatically stayed the temporary
injunctions under Rule of Appellate Procedure 29.1(b), the court of appeals
reinstated them under Rule 29.3. We granted mandamus relief from the
Rule 29.3 order in the Doe suit, holding that the court of appeals abused its
discretion by enjoining the Governor and by issuing an order purporting to bind
nonparties. In re Abbott, 645 S.W.3d at 283-84. The Voe plaintiffs did not seek
to enjoin the Governor.
3 While the appeals were pending, Stephanie Muth succeeded Masters

as DFPS Commissioner, so she was substituted in as a party to this proceeding.
See TEX. R. APP. P. 7.2(a).
4 On defendants’ motion, the petition in Case No. 24-0387 was
consolidated into Case No. 24-0384, which was then jointly briefed with Case
No. 24-0385.

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Plaintiffs sought, and the trial court granted, injunctive relief
restraining DFPS from investigating allegations regarding children’s
use of drugs for the purpose of gender transitioning. Since then, DFPS
has closed its investigations of three of the four families with a finding
that no further action will be taken. According to DFPS’s Associate
Commissioner for Statewide Intake, “[w]hen an investigation is closed,
DFPS will not investigate new reports involving the same allegation
that has already been investigated. Subsequent reports regarding the
same allegation will be closed without investigation.” Given the
permanent closure of DFPS’s investigations of these three families, they
no longer face a credible, nonspeculative threat that DFPS will press
any such investigations in the future.
The same is true of the fourth family, the Does, although they are
slightly differently situated. DFPS has not formally closed its
investigation as to them, but it asserts the investigation remained open
only because the trial court’s temporary-injunction order in that suit
(unlike the others) prohibited DFPS from closing it. Even leaving that
aside, there is another reason the Does no longer face a credible,
nonspeculative threat that DFPS will investigate further. Mary Doe is
no longer a minor, and the Doe parents have no other children, so by
DFPS’s own admission, it no longer has any authority to investigate
them.
Plaintiffs do not refute these facts demonstrating mootness.
Instead, they argue that dismissal for mootness based on voluntary
cessation of the challenged activity is disfavored and suggest DFPS
could choose to reopen its investigations absent the injunction. We

5
rejected a similar argument in Grassroots Leadership, reasoning that
voluntary cessation “can lead to mootness ‘when subsequent events
make absolutely clear that the [challenged conduct] could not
reasonably be expected to recur.’” 717 S.W.3d at 878 (alteration in
original) (quoting Matthews v. Kountze Indep. Sch. Dist., 484 S.W.3d
416, 418 (Tex. 2016)). We explained that “our approach to mootness
insists on a close tether to reality and rejects indulging ‘an ingenious
academic exercise in the conceivable.’” Id. at 879 (quoting United States
v. SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669, 688 (1973)). The “mere possibility” that future
events may occur, we said, is not enough to overcome facial mootness.
Id. DFPS’s unambiguous assertions that it “will not investigate new
reports involving the same allegation” and that “[s]ubsequent reports
regarding the same allegation will be closed without investigation” are
sufficient to show that any threat of a future investigation is too
speculative to justify the exercise of this Court’s jurisdiction.
Plaintiffs also suggest DFPS’s commitment to refrain from
opening a new investigation involving “the same allegation” cannot be
taken at face value. They worry that DFPS may treat a future allegation
that a minor plaintiff received drugs for gender transitioning as a
different allegation worthy of investigation as long as it comes from a
new source or involves ongoing treatment. Having considered DFPS’s
testimony as a whole, we conclude the concern is too speculative to
defeat the facial mootness reflected by the record. Because the families
are under no nonspeculative threat of investigation, resolving this
appeal would require us to deliver an advisory opinion, which our
Constitution forbids. See id. at 874-75.

6
PFLAG’s claim for injunctive relief is moot for similar reasons.
PFLAG asserts associational standing on behalf of its members
(including the Voes, the Roes, and the Briggles), which requires, among
other things, that “its members would otherwise have standing to sue in
their own right.” Tex. Ass’n of Bus. v. Tex. Air Control Bd., 852 S.W.2d
440, 447 (Tex. 1993) (quoting Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Advert.
Comm’n, 432 U.S. 333, 343 (1977)). Because PFLAG’s associational
standing is based on the standing of members whose claims are now
moot, PFLAG’s claim is also moot. See Munsell v. Dep’t of Agric., 509
F.3d 572, 584 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (holding that an association’s challenge
to an agency enforcement action was moot because the plaintiff
members’ claims were moot).5
III
We also conclude that we lack jurisdiction over Dr. Megan
Mooney’s claim for injunctive relief. A psychologist, Dr. Mooney treats
children diagnosed with gender dysphoria. She asserts she will face the
threat of civil and criminal penalties and the loss of her license if she
fails to comply with her obligation to report children who receive medical
treatments for gender transitioning. But she has not alleged that she
has been threatened with prosecution or an action to revoke her license.

5 Our holding is limited to the claims for injunctive relief before us in

this interlocutory appeal. We express no opinion on the justiciability of
plaintiffs’ claims for declaratory relief, which are not before us. See Grassroots
Leadership, 717 S.W.3d at 877 (“Courts may continue to adjudicate any parts
of a case that remain within their subject-matter jurisdiction and are otherwise
justiciable.”).

7
Nor does she allege that any state agency has investigated or threatened
to investigate her conduct.
Dr. Mooney also asserts she will suffer injury sufficient to confer
standing even if she does comply with the reporting requirements.
Doing so, she alleges, would violate her professional standards and
cause her patients to lose trust in her. She fears she “could face the
possible closure of her practice” and “be subject to malpractice lawsuits.”
But, again, her pleading reveals these concerns are, at this point, purely
hypothetical. Dr. Mooney has not alleged that any patient has
threatened to sue or leave her practice based on her compliance with
DFPS’s reporting requirements.
“Standing is implicit in the concept of subject-matter jurisdiction,
and subject-matter jurisdiction is essential to the authority of a court to
decide a case.” In re Abbott, 601 S.W.3d 802, 807 (Tex. 2020) (citing Tex.
Ass’n of Bus., 852 S.W.2d at 443). Standing is specific to each individual
plaintiff and to each plaintiff’s individual claims. Id.; see Heckman v.
Williamson County, 369 S.W.3d 137, 153 (Tex. 2012) (“[E]ach party must
establish that he has standing to bring each of the claims he himself
alleges—meaning the court must assess standing plaintiff by plaintiff,
claim by claim.”). Standing requires the plaintiff to demonstrate “an
injury-in-fact that is fairly traceable to the defendant’s conduct and
likely to be redressed by a decision in the plaintiff’s favor” on that claim.
Abbott v. Harris County, 672 S.W.3d 1, 8 (Tex. 2023).
Dr. Mooney alleges no more than a theoretical possibility of some
future injury, which is insufficient to establish standing for the
injunctive relief she seeks. See State v. Zurawski, 690 S.W.3d 644, 658

8
(Tex. 2024) (concluding that a doctor lacked standing to sue the Texas
Medical Board because it had not threatened enforcement of the
challenged statute); In re Abbott, 601 S.W.3d at 812 (concluding that
“mere allegations of possible future injury are not sufficient” to establish
standing (citation modified)); see also Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568
U.S. 398, 410 (2013) (holding that an injury that “relies on a highly
attenuated chain of possibilities” does not support standing).
Accordingly, her claim for injunctive relief must also be dismissed for
lack of jurisdiction.
IV
The claims for injunctive relief asserted by the families and
PFLAG are no longer justiciable and therefore must be dismissed as
moot. There exists no credible, nonspeculative threat that DFPS will
investigate these plaintiffs in the future based on the use of medical
treatments for gender transitioning, either because DFPS has already
ruled out these families for such an investigation or because the
children’s having reached the age of majority deprives DFPS of
authority to investigate. And Dr. Mooney lacks standing to assert a
claim for injunctive relief because the injuries she alleges are
speculative. Accordingly, without hearing oral argument, we reverse
the court of appeals’ judgments, dismiss the appeals, and vacate the trial
court’s temporary-injunction orders for lack of jurisdiction. See TEX. R.
APP. P. 56.2, 59.1.

OPINION DELIVERED: April 24, 2026

9

Concurrence Opinion

by Blacklock

Supreme Court of Texas
══════════
No. 24-0384
══════════

Stephanie Muth, in her official capacity as Commissioner of the
Texas Department of Family and Protective Services, and the
Texas Department of Family and Protective Services,
Petitioners,

v.

Mirabel Voe, individually and as parent and next friend of
Antonio Voe, a minor; Wanda Roe, individually and as parent and
next friend of Tommy Roe, a minor; PFLAG, Inc.; and Adam
Briggle and Amber Briggle, individually and as parents and next
friends of M.B., a minor,
Respondents

~ and ~

══════════
No. 24-0385
══════════

Greg Abbott, in his official capacity as Governor of the State of
Texas; Stephanie Muth, in her official capacity as Commissioner
of the Department of Family and Protective Services; and the
Texas Department of Family and Protective Services,
Petitioners,

v.
Jane Doe, individually and as parent and next friend of Mary
Doe, a minor; John Doe, individually and as parent and next
friend of Mary Doe, a minor; and Dr. Megan Mooney,
Respondents

═══════════════════════════════════════
On Petitions for Review from the
Court of Appeals for the Third District of Texas
═══════════════════════════════════════

CHIEF JUSTICE BLACKLOCK, concurring.

I agree with the Court that the injunctions in these consolidated
cases, which this Court long ago stayed, must now be dissolved in their
entirety. I also agree with the Court that the families’ claims are moot
and that PFLAG lacks standing. In my view, however, Dr. Mooney
likely has standing sufficient for at least some of her case to proceed
against the Department of Family and Protective Services. I would
therefore reach the question of Mooney’s probable right to relief on the
merits and would vacate the injunctions because the merits point firmly
in the other direction.
As a licensed psychologist, Mooney is subject to the mandatory
child-abuse reporting regime administered by DFPS. See 40 TEX.
ADMIN. CODE § 707.451–.471. Her portion of the suit challenges, in part,
DFPS’s decision to make the administration of “gender-transition”
therapy to children reportable as child abuse. Mooney—who has a
history of counseling people considering these treatments—takes the
position that DFPS’s changed view of the matter violates the law.
Although I do not think she is right about that, I am inclined to view

2
imposition by the government of an increased reporting burden of this
nature as an injury sufficient to confer standing. It seems to be an injury
to which Mooney remains subject, despite intervening developments in
the case.
I would nevertheless fully vacate the injunctions. Since these
cases were initiated, the conduct at issue—“gender-transition”
treatments for children—has been outlawed in Texas. Both this Court
and the U.S. Supreme Court have upheld such bans against
constitutional attack. State v. Loe, 692 S.W.3d 215, 239 (Tex. 2024);
United States v. Skrmetti, 605 U.S. 495, 525 (2025). Thus, since the time
of the injunctions, the law has developed in a way that forecloses the
legal theories animating this litigation, including Mooney’s portion of it.
In light of those developments, the sweeping temporary injunctions are
plainly improper on the merits. I therefore concur in the Court’s
decision to vacate the injunctions.

James D. Blacklock
Chief Justice

OPINION FILED: April 24, 2026

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