DeLancy v. Memorial Health System - Medical Malpractice Remand

Jump To

Top Caption Trial Court Document The text of this document was obtained by analyzing a scanned document and may have typos.

Support FLP

CourtListener is a project of Free
Law Project, a federally-recognized 501(c)(3) non-profit. Members help support our work and get special access to features.

Please become a member today.

Join Free.law Now

Feb. 27, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

Laura DeLancy, Administrator of the Estate of B.D. v. Memorial Health System, et al.

District Court, S.D. Ohio

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: 2:26-cv-00101

• Precedential Status: Unknown Status

• Opinion

• Authorities (2)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (0)

• PDF

Trial Court Document

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
EASTERN DIVISION
Laura DeLancy,
Administrator of the Estate of B.D.,
Plaintiff,
Case No. 2:26-cv-101
Vv.
Judge Michael H. Watson
Memorial Health System, et a/.,
Magistrate Judge Deavers
Defendants.
OPINION AND ORDER
This is a medical malpractice case that was removed to this Court from the
Court of Common Pleas in Washington County, Ohio. ECF No. 1. In January
2026, the Government was substituted as a Defendant by operation of law, see 42 U.S.C. § 233, for original Defendants Hopewell Health Centers Inc. and Dr.
Patrick G. Swanson. ECF No. 2. The Government subsequently moved to
dismiss this case, asserting that Laura DeLancy (“Plaintiff”) failed to exhaust her
administrative remedies. ECF No. 5.
Plaintiff now moves to voluntarily dismiss the Government as a Defendant,
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 21. ECF No. 10. The remaining
Defendants (i.e., those for whom the Government did not substitute) do not
oppose Plaintiffs dismissal request and further agree that, without the
Government as a party, there is not a valid basis for this Court’s subject-matter

jurisdiction, such that the case should be remanded to state court. /d. at PAGEID

131-32.

The Court begins with Plaintiffs request for dismissal under Rule 21, which
permits the Court to, “[o]n motion or on its own, . . . at any time, on just terms,
add or drop a party. . . [or] sever any claim against a party.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 21.
Simply put, Rule 21 applies when a plaintiff seeks to dismiss less than an entire
case. Fekieh v. Allstate Fire & Cas. Ins. Co., No. 1:20-CV-1989, 2021 WL
2400949, at *2 (N.D. Ohio June 11, 2021). “[W]hen evaluating a motion for
dismissal under Rule 21, courts should consider Rule 41 standards as guidance
for analyzing potential prejudice to the non-movants.” Murray Energy Corp. v.
Cassidy, Cogan, Chappel, & Voegelin, L.C., No. 2:18-CV-440, 2020 WL
4201666, at *1 (S.D. Ohio July 22, 2020) (citation omitted). And, when
considering prejudice pursuant to dismissal under Rule 41, “a court should
consider such factors as the defendant’s effort and expense of preparation for
trial, excessive delay and lack of diligence on the part of the plaintiff in
prosecuting the action, insufficient explanation for the need to take a dismissal,
and whether a motion for summary judgment has been filed by the defendant.”
Grover v. Eli Lilly & Co., 33 F.3d 716, 718 (6th Cir. 1994) (citation omitted).
Upon review, the Court finds Plaintiff's motion to be well taken. The Court
concludes that the Government will not be prejudiced by its dismissal, particularly
given the pendency of the Government’s own dismissal request. See ECF No. 5.
Nor do the remaining Defendants oppose Plaintiff's dismissal request, which
Case No. 2:26-cv-101 Page 2 of 4

negates any prejudice. Finally, this case is in its early stages, there is no delay
or lack of diligence on Plaintiff's part, and Plaintiff has provided a sufficient
explanation for the dismissal—the need to exhaust her administrative remedies.
Plaintiffs motion is proper under Rule 21, and the Court GRANTS the same.
Accordingly, Plaintiff's claims against the Government are DISMISSED
WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
The Court turns to the remaining parties’ request for remand. 28 U.S.C.
§ 1441 provides that “any civil action brought in a State court of which the district
courts of the United States have original jurisdiction, may be removed by the
defendant.” 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (a). The party seeking removal “has the burden to
establish federal subject-matter jurisdiction.” Tennial v. Bank of Am., N.A., No.
17-6377, 2020 WL 2530872, at *1 (6th Cir. 2020) (citation omitted). Any “doubts
as to the propriety of removal are resolved in favor of remand.” Nessel ex rel.
Michigan v. AmeriGas Partners, LP., 954 F.3d 831, 834 (6th Cir. 2020) (internal
quotation marks and citations omitted).
Without the Government as a party, Plaintiff and several remaining
Defendants are citizens of the same state (Ohio), so there is not complete
diversity-of-citizenship jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332. See Compl., ECF
No. 4-1. Nor do any of Plaintiff's claims against the remaining Defendants arise
under federal law for purposes of federal-question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1331. See id. Instead, the only claims left in this case are state-law claims,
and the Court is mindful that the remaining parties support remand.
Case No. 2:26-cv-101 Page 3 of 4

Therefore, the Court GRANTS the motion, ECF No. 10, and REMANDS
this case to the Court of Common Pleas in Washington County, Ohio.
IT IS SO ORDERED. My jj Wb Ly □
MICHAEL H. WATSON, JUDGE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

Case No. 2:26-cv-101 Page 4 of 4